Nationality after World War II

Japan's bilateral talks with ROC and ROK

By William Wetherall

First posted 1 August 2006
Last updated 25 August 2015


Government, territory, people Empire of Japan | Terms of surrender | Sovereignty, control, jurisdiction | Affiliation | Occupations and separations
Occupation AuthoritiesThe Allied Powers as a supernational legal body 22 Mar 1952 DS notifies KDMJ that SCAP's jurisdiction will end
San Francisco Peace TreatyThe political watershed of postwar settlements with Japan
ROC and peace treatyNegotiations between two states only one of which had been at war
ROK and peace treaty Yang-Rusk exchanges | 19 July 1951 Yang request | 2 August 1951 Yang request | 9 August 1951 Rusk reply


1951-1952 ROK-Japan talksSCAP deems the legal status of Koreans in Japan the first and only priority
Personae dramatis 15 February 1952 conferees Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee | Yang You Chan | Yu Chin O | Karl Hongkee | Kim Yong Shik | Kim Dong Jo | Robert T. Oliver Japan Iguchi Sadao | Chiba Kō | Matsumoto Shun'ichi | Tanaka Mitsuo | Hiraga Kenta | Nishimura Kumao United States George Atcheson | Dean Acheson | John Foster Dulles | William J. Sebald | Alva C. Carpenter | Richard B. Finn | William H. Sullivan | Charles A. Willoughby | John J. Muccio | Dean Rusk and other American officials
Chronology Meetings 1945 to September 1951 | October 1951 | November 1951 | December 1951 | January 1952 | February 1952 | March 1952 | April 1952

Legal Status Subcommittee and other documents on nationality and related issues
SCAP to KDMJ -- ROK must negotiate
Fall 1950 ROK on status of "Overseas Koreans in Japan"
15 May 1951 DS/SCAP on status of Koreans in Japan
Summer 1951 ROK on nationality of Koreans
Summer 1951 ROK contemplates four measures
 6 Aug 1951 Japan : Chosense, Taiwanese will lose nationality
10 Aug 1951 Japan : Domestic "Chosenese" will become aliens
10 Aug 1951 ROK : All Koreans are ROK nationals
24 Aug 1951 SCAP : Nationality outside SCAP's authority
10 Sep 1951 ROK on international conventions
 8 Oct 1951 ROK's nationality choice contingencies
Warming up -- Circling and sniffing
20 Oct 1951 Talks begin with cautious hope
22 Oct 1951 Burying hatchets, real and imaginary
25 Oct 1951 Japan puts three cards on the table
29 Oct 1951 ROK's 7-point "nationality question" draft
30 Oct 1951 MOFA Immigration Control Order press release
 2 Nov 1951 Yu vs Tanaka & Hiraga on legalities
14 Nov 1951 am Intermarriage and dual nationality
14 Nov 1951 pm MOFA's Tanaka leaps before he looks
20 Nov 1951 Legal Status Subcommittee progress report
22 Nov 1951 Yang and Chiba debate status issues
26-27 Nov 1951 MOFA-SCAP on nationality and treatment
30 Nov 1951 ROK says Koreans in Japan "not immigrants"
 4 Dec 1951 Sullivan's report on last preliminary session
 6 & 7 Dec 1951 Nationality loss effects clarified
1st round of drafts -- Drawing lines
12 Dec 1951 ROK's 1st legal status proposal draft
15 Dec 1951 "Consent" vs "liaison and deliberation"
18 Dec 1951 Japan's 1st legal status proposal draft
21 Dec 1951 Japan's 2nd legal status proposal draft
22 Dec 1951 Japan's 3rd legal status proposal draft
23 Dec 1951 Japan's 4th legal status proposal draft
2nd round of drafts -- Moving closer
24 Jan 1952 ROK's 2nd legal status proposal draft
26 Jan 1952 Japan's 5th legal status proposal draft
29 Jan 1952 Japan's 6th legal status proposal draft
 1 Feb 1952 7th proposal 1st status agreement draft
 6 Feb 1952 Chosenese will have no nationality choice
3rd round of drafts -- Ready to sign
 7 Mar 1952 Early English version of status agreement
18 Mar 1952 Advanced working status agreement draft
29 Mar & 1 Apr 1952 Nearly final status agreement drafts
 1 & 3 Apr 1952 Korean and Japanese langauge drafts
 5 Apr 1952 Japan & ROK English language drafts
Status agreement hostage to other issues
24 Mar 1952 4th Plenary Session meeting summary
 4 Apr 1952 Yang You Chan : "Fruitless to proceed"
 [4] April 1952 Matsumoto Shun'ichi : "Small beginnings"
25 Apr 1952 Matsumoto confirms ending talks unavoidable

Sources Reviews Sung-hwa Cheong 1990, 1991 | Kim Dong Jo 1993 | Kim Tae-gi 1997, 2011 | Yi Yangsu 2007 | Yoshizawa Fumitoshi 2005
ROK and Japan archives dongA.com zip and tif files | Nik-Kan Kaidan Bunsho Kai pdf and xdw files | Other sources | Most important ROK files | Most important Japan files Status agreement drafts Citations, transcriptions, translations, markup | Nik-Kan Kaidan Bunsho Kai activism | Yoshizawa et al. v. State ROK Japanofile list
Related article Separation and choice: Between a legal rock and a political hard place


1952 Nationality Agreements Click to see full details below

Overview

Contentious but bilateral

Many people claim that Japan unilaterally separated Chosenese and Taiwanese form it's nationality in 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect and Japan formally lost Chōsen and Taiwan as parts of its sovereign territory. Many writers also claim that Japan's actions in 1952 both violated international law and were illegal under its own domestic laws.

The following official English, Japanese, and Korean documents related to the 1951-1952 talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), observed by officials of the Diplomatic Section (DS) and at times the Legal Section (LS) of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) in Tokyo, show that these contentions are incorrect.

What Japan did in 1952 was in full accord with a ready-to-sign bilateral nationality and treatment agreement between the two states. The agreement took into consideration the recognition by Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), based on their often contentious discussion of nationality issues, that reciprocal nationality choice-provisions, of the kind that are commonly but not universally made when territories change hands, were not politically feasible in their case.

Nationality impasse

ROK was then at war with the Democractic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, it held that it was the sole legitimate government of the entire peninsula, which it called Korea and not Chōsen. It also regarded all people in peninsula household registers as its nationals, and refused to acknowledge that they had ever been Japanese. However, under Japanese law, and in accordance with GHQ/SCAP's directives which recognized Japanese law, people in Chōsen registers had been Japanese, and Chosenese in Japan were still its nationals. Moreover, Japan would not force those who supported DPRK to be ROK nationals.

ROK and Japan circumvented this nationality impasse by agreeing that nationality did not qualify as a bilateral issue. The two states agreed that Koreans in Japan would be ROK nationals, though individuals would have to register their intent with an ROK legation in Japan. They also agreed to recognize the effects of their respective domestic civil status (household register) laws on nationality prior ro the coming into force of their nationality and treatment agreement.

Nationality territorial

Japan's recognition of Chosenese as ROK nationals, like its recognition of Taiwanese as ROC nationals, would be concomitant with their loss of Japan's nationality when Japan formally lost Chōsen (Korea) and Taiwan (Formosa). Japan's nationality had been, was then, and continues to be based entirely on whether one's primary domicile register (honseki 本籍) -- or household (family) register (koseki 戸籍) -- is affiliated with a municipal (village, town, city, ward) polity within Japan's sovereign dominion. Japan's nationality thus comes and goes with territorial cessions to and away from Japan. The loss by Chosenese and Taiwanese of Japan's nationality in 1952 is predicated on the separation of Chōsen and Taiwan from Japan pursuant to the SF Peace Treaty.

The suspension of Japan's nationality for people with domicile registers in Okinawa, concomitant with the suspension of Japan's sovereignty over the prefecture, during the period that it was administered under the control and jurisdiction of the United States, was based on the same principle.

Related article Separation and choice: Between a legal rock and a political hard place

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Government, territory, and people

Understanding the legal settlements that followed Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945 -- especially those that determined the borders of states and reach of their nationality -- requires making clear distinctions between different kinds of governments and territories, and the statuses of people in governed territories. Governments include states and state-like entities which exercise absolute (sovereign) or qualified authority through their control and jurisdiction of one or more territories, the inhabitants of which are subject to a government's laws and regulations according to their legal status.

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Empire of Japan

The Empire of Japan, as a state, consisted of territories that were part of its sovereign dominion, and other territories that were legally under its control and jurisdiction.


Sovereign Empire

At the time Japan surrendered, its sovereign dominion included the Interior or prefectures including Karafuto, and also Taiwan (Formosa) and Chōsen (Korea). Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) had been incorporated into the Interior as a prefecture in 1943. The Kuriles, which had belonged to Japan since 1875, were part of Hokkaidō. Hokkaidō and Okinawa, though governed somewhat differently than other prefectures and sometimes spoken of as though they were not part of the Interior, were in fact very much a part of the Interior as a subnational territory.


Legal Empire

Territories within Japan's legal dominion, but outside its sovereign dominion, included the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Sea Islands. Russia had leased Kwantung from China in 1898 but transferred the lease to Japan in 1905. Kwantung was part of Manchuria, but after the creation in 1932 of Manchoukuo, mainly out of Manchuria, Japan regarded Kwantung as part of Manchoukuo rather than China. Russia had also given Japan its leases of right-of-ways and other land in the Railway Zone outside the Kwantung territory, but Japan's jurisdiction in the zone ended in 1937 with the end of extraterritoriality in the state.


Manchoukuo

Though Japan was instrumental in the establishment of Manchoukuo, and continued to wield enormous control over the state through its considerable involvement in the territory and its government, it regarded the entity as an independent state. As such, Manchoukuo was never part of the Empire of Japan. China continued to regard Manchuria as part of its sovereign dominion, and when the League of Nations sided with China, Japan resigned its membership. A number of other states, however, recognized Manchoukuo and established diplomatic ties with the entity.


Occupied territories

As of 2 September 1945, when Japan and the Allied Powers signed the general Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo, ending World War II in Asia and the Pacific, Japanese military forces were occupying or present in a number of territories in parts of China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, the result of invasions or political manipulations before and after the start of the Pacific War on 8 December 1941 Japan time. These territories were temporarily occupied by third-party Allied commands for the purpose of receiving Japan's surrender and facilitating an orderly transfer of power to the state having governmental rights under the terms of surrender or later treaties.

The Empire of Japan, however, did not include territories outside its sovereign dominion or legal control and jurisdiction. Manchoukuo, China, and countries like the Philippines -- as much as they had been subjected to Japanese military incursions and invasions, and partly or fully occupied by Japan, or under partly under Japanese control after Japan established relations with them as states -- were never part of the Empire of Japan.

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Terms of surrender

The terms of surrender set down in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 specifically included the terms in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943. It did not refer to the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, as it was still secret. The general order issued at the time of the signing of the general Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, however, including surrenders related to the Yalta Agreement.


Cairo Declaration

The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, issued by the United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain, viewed Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores as territories which Japan had "stolen from the Chinese" and would be "restored to the Republic of China".

The "Three Great Allies" which signed the declaration also determined that, "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea", Korea would "in due course . . . become free and independent".

The phrasing is extremely important, for it implies that China would recover its sovereignty over the "stolen" territories, while "Korea" was merely a territory -- not a state -- which, in time, would become a "free and independent" state.


Yalta Agreement

The Yalta Agreement of February 1945 -- between the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain, and implicitly endorsed by China -- was kept a secret until later in the war, as at the time it was signed, the Soviet Union was still bound by a neutrality pact it had signed with Japan in April 1941.

The agreement provided that the southern part of Sakhalin and adjacent islands -- meaning Karafuto -- would be "returned" to, and the Kuril islands "handed over" to, the Soviet Union.

The lease of Port Arthur as a naval base would also be "restored" to the USSR, and other provisions for the protection of Soviet interests in the region -- while recognizing that "China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria".

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Sovereignty, control, and jurisdiction

When signing the general Instrument of Surrender on 2 September 1945, Japan delegated the "authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state" to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), namely General Douglas MacArthur.


"Formosa" and "Korea"

Japan continued to have control and jurisdiction in other parts of the formal and informal empire until the effectuation of local surrenders. These took place in Korea later in September, and in Taiwan in late in October.

Under the terms of surrender, Japan had agreed it would lose these territories. It lost effective sovereignty when it signed the general Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo, and it surrendered its actual control and jurisdiction when it surrendered the territories to designated Allied commanders -- the entirely of Formosa to the Republic of China, which claimed the territory -- and Korea by halves to the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south, which would occupy the peninsula until they could establish a Korean state to govern the territory.

However, Formosa and Korea were not formally separated from Japan's sovereignty until the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952. This lag between the loss of effective sovereignty in 1945, and the loss of formal sovereignty in 1952, effected the status of people in Occupied Japan whose family registers were affiliated with Formosa and Korea.


"Japan"

The sovereign dominion of "Japan" as an empire, prior to its surrender, had included the Interior, Formosa, and Korea. But under the terms of surrender, "Japan" was reduced to an occupation zone defined as the Interior minus two prefectures -- Okinawa and Karafuto. The Kurile islands, which had been parts of Hokkaidō, and number of islands associated with Tokyo and Kagoshima prefectures, were also excluded from "Occupied Japan".

Japan, in its view, retained residual sovereignty over all parts of its Interior entity except Karafuto and the northern Kuriles. Japan continues to claim the southern Kuriles, which remain under the control and jurisdiction of Russia, and two small island groups, one claimed by the Republic of Korea, the other by the People's Republic of China.


Japanese government

"Occupied Japan" became the foundation for the "Japan" that signed a peace treaty with the "Allied Powers" in September 1951, according to which the Occupation ended and Japan regained its sovereignty in April 1952. During the Occupation, the imperial government of Japan continued to operate under its own powers, exercised under its own laws and regulations, limited and otherwise qualified only by SCAP directives.

The transition from an imperial government under the 1890 Constitution, to a post-imperial government under the 1947 Constitution, was effected in an orderly manner by the Japanese government itself. Many of the strings that animated the government were pulled by SCAP, especially during the early months of the Occupation. But most governmental strings continued to be pulled by duly elected representatives of "the Japanese people" by one or another definition.

SCAP, who held sovereign powers over Occupied Japan as an occupation zone, hitched the Japanese government to his General Headquarters. While GHQ/SCAP in principle governed Japan's national and local governments, it permitted these governments -- out of both political considerations and practical necessity -- to continue to operate under laws and regulations in force in Japan at the time its surrender, including the 1890 Constitution

SCAP nullified or revised only legal measures and related policies and practices, or disbanded or restructured only agencies or other offices, that conflicted with Allied reconstruction plans, such as they existed at the time Japan surrendered, and as they developed during the course of the Occupation. Government powers limited at the start of the Occupation were gradually restored as laws were revised to reflect the standards of government set down in the 1947 Constitution.


Negotiations with ROC and ROK

During the half year or so that elapsed between the signing of the peace treaty on 8 September 1951 and its enforcement from 28 April 1952, Japan regained effective control and jurisdiction over most of its domestic affairs. In preparation the restoration of its sovereignty, it also began to take charge of more its diplomatic affairs.

After Japan signed the peace treaty, GHQ/SCAP -- still formally an Allied authority but by then far more than originally an essentially American operation -- directed Japan to negotiate settlements with concerned states regarding Formosa (Taiwan) and Korea (Chōsen), and the status of Formosans (Taiwanese) and Koreans (Chosenese) in Japan, most of whom were still considered Japanese nationals. The concerned states favored by GHQ/SCAP were those the United States recognized, namely the Republic of China (ROC) and the Republic of Korea. These were also states with which the United States was allied in its own cold and hot wars against Communism.

The government of Japan, having been staunchly anti-communist and anti-socialist since the spread of proletarian movements in Japan during the early decades of the 20th century, and concerned about the spread of Communism in neighboring Asian states and subversive activities domestically, had no difficulty falling in line with the United States regarding ROC and ROK, both embattled with their revolutionary counterparts, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). ROC had lost its battle on the Chinese mainland and its government had taken refuge in the province of Taiwan, and at time it controlled only the province and a few islands affiliated with a mainland province. And ROK was embroiled in a fight for its life in a civil war with DPRK, which was supported by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Japan and ROC, though their talks were touch and go, succeeded in negotiating a peace treaty the two states were able to sign on 28 April 1952, the day Japan regained its sovereignty and diplomatic powers. Japan and ROK also began, in the fall of 1951, to work out a normalization treaty and status agreement by the same date. But by early April 1952 negotiations had broken down to the point that they were deferred until after the peace treaty came into effect -- and the two states were unable to agree to terms until 1965.


Sovereignty and state succession

Ordinarily, territorial cessions are effected by treaties in which one state cedes part or all of itself to another state, which then becomes the successor state. And treaties involving territorial cessions usually include transitional provisions regarding the legal statuses, including the nationalities, of the people inhabiting affected territories.

However, Taiwan and Chōsen were not ceded away from Japan to other states. Rather they were separated from Japan by a third party -- namely, the Allied Powers -- and never formally ceded to "China" or "Korea". That ROC was a member of the Allied Powers did not itself matter. What mattered was that ROC, as the successor to the Chinese state which had ceded Taiwan to Japan, was the state which, according to the Cairo Declaration, stood to acquire Taiwan. Hence ROC was designated as the state to which Japan would surrender its control and jurisdiction of Taiwan, which ROC wold occupy and govern, and then incorporate as a province of its state.

Japan surrendered Chōsen, though, to the control and jurisdiction of two third-party Allied States, north and south of the 38th parallel. As in the case of Taiwan, Japan lost all say in the future of Korea (Chōsen) from the moment it signed the Instrument of Surrender. Until Japan and the Allied Powers signed a peace treaty, confirming the territorial provisions of the terms of surrender, Japan would retain de jure sovereignty for the purpose of attributing its nationality, but de facto sovereignty would be in the hands of the Allied Powers or the states which the Allied Powers recognized as the successor states.

Japan's abandonment of sovereignty over Taiwan and Chōsen under the terms of surrender, effective from 2 September 1945, was confirmed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, effective from 28 April 1952. However, the treaty could not specify successor states, since after World War II the divided Allied occupation of Chōsen had resulted in the emergence in 1948 of two Korean states which claimed the peninsula and its population, and a civil war in China had resulted in the creation in 1949 of second Chinese state which claimed the same territory and population as the first. Never mind that ROC had both control and jurisdiction over Taiwan, and never mind that ROC was itself a major Allied Power, the other Allied Powers, divided over their recognition of ROC and PRC, agreed that ROC was no longer politically qualified to participate in the treaty.

Apart from the fact that the Allied Powers were also divided in their recognition of ROK nor DPRK, neither of these states had the legal capacity to participate, since they had not existed until after the war. In any event, Korea as Chōsen -- while a part of Japan which the Allied Powers had vowed to "liberate" from Japan -- had nonetheless, as part of Japan, not been at war with Japan. And at the time the San Francisco Peace Treaty was drafted and signed, the divided Koreas were at war, and the Allied Powers were divided in their military support of the warring states.

Not only could the San Francisco Peace Treaty not name successor states, it could not dictate which states Japan would have to provisionally recognize in order to negotiate appropriate treaties -- a peace treaty in the case of "China", a normalization treaty in the case of "Korea". However, for many reasons, Japan's logical political choices -- if political choices can be logical -- were to resume recognizing the Republic of China, established in 1912, and to newly recognize the Republic of Korea, founded in 1948.

The point, though, is that in 1945, Japan would be deprived of its de jure control and jurisdiction of Taiwan and Chōsen, and also of its de facto sovereignty over these territories. Then in 1952, when it also lost its de jure sovereignty, it would lose its right to ascribe its nationality to people in Taiwan and Chōsen registers. Everyone affiliated with these territories, meaning people enrolled in their household registers, had become Japanese through Japan's acquisition of sovereignty over them. Their Japanese nationality was linked with the status of these territories as parts of Japan of Japan's sovereign dominion.

From the day the peace treaty came into effect, Taiwan and Chōsen would be formally separated from Japan's dominion, and Japan would no longer have the legal right to recognize people affiliated with their population registers as it nationals. Japan would regard them as nationals of the states which the Cairo Declaration presumed would be the successor states.

Japan had actually lost its legal right to attribute its nationality when surrendering to the Allied Powers in 1945, because Japan had delegated its sovereignty to the Allied Powers. In other words, the Allied Powers had the right to determine whether Taiwanese and Chosenese had been, or would continue to be, Japanese. The Allied Powers, never mind the harsh wording of the Cairo Declaration, never doubted that Taiwanese and Chosenese had been Japanese, and as they foresaw an orderly legal restoration of Taiwan and Chōsen to "China" and "Korea" they deemed that the future nationality of Taiwanese and Chosenese would be determined by treaties.

As Japan would sign a peace treaty with ROC on the same day, ROC's nationality would be recognized, and hence most Taiwanese in Japan, who had already been enrolled in ROC's nationality under SCAP's authority and with Japan's acknowledgement, would be recognized as ROC nationals, while Taiwanese who had chosen not to be ROC nationals would also be classified as Chinese for alien registration and most other purposes. The nationality of Chosenese in Japan, however, would be merely "Chosenese" -- until which time Japan recognized a Korean state and permitted it to enroll Koreans in Japan who aspired to its nationality.


Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam

On 15 August 1945, the emperor of Japan announced his acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, and ordered the commanders of Japan's armed forces to cease hostilities. The Potsdam terms, which incorporated the territorial terms of the Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943, became the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, which Japan signed on 2 September 1975. Some terms of the Yalta Agreement of 11 February 1945, including those concerning "the southern part of Sakhalin" and "the Kuril islands", also became part of the terms of surrender.

As an agreement between Japan and the Allied Powers, the surrender instruments had a number of immediate legal effects, two of which informed definitions of "nations" and "nationality" during the Allied Occupation of Japan.

1. Japan immediately lost all the territories specified (according to the Potsdam Declaration) in the Cairo Declaration, and "Japanese sovereignty [was] limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku" and other minor islands as determined by the Allied Powers.

2. From the moment of surrender, "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state [became] subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers", and the Allied Powers would continue to occupy Japan "until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration [were] achieved."

The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, otherwise known as SCAP, was corporalized in the body and will of General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) from 1945, and in his successors from April 1951 to the end of the occupation in April 1952. Much of SCAP's authority was delegated to and mediated by the higher officials at SCAP's General Headquarters in Tokyo -- or "GHQ/SCAP".


Process versus posturing

The aggressive language of the Cairo Declaration -- that Japan would be "stripped of" Taiwan and "expelled from" Korea -- expressed the goals of the Allied campaign against Japan. Coming as it did at the height of the war, this was little more than nationalistic posturing. In the event of victory, the process of "stripping" and "expelling" would be according to international law. The effects of the treaties that had caused Taiwan and Korea to become parts of Japan would have to be reversed through new treaties.

On the surface of the wording of the Instrument of Surrender -- reflecting, as in a hall of mirrors, the terms of the Potsdam and Cairo declarations -- it would appear that Japan had immediately lost not only its governmental control and jurisdiction over Taiwan and Chōsen, for example, but also its sovereignty over these territories. Potsdam and the instruments, though, provided only that Japan's sovereignty would "be limited to" the islands that constituted "Japan" as occupied by the Allied Powers.

As a matter of legal process, Japan did not formally "renounce" (abandon) all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and Chōsen, among other territories that were once part of its sovereign dominion, until Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952 -- from which date, according to Article 1, the Allied Powers recognized "the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters."

Under the authority of the Allied Powers Japan was expected to negotiate and sign a peace treaty. However, Japan's renunciation (abandonment) in the treaty of its sovereignty over Formosa (Taiwan) and Korea (Chōsen) would not be effected until it regained its own sovereignty under the same treaty.

The problem was that Formosa was under the control and jurisdiction, and effective sovereignty, of the Republic of China (ROC), while the People's Republic of China (PRC) claimed Taiwan as one of its provinces. And Korea was claimed by two states, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), then at war. The Korean war had divided the Allied Powers in their support over one or the other Korea, and ROC and PRC, still confronting each other over their mutual claims to China, were also on opposite sides in the war.

Recognition politics, and conflicts over rights of succession, were not the only issues that prevented the participation of China or Korea in the peace treaty. ROK wanted to participate, but even if it had been the sole state on the peninsula, it had existed until 1948. Besides, the "Korea" which Japan would be renouncing in the treaty had been Chōsen -- i.e., part of Japan, and as such had not at war with Japan.

Consequently, no China or Korea was able to participate in the peace treaty with Japan, either as a state which had been at war with Japan, or as a state that needed to settle territorial and other issues with Japan. So Japan would have to negotiate separate treaties with one or the other or both of the states that claimed to be "China" and "Korea".


Settlement over Formosa (Taiwan) with ROC

On 28 April 1952, the very day its diplomatic powers were restored, Japan signed a peace treaty in Taipei with the Republic of China (ROC), according to it recognized that Taiwan was "under the control of" the ROC government. The Taipei treaty, in accord with the San Francisco treaty, did not specify ROC as the successor state, but merely recognized that ROC was the state then in control of the territory.

In 1972, Japan recognized the People's Republic China (PRC) as "China" and rescinded the 1952 treaty with ROC. However, Japanese courts continue to recognize the effects of the Taipei treaty until the change of recognition -- when, in the eyes of Japanese law, PRC became a state and ROC ceased being a state.


Settlement over Korea (Chōsen) with ROK

Apart from the fact that the two Korean states did not exist until 1948, there was no need for Japan to sign a peace treaty with any Korean state, since Japan was never at war with "Korea". Japan did, however, have to settle its territorial relationship with "Korea" as Chōsen.

At the time Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on 8 September 1951, it informally recognized only the Republic of Korea (ROK). The following month, Japan, ROK, and GHQ/SCAP began discussing the legal status of Chosenese (Koreans) in Japan when the Peace Treaty came into effect the following year. At issue was the disposition of the Japanese nationality they still held under Japanese law, and what to do about Chosenese who did not migrate to ROK nationality.

Japan and ROK did not get around to normalizing their relationship until 1965. The normalization treaty is pursuant to "relevant provisions" of the San Francisco Peace treaty and certain United Nations General Assembly resolutions. The "relevant provisions" in the Peace Treaty included Japan's renunciation (abandonment) of all right, title, and claim to "Korea" -- which Japan understood to mean "Chōsen". The United Nationals resolutions provided the authority for Japan's recognition, in the normalization treaty, of ROK as "the only lawful Government in Korea".

The 1965 normalization treaty is the foundation of the 1966 agreement with ROK (promulgated with the treaty in 1965) concerning the status of ROK nationals in Japan who qualified for rights of abode according to Japanese laws that defined such rights pursuant to the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender.

The normalization treaty takes 15 August 1945 -- rather than 2 September 1945 -- as the date of the "initial determination" of the population that qualifies for rights of abode under the status agreement -- in acknowledgement of ROK's position that "Korea" was liberated on 15 August 1945. However, the "Special Permanent Residence" status created in 1991 for all treaty-defined aliens -- 25 years after the 1966 status agreement, which applied only to qualified ROK nationals -- adopts 2 September 1945 as the date of the "initial determination" of the residual population of former former Japanese subjects of Taiwan and Korea and others who lost their Japanese nationality because of the Peace Treaty and descendants born in Japan on or after 3 September 1945.

See Declarations and treaties: From Washington to San Francisco via the USS Missouri for introductions to, and full or partial texts of, all wartime and postwar declarations, agreements, instruments, and treaties from the Cairo Declaration to the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

See Territorial settlements: ROC and PRC, ROK and DPRK, and the USSR and Russia for introductions to, and full or partial texts of, major treaties and agreements between Japan and these entities, after the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

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Affiliation

An individual's legal status is always complex. All people have a number of statuses defined by the laws of the country with which they are affiliated as nationals and/or in which they reside. The statuses of people in Occupied Japan were determined not only by applicable Japanese laws, but SCAP directives and legal provisions introduced in compliance with SCAP policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. redefined the borders of "Japan" as an occupation zone to be governed by SCAP. It also redefined "Japanese" in such a way that partly alienated people whose family registers were under the control and jurisdiction of territories or polities outside the zone.

In a 3 November 1945 directive titled "Basic Directive For Post-Surrender Military Government In Japan Proper", JCS instructed SCAP to treat "Formosan-Chinese [sic] and Koreans as liberated peoples in so far as military security permits." They were excluded from the term "Japanese" as used in the directive, but SCAP was to treat them as "enemy nationals" when necessary. They could be repatriated if they wish, but priority was to be given to the repatriation of "United Nations nationals".

A 1 November 1945 GHQ/SCAP memorandum to the Japanese government (SCAPIN-224) concerning repatriation had spoken of "Koreans" and "Chinese" as "non-Japanese nationals" and alluded to people "formerly domiciled" in Formosa and the Ryukyus as though they might be "non-Japanese" by nationality. A 17 February 1946 memorandum (SCAPIN-746) more specifically listed "Koreans, Chinese, Ryukyuans and Formosans resident in Japan" as "nationalities".

By the end of 1946, there was considerable public confusion as to the status of Koreans who had remained in Japan rather than be repatriated by the 15 December 1946 deadline. GHQ/SCAP appears to have regarded them as "Koreans" or "Korean nationals" by "nationality" for classification purposes related to repatriation. Though "non-Japanese" in this regard, formally they would retain their Japanese nationality until treaties or other agreements determined otherwise.

GHQ/SCAP defined all manner of legal statuses that differentiated people in Occupied Japan, including whether one was a United Nations, enemy, or liberated national. Such statuses determined one's qualifications for food rations and other privileges, repatriation priority, and generally how one would be treated under measures introduced by Occupation Authorities.

GHQ/SCAP's directives concerning such statuses caused considerable confusion for the Japanese government, for Japan's laws made no such distinctions. No one was "non-Japanese" under Japanese law. There was territoriality (Interior, Taiwan, Chōsen) but no extraterritoriality. People who possessed Japan's nationality were Japanese, and those who did not were aliens. Chinese were aliens. Formosans (Taiwanese), Koreans (Chosenese), and Ryukyuans (Okinawans) were Japanese.


People, subjects, nationals

The English version of the general Instrument of Surrender signed on 2 September 1945 referred to "the Japanese people". The Japanese version referred to "Nihon-koku shinmin" (日本國臣民) -- or "Japan-country [Japanese] subjects" -- which included Taiwanese and Chosenese.

Subjecthood as such ended with the beginning of the Occupation, though as a legal category the word survived in a number of laws, including the 1890 Constitution, until they could be revised. The 1947 Constitution replaced the term "shinmin" with "kokumin" (國民、国民), meaning "national" but also reflecting the "the People" as used in the English version. This was not a new term, but one which had been used along with "shinmin" (subject) and sometimes "jinmin" (人民) or "people" since the early 1870s.

The term "nationality" (國籍、国籍 kokuseki) had been used to refer to state (national) affiliation since the 1899 Nationality Law. This law spoke of people who possessed Japan's nationality as "Japanese" (日本人 Nihonjin), reflecting conventions in legal terminology that also date to the early 1870s. The 1950 Nationality Law, reflecting usage in the 1947 Constitution, speaks of "nationals" rather than "Japanese".

GHQ/SCAP officials, however, spoke of "nationals" and "nationality" as defined by its own dictionary, which at times conflicted with the meanings of these terms in Japanese law.


Status and applicable law

Another wrinkle in the laws of all states is that nationals may be treated differently according to their affiliations with polities within the state. Most nationals of a country have multiple affiliations which subject them to territorial, including provincial and municipal laws, within the state's overarching jurisdiction.

Even non-nationals residing with a country as aliens are generally subject to the country's control and jurisdiction, unless they are protected by extraterritorial rights or diplomatic immunity. Whether an alien is subject to the laws of the country, or to those of another country, will also depend on the particular matter or incident, and determinations of laws of laws -- rules for determining applicable laws in cases of jurisdictional conflicts.


Nationals as aliens

Just as a state is free to differentiate among aliens, it is free to differentiate among its own nationals. A state may treat some aliens on a par with its nationals under some of its laws, and treat some nationals on a par with aliens under others.

No Japanese law during the Occupation of Japan classified Taiwanese or Koreans in Japan as as aliens. No law could have, for during the Occupation they remained Japanese. The 1947 Alien Register Order, for example, did not include Taiwanese and Koreans in its definition of aliens. It did, however, have a provision which stipulated that Koreans, and some Taiwanese, would be regarded as aliens for the purpose of the law. When the Philippines became a commonwealth protectorate of the United States in 1935, Filipinos remained non-citizen nationals of the United States, but exceptionally they treated as aliens under all US laws related to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens.

GHQ/SCAP, as a military government, depended on the ability of Japan's legal system to continue to function. Accordingly, it had to take the established legal system into account when issuing directives that would affect the way the system worked. However, it is clear from its earliest directives on the treatment of what it called "non-Japanese" that it was not using terms like "national" or "nationality" in any way consistent with Japanese law. It was, in effect, imposing a new status system on top of an existing system. Japan was expected to treat so-called "non-Japanese" according to GHQ/SCAP's directives, yet under its own laws -- among Koreans, Chinese, Formosans, and Ryukyuans, which GHQ/SCAP was calling "nationalities" -- Chinese were "non-Japanese nationals" on account of their nationality.

During the Occupation, Japanese legislators had to come up with ways to reflect GHQ/SCAP directives in their revisions of Japan's laws. The laws had to be revised in ways that were consistent with Japanese law, while complying with GHQ/SCAP's rules.

In December 1945, as directed by GHQ/SCAP, revised its election law to include women and lower the age of eligibility to vote or hold office. A supplementary provision stipulated that only those subject to the Family Register Law, an Interior law, would be eligible. This in effect disenfranchised Taiwanese and Chosenese residents, who had previously been eligible.

GHQ/SCAP did direct Japan to exclude Formosans and Koreans from rights of suffrage. However, alienating them as "non-Japanese nationals" did not encourage their inclusion. Moreover, at this stage in the Occupation, when all it would have taken was a direct order on a single sheet of paper, GHQ/SCAP did nothing to reverse the effects of the supplementary provision -- which was, in any case, a well-established legal device for territorially limiting the reach of a national law.

Municipal halls and courts, and of course legislators, had to deal with problems of applicable law that arose because, despite the separation of a number of territories from Japan's legal control and jurisdiction, private matters involving individuals in Occupied Japan whose registers were in these territories would still need to be dealt with according to territorial laws of laws. Under Japanese law, people were in "Naichi" or "Taiwan" or "Chōsen" registers, but all three territories had been part of Japan. And because Japanese nationality was a matter of membership in a register within Japan, and all people in the registers of these three territories had been Japanese.

No treaties had yet made Taiwan and Chōsen foreign entities. They were no longer under Japan's control and jurisdiction, but Taiwanese and Chōsenese in Japan reduced to the Occupied Interior were very much under Japan's control and jurisdiction. Yet they, like everyone else in Japan, was also under the control and jurisdiction of SCAP.

Japan had two laws of laws. One, introduced in 1898, concerned distinctions between Japan and other countries. The other, introduced in 1918, concerned distinctions between territories within Japan -- i.e., between Naichi, Taiwan, Chōsen, and other jurisdictions within the legal empire. Ryukyu, of course, was part of Naichi.

The knots that GHQ/SCAP tied in Japan's legal status ropes created headaches for those who had to handle them. Some indication of the difficulty in dealing with such knots that can be seen in a thick study, published in December 1949 by the Attorney General's Office of Japan, called Nihon ni zaijū suru hi-Nihonjin no hōritsu-jō no chii: Toku ni Kyōtsūhō-jō no Gaichijin ni tsuite or "Legal status of non-Japanese residing in Japan: Especially concerning Exteriorites under Common Law)". Undertaken from 1948 to 1949 by a judge doing research at the Judicial Research Institute, the study focused on the legal implications of SCAP's notion of "non-Japanese" (非日本人 hi-Nihonjin) in the light of Japan's Common Law, referring to the 1918 law of laws concerning applicable law within Japan's various legal jurisdictions.

Such studies were vital to the preparation required to deal with future legislation and litigation, which would have to take into consideration the effects of legacy laws. During the Occupation, though ordinances and regulations made for Taiwan and Chōsen were no longer applicable within these territories, they continued to apply within Japan in private (mainly civil, family) matters involving Taiwanese and Chosenese, whether with others Taiwanese or Chosenese, or with Interiorites, or with aliens regarded as such under Japanese law.

For details about the Attorney General's Office publication, see Legal status of SCAP's "non-Japanese" (Koshikawa 1949).

For details about the Japan's various laws of laws, see Status and applicable law.

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Occupations and separations

Breaking up the Empire of Japan -- downsizing Japan -- separating from Japan the territories it would lose as parts of either its sovereign or legal dominion, and dealing with the territories it had invaded and -- was an extremely difficult undertaking, given the geographical spread of the formal empire, the sheer diversity of local conditions, and the numbers of states that would need to cooperate in the movement of people from where they were to where they were supposed to be or wanted to be.

Territorial separation was one problem. Separating and relocating people from territories (including countries or regions within countries) where they happened to be at the end of the war -- and determining their statuses whether they stayed or moved, and whether they did either by choice or because they had to -- proved to be a huge logistical challenge. When it was all over, several million people had been repatriated -- mostly back to Japan.


Occupied Japan as a dependency

When the Empire of Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers on 2 September 1945, it delegated its sovereignty to the Allied Powers. In doing so, it became very much like a dependency of another state, and as such it lost the quality of being an independent and sovereign state. In other words, like a dependency, Japan's statehood was suspended. The "state" on which Japan depended was the Allied Powers -- the collective "United Nations" which had declared war on Japan.

Dependencies typically delegate their diplomatic powers, among other matters of state, to another state, which acts as a proxy for the dependency. The Allied Powers, as victors with a mission to reconstruct Japan, agreed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in the person of General MacArthur, would govern Japan for the purpose of carrying out the terms of surrender. As the sovereign authority in Occupied Japan, SCAP -- or officials he delegated, possibly even Japanese officials -- would act on Japan's behalf in all relations with other states and entities, until which time a joint peace treaty was signed and ratified by the Allied Powers, and Japan regained its sovereignty.


Occupations and separations in the Interior

As noted above the sovereign Empire of Japan included three territories -- the Interior, Taiwan, and Chōsen. The Interior consisted of 48 prefectures, including Karafuto, which had formally been integrated into the Interior in 1943. The Kuriles were part of Hokkaidō.

Legally, first the terms of surrender, and then the terms of the peace treaty, determined what parts of Japan were formally separated from Japan -- whether termporarily or permanently. Physically, however, separations were the effects of military actions, including invasions and occupations.

Parts of the Interior occupied by invasion

Before Japan announced its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August 1945, several parts of the Interior had already been invaded, captured, and occupied by American forces -- including Okinawa prefecture, some islands of Kagoshima prefecture, and some islands of Tokyo prefecture. By the end of August, the Soviet Union had occupied Karafuto and the Kuriles, which it began to invade on 9 August.

Practically all of these territories were excluded from the entity of "Japan" that the Allied Powers defined as the object of the Allied Occupation. Some were formally lost as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Karafuto, the Kuriles). Others continued to be administered by the United States for as long as two decades after the end of the Occupation (Ogasawara until 1968, Okinawa until 1972).


Parts of the Interior occupied peacefully

While "peaceful" may seem an inappropriate characterization of the occupation of most of Japan's Interior -- which had been subjected to horrifying air raids of unpreceded destruction to property and life -- as an occupation it was "peaceful" in two sense of the word -- (1) it took place after a cease fire and promise to surrender, rather than after being captured in a military invasion, and (2) it was a relatively amicable occupation in which victors and vanquished generally cooperated in the reconstruction what was remained of Japan and its government.

The entity of "Japan" as defined by the Allied Powers consisted, by and large, of the parts of the interior that were occupied peacefully after Japan announced its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. I.e., "Occupied Japan" consisted of the Interior minus the parts which had been captured and occupied following a military invasion.

Many parts of the rest of Japan too would have been bombed, invaded, captured, and occupied. had Japan not surrendered following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Interior. American forces, and probably some British Commonwealth forces, would have invaded several parts of Kyōshō, Shikoku, and Honshū. Soviet forces would have invaded Hokkaidō and the northern provinces of Chōsen. Some ports of Chōsen and Taiwan would have bombed. Probably only Taiwan would not have been invaded. Was was left of Japan would eventually have surrendered. But had the war continued for a another few months, the political map of East Asia today might be very different.


Planning the occupation of Japan

As it was, Japan signaled its willingness to surrender on 9 August, in principle ceased fire on 15 August, and generally surrendered on 2 September 1952. Some local surrenders had been effected long before 2 September, and several would take place later in the year. Some individual Japanese soldiers, who had gone into hiding in the jungles of islands where Japanese forces had been defeated, would not surrender until the 1970s.

Procedures for carrying out the terms of Potsdam Declaration, including the occupation of Japan's main islands, were established at the Manila Conference of 19-21 August. Advanced contingents of US forces began arriving in Tokyo and Kanagawa a week later. MacArthur arrived on 30 August.

The Instrument of Surrender -- marking the formal start of the surrender and occupation of the entire Empire of Japan -- was signed on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.

The surrender and disarming of Japanese military forces within the main islands of Japan took a few weeks.


Surrenders in other Japanese territories

On the day the Instrument of Surrender was signed aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, and pursuant to their terms, the Imperial General Headquarters of Japan issued orders for the surrender of Japanese forces and agencies everywhere they were known to exist. The order -- which stipulated which commander of which Allied Power was responsible for receiving Japan's surrender in which country or territory -- came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington by way of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo.

The surrender of Japanese forces beyond the Interior took a few months. The sovereign Empire of Japan included, in addition to the prefectural Interior (内地 Naichi), the legally distinct territories of Taiwan (台湾) and Chōsen (朝鮮). These were informally called "external territories" (外地 gaichi) in that they were outside -- i.e. not yet part of -- the prefectural Interior (内地 Naichi), hence not subject to Interior laws unless the laws were specifically extended to them.

Two other external territories -- the Kwantung Leased Territory, which was formally part of China but under Japan's legal control and jurisdiction -- and the South Sea Islands, which Japan was legally administering under a League of Nations mandate -- were part of Japan's legal empire but not part of its sovereign empire.

In addition to these territories, all legally part of Japan, there were several territories in which Japan had established governmental facilites or military bases, either peacefully (e.g., Vietnam and Thailand) or by invasion (e.g., China and Burma).


Peaceful occupations of other parts of Japan

While the occupations of all parts of Japan were important for people effected by them, the most important occupations were those of the largest -- Chōsen and Taiwan.

The occupation of Chōsen (Korea)

The Soviet military occupation of the northern provices of Chōsen, while not a military invasion, was reported much rougher on Japanese inhabitants, both Chosenese and Interiorites, than in the southern provinces, occupied by the US forces. Both occupying powers set up provisional governments, the north a communist regime, the south a nationalist regime. Both provisional governments were headed by Koreans who had participated in and led resistance movements beyond Japan's reach.

Japan's sovereignty over "Chōsen" was supposed to revert to "Korea" -- but there was no "Korea" in 1945 when the peninsula was occupied in the south by the United States and in the north by the Soviet Union. The failure of the US and the USSR to unify the two occupation zones, and create a single state with effective control over the entire peninsula, resulted in the founding of two Korean states in 1948 -- the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the US occupation zone, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the Soviet zone.

Both Korean states claimed to be the true government of the "Korea" from which the Cairo Declaration promised to "expel" Japan. During the Allied Occupation, however, Japan followed the United States and the largely US-inspired United Nations recognition of ROK -- and subsequently normalized its relationship with ROK while confirming its view that ROK was the only lawful government in or on "Chōsen" (Japanese version), "Korea" (English version), or "the Korean peninsula" (ROK Korean version).

ROK not qualified to join peace treaty

Even if the peninsula had not been divided into occupation zones which resulted in the founding in 1948 of two Korean states that by 1950 were at war -- a united, peaceful Korea would not have been qualified to join the peace treaty signed by Japan and the Allied Powers in San Francisco in 1951. The Allied Powers different in their recognition of ROK and DPRK, and in their view of whether either or both states should be party to the treaty.

The United States, however, refused to accept claims by Korean nationalists that Korea had never belonged to Japan. It also refused to entertain demands by those returning from exile, like Kim Ku, then president of the "Korean Provisional Government" (KPG) founded in Shanghai in 1919, should be immediately recognized as the legitimate government of a "liberated" Korea.

Japan's annexation of Korea as Chōsen had in fact been recognized by all of the Allied powers. Even during the war, and despite the rhetoric of the Cairo Declaration, none of the Allied powers had recognized KPG -- except ROC, but only after it had fled from Nanking (Nanjing) to Chungking (Chongqing) in virtual exile within China.

KPG too, under the leadership of Kim Ku (金九 김 구 1876-1949), had fled from Shanghai to Chungking, where it joined ROC in declaring war on Japan and Germany after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941 (East Asia time). Kim, KPG's president since 1927, pledged its "Korean Liberation Army" to local resistance against Japan, and was about to take the war to Korea, as the USSR had taken it to Manchuria, when Japan surrendered.

On the advice of Chiang Kai-shek, MacArthur invited Kim Ku, as well as Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), KPG's first president from 1919-1925, to come to Korea and help put together a government. Kim lost to Rhee in ROK's first elections, held a month before the formal founding of the state on 15 August 1948.

ROK, though immediately recognized by the United States, the Republic of China, and a number of other members of the United Nations who were opposed to communism, was generally not regarded as qualified to join the peace treaty with Japan for reasons having little to do with recognition politics. There had been no Korean state in the eyes of the world at large since 1910. No Korean stated existed in January 1942 when the Allied Powers, calling themselves the United Nations (not the later United Nations), declared war against the Axis powers and vowed to sign a common peace treaty with Japan. Throughout the war, what the Allies called "Korea" had not been a belligerant against Japan but an integral part of Japan.

The Allied Powers did not recognize that KPG -- never mind KPG's declaration of war against Japan, and its boasts of having supported resistance operations against Japan -- had represented "Korea" as a state, much less been a member of the Allied Powers.

No retrocession and no successor state

Unlike conventional territorial transfers, which take place between two states, "Chōsen" was separated from Japan by a treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers, which did not -- because it could not -- designate a successor state. Japan was not given an opportunity to retrocede Chōsen to "Korea" or any other successor state. Japan had no say in the disposition of "Korea" -- except to renounce its claims to Korea (Chōsen) to 48 3rd-party states.

p>In the meantime, the "Korea" that Chōsen should have become ended up divided into two states -- the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. Given the build-up of tensions in the region, I would argue that these two states -- apart from the fact that Soviet-supported DPRK invaded America-supported ROK, thus firing the first shot -- were bound to end up fighting over the half of Korea both claimed but didn't control.

For Chosenese north and south, the divided occupation of the peninsula was a nightmare in the making. For Chosenese in Japan, the separation of "Chōsen" from Japan without the agency of a bilateral treaty between Japan and a Korean state meant that -- when losing Japanese nationality on 28 April 1952 -- they were left with no state affiliation -- or, as I would put it, a would-be nationality without a state.

Taiwan and the Pescadores

Taiwan and the Pescadores (澎湖 Penghu), which is what I mean when I say Taiwan, was the diametri opposite of Chōsen when it came to surrender and occupation. Unlike Chōsen, Taiwan had a Chinese state waiting to accept its return to China -- the Republic of China -- an major Allied Power no less.

ROC, representing the Allied Powers, accepted Japan's surrender in Taiwan on 25 October 1945. As the Cairo Declaration, embedded in the Potsdam Declaration, had designated ROC was the suggessor state, ROC, not waiting for a treaty, immediately incororated Taiwan back into China, 50 years after the government of China under the Ching (Qing) Dynasty had ceded the territory to Japan.

ROC expected to participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and would have, if it had not been driven off the mainland in 1949 by the People's Liberation Army after the founding of the People's Republic China that October. The Allied Powers could not agree over ROC's representation, hence the treaty allowed Japan to merely renounce its claims over Taiwan -- without any designation of a successor state. Japan, when signing an independent peace treaty with ROC on 28 April 1952, the day Japan regained its sovereignty and right to conduct its own foreign affairs, was unable to retrocede Taiwan to ROC because it was no longer Japan's territory.

Taiwanese in Occupied Japan were allowed to enroll in ROC nationality, and most had thereby become ROC nationals also in SCAP's and therefore Japan's eyes, long before the revolution on the mainland drove the ROC government into exile in Taiwan. Consequently, they became affiliated with a state with which Japan immediately normalized it relationship.

The separation of Taiwan from Japan de facto in 1945 and de jure in 1952 -- and the separation of Taiwanese from Japanese nationality in 1952 -- does not seem to have caused Taiwanese in Japan a great deal of grief. The occupation of Taiwan by the ROC government in exile in 1949 was arguably more traumatic for Taiwanese in Taiwan than the relatively peaceful conditions which existed in the territory under Japanese rule in the 1920s and 1930s.

When becoming ROC nationals, Taiwanese in Japan acquired the status of United Nations nationals, which means they had three statuses. When the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, they lost two of their statuses -- as United Nations nationals and as Japanese -- and became simply aliens of ROC nationality.

The loss of Japanese nationality and the recognition of alien status in 1952 were formalities related to the end of the Occupation and Japan's rebirth as a sovereign state. For during the Allied Occupation, Taiwanese in Japan had already become ROC nationals and were essentially treated as such under Occupation law. In the meantime, Japanese law continued to associate Japanese nationality with Taiwanese registers until Taiwan was formally separated from Japan.

Japan's and ROC's relations were such that ROC nationals -- most of them Taiwanese rather than mainland nationalist refugees -- were generally welcome in Japan. Most spoke Japanese, and had recently themselves been Japanese, and even those who had never been to the prefectures would not have felt entirely like fish out of water.

Even after Japan switched its "China" recognition from ROC to PRC in 1972, relations between the two states remained cordial. Though formally Japan could no longer regard ROC as a state, it continued to treat ROC nationals pretty much the same way when it came to issuing permits to enter or stay in Japan. Moreover, ROC nationals who had settled in Japan had no difficulty plying between Japan and ROC.

The switch of recognition in 1972 resulted in a sudden jump per year, in 1972 and 1973, of about 6,000 applications for permission to naturalize -- from ROC nationals who had obtained certificates of renunciation of ROC nationality in advance and become stateless shortly before the recognition change. During the early 1970s, well over 12,000 ROC nationals in Japan were permitted to naturalize in what remains the most dramatic leap in the naturalization rate in Japanese legal history.

See Naturalization under the 1950 Nationality Law for statistics and commentary.

Karafuto and the Kuriles

The Soviet Union, also in lieu of a treaty, similarly treated the Kuriles and Karafuto as part of its sovereign territory. In 1875, Japan and Russia resolved their claims over the southern part of Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the northern Kuriles by agreeing that all of Saghalin would belong to Russia and all the Kuriles to Japan. Then in 1905 Russia had ceded Karafuto (southern part of Sakhalin) to Japan.

While Japan has recognized its loss of Karafuto, it claims that, in signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it did not intend to cede its sovereignty over the southern Kuriles, which had not been contested by Russia in 1875. Though Japan and the USSR normalized their relationship in 1956, the two countries -- the USSR as Russia since 1991 -- have yet to sign a peace treaty, on account of their continuing disagreement over what Japan has called its "Northern Territories" since the 1960s.

and had, which the Soviet Union began to invade on 9 August 1945, had been occupied by 28 August which the Soviet Union had invaded before the announcement of surrender, were fully occupied were u to had already invaded, were under and The surrendered, it had lost control of Okinawa and all these territories when it surrendered -- Korea when Japan surrendered Chōsen south of the 38th parallel to the United States and north of the parallel to the Soviet Union -- Taiwan when Japan it was surrendered to and occupied by the Republic of China, and Karafuto and and the Kuriles when they were invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union.


Non-sovereign territories of Japan

In addition to territories that were formally incorporated into Japan's sovereign dominion, a number of territories were under Japan's effective legal control and jurisdiction.

Kwantung Leased Territory and Railway Zone

Japan's sovereignty did not extend to the Kwantung Leased Territory or the Railway Zone. Originally these territories were leased from China, then from the Republic of China. From the mid 1930s, however, Japan took the position that they were part of Manchoukuo, which it considered an independent state, and so Manchoukuo replaced ROC as the lessor state.

These territories -- including "Manchuria" (as the Allies referred the part of China that had become "Manchoukuo") -- were invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union. By mid 1946 the USSR had transferred control of all of Manchuria to ROC -- except what it considered its continuing interests in the Kwantung leased territory, particularly Port Arthur. ROC agreed to a Soviet plan to jointly operated an area about the size of Kwantung called the Port Arthur Naval Base District.

China was then divided by civil war, and by 1948 most of Manchuria was under communist control. In USSR eyes, China became the People's Republic of China in 1949. In 1955, the USSR returned its Port Arthur interests to PRC and withdrew its military forces from the area.

South Sea Islands

The South Sea Islands, formerly German outposts in western Pacific, were administered by Japan under a League of Nations mandate. Japan continued to discharge this mandate after its formal withdrawal from the league.

Many of the mandate islands were invaded, captured, and occupied by the United States during its Pacific operations. Most of the islands were later administered by the United States under UN mandates.


Countries occupied by Japan or under Japanese influence

When the war ended, a number of countries -- though not formally part of the Empire of Japan [double hyphen]were under Japanese control or influence. Japan was involved in the affairs of Manchoukuo, China, and Vietnam before the start of the Pacific War. Other countries, like the Philippines and Burma, had been been invaded and occupied by Japan during the Pacific War

During the war, Japan restructured several of the countries it partly or completely occupied as nominally independent states which joined Japan's declaration of war against the Allied Powers. Examples include the National Government of China under Wang Jing-wei and the Republic of the Philippines under José P. Laurel.

Manchoukuo

Manchoukuo represented a different situation, in which Japan helped create a new state out of territories that had been contested by China and Russia, then by the Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Japan's actions in setting up Manchoukuo seeded the diplomatic hostilities that grew the conflict that began between Japan and ROC in 1937 and exploded in Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War in 1931.

Manchoukuo, despite all the posturing by the Republic of China and its supporters in the League of Nations, actually functioned as state. The considerable influence which Japan had over Manchoukuo could be characterized as "control" but not "jurisdiction" -- as Japan had resorted to all manner of legal ruses to showcase Manchoukuo as an independent country.

The other Allied Powers supported China's claim that "Manchoukuo" did not exist except in Japan's imagination. Like China, called the region "Manchuria" in English and considered it an "occupied" territory that had to be "liberated" from Japanese control.

Because Japan had never claimed Manchoukuo, and since it was never otherwise a part of the Empire of Japan, greater Manchuria was never the object of a treaty of cession with Japan.

China

The object of Japan's expansion in China was to rescue the country from the inability of its territorial and ideological war lords to put aside their differences in order to build a strong, prosperous, peaceful, and friendly China. Japan was particularly plagued by civil unrest along China's border with Manchoukuo, which China claimed Japan had illegally established in territory that rightfully belonged to China.

Aside from whether the establishment of Manchoukuo in Manchuria in 1932 constituted an occupation of China, Japan's actions in China from 1937 undoubtedly constituted a military invasion and occupation of some of China's major provinces, ports, and cities, beginning with its northern and southern capitals.

That Japan signed a peace treaty with the Republic of China in 1952 was a bit ironic. Japan had never declared war on China. ROC had declared war -- but not in 1937 when Japan invaded and occupied parts of China -- and not in 1938, after the ROC government went into exile in Chungking (Chongqing) -- and not even in 1940, when Japan recognized the Chinese government of Wang Jing-wei -- but only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, when it ROC joined the United States in its declaration of war against Japan. And then, of course, ROC became one of the major Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war against Japan.

Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty imposed the following obligation on Japan.

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

To add to the irony -- by 1952, the ROC government no longer had control over the "China" which Japan had partly invaded and occupied. It had taken refuge in, and controlled only what had legally been part of Japan until ROC received the surrender of Taiwan in 1945 -- plus a couple of islands, which were part of Fukien province, which ROC had fortified to discourage PRC from attacking it across the straits.

Japan's signing of the Taipei Peace Treaty with ROC was almost as though it was signing a peace treaty with itself.

Southeast Asian countries

The object of Japan's military invasions of Southeast Asian countries was to liberate them from the American, British, and Dutch powers that were not only controlling their governments and economies, but were denying their port facilities to Japanese ships if not using their ports as bases for naval blockades of Japanese shipping routes.

All these countries were in turn "liberated" from Japanese control or influence -- some, like the Philippines, in bloody battles, others in peaceful transfers of authority after Japan's unconditional surrender.

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Occupation Authorities

Understanding the legal workings of the Allied Occupation of Japan, and of occupations of other territories that were part of the Empire of Japan, and of all postwar settlements, including the San Francisco Peace treaty, requires recognition of the fact that the Allied Powers constituted a supernational legal body since their joint declaration of war as the "United Nations" against Germany, Italy, and Japan on 1 January 1942.

William Sebald on the Occupation as an "international enterprise"

William Sebald, who arrived in Occupied Japan in January 1946 to begin his assignment to POLAD as an expert on Japanese law, describes the office like this in his autobiography, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (New York; W.W. Norton & Co., 1965, with Russell Brines) (Sebald 1965, page 42).

Although the State Department had participated in preliminary planning [for the Occupation], its role in Tokyo at this period of the Occupation was limited and only vaguely defined. Our office was known as Acting United States Political Adviser to SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers = General Douglas MacArthur], shortened to POLAD. Headed by the late George Atcheson, Jr., with the personal rank of minister, it operated in many ways like an embassy accredited to the Occupation. This was consistent with the legal concept of General MacArthur as supernational representative of an Allied occupation. But, in fact, the Occupation never became an international enterprise, despite the involvement of all eleven wartime associates [Great Britain, Republic of China, Soviet Union, et cetera]. Instead, SCAP was predominantly American in operation, as well as in personnel, to the discomfiture of several Allied governments. The position of POLAD, therefore, was in the beginning curiously half in and half outside the mainstream of Occupation affairs.

Sebald had been a Japanese language officer with the U.S. Navy in Japan in the mid 1920s, and had practiced and translated law in Kobe in the 1930s before being suspected of spying on Japanese naval operations and forced to Japan in 1939. He quickly became Atcheson's assistant, and would himself head POLAD after Atcheston died in plane crash in August 1947. He then became the Chief of the SCAP's Diplomatic Section, and would be involved in many of Japan's diplomatic affairs for the duration duration of the Occupation -- including Japan's talks with ROK.

Sebald, bilingual and legally minded, and a quick student of diplomacy, clearly perceived the legal responsibilities of the Allied Powers as an Occupation Authority. There were numerous examples of how victors had treated the vanquished in the past, and many precedents regarding the disposition of the nationality status of inhabitants of transferred territories and of displaced people -- people who ended up in a territory to which they would no longer legally belong.

I have no evidence of the extent to which Sebald was involved in the drafting of POLAD's "Status of Koreans in Japan" report -- but I would guess that he at least read it and approved.

Far Eastern Commission

The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established to oversee the multiple occupations of the territories of the Empire of Japan, including the parts of the prefectural Interior that became Occupied Japan. In principle, SCAP was subject to FEC's control and obliged to carry out its directives.

The "eleven wartime associates" Sebald mentions in his statement about how the Allied Powers intended to oversee SCAP in Occupied Japan refer to the following FEC members.

United States of America
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
[Republic of] China

France
The Netherlands
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
India
The Philippine Commonwealth

The 4 first listed powers -- the "Big 4" -- had veto powers over a majority of the other powers. But the arrangement didn't work, mainly (but not only) because of disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Americanization of history

Some historians call the Occupation of Japan the "American Occupation" and a few even characterize the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a treaty between Japan and the United States. Whatever the extent of America's control of the Occupation, and of American say in the drafting of the Peace Treaty, both were nonetheless legally -- under international conventions of postwar settlements -- "Allied" enterprises.

The Allied Powers constituted the equivalent of what Sebald properly characterized as a "supernational" body. If asked for clarification, he would have said a body with powers equivalent to those of state -- or even dictatorship -- over an occupied entity. The terms of surrender suspended Japan's sovereignty and subject the government of Japan to the absolute authority of the Allied Powers, represented by SCAP -- the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. SCAP, though, was not the supreme authority within the Allied Powers. Whoever sat on SCAP's throne -- initially Douglas MacArthur -- was in principle, if not always in practice, subject to the larger collective authority of the Allied Powers.

The point, though, is that the Allied Powers were a source of law and enforcement unto themselves. Most the members of the Allied Powers were founding members of the United Nations. And it is no co-incidence that the major Allied Powers, following their victories in the European and Pacific theaters of World War II, dominated the United Nations in its earlier years.

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22 March 1952 DS notifies KDMJ that SCAP's jurisdiction will end

On 22 March 1952, the Diplomatic Section of GHQ/SCAP informed the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan -- in what appears to be a form letter that DS probably sent to all diplomatic missions in Occupied Japan -- that SCAP's jurisdiction would soon end pursuant to the imminent effectuation of the Allied Peace Treaty with Japan. Upon the restoration of sovereignty to Japan and its people, KDMJ would be on its own regarding its relationship with Japan. SCAP would no have the authority to mediate.

The following text is my transcription of a scan of a copy of DS's 22 March 1952 communication to KDMJ in ROK archives (KRN 82: 138). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars.

Diplomatic Section

    The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan and has the honor to refer to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, which will come into force upon the deposit, expected in the near future, of the instruments of ratification of the requisite number of signatory Powers.

    In view of the imminence of the date upon which this Treaty will become effective, it is considered appropriate that notification now be given that the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan will terminate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander and restore complete sovereignty to the Japanese Government and people. Accordingly, the diplomatic missions now accredited or near to the Supreme Commander will cease to exist in their present status upon the first coming into force of the Treaty of Peace. The terms of their establishment thereafter will depend upon arrangements to be made with the Japanese government. [← Manual underscoring as received]

    The Diplomatic Section takes this occasion to express the sincere gratitude of the Supreme Commander for the Mission's assistance and cooperation in matters of mutual interest connected with the Allied occupation of Japan, and of his appreciation of the spirit of friendly cooperation and interest which has characterized the relations between the Mission and the General Headquarters.

    As soon as it is possible to do so, notice will be given as to the exact time the Treaty of Peace comes into force.

Tokyo, March 22, 1952

To the
    Korean Diplomatic Mission
    in Japan,
        Tokyo

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San Francisco Peace Treaty

The spring of 1947 was the watershed for the start of the push by the United States for a peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan. According to William Sebald, the United States completed a first draft of the peace treaty in March 1947, and he refers to August 1947 and January 1948 revisions. He called the approach taken by the Allied Powers at this time "Draconian", described the earlier drafts as "unworkable", and said the situation was "the Versailles Treaty all over again" -- referring to the harshness of the conditions the Allied Powers had imposed on Germany in 1919 after the Great War of 1914-1918 (Sebald 1965, pages 243-244).

The situation is not much better by late 1949 and early 1950. There are conflicts within the Allied ranks, within the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), and between SCAP and Washington over the terms of the treaty. The prospects for an early treaty worsened after the start of the Korean War in June 1950.

SCAP's position, since early 1947, had been to conclude a treaty as early as possible. Note in this regard that the Allied Powers had signed a peace treaty with Italy in February 1947. The Allied Powers had liberated Italy during the war in Europe, and Italy had joined the Allied Powers in the continuing war with Germany and even Japan.

Political and military conditions in East Asia, however, rapidly deteriorated, first in 1948 with the establishments of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), then in 1949 with the creation in China of the People's Republic of China. ROK and DPRK claimed the same former Japanese territory of Chōsen (Korea) and refused to cooperate for the sake of creating a unified Korean state. And the People's Liberation Army drove the government of the Republic of China (ROC) into exile in the province of Taiwan, which ROC had created out of the former Japanese territory of Taiwan (Formosa).

These developments hugely complicated the process of concluding a peace treaty with Japan. Concerns varied within the United States government, and the Allied Powers were divided by ideological differences or by differences in diplomatic approach to dealing with the territorial conflicts between the two Koreas and the two Chinas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, worried about the military instability of the region, weeks before the start of the Korean War, sought an indefinite delay in order to find political solutions (Seward 1965, page 250). The State Department wanted to continue negotiations to see if a treaty was possible, while the Defense Department wanted to "halt all peace treaty activity for the time being" -- and JCS's position was that "no treaty negotiations should be undertaken without assurance that Soviet Russia and Communist China would sign" (Sebald 1965, page 255).>

SCAP, meaning MacArthur, was closer to State's position, and Sebald himself, of course, represented State as the chief of GHQ/SCAP's Diplomatic Section. Sebald, as the chief of DS, and an ambassador by rank, was essentially in charge of facilitating Japan's foreign affairs, for Japan, when surrendering to the Allied Powers, had had delegated its sovereignty, and therefore its diplomatic powers, to SCAP. SCAP, attempting to bridge the differences between State and Defense, argued that "it did not follow that no action should be taken until their [USSR and PRC] conditions were met" (Sebald 1965, pages 254-255)

The start of the Korean War changed everything except State's and SCAP's urgency to get on with the peace treaty. John Foster Dulles, a special State Department adviser appointed by President Truman, had already stepped into the negotiation ring with Yoshida Shigeru, who was then both the Prime Minister of the Foreign Ministry of Japan.

Dulles formulated his own policies, and ran his own interference in diplomatic plays with Allied Powers which did not share his opinion as to how to deal with the two Chinas and the two Koreas, and the difficulties their territorial wars had created for a treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Japan. Dulles, opposed by some Allied Powers, most significantly Great Britain, and over the objections of some other American officials, angled toward a peace conference to which neither China would be invited, though Nationalist China (ROC) had been a major Allied Power.

The Soviet Union, also a major Allied Power, would participate in the conference but decline to join the treaty. The Soviet Union had taken the position that it would "object to any treaty language which cast doubt on the Soviet title to Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands or on Communist China's sovereignty over Formosa." The USSR also "questioned the right of the United States to exercise trusteeship over the Bonin Islands [Ogasawaras] and the Ryukyu Group [mainly Okinawa prefecture]". (Sebald 1965, page 259)

Had the two Koreas not been at war, they might have been invited to observe the peace conference, would given their postwar establishment and the fact that "Korea" (Chōsen) had been part of Japan, neither would have been qualified to join the treaty. The Soviet Union, and of course PRC, were militarily backing DPRK forces, and ROK forces were being supported by United Nations forces, particularly American forces. ROC, a member of the United Nations, was not allowed to send military forces to Korea, but ROC logistically supported UN forces in Korea.

Japan contributed immensely to the support of US military operations in Korea, most of which were mounted from, or through, US military bases in Japan. Many Japanese ships and crews were involved in the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950, which was staged from Japan. Thousands of ROK soldiers had been brought to Japan for training and integration with American invasion forces. (Sebald 1965, pages 198-199)

General MacArthur, relieved by Truman on 11 April 1951, was replaced by General Ridgeway as SCAP, and peace negotiations with Japan continued under Ridgeway's watch. As the treaty was between Japan and the Allied Forces, SCAP was not itself a party to the negotiations, but as the head of the military government in Japan it facilitated treaty negotiations.

The signing of the peace treaty by the Allied Powers and Japan in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 left a number of other peace treaties to be negotiated between Japan and and Allied Powers which, for various reasons, had not signed the San Francisco treaty. These states included, among others, India, Italy, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China.

India had been invited to the peace conference in San Francisco but declined to participate, owing to its view that some of the terms were unfair to Japan. India would sign a separate peace treaty with Japan on 9 June 1952.

Japan and the Soviet Union did not formally declare an end to their state of hostilities and normalize their diplomatic relations 18 October 1956, but Japan and Russia have yet to sign a formal peace treaty as Japan continues to dispute Russia's claim to and control over several islands in the southern stretch of the Kuriles. In the 1956 joint declaration, the USSR agreed to support Japan's membership in the United Nations, and Japan was formally admitted to the UN on 18 December 1956.

Italy, having been defeated by the Allied Powers, joined the Allied war against Germany on 19 October 1943, and against Japan on 14 July 1945 a month before Japan informed the Allied Powers that it would surrender. Italy, however, was not invited to the peace conference in San Francisco. Sebald writes that his deputy, Niles Bond, "suggested the eventual compromise formula to break a long impasse over formal peace between Japan and Italy (Sebald 1965, page 284).

A peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China would be "more difficult" and would engage his "close attention for some months", Sebald wrote in his memoirs (Sebald 1965, page 284).

Sebald characterized "the Korean-Japanese conference" -- which also engaged his attention -- as "[a]nother 'peace' effort which caused many difficulties and some embarrassment" (Sebald 1965, page 287). He bracketed "peace" in his reference to the talks he would facilitate, between the Republic of Korea and Japan, though having nothing to do with "peace" since "Korea" had been part of Japan and not at war with Japan, would not be peaceful.

See the following two sections for further commentary on Japan's talks with ROC and ROK, after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to 28 April 1952 when the treaty came into force.

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ROC and the San Francisco Peace Treaty

Regarding Taiwan and the Pescadores, which China had ceded to Japan in 1895, Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on 8 September 1951, stated only that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." While Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) favored a normal retrocession provision, ROC was unable to participate in the treaty because of divisions among the other Allied Powers concerning the recognition of the People's Republic of China. And the United States, in the position of dealing with the territorial standoff between the ROC and the People's Republic of China (PRC), while engaged against PRC in the Korean War, proposed as a compromise that the peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan could not specify the name of the successor state.

The Soviet Union, also an Allied Power, chose not to join the treaty. And neither of the two Korean states were qualified to participate because they had been created after the war on territory which had been part of Japan and therefore had not been members of the Allied Powers at war with Japan. Hence Japanese territories which had been separated from Japan in 1945, with the understanding that Japan had lost them to the USSR and a future Korean state, were also described in the treaty in terms of Japan simply "renouncing" (放棄する hōki suru) all right, title and claim to the territories, without specifying the successor states.

William J. Sebald

William J. Sebald (1901-1980), as the head of the Diplomatic Section of GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo and an ambassador by rank, was in charge of Japan's diplomatic affairs. As such he was deeply involved in the negotiations between Japan and both the the Republic of China and the Republic Korea, which began soon after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Sebald records some of his recollections of the talks in his 1965 memoirs written with Russell Brines (see "Sources" for particulars).

Regarding Japan's postwar settlement with China, Sebald describes the "fundamental position" held by John Foster Dulles (1888-1959), and comments on Dulles's position, like this (Sebald 1965, page 286, italics Sebald's, underscoring mine).

Japan should conclude a treaty with Taipei relating only to the Chinese territory over which that government has de facto control -- Taiwan and its adjacent islands. Relations over other Chinese areas which the Republic of China did not control, principally the mainland, would be left for later determination. This formula, like other elements of the peace settlement, postponed a final solution to the indefinite future when the Communist attitude might change, while affording Japan an opportunity to resume relations with Taipei.

Dulles, an ambassador-at-large and consultant to the Secretary of State from 1951 to 1952, became Secretary of State under Eisenhower in 1953 and served in this post until the month before his death in 1959. A staunch anti-communist, he is credited with formulating America's position regarding the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and was one of the authors of the treaty. He seems to have had little difficult persuading -- some would say pushing -- Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), who at the time was also the Prime Minister, to go along with America's position regarding settlements concerning Taiwan.

Sebald, who often met with Yoshida, his diplomatic counterpart in the Japanese government as well as its political head, gives a dramatic account of his own involvement in facilitating a letter from Yoshida to Dulles, in which Yoshida assures Dulles that Japan has no intentions of recognizing PRC. This drama unfolds in private chambers, and then in the public press, in December 1951 and January 1952.

Still, the Japan-ROC talks encountered all manner of snags that threatened their success, and this continued to worry Sebald's bosses in Washington. About his role, he gives this account (pages 286-287, underscoring mine).

This [Yoshida's assurances to Dulles] did not settle the differences between Tokyo and Taipei, however, and I was increasingly in the middle of these complicated problems until the end of February, 1952, when the negotiations were transferred to Taipei. Washington asked me for my advice at the time and I replied that the two nations could themselves resolve the question. The Chinese, I said, were old hands at diplomacy and would take care of their own interests. The Japanese, I added, would carry out their commitments under the Yoshida-Dulles letter of December 24, 1951.

. . . Yoshida told me on March 14 that he foresaw no difficulties in the negotiations with China, and they were finally concluded and the treaty signed on April 28, 1952. It came into force on August 5, 1952.

Note that, as of 14 March 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which had to come into effect before the Taipei Peace Treaty could be signed, awaited the ratification of the United States -- which would not be made until 20 March the following week.

I have underscored remarks that seem significant to me. In his comments on ROK-Japan talks, he did not characterize ROK's delegation as particularly adept at diplomacy, nor did he express much confidence that the talks would succeed -- though of course that was his fervent hope (see below).

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ROK and the San Francisco Peace Treaty

Japan's renunciation of "all right, title and claim" over "Korea" in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was also without any specification of the assumed successor state with which Japan would be obliged to negotiate settlements. As with the settlement over Taiwan and the Pescadores, Japan was to follow the guidance -- if not the direction -- of the United States.

As with its choice to negotiate with the Republic of China (ROC) rather than the People's Republic of China (PRC) concerning its making of peace with "China" and the status of Taiwan and the Pescadores -- Japan chose, or rather had little choice but to choose, to negotiate with the Republic of Korea (ROK) rather than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) regarding "Korea".

Unlike its talks with ROC, however, would lead to a peace treaty, since ROC as an Allied Power had declared war on Japan (Japan had not, however, considered itself at war with ROC) -- Japan's talks with ROK would not be about peace, for ROK had been established on territory which had been part of the Empire of Japan in Japan's war against the Allied Powers. Rather Japan and ROK would be negotiating a normalization treaty to clear the way to establishing ordinary diplomatic relations, and a status agreement regarding the treatment of ROK nationals in Japan.

Talks over normalization would break down over mainly territorial and property disputes. Talks over the legal status in Japan of ROK nationals went comparatively much smoother after overcoming some initial hurdles.

The Japan-ROK talks, like the Japan-ROC talks, were facilitated by GHQ/SCAP's Diplomatic Section, especially by its chief, William Sebald, who oversaw Japan's foreign affairs -- at the time of these talks, with his counterpart foreign minister Yoshida Shigeru (who was also Japan's prime minister). And as he did when setting up Japan's talks with ROC, Sebald left Japan and ROK to make their own way, without SCAP interference.

Concerning the 1951-1952 round of Japan's talks with ROK, Sebald says this in memoirs (Sebald 1965, pages 287-288, italics Sebald's, underscoring mine).

Another "peace" effort which caused many difficulties and some embarrassment was the Korean-Japanese conference to settle some outstanding difficulties between those two nations. This was convened, with SCAP's approval, on October 20, 1951. . . .

At the outset I made it clear that I was not a mediator and that the two diplomats should negotiate in their own way. Nevertheless, I urged them to be reasonable, particular in their opening statements, which were to be made public. The situation was complicated, of course, by the effects of Japan's long domination of Korea and by [ROK President Syngman] Rhee's intransigent attitude toward the Japanese. With more hope than optimism, I made an opening statement designed to encourage both sides to take a broad approach toward solving their many outstanding problems.

[Japan's chief delegate Sadao] Iguchi followed with a conciliatory and friendly statement, calling for give-and-take on both sides. [ROK's chief delegate You Chan] Yang then proceeded to deliver a scorching indictment of Japanese actions in Korea for the previous forty years. He included demands for payment of an indemnity so huge it would have bankrupted Japan. As soon as the Korean representative had finished I adjourned the meeting. Iguchi was obviously troubled and annoyed. I spoke to Yang about his statement, pointing out that he could not obtain Japanese cooperation through intemperate language. I also attempted to soothe Iguchi. At the time I believed I had made progress with both sides. I had, but only for a few weeks. The conference slowly collapsed after futile attempts to agree upon an agenda. Talks were revived later and periodically were pursued, but the issues still remained unresolved at the end of 1964.

Japan and ROK signed a normalization treaty and status agreement on 22 June 1965, by which time Sebald's memoirs had already been published or was on its way to press.

The conference slowly collapsed after futile attempts to agree upon an agenda   Sebald seems to have forgotten that Japan and ROK did agree to an agenda, and established subcommittees to deal with normalization and status issues separately. The nationality and status subcommittee produced a signable agreement on 28 April 1952, which was edited a bit on 1 April 1952, by which time the normalization talks had floundered on territorial and property disputes.

All evidence suggests that Japan was hoping to sign off on matters that the two states could agree to, in order to normalize their relations, which would allow ROK to enroll willing Koreans in Japan into its nationality -- but that ROK insisted on agreement to everything or nothing at all. Sebald's qualified optimism was not to be realized.

Sebald is often seen as being "pro-Japan" and "anti-Korean" in his personal views of the two countries and their people. He many personal reasons to like Japan, and perhaps he also had reasons to be generally critical of Korea and Koreans. At the same time, I get the impression that he was a realist who understood the limits of what could be achieved in a bilateral talk between Japan and ROK, and truly thought it would be in the best interests of both countries to put the past behind them and get on with the future.

Sebald and nationality issue

One of the "outstanding difficulties" and "outstanding problems" between Japan and ROK was the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan (see below). Though Sebald does not mention the nationality issue in his memoirs, it is clear from memoranda between him as chief of the GHQ/SCAP's Diplomatic Section (DS), and Alva C. Carpenter as chief of the Legal Section (LS), that Sebald was pragmatic about Carpenter's attempt, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty had already been signed, to impose a "nationality choice" provision on the Japan and ROK.

Within days after the ROK-Japan talks had begun -- when Japan clarified its position that the Koreans would lose their Japanese nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect and have to naturalize if they wished to again be Japanese -- Carpenter was advising Sebald that there should be provisions for choice, such as those in the treaty of peace the Allied Powers had signed with Italy in 1947. Sebald, though, had already informed Japan and ROK that SCAP would not interfere in their talks, and that whatever they bilaterally agreed to would be accepted.

Sebald may also have reasoned that SCAP could not possibly have imposed Carpenter's formalism on Japan and ROK, for many political reasons that were obvious to anyone eavesdropping on exchanges between ROK and Japan delegates at the bilateral talks.

  1. SCAP didn't have the authority to dictate nationality terms
    Having already signed a treaty of peace with Japan, in which Japan had renounced all right, title, and claim to Korea -- without specifying a successor state or states, or making any stipulations about nationality options -- the moment had passed for the Allied Powers to have any say in negotiations between Japan and ROK. And SCAP itself never had the authority to dictate any treaty terms. Carpenter was expressing a personal opinion, not SCAP policy -- and both ROK and Japan knew this.
  2. Japan no longer had any say in the disposition of Chōsen (Korea)
    Having already abandoned all right, title and claim to Korea, Japan could not have agreed to a transfer of Korea (Chōsen) to ROK, which claimed sovereignty over the entire peninsula. In other words, Japan had already lost its standing in having a say in the disposition of Korea (Chōsen) as a territory.
  3. Japan no longer had "grounds" for attributing its nationality to Chosenese
    The moment Korea was formally separated from Japan's territory, concomitant with the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan would also have no legal foundation for attributing its nationality to people in registers affiliated with Korea. Hence Koreans would lose their Japanese nationality.
  4. ROK held that Koreans had already lost Japanese nationality
    Even if ROK accepted that Koreans had become Japanese de facto, it viewed Japan's first signalling of its intent to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on 9 August 1945 as the date on which "Chōsen" was liberated as "Korea" and "Chosenese" became "Koreans". If not 9 August then 15 August, when Hirohito ordered his commanders to cease fire. If not 15 August then 2 September, when Japan formally surrendered.
  5. ROK held that Koreans in Japan had already become its nationals
    Even if Koreans in Japan could be construed to still be Japanese during the first three years of the Occupation, ROK argued that they became its nationals the moment it became a state on 15 August 1948, under its nationality laws -- its Provisional Nationality Law of 11 May 1948, and its Nationality Law of 20 December 1948.
  6. ROK even held that Koreans had never legally been Japanese
    ROK viewed the 1910 annexation treaty as illegal, hence would never have recognized that Japan had legally possessed sovereignty over Korea, and therefore could not have legally attributed its nationality to Koreans. So from ROK's standpoint, Koreans had never become Japanese de jure.
  7. ROK had no interest in talking about nationality
    Japan informed ROK that, after losing their Japanese nationality, Koreans could naturalize if they wanted to be Japanese again. ROK replied that every sovereign state had the right to determine who it considered its nationals, and hence what Japan did with its nationality did not qualify as a topic for discussion at their bilateral talks. ROK had its views, and Japan had its views, and they agreed to accept that each state would think as it pleased about nationality.
  8. ROK was upset that Japan continued to speak of "Chōsen" and "Chosenese"
    Long before ROK and Japan began to directly negotiate, ROK had appealed to SCAP to pressure Japan to stop speaking of "Korea" and "Koreans" as "Chōsen" (朝鮮) and "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人) -- not only because it smacked of the period of annexation, but because it suggested that Japan was sympathetic with DPRK, whose name included the Sino-Korean word for Sino-Japanese "Chōsen". However, from Japan's point of view, it could not arbitrarily call "Koreans" in Japan "Kankokujin" (韓国人) or "Kanjin" (韓人), since they were not yet ROK nationals. Legally they were still Chosenese who had Japanese nationality because Chōsen -- though already under the control and jurisdiction of two sovereign Korean states, ROK and DPRK -- was formally still part of Japan.
  9. Japan was concerned that most Koreans in Japan politically identified with DPRK
    Apart from the legal statuses of Koreans in Japan, as determined by the Allied Powers in concert with its own laws and Japan's laws, the political reality in Occupied Japan was that, while roughly 95 percent of Koreans in the prefectures had family registers and ancestral roots in the southern provinces under ROK control and jurisdiction, most appeared to support DPRK, which had control and jurisdiction over the northern provinces. Moreover, ROK and DPRK were at war, and Japan did not want to throw oil on the ideological fires burning among Koreans in Japan siding with ROK's view of their nationality.
  10. Japan insisted on voluntary enrollment in ROK nationality
    Japan balked at ROK's insistence that Japan recognize all Koreans in Japan as ROK's nationals as a matter of ROK decree. Japan took the position that it lacked the authority to tell Koreans in Japan what country to belong to. Every Korean in Japan would have to decide themself. Once ROK and Japan had normalized their relationship, ROK would have the right to enroll willing Koreans in Japan into its nationality. Until they did so, they would remain simply "Koreans" -- i.e., "Chosenese" -- nationals of neither ROK nor DPRK, but of a legacy territory that had no state -- or rather had two states that vied for their loyalty.

Japan had two choices -- both moral. One moral choice was to make legal provisions for Koreans in Japan to remain Japanese without losing Japan's nationality, or regain its nationality after losing it without having to naturalize. The other moral choice was whether to go along with ROK's initial insistence that it force all Koreans in Japan in to ROK's political mold.

By the end of 1951, ROK had essentially relented to Japan choice to let Koreans in Japan decide for themselves whether to be ROK nationals or remain simply Chosenese -- which did not mean that they were DPRK nationals, but simply "nationals" of the independent "Korea" that "Chōsen" had become when Japan renounced all title, right and claim over the territory.

Regarding its own nationality, Japan chose not to provide a choice -- other than to naturalize. Many people writing in English today insist that Japan's choice was both illegal and immoral, and one writer -- George Hicks -- has alleged that "by depriving the Koreans of their Japanese nationality, Japan acted illegally, immorally, and unwisely" (Hicks 1997, page 51).

I would argue that Japan was acting legally, with the consent of SCAP representing the Allied Powers, and without any objection on the part of ROK. While bilateral choice provisions were impossible, unilateral provisions were feasible -- and I would agree that Japan "should" have made such provisions -- the only question being what kind of provisions, given its domestic laws -- not its Nationality Law (as many people wrongly contend), but its Civil Code, and the Family Register Law which facilitates the undercurrent of family law in the Civil Code (see Separation and choice for a fuller discussion of what Japan could have done).

Note that, even in the 1965 Japan-ROK normalization treaty, Japan recognized that ROK was "the only lawful Government in Korea" -- pursuant to a 1948 resolution by the United Nation's General Assembly. Japan was not admitted to the United Nations until 1956. ROK and DPRK were simultaneously admitted to the UN in 1991, since which time Japan and DPRK have been attempting to normalization their relationship. As of this writing (2011), ROK and DPRK remain in a state of armistice regarding their 1950-1953 war. Neither Japan nor ROK recognize DPRK or its nationality.

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Yang-Rusk exchanges

In the months leading up to the Peace Conference held in San Francisco in September 1951, for the purpose of confirming and signing the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan, the Republic of Korea attempted to convince anyone who would listen that ROK deserved to participate in the conference and join the treaty as a member of the Allied Powers.

The most interesting exchanges regarding ROK's understanding of its role in the Pacific War took place in late July and early August in 1951 between Yang You Chan (梁裕燦 1897-1975), ROK's ambassador to the United States, who would lead ROK's delegation in the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks which convened in late October after the signing of the Peace Treaty in early September -- and Dean Rusk (1909-1994), Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs -- by way of Dean Acheson (1893-1971), then the Secretary of State.

Three Yang-Rusk documents

Wikisource has posted transcriptions of the following 3 Yang-Rusk documents, which I have slightly reformatted here.

Letter from You Chan Yang to Dean Acheson, 19 July, 1951
Letter from You Chan Yang to Dean Acheson, 2 August, 1951
Rusk note of [August 10,] 1951

Images of the 4-page Rusk note are available are attributed to the following source.

U.S. NARA (National Archives and Records Administration)
RG59, Lot54 D423 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY FILES OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Box 8, Korea

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Yang's 19 July 1951 request to Rusk

The Korean Ambassador to the Secretary of State

Washington, Jury 19, 1951.

Your Excellency, I have the honor to present to Your Excellency, at the instruction of my Government, the following requests for the consideration of the Department of State with regard to the recent revised draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

1. My Government requests that the word "renounces" in Paragraph a, Article Number 2, should be replaced by "confirms that it renounced on August 9,1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the island Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo."

2. As to Paragraph a, Article Number 4, in the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, my Government wishes to point out that the provision in Paragraph a, Article 4, does not affect the legal transfer of vested properties in Korea to the Republic of Korea and the United States Military Government in Korea, of September 11, 1948.

3. With reference to Article 9, my Government wishes to insert the following at the end of Article 9 of the proposed Peace Treaty, "Pending the conclusion of such agreements existing realities such as the MacArthur Line will remain effect."

Please Accept

You Chan Yang

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Yang's 2 August 1951 request to Rusk

Request From Korea 1951.08.02

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
August 2, 1951

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to refer Your Excellency to my communication to you for Jury 19, 1951 with reference to requests by the Korean Government for the consideration of the Department of State of certain suggestions in connection with the revised draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Further instructions from my Government enable me to convey to Your Excellency the following suggestions with respect to the revised Treaty, looking towards their incorporation in the document:

1. Article 4: Japan renounces property of Japan and its nationals against Korea and its nationals on or before August nine, Nineteen hundred Forty-One.

Article 9: The MacArthur Line shall remain until such agreements be concluded.

Article 21: And Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 9, 12, and 15-a of present Treaty.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

YOU CHAN YANG

His Excellency
Dean G. Acheson
Secretary of State
Washington D C

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Rusk's 9 August 1951 reply to Yang's 19 July and 2 August requests

[ Salutation at bottom of first page ]

His Excellency

       Dr. You Chan Yang,

              Ambassador of Korea.

[ First page begins here ]

Excellency:

       I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of July 19 and August 2, 1951 presenting certain requests for the consideration of the Government of the United States with regard to the draft treaty of peace with Japan.

       With respect to request of the Korean Government that Article 2(a) of the draft be revised to provide that Japan "confirms that it renounced on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo," the United States Government regrets that it is unable to concur in this proposed amendment. The United States Government does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory that Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the areas dealt with in the Declaration. As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea. It is understood that the Korean Government's request that "Parangdo" be included among the islands named in the treaty as having been renounced by Japan has been withdrawn.

       The United States Government agrees that the terms of paragraph (a) of Article 4 of the draft treaty are subject to misunderstanding and accordingly proposes, in order to meet the view of the Korean Government, to insert at the beginning of paragraph (a) the phrase, "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article", and then to add a new paragraph (b) reading as follows:

(b) "Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3".

The present paragraph (b) of Article 4 becomes paragraph(c).

       The Government of the United States regrets that it is unable to accept the Korean Government's amendment to Article 9 of the draft treaty. In view of the many national interests involved, any attempt to include in the treaty provisions governing fishing in high seas areas would indefinitely delay the treaty's conclusion. It is desired to point out, however, that the so-called MacArthur line will stand until the treaty comes into force, and that Korea, which obtains the benefits of Article 9, will have the opportunity of negotiating a fishing agreement with Japan prior to that date.

       With respect to the Korean Government's desire to obtain the benefits of Article 15(a) of the treaty, there would seem to be no necessity to oblige Japan to return the property of persons in Japan of Korean origin since such property was not sequestered or otherwise interfered with by the Japanese Government during the war. In view of the fact that such persons had the status of Japanese nationals it would not seem appropriate that they obtain compensation for damage to their property as a result of the war.

       Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

       For the Secretary of State:

              [stamped] Dean Rusk

FE:NA:RFEAREY:SB
August 9, 1951.

[ FE = Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
  NA = Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
  RFEAREY = Robert Fearey
  SB = Samuel Boggs ? ]

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1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks

Legal status the first and only priority

The principle facilitator of the talks between ROK and Japan was William Sebald, the chief of the Diplomatic Section at GHQ/SCAP. He not only set up the talks but was present at its first meeting, and DS officials were present as observers at subsequent meetings. ROK explicitly requested that SCAP observe the talks, but the presence of SCAP observers was also appropriate as a matter of what I would call "pro forma diplomacy" under the circumstances, since Japan's sovereignty was technically in SCAP's hands, and DS essentially mediated Japan's foreign affairs.

Takasaki describes the talks as actually being "ROK-Japan-US talks" (Takasaki 1996: 24). But the record shows that SCAP stood aside and let Japan deal with ROK directly and without any interference. The Peace Treaty had already been signed. SCAP had no standing in the matter. SCAP had no legal authority to "impose" any conditions on Japan -- much less on ROK, which was a fully competent independent sovereign state.

The United States arguably had more influence on talks subsequent to the failed 1951-1952 talks. Tae-Ryong Yoon makes a convincing argument that the success of the talks between ROK and Japan in the early 1960s, which led to their normalization treaty of 1965, were not so much the result of sudden changes in the political atmosphere, as a crystallization of bilateral efforts since 1951, with some but not definitive influence from the United States (Yoon 2008).

Yoon makes this interesting observation regarding 1st round of talks between ROK and Japan in 1951-1952 (Yang 2008, pages 69-70).

For instance, the first conference was held through the good offices of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) under the condition that, at Japan's request, the talks focus solely on the legal status of Korean residents in Japan. However, once the talks started, the two sides agreed to extend the agenda at Korea's request.

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Priorities

From GHQ/SCAP's point of view, the number one priority -- the only priority -- in the ROK-Japan talks was the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan after the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. This was also Japan's principle concern.

From the start, ROK clearly wanted to stress other issues, such as property and claims of Korea and Koreans against Japan and Japanese, and fishing and other economic issues. ROK went along with GHQ/SCAP's priorities, hoping to then focus on the other issues.

This is clear from from all documents exchanged between the Diplomatic Section (DS) of SCAP and the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ), and the government of Japan, shortly before and after the signing of the Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951, and the convening of the talks between Japan and ROK on 20 October 1951. The talks were initiated by GHQ/SCAP's Diplomatic Section (DS), which continued to observe the talks but left the negotiations to the two state parties.

Nationality

Status and treatment meant, first, determining nationality. Within a few meetings, the nationality issues was resolved by leaving it entirely to the domestic laws of the party states. All documents created by ROK prior to the talks, and in the course of the talks, show that this was an essentially foregone conclusion. Which is to say -- ROK had already determined that Koreans in Japan were its nationals, and Japan had no standing in determining who had ROK nationality.

Japan, too, had come to the conclusion -- again before the talks convened -- that Chosenese (Koreans) would naturally lose Japan's nationality when Japan lost Chōsen (Korea). Japan held that nationality losers who wished to be Japanese could naturalize. ROK had no objection to anything Japan did with its own nationality, as every sovereign state had the right to determine who qualified for its nationality.

Choice of nationality

Both parties -- Japan soon after it surrendered, and ROK later -- considered the need to make provisions for nationality choices like those made in many European states following World War I. By the time ROK-Japan talks began, there were also a number of World War II precedents in Europe.

Japan was very familiar with status issues following territorial transfers, in its own territorial history, going back to no later than the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg with Russia. ROK, having only recently become a state, had to do more homework, but its Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and other legalists had no difficulty understanding the conventions of international law -- keeping in mind that there were no absolute rules, and every war and every treaty differed in various respects.

However, all available documents make it clear that ROK ruled out the applicability of bilateral choice provisions on account of what it considered the special circumstances of its "liberation" by the Allied Powers and the manner in which it became a sovereign state and, as a sovereign state, defined its nationality. ROK's definitions of its nationality essentially ruled out the possibility of bilateral choice provisions, which would have required that ROK recognize Japan's recognition of Koreans (Chosenese) as having become its nationals -- as well as recognize the rights of Japanese with prefectural registers, who had settled in Chō, to choose ROK nationality and remain in (or return to) Korea.

Japan, too, realized that -- under the conditions that prevailed by the late 1940s -- bilateral choice provisions would not be possible. Japanese with prefectural (Interior) registers had already been compelled -- not given a choice -- to withdraw from Occupied Korea to Occupied Japan (which consisted of the Interior minus a couple of prefectures and small islands). But Japanese with Chōsen registers, if residing in the prefectural Interior when Japan surrendered, had been permitted to remain in Occupied Japan. And they remained under international conditions (in particular the Korean War) that were not conducive to conventional choice provisions.

SCAP's Diplomatic Section -- in particular Sebald -- apparently understood the impossibility of attempting to impose choice provisions on ROK and Japan. Its Legal Section -- in particular Carpenter -- attempted, without success, to interest both parties in what he considered more appropriate solutions to the "nationality" problem that they soon declared was a non-issue.

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Personae dramatis

Many people participated in, or witnessed, the 1951-1952 rounds of talks held between Japan and ROK. Here is a short list of the principal representatives who figured in (1) exchanges between ROK and the US concerning the terms of the peace treaty (see above), and (2) talks between ROK and Japan, sometimes under US observation, concerning Japan-ROK normalization and status of ROK nationals in Japan after enforcement of peace treaty.

In this section I will present from brief to long profiles of some of the people who directly or indirectly participated in the general plenary sessions and/or in the meetings of the Legal Status Subcommittee.

First, though, I will present lists of the 13 Korean and 16 Japanese delegates who attended the 1st Formal Session of the Japan-Korea Conference, convened on 15 February 1952 at Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

The following table is a reformatted and annotated merger of (1) simplified lists included in the body of an English summary of the proceedings of the meeting (KRN 82: 11-12), and (2) separate, more detailed lists, also dated 15 February 1952, showing each conferee's affiliation and name in Sino-Korean or Sino-Japanese, and name in Latin script (KRN 82: 16-18).

The simple lists show only 11 Korean and 15 Japanese conferees, and show Korean names surname first and Japanese names family name last. The detailed lists show 2 more Koreans and 1 more Japanese, and show the names of both Koreans and Japanese surname or family name first. The simple lists show "Mr." before all names, whereas the detailed lists show no honorific suffixes and uses macrons in the romanized names of Japanese delgates.

In the following table, I have shown the names and affiliations as written on the detailed lists. Names not listed in simple lists are highlighted in red. Spellings on simple lists, if different, are highlighted in purple, and one mispelling is noted in blue. The green numbered notes, the abbreviations and English translations of the affiliations, and the (parenthetic) remarks following some of the English, Sino-Korean, or Sino-Japanese affiliations are mine.

Conferees attending 15 February 1945 session of Japan-Korea Conference

Korean Delegates

Amb to US
KDMJ
DC
Korea Univ
Shiksan Bank
MOJ
KDMJ
MOFA
KDMJ
KDMJ
Korea Bank
MOT
MOC
梁祐燦
金溶植
任哲鎬
兪鎮午
林松本
洪璡基
柳泰夏
金東祚
崔圭夏
金泰東
李相徳
黄富吉
池鉄根
YANG You Chan (1)
KIM Yong Shik
YIM Chol Ho (2)
YU Chin O (3)
LIMB Song Bon
HONG Jin-ki
YIU Tai Ha
KIM Dong Jo
CHOI Kyu Hah
KIM Tai Dong
LEE Sang Duk
WHANG Boo Kil
CHEE Shoul Keun
(1) Physician
(2) Attorney
(3) Legal Advisor

Japanese Delegates

MOFA
AGO
MOFA
MOFA
MOFA
MOFA
MOFA
FA
MOT
AGO
RA
ICA
MOFA
MOF
FA
MOT
松本俊一
村上朝一
井口貞夫
西村熊雄
倭島英二
大野勝巳
舟山正吉
塩見友之助
牛島辰彌
平賀健太
川崎一郎
田中三男
千葉皓
石田正
永野正二
国安誠一
MATSUMOTO Shunichi
MURAKAMI Tomokazu
NISHIMURA Kumao
IGUCHI Sadao
WAJIMA Eiji
ŌNO Katsumi (OHONO)
FUNAYAMA Masakichi (Shokichi)
SHIOMI Tomonosuke
USHIJIMA Tatsuya
HIRAGA Kenta
KAWAGE [sic=KAWASAKI] Ichirō Ichiro
TANAKA Mitsuo
CHIBA Kō Koh
ISHIDA Tadashi
NAGANO Shōni Shoni
KUNIYASU Seiichi

Korean ministries and agencies

Amb to US
KDMJ
DC
MOFA
MOJ
MOT
MOC
Korea Univ
Shinsan Bank
Korea Bank
Ambassador to the United States
Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan
Diplomatic Commission
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Commerce
Korea University (formerly Posung College)
Shiksan Bank (former Chosen Shokusan Bank)
Korea Bank (former Chosen Bank)
駐米大使
駐日韓国代理部
外交委員会
外務部
法務部
交通部
商工部
高麗大学 (旧普成専門学校)
殖産銀行 (旧朝鮮殖産銀行)
韓国銀行 (旧朝鮮銀国)

Japanese ministries and agencies

MOFA
AGO
MOF
MOT
ICA
RA
FA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Attorney General's Office (later Ministry of Justice)
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Transportation
Immigration Control Agency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Reparations Agency (1948-2-1 to 1952-4-28)
Fisheries Agency (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry)
外務省
法務府 (後法務省)
大蔵省
運輸省
入国管理庁 (外務省の外局)
賠償庁(昭和23年2月1日〜昭和27年4月28日)
水産庁 (農林省の外局)

List of conferees in ROK archives

The following list of conferees is found in File 77 in ROK archives, immediately after the Korea-side report on the 1st session, held on 20 October 1951, of the preliminary plenary conference (KRN 77: 53-54, NKBK 77: 14-15). However, the names on list are clearly of the officials who particpated in the 1st session, held on 15 Februray 1952, of the main plenary conference, documents for which are found in File 82. The archivists appear to have confused the two conferences.

Republic of Korea delegation

首席代表 駐米大使 梁祐燦
Yang You Chan, head of delegation
Republic of Korea ambassador to the United States

交替首席代表 駐日韓国代表部公使 金溶植
Kim Yong Shik, alternative chief representative
Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, envoy (minister)

代表 外交委員会委員弁護士 任哲鎬
Yim Chol Ho, representative
Diplomatic Commission, member, attorney

高麗大学総長 兪鎮午
Yu Chin O, Korea University, president

殖産銀行頭取 林松本
Limb Song Bon, Shiksan Bank, president

法務部法務局長 洪璡基
Hong Chin Gi, Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs Bureau, director

専門委員 駐日韓国代表部参事官 柳泰夏
Yiu Tai Ha, expert member
Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, councilor

外務部政務局長 金東祚
Kim Dong Jo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Bureau, director

駐日韓国代表部一等書記官 崔圭夏
Choi Kyu Hah, Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, 1st secretary

駐日韓国代表部政務部長 金泰東
Kim Tae Dong, Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, Political Affairs Department, director

韓国銀行調査部長代理 李相徳
Lee Sang Duk, Korea Bank, Investigation Department, director representative
WHANG Boo Kil
CHEE Shoul Keun

交通部海運局長 黄富吉
Whang Boo Kil, Ministry of Transportation, Shipping Bureau, director

商工部水産局漁労課長 池鉄根
Chee Shoul Keun, Department of Commerce, Fisheries Bureau, Fishing Section, director

その他随員員数名
Several other accompanying personnel

Japan delegation

首席代表(全権) 外務省顧問 松本俊一
Matsumoto Shun'ichi, chief delegate (penipoteniary)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs advisor

代表 法務部[sic=法務府]民事局長 村上朝一
Murakami Tomokazu, representative
[ROK] Ministry of Justice[sic = (Japan) Attorney General's Office], Civil Affairs Bureau, director

外務事務次官 井口貞夫
Iguchi Sadao, Foreign affairs, administrative affairs, vice minister

外務省条約局長 西村熊雄
Nishimura Kumao, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Bureau, director

外務省アジア局長 倭島英二
Wajima Eiji, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asia Bureau, director

外務省参事官 大野勝巳
<Ōno Katsumi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, councilor

大蔵事務次官 舟山正吉
Funayama Masakichi, Ministry of Finance, vice minister

水産庁長官 塩見友之助
Shiomi Tomonosuke, Fisheries Agency, director

運輸省事務次官 牛島辰彌
Ushijima Tatsuya, Ministry of Transportation, administrative vice minister

随員 法務府民事局主幹 平賀健太
Hiraga Kenta, accompanying personnel
Attorney General's Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, deputy director

法務府賠償庁次長 河崎一郎
Kawasaki Ichirō, Attorney General's Office, Reparations Agency, deputy director

入国管理庁実施部長 田中三男
Tanaka Mitsuo, Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Agency, Enforcement Department director

外務省参事官 千葉皓
Chiba Kō, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, councilor

大蔵省理財局長 石田正
Ishida Tadashi, Ministry of Finance, Financial Bureau, director

水産庁次長 永野正二
Nagano Shōni [Shōji, Masaji], Fisheries Agency, deputy director

運輸省海運調整部長 国安誠一
Kuniyasu Seiichi, Ministry of Transportation, Shipping Coordination Department, director

その他随員 数名
Several other accompanying personnel

See 20 October 1951 Talks begin with cautious hope for a list of conferees attending the 1st session of the prelimiary plenary conference.

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ROK

Syngman Rhee (李承晩 이승만 I [Yi] Sŭngman 1875-1965)

President of ROK from 1948-1960, which spanned the first four rounds of talks (1951-1959). Not a direct participant but the most powerful voice in early talks.

1897-1904 Imprisoned for demonstrations against Japanese monarchy. Became Christian in prison.

1904 Sent by Yi government to US to represent its interests. He remained long enough to collect a few college degrees.

1910-1912 Returned to Korea after it had become Chōsen, to evangelize as a Methodist minister.

1912 Migrated to Hawaii as headmaster of a Methodist school.

1919-1925 First president of so-called Korean Provisional Government founded in Shanghai during the March 1st Movement of 1919.

1925-1945 Resident in Hawaii and Washington, D.C. after expulsion from KPG. Married Austrian-born Francisca Donner on 8 October 1934 in New York.

1945 Allowed by MacArthur to return to "liberated" Korea, where eventually he and other nationalists set up a new government.

1948 Elected first president of Republic of Korea.

1960 Fled during election scandal to Honolulu, where he lived in exile with his wife and their adopted son until his death.

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Yang You Chan (梁裕燦 량유찬 Ryang Yu Ch'an 1897-1975)

Chief delegate for ROK at both the preliminary talks (1951) and main talks (1952) of the 1st round of ROK-Japan talks (1951-1952). Then ROK's ambassador to the United States and its chief negotiator with SCAP and Japan.

Yang, born in Pusan in the Empire of Korea in 1897, he migrated to Honolulu with his parents in 1903, graduated from McKinley High School in Honolulu, attended the University of Hawaii for a while before going to Boston University. After finishing medical school, he practiced in Honolulu, where he was instrumental in building the Korean Christian Church in the city. He was living in Honolulu when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Syngman Rhee also lived in Honolulu, and Yang, who was once his personal physician, became a close friend. In 1951, Rhee appointed Yang as ROK ambassador to the United States, and in 1954 Yang also became ROK's chief delegate to the United Nations for the Ninth General Assembly sessions. Rhee also asked Yang, who shared his anti-Japanese views, to head ROK's delegation to the 1951-1952 ROK-Korea talks in Tokyo, where he faithfully defend Rhee's hard line vis-a-vis Japan.

Yang was barely 6 years old when he left the Empire of Korea in 1903, a year before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, during and after which Japan became significantly involved in Korea's domestic and international affairs. He never lived in Chōsen or other parts of Japan during the annexation years, and was all but an alien in his country of nationality.

Yang resigned when Rhee's government fell in 1960, he but stayed in Washington, D.C., where in 1975 he died of cancer at George Washington Hospital. He was buried, however, in the National Cemetery in Seoul.

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Yu Chin O (兪鎮午 유진오 1906-1987)

Yu Chin O was the legal advisor (法律顧問 hōritsu komon) to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (駐日代表部 Chū-Nichi Daiyō Bu). He was one of the leading ROK delegates in the 1951-1952 round of ROK-Japan talks.

Yu graduated in literature and law from Keijō Imperial University (京城帝国大学) in 1929. He became active as a proletarian writer while in college, and was later a novelist of the "pure literature" school. In the early 1930s, he continued to write while teaching law at Keijō University. He became the head of the law department of Posung College (普成専門学校), also in Keijō (Seoul), from 1939, a post he appears to have held until the end of World War II.

Yu was known as a "Japanophile" (親日派), and during the war, he published articles in Korean and Japanese, supporting the recruitment of Chosenese soldiers and predicting that Japan would win. After the war, he was active in the establishment of the Republic of Korea, participated in the creation of its Constitution and laws, and in 1948 he was the head of its justice department.

Yu Chin O was appointed the legal advisor to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan in 1951, and in 1952, while still serving in this post, he became the president of Korea University (高麗大学), which had founded in 1946 from Posung College. Yu later became a politician, and supported the 1961 government of Park Chung Hee after Park's coup d'etat in 1960.

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Karl Hongkee (葛弘基 갈홍기 Kal Hong Gi 1906-1989)

Karl Hongkee -- aka Karl Hong Kee -- was usually referred to as "Dr." (博士) in English (Korean, Japanese) documents related to the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks. In 1934, Karl had received a PhD from the Department of Comparative Religion at the University of Chicago for a dissertation titled A Critical evaluation of modern social trends in Korea.

Karl taught at a number of schools, and after the Pacific War -- as one of many other Koreans who had known Shygman Rhee in the United States -- he became involved in Rhee's efforts to rebuild Korea.

Karl had taught at number of schools and colleges before becoming an ROK government councilor (参事官) with Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan. As such was valued for his knowledge of America and English in addition to his patriotism.

After the Korean War, President Rhee -- stung by criticism in The Korea Times, an English-language paper launched with state support in November 1950, five months into the Korean War -- decided to start a state-sponsored English paper called The Korean Republic. This paper debuted in August 1953 as a 4-page tabloid, but by 1961 it was a full-size broadsheet, and in 1965 it became The Korea Herald.

Karl was the editor of The Korean Republic during its first year. From February 1955 to July 1956, he served as the first head (長 장 chang) of the newly created Office of Public Information (公報室 공보실 Kongbosil). During this period, he authored a number of books in English on Korea, and on Syngman Rhee, all published by this goovernment office. One of books on Rhee is an account of Rhee's 20-day visit to America in 1954, when Rhee spoke before the joint session of the U.S. Congress and made speeches in a number of cities. For Rhee, who had lived in the United States for about 3 decades, it was more like a homecoming.

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Kim Yong Shik (金溶植 김용식 Kim Yongsik 1913-1995)

Kim was born in Chōsen in 1913, educated through high school on the peninsula, and in 1937 graduated from Chūō University in Tokyo. His Yamato-style name was Kanemoto Yoki (金本溶植).

Kim joined ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1949, and after brief stints as a counsul in Hawaii and general consul in Hong Kong, he was posted to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ).

As KDMJ's chief minister, Kim was a representative of the ROK delegation to preliminary ROK-Japan talks from October to December 1951, and was the alternative chief delegate for ROK at the 1st formal conference from February to April 1952. He then became the chief delegate for ROK at the 2nd (April-July 1953) and 3rd (October 1953) rounds.

Kim twice served as ROK's Minister of Foreign Affairs, first briefy from 16 March to 16 December 1963, then from 4 June 1971 to 2 December 1973. In his second posting, he was succeeded by Kim Dong Jo, whose diplomatic career centered on Japan.

During the 1960s, before and after his first stint as foreign minister, he served as ROK's ambassador to Great Britain, the Philippines, and Canada (and the United Nations). From April 1977 to June 1981, he was ROK's ambassador to the United States.

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Kim Dong Jo (金東祚 김 동 조 Kim Tong Jo 1918-2004)

Participated in 1st round of talks (1951-1952) as director of ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Policy Bureau (外務部政務局 외무부 정무국 K. Oemubu Chŏmuguk, J. Gaimubu Seimukyoku).

Participated in 4th round of talks (1958-1960) as ROK's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Participated in final 7th round of talks (1964-1965) as head of ROK's delegation while serving as ROK's plenipotentiary representative in Tokyo.

Born, raised, and totally educated in Japan

Kim represents an ROK official who, unlike Yang and of course also Rhee, had been born, raised, and totally educated in Japan inclusive of Chōsen. Born in Pusan in 1918, Kim graduated from Keijō Higher School of Commerce (京城高等商業学校 Keijō Kōtō Shōgyō Gakkō). Then under the control of the Government-General of Chōsen, this school, established in 1922 from an institute founded in 1907, was briefly closed after World War II but soon reopened as a Korean vocational school of economics, and in 1946 it became the school of commerce of the newly created Seoul University.

After graduating from the Keijō high school, Kim entered the law department of Kyūshū Imperial University in Fukuoka, and after graduating, having passed the higher civil service exam while still a student, he joined the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Ministry of Home affairs. He was working in Kyoto when Japan surrendered, and Chōsen was liberated as Korea, in 1945. Kim then returned to the peninsula and became involved in the foreign affairs of the emerging ROK government, which was formally established in 1948.

In the course of his career as an ROK official, Kim was ROK's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, its ambassador to Japan, its ambassador to the United States, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs (1973-1975) under President Park Chung Hee (Pak Chŏ Hŭi).

Kim participated in the Preliminary (1951), 1st (1952), 4th (1958-1960), and 7th (1964-1965) ROK-Japan normalization conferences. He was ROK's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the 4th conference, and its chief negotiator at the 7th (and final) conference from 3 December 1964 to 3 April 1965, during which time he was ROK's ambassador to Japan.

Kim signed the 1965 ROK-Japan normalization treaty, status agreement, and other agreements and protocols as as the second of ROK's two plenipotentiaries, the first being ROK's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Their Japanese counterparts signed for Japan.

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Robert T. Oliver (1909-2000)

The Republic of Korea had a number of officials who were fluent in English as a result of educations and life in the United States, some of them -- like Syngman Rhee himself -- active in the Korean Provisional Government, which considered itself Korea's government in exile.

Rhee and KPG also had a number of publicists for the cause of Korean independence, one of whom was Robert Tarbell Oliver (1909-2000), a professor of speech at Pennsylvania State University who became an adviser to Syngman Rhee and served the Korean government for several while at PSU. Oliver was a passionate advocate and lobbyist for Korea's independence from 1942 to 1960.

Oliver's 1944 book, Korea: Forgotten Nation (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press), had an introduction by Syngman Rhee, with whom he had become friends. He urged the United States to recognize the Korean Provisional Government, and after the Pacific War he sharply and prolifically criticized America's failure to insist on a unified Allied occupation of Korea and expedient assumption of control and jurisdiction of the entire peninsula by KPG's successor, namely ROK.

In 1947, Oliver became the manager of the Washington Bureau of the Korean Pacific Press, which was registered with the United States Attorney General as a foreign agent. At the time of his participation in the ROK-Japan talks in 1951, he was also the editor of Korean Survey, a monthly magazine on unification, political, and economic issues in Korea, published by the Korean Affairs Institute and Korean Pacific Press.

Oliver had anticipated the Korean War as the inevitable consequence of the United States giving in to Soviet demands that its military commander be allowed accept Japan's surrender of Korea north of the 38th parallel. A year before the start of the ROK-Japan talks in 1951, he published Why War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham University Press, 1950), in which made the following comments about Koreans in Japan (pages 239-241).

  In Korea, where the exploitation of the country and the people for the benefit of Japanese had been severest, suspicion and dislike of Japan persist. The feelings have been accentuated by ill treatment of the 600,000 Koreans who still reside in Japan. They have neither been accorded the special privileges granted to "Allied nationals" resident in Japan since the war, nor the same basic rights as Japanese citizens. This has continued to be a point of sharp dissension during the past five years. President Rhee has made it one of his prime objects to try to solve the difficulties. Korea's first trade treaty was a $90-million-dollar trade agreement with Japan, negotiated in 1949 through SCAP.

  This attempt to build a future of cooperative understanding was most clearly formalized by President Rhee in a statement he issued in Tokio, on February 16, 1950, as he arrived there for conferences with General MacArthur:

  "I myself have never been known as a friend of Japan. Nevertheless, the present situation requires reaching a common understanding between the Korean and Japanese people for their common safety in facing their common danger arising from the growing Communist expansion directed chiefly toward the Pacific areas. Instead of quarreling over the unhappy past, if the Japanese realize their danger as we do and are willing to cooperate with us in fighting for life and liberty not only of Japan and Korea but of all Pacific nations, we certainly can solve any problems existing between us."

  The problems which President Rhee had primarily in mind are three-fold:

  (I) Rights of Korean residents in Japan. At the conclusion of the war, approximately a million and a half Korean residents in Japan, most of whom had been taken there unwillingly for war service, were repatriated. The remaining 600,000 have property or other interests in Japan which make them desirous, for the time being at least, of remaining. The Japanese charge that many of these Koreans are black marketeers, trouble makers, and Communists. The Korean government points out that their language schools have been closed, their properties hedged by unique restrictions, and their status remains largely undefined.

This is a generally correct statement, though "half of whom" would probably be more accurate than "most of whom" as a measure of how many had come to the prefectures as conscript laborers. The population of Chosenese in the Interior at the end of 1944 was 1,936,843 -- and is believed to have peaked at around 2,100,000 sometime in 1945. However, when the war came to the prefectures of the main islands in the spring of 1945 in the form of regular and devastating air raids on major cities, and with increasing anticipation of Japan's defeat, Koreans began returning to the peninsula before the end of the war. Oliver's characterization of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan who remained as having remained because they had "property and other interests" there which made them "desirous, for the time being at least, of remaining" is a very reasonable appraisal of the ambivalence of Koreans who had good reasons to stay in Japan as well as reasons to want to be Korea.

  (2) Trade relations [ omitted here ]

  (3) Korean claims for indemnity from Japan [ omitted here ]

Oliver's book-length publications about Korea include these titles.

1944   Korea: Forgotten Nation, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press
1950   Why War Came in Korea, New York: Fordham University Press
1951   The Truth About Korea, London: Putman
1952   Verdict in Korea, State College, Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle Press
1954   Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, New York: Dodd Mead and Co.
1993   A History of the Korean People in Modern Times: 1800 to the Present, Newark: University of Delaware Press

Oliver also edited Yung Tai Pyun's Korea, My Country (Washington, D.C.: Library of International Speech, Korean Pacific Press, 1953), and wrote extensively on speech and communication in Asia, including India and China.

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Japan

Iguchi Sadao (井口貞夫 1899-1980)

Chief delegate for Japan at preliminary talks (1951), and also participated in main talks (1952), of 1st round of ROK-Japan talks as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (from 30 January 1950).

As a councilor at the Japanese Embassy, Washington, D.C. on 7 December 1941, Iguchi has been blamed for the delay in Japan's declaration of war on the United States until after the start of its attack on Pearl Harbor.

Iguchi's wife was a daughter of Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤 謙吉 1874-1965), a career diplomat who was serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs when Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (犬養毅 1855-1932), his father-in-law, was assassinated in 1932. Yoshizawa's grandchildren include a number of diplomats, including Ogata Sadako (緒方貞子 b1927). Yoshizawa held posts all over Asia (particularly China) and in Europe (especially France), but was more of an Asian specialist. During the Pacific War he served as ambassador to French Indochina, most of which Japan had occupied, partly with the permission of the Vichy French government. His last diplomatic post was as ambassador to the Republic of China, on Taiwan, in 1952.

Iguchi's son, Iguchi Takeo (井口武夫), after his own career in the Foreign Ministry, became a professor of international law and politics. He has devoted much of his academic life to defending his father from blame for Japan's failure to inform the United States of its war intentions before it attacked Pearl Harbor.

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Chiba Kō (千葉皓)

Alternative chief delegate for Japan at preliminary talks (1951) of 1st round of ROK-Japan talks. Then Administrative Official of Foreign Affairs.

Chiba was a Councilor at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. on 7 December 1941. He shared the blame for the delay in translating Japan's declaration of war for presentation to the United States before the commencement of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Promoted to Vice Foreign Minister on 30 January 1950. His wife was a daughter of Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山 1884-1973), a journalist and politician, who served as prime minister in 1956-1957 but resigned after only two months in office after suffering a stroke.

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Matsumoto Shun'ichi (松本俊一 1897-1987)

Head of Japan's delegation at main talks (1952) of 1st round of ROK-Japan talks. Matsumoto, the most seasoned and experienced Japanese negotiator in the first rounds, was a career bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he held both political (vice-minister) and diplomatic (ambassador) posts. In the late 1950s, he was elected to the House of Representatives.

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Tanaka Mitsuo (田中光男)

Tanaka Mitsuo (田中三男) was the Director of the Enter-country [Immigration] Control Division of the Control Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省管理局入国管理部長) from 19 August 1950 to 1 October 1950. His title was Foreign Affairs Secretary (外務事務官).

From 1 October 1950, the Control Bureau became the Enter-exit-country [Immigration] Agency (出入国管理庁) of the Foreign Ministry. Suzuki Hajime (鈴木一) was appointed its 1st General director (長官). From 1 November 1951, the agency was renamed Enter-country [Immigration] Control Agency, and Suzuki continued to be its director. He remained the head of the agency when it was transfered to the Ministry of Justice (as the Attorney General's Office was renamed) from 1 August 1952, and he continued to serve as its head, with the title of Judicial Affairs Secretary (法務事務官), until 29 June 1954.

When Suzuki replaced Tanaka as the head of the new agency in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1 October 1950, Tanaka became the director of the agency's 1st Division, which oversaw planning, investigations, policing, illegal entrants, facilities for holding detainees, and deportation. The 2nd Division oversaw border control at ports of entry and exit, alien registration, and related records and statistics.

Tanaka also appears to have been involved in Foreign Ministry protocol related to the visitations of ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to Japan, including those posted to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo during the ROK-Japan talks. Tanaka is named as the addressee of a communication from the 2nd Section of the Asia Bureau of ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 7 January 1952, concerning the arrival in Japan of representatives of ROK's delegation. This would have been right after the 1951-1952 holiday recess, and just before the talks were reconvened from mid January. (国会図書館、日韓国交正常化問題資料、第1期 (1945年〜1953年) 第1巻 [54], page 2ff)

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Hiraga Kenta (平賀健太 1912-2004)

Participated in preliminary talks (1951) of 1st round of ROK-Japan talks as a main liner in the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Attorney General's Office (AGO). Hiraga also participated in the 4th through final 7th round -- in the 4th round from the 5th round as the director of the Civil Affairs Bureau in what by the fall of 1952 had become the Ministry of Justice.

Hiraga was AGO's resident expert on nationality law. His participation in the 1951 preliminary talks, as well as in later talks, is significant because in October 1950, several months before the first drafts of the peace treaty, and in October 1951, when the preliminary talks of the 1st round of ROK-Japan talks began, he published Kokusekihō [Nationality Law], the two-volume study that remained the bible of nationality law in Japan until the 1970s. See Hiraga 1950-1952 for review.

Hiraga's Diet testimony on Koreans in Japan, especially in 1963, during the 6th rounds, is also extremely important in understanding how Japan's legal bureaucrats viewed nationality, especially the status of Koreans in Japan. See 1963 Hiraga and Nakagaki testimony for transcription and partial translation.

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Nishimura Kumao (西村熊雄 1899-1980)

Participated in main talks (1952) of 1st round of ROK-Japan talks as director of treaty bureau.

Nishimura, a career diplomat, was secretary at Japanese Embassy to France, in Treaty Bureau from 1937, General Consul at Hanoi from 1944, then chief of Treaty Bureau from 1947 to 1952. He participated in the Peace Conference in San Francisco as an accompanying member of Japan's plenipotentiary delegation, and from 1952 to 1956 he was posted to France as an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

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United States

George Atcheson (1896-1947)

George Atcheson Jr. (1896-1947) -- first Political Adviser (POLAD) from the U.S. State Department to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Occupied Japan, and wearing the same shoes but a different hat the chief of the Diplomatic Section (DS) of GHQ/SCAP -- figures in the story of the 1951-1952 ROK Japan talks in the perverse sense of having died in on 17 August 1947 -- a full year before ROK was born. His death en route to Washington, D.C. on official business -- in the crash of a B-17 near Hawaii -- made it possible for his legal adviser, William Sebald, who was not a career Department of State (DOS) foreign service officer (FSO), to become the acting and then actual POLAD and DS chief -- positions he would hold until the end of the Occupation in 1952.

Atcheson became DOS's POLAD to SCAP from 7 September 1945, the chief of DS when it was created in 18 April 1946, and from 22 April 1946 he also represented SCAP and Japan on the Allied Council. A graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, then a journalist, be became a student translator at the U.S. legation in Peiping in 1920. From 1924 to 1939, he served as a diplomat in China. In 1941 he became the assistant chief of DOS's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and from 1942 he served as the charge d'affaires at the U.S. embassy in Chungking (Chongqing), where the Republic of China had set up its government in exile, after Japan's invasion of China in 1937 and its advance up the Yangtze River in 1938.

(Sources: Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 1965, and National Diet Library, 人物紹介 (Jinbutsu shōkai) (Historical Figures) [involved in the birth of the Constitution of Japan].

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Dean G. Acheson (1893-1971)

Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971), and attorney and statesman, was the U.S. Secretary of State from 21 January 1949 to 20 January 1953, during the Truman administration. He was succeeded by John Foster Dulles (see next), who was instrumental in drafting the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan in 1951.

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John Foster Dulles (1888-1959)

Consultant to the Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary of State

The chief architect, with Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru, of the drafting and completion of the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan in 1951.

Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959 under Dwight Eisenhower.

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William J. Sebald (1901-1980)

In 1946, Sebald became the legal adviser to George Atcheson (1896-1947), the State Department's Political Adviser (POLAD) to SCAP and also chief of the Diplomatic Section (DS) of GHQ/SCAP. Sebald became the acting POLAD and DS chief in 1947 when Atcheson died, and the actual POLAD and DS chief, with the title of Ambassador, in 1948.

Sebald arranged for U.S. special envoy John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) to meet Japanese party leaders four times in February 1951.

He appealed to his friend Okazaki Katsuo (岡崎勝男 1897-1965), the chief secretary of the Cabinet, who took a message to Yoshida, who appointed Iguchi Sadao (井口貞夫 1899-1980), a foreign ministry official who participated in the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks, as deputy-minister in charge of treaty negotiations.

Sebald wanted ROK's participation in the peace treaty talks but Japan and UK objected because Korea was not a member of the Allied Powers.

An expert among experts

Sebald, a bilingual attorney, had been a Japanese language officer with the U.S. Navy in Japan in the 1920s, and as a civilian had practiced and translated law in Kobe in the 1930s before being suspected of spying on Japanese naval operations and forced to leave Japan in 1939 with his wife, a former Japanese national who had become stateless. The law office in Kobe was that of his late father-in-law, a former British subject who married a Japanese woman and become a Japanese national.

During the Pacific War, Sebald again served in the U.S. Navy, this time as an intelligence officer. After the war, in January 1946, he arrived in Occupied Japan, as a civilian, to begin his assignment as the legal adviser to George Atcheson, the State Department's Political Adviser (POLAD) to SCAP. He quickly became Atcheson's assistant, and when Atcheson died in a plane crash near Hawaii on 17 August 1947, Sebald, then the deputy chairman of the Allied Council for Japan, became acting POLAD. From October 1948, he was appointed POLAD with the rank of minister, and served in this post for the duration of the Occupation of Japan.

Sebald was arguably the most important figure in the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks in that he brokered the talks, established the basic objectives and ground rules, pronounced the somewhat reluctant couple engaged, and then stood back and let them negotiate a prenuptial agreement that hopefully would enable them to consummate their relationship on or shortly after the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952.

See J. E. De Becker becomes Kobayashi Beika (1863-1929) for details about his British-turned-Japanese father-in-law.

See Fully stateless Edith Sebald (1902-1981) for details about De Becker / Kobayashi's daughter, who Sebald married before going to law school,

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Alva C. Carpenter (1902-1979)

Alva C. [Clinton] Carpenter -- a "tall, square-jawed" Fort Wayne, Indiana corporation lawyer -- was the head of the Legal Section (LS) within the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). While leading investigations in Occupied Japan of war crimes, and developing cases against persons tried of war crimes in tribunals convened in Occupied Japan, he and his office also dealt with other legal matters, and advising SCAP and other sections in GHQ, including the Sebald's Diplomatic Section, about all manner of legal matters.

Carpenter, a U.S. Army Colonel, was instrumental in opposing, on legal and humanitarian grounds, plans some SCAP and Japanese Government officials were discussing to deport substantial numbers of "undesirable" (especially subversive) Koreans in Japan to the Republic of Korea (Simon Nantais, Koreans and the Politics of Nationality and Race During the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952, Chapter 4: Attempts to Deport Koreans in Japan to the Republic of Korea, 1948-1951, 2011 doctoral dissertation, pages 92-115).

On 22 October 1951, the day of 2nd conferences in the ROK-Japan talks, Carpenter, who attended some of the talks, conveyed to William J. Sebald, chief of the Diplomatic Section, which had set up and then observed the talks, his apprehensions about the apparent intent of ROK and Japan not to make provisions for nationality choice such as those which had been made in the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy between Italy and the Allied Powers in the European theater of World War II, beginning with the Big Four -- France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Kim Taegi, among others, refers Carpenter's memorandum to Sebald (Kim Taegi 1997, page 789, note 45, "Memorandum for Chief, DS from Alva C. Carpenter, Subj.: Japan-Korean Nationality Conference, 22 October 1951, [320. Japan-Korea], RG 84, POLAD (Tokyo) CGR 1950-1952, WNRC").

Carpenter, however, was especially aware of the possibility that "subversive" Koreans in Japan -- who ranked high on some people's lists of deportable "undesirable" Koreans -- might intentionally chose to remain Japanese precisely in order not to be deported to ROK, which held them in even less esteem, according to Simon Nantais, who cites him as having made the following statement in a memorandum (Nantais 2011, page 111, note 79, "NDL-GHQ, TS 327, file 85, 'Deportation of Subversive Aliens,' memo from E.C.E [E.C. Ewert], Chairman, to Chief of Staff, G-2, JA, and LS, 11 August 1951", Nantais's italics and [brackets]).

If the Japanese authorities can render decisions as to the true nationality status of a majority of these persons and if it appears that the worst of the subversives have not deliberately retained their Japanese nationality, which could be the case, thus making it impossible to deport the very ones against whom action should be taken[,] then it appears logical to proceed with the mechanism as recommended originally by the Committee (Note 79).

Sebald, though, had already decided that SCAP had no standing in the talks, other than as an observer. I also get the impression that the realist Sebald, unlike the idealist Carpenter, understood that treaties of the kind the Allied Powers had signed with Italy, in which status and treatment provisions were reciprocal, would not have worked in the case of Japan and ROK, which fundamentally disagreed over whether Koreans in Japan were still, at the time of their talks, Japanese, if ever they had truly become Japanese.

Nantais makes the following observation about Carpenter's 22 October 1951 memo to Sebald (Nantais 2011, page 127, note 46, "NDL-GHQ, LS 24687 [microfiche file], folder 32, 'Japan-Korea Nationality Conference,' memo from Alva C. Carpenter to Diplomatic Section, Chief, 22 October 1951."

Legal Section's Carpenter warned Diplomatic Section that this agreement would constitute the arbitrary deprivation of Japanese nationality and the forced naturalization of the Koreans. Moreover, the extension of Korean nationality to Koreans who were born in Japan or with little connection to Korea other than ancestral ties troubled Carpenter. There were, of course, legal grounds for the deprivation of nationality, but these were usually enacted on a case-by-case basis rather than the wholesale expatriation of an ethnic group, as both sides contemplated. The ROK's proposal to forcibly naturalize all Koreans based solely on their ethnic origin was truly problematic. Carpenter recommended a solution based on the Italian Peace Treaty since this would fall within established legal international norms. Since SCAP was not actively involved in the deliberations of the nationality conference, Carpenter suggested that the State Department be notified of the problem. (Note 46)

Not having seen a copy of Carpenter's memorandum, I don't know if Nantais's remarks accurately reflect Carpenter's metaphors or his own (Nantais's) understanding of the issues. Therms like "arbitrary deprivation" and "forced naturalization" and "expatriation of an ethnic group" would not have found a receptive audience on either side of the ROK-Japan table.

Japan regarded the Japanese nationality of Chosenese (Koreans) and Taiwanese (Formosans) in Japan as linked with the territorial status of Chōsen (Korea) and Taiwan (Formosa). The territorial separations of Chōsen and Taiwan from Japan, that would become effective under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, meant that Japan would no longer have a legal basis for attributing its nationality to the people affiliated with these territories -- Chosenese and Taiwanese -- who therefore, concomitant with the territorial separations, would separate from -- i.e., lose -- the nationality of Japan.

ROK, for its part, insisted that all Koreans in Japan were already ROK nationals whether they liked it or not -- Japan insisted -- and eventually got its way -- that individual Koreans in Japan should choose whether they wanted to be ROK nationals. In the meantime, having lost Japan's nationality, they would have the choice of living in Japan as aliens or seeking permission to naturalize as Japanese in accordance with established legal procedures.

While ROK officially, according to its Constitution and some of its laws -- and Japan unofficially, according to common ethnonationalist sentiments -- regarded Koreans as a "[racioethnic] nation" or "minzoku" (民族) -- legally, the "Koreans in Japan" who were objects of the bilateral talks constituted a cohort defined by family register status -- a purely civil attribute that made one a "national" or "kokumin" (国民) of the state having control and jurisdiction over one's household register -- an ROK national hence "Korean" if in an ROK registers, a national of Japan hence "Japanese" if in a Japanese register. This is clear from the definitions agreed to by both parties.

SCAP was actively involved to the extent of convening the bilateral talks and continuing to observe them. SCAP's observers appear to have been welcome by both party's, who undoubtedly saw their presence as a stabilizing factor. Many of the conferences were, in fact, convened at SCAP's Diplomatic Section.have written reports of the give and take they witnessed, -- which constituted certain amount of pressure on the parties to comport themselves. Beyond this, SCAP did not have the authority to tell either Japan or ROK what do do regarding the their considerations of status and treatment -- from which the issue of "nationality" was quickly eliminated as a non-issue.

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Richard B. Finn (1917-1998)

Second most important member of Diplomatic Section. Assigned to duties in Japan, mainly in the State Department's office in Tokyo, from 1947-1954. From 1949 he served stints as a consul in Yokohama for a year and in Sapporo for half a year, took a brief home leave, and was back in Tokyo from early 1951, in time to be a "briefcase carrier" ("bag carrier") during the drafting of the peace treaty. The treaty was largely the work of John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson, but the Diplomatic Section, in particular Finn's boss, William Sebald, was deeply involved in liaison between Dulles and Japan's prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967).

Charles Stuart Kennedy, of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, interviewed Finn on 8 April 1991. The interview has been published since his Finn's death in 1998. See "Oral History Interviews" on ADST website or direct link Richard B. Finn for pdf file. The following information is extracted from the 1991 ADST interview.

Richard Boswell Finn was born 1917 in Niagara Falls, New York, where he also grew up. He studied classics at Harvard College and was in his senior year at Harvard Law School when the Pacific War began. He joined US Navy in 1942 and from the summer of that year he studied Japanese at the U.S. Navy Japanese Language School (JLS) at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

After a year at JLS he served in Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines, and was stationed in Japan for about 3 months immediately after the end of the war. He was then assigned to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), in Washington, D.C., which he described as "a policy making organization of the Allied Powers for dealing with occupied Japan" (1991 interview, page 3). As a member of FEC, we was "the secretary of the committees of the Far Eastern Commission that dealt with the constitution and legal reform, which was something that a legal background was useful for" (1991 ADST interview, page 4)

He took the FSO (Foreign Service Officer) exam in December 1945. In the summer of 1946, the State Department accepted him as an FSO, after which he left the Navy and the Far Eastern Commission and began training at the Foreign Service Institute. He was hoping he might be sent to Europe, but in September 1947, he was back in Japan, at the Department of State's Tokyo office, by which time "diplomatic relations had solidified into the semi-Cold War relationship between the Russians and the rest of the diplomatic community" (1991 ADST interview, page 8).

The State Department's office in Occupied Japan had two titles, he said. "One was the Political Adviser's Office (POLAD) -- as such we were a State Department Office -- and the State Department representative in Japan to MacArthur's Headquarters. MacArthur would accept the State Department's office only on condition that it be a SCAP military headquarters office under his control and it was called in that capacity the Diplomatic Section. So the office and the man in charge really had two hats -- the State Department hat and the MacArthur Headquarter's hat" (1991 ADST interview, page 5).

MacArthur did not permit "POLAD" alias "Diplomatic Section" to communicate with the State Department through telegraphic messages. Airmail exchanges were possible. But MacArthur's General Headquarters knew practically everything the State Department's office in Japan did -- unlike its counterpart in Germany, which had considerable autonomy.

Finn on "Korean minority" in Japan

Finn considered his work in the Diplomatic Section on the "Korean minority" in Japan his main contribution to the Occupation (1991 ADST interview, pages 6-7).

Richard B. Finn on "Korean minority" in Japan

Q [Charles Stuart Kennedy]:   Well, what sort of things were you doing?

FINN:   We had a political section, a consular section, and an administration section. We were, for want of a better description, the substitute foreign office for the government of Japan. Japan had no foreign relations, no foreign representatives. They couldn't communicate with the Japanese nationals in Brazil, for example, or anywhere. We did all that work for them.

My own work was more semi-political, political-diplomatic. The Japanese had all kinds of problems with their relations with foreign countries. The neutral nations of World War II, for instance, had not been at war with Japan. At first Japan wanted to deal with them. That was not permitted. Anything Japan wanted to do through its Foreign Office involving foreign matters had to go through our office. I did a lot of work on the Korean minority in Japan, which was a knotty problem.

Q:   It still is.

FINN:   Yes. Then there was the Taiwanese minority. There were a lot of Japanese scattered around Southeast Asia and in China. I suppose the main contribution that I made was to try to work out some kind of arrangement that would take care of the Korean problem. One, to minimize friction with the Japanese and two, to encourage the Koreans to go back and live in Korea. MacArthur decided about half way through the occupation, and I think rather wisely, that the United States ought not to be solving Japan's problem with the Korean minority..

The Japanese would have loved to put them all on a ship and send them to Korea and not let them back into Japan. We didn't believe in doing that. They had the rights of liberated people in Japan. But the Korean minority was a rather activist, if not obstreperous, group in Japan and to some extent still is. They were hard to handle. MacArthur said that we are going to just get along with this problem and let the Japanese handle it when a peace treaty comes along. Similarly with the Taiwanese minority..

My own opinion was that it has been very good for Japan to have a minority. One of Japan's great problems in the world is its isolation and lack of easy relationship with the outside world. Japan had, of course, nurtured this isolation for centuries. Many of the Koreans were born in Japan and have lived all their life there. The Japanese are bit by bit doing much better with the Korean problem but they are a long way from treating the Koreans equally and fairly.

Finn's appraisal of Sebald

Finn made the following remarks about his boss, William J. Sebald, in a response to how people behaved after 11 April 1951, when President Truman relieved MacArthur of all his commands, including is positions as SCAP and as the Commander of United Nations forces in Korea, for publicly advocating actions in the Korean War that were contrary to U.S. policy (1991 ADST interview, page 14).

Richard B. Finn on William J. Sebald)

Q [Charles Stuart Kennedy]:   When MacArthur went [left Japan] then everybody wasn't running around wringing their hands.

FINN:   No, I wouldn't say that. Bill Sebald, who was my boss, the head of the office, was certainly concerned. Just a word about Sebald: he was an Annapolis graduate, became a language officer in Japan [in the 1920s], was in the Navy during the [Pacific] war as an intelligence officer; he [had] left the Navy in the mid-30s [sic = late 1920s] to become a lawyer in Japan where his father-in-law had been a prominent British [then Japanese] commercial lawyer and had a Japanese wife. Sebald rejoined the US Navy after the war started and became an intelligence officer. The State Department hired him after the war and sent him out [to Japan] in late 1945 as a lawyer to serve in the diplomatic section. When the man who was the head of it, a China expert, George Atcheson, was killed in a plane crash in 1947, MacArthur said he wanted Sebald for the job. The State Department didn't want Sebald for the job, of course, because he was not a State Department career man. They wanted to put Maxwell Hamilton in. But MacArthur's view prevailed. So Sebald was somewhat beholden to MacArthur. The State Department didn't make an issue of his appointment. Dulles thought well of Sebald. Sebald made his own reputation and did not have to depend on MacArthur to stay in his job.

Finn's narrative is a little shaky. Sebald's father-in-law had become a Japanese national through his marriage to a Japanese woman. Sebald's wife -- "Edith Francis Kobayashi (de Becker)" on their 1927 American Consular Service Certificate of Marriage -- was born Japanese but became stateless and wouldn't become a U.S. citizen until 1947. See William J. Sebald for an overview of Sebald's life and links to articles about his father-in-law and wife.

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William H. Sullivan (1922-2013)

William Healy Sullivan (1922-2013), after graduating from Brown University in 1943, joined the Navy, and was gunnery officer on the USS Hambleton, a destroyer on which he saw service in the North Atlantic and North Africa, the invasions of Normandy and Okinawa, and was with the Hamilton when it arrived in Tokyo Bay and Yokohama on 28 August 1945 in time to witness Japan's surrender on 2 September.

After studying at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and at Harvard, he entered the foreign service, and briefly served in Thailand and India before being assigned to POLAD alias Diplomatic Section, GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo. He was Sebald's pick to be SCAP's regular observer at the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks, and as such he was probably the most qualified American to write an eye-witness account of talks -- but didn't.

Sullivan then served in several brief European posts before becoming the U.S. ambassador to Laos in 23 December 1964, shortly after the Tonkin Gulf incident that sparked the Vietnam War. He served in Laos until 18 March 1969, then served a stint as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State involved in Southeast Asian affairs. He was the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines from 1973 to 1977, and to Iran from 1977 to 1979 during the final years of the Shah government. His only book is an account of what happened in Iran during his years there (William Sullivan, Mission to Iran, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981).

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Charles A. Willoughby (1892-1972)

Charles A. [Andrew] Willoughby was Adolf Charles Weidenbach when he migrated from Germany to the United States in 1910. Comissioned in the U.S. Army during World War I, he was Douglas MacArthur's chief intelligence officer during the Pacific War. MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in Occupied Japan, made Willoughby -- by then a Major General -- the chief of G-2, the Intelligence arm of SCAP's General Headquarters in Tokyo. He would be MacArthur's intelligence officer during the first few months of the Korean War.

An ardent anti-Communist, Willoughby spent a lot of time during his years in Occupied Japan suppressing groups of Koreans in Japan who supported Kim Il Sung's Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in North Korea, and scheming up ways to deport as many "undesirable" (subversive) Koreans as possible (Simon Nantais, Koreans and the Politics of Nationality and Race During the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952, Chapter 4: Attempts to Deport Koreans in Japan to the Republic of Korea, 1948-1951, 2011 doctoral dissertation, pages 92-115)

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John J. Muccio (1900-1989)

John J. [Joseph] Muccio was America's 1st ambassador to the Republic of Korea. He first served in the post as Special Representative of the President, under U.S. President Harry Truman, with the title Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. He became an ambassador by title on 20 April 1949, and held the post until 8 September 1952.

Muccio was in constant touch with the Diplomatic Section of GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo over issues that involved Koreans in the Republic of Korea, and Koreans in Occupied Japan. During his tenure, he witnessed the Korean War from its start in June 1950 through its most critical phases, and twice had to evacuate Seoul and operate out of Pusan.

Muccio was born in Italy, and entered the U.S. Foreign Service as a Consular Assistant after graduating from college in the early 1920s. In the late 1920s he was a U.S. Consul in Hong Kong, and the severed in Shanghai and other parts of China, and in Bolivia and Panama. He was part of the U.S. Mission to Germany from May 1945 until April 1947, and he first met Truman at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. He again met Truman in July 1948, and the following month he arrived in as Truman's Special Representative to the government of the Republic of Korea, which formally became a sovereign state on 15 August 1948.

Muccio made the following observation of his early work in Korea, in the 1st of 3 "oral history" interviews conducted by Jerry N. Hess, this one on 10 February 1971 in Washington, D.C. (Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, underscoring in received text).

HESS: What were the first problems that you were presented with when you arrived at your new post in Korea?

MUCCIO: Well, the Government of Korea was inaugurated August 15, 1948. U.S. military government and all of its ramifications still intact. My immediate concern was the transfer of all the functions of military government to the new government set up by the Koreans, under the direction of President [Syngman] Rhee. We transferred the police force, the whole police establishment, on the 11th of September of 1948. And between that and December 12th, when we finally transferred the bank account to the new authorities, there was a constant transfer of responsibility from U.S. Military Government authorities to their new Korean counterparts. It was very intricate.?

One interesting and complicating factor that plagued me during this period was the struggle between the Koreans that had come to the fore under U.S. Military Government and these appointed by the new government. The former came forward from 1945 to 1948, and later as the United States authorities set up what was called the interim government, when Koreans were placed in authority with Americans as advisers. These Koreans who first worked with the Americans were sneeringly referred to by other Koreans as the "interpreter government." We must admit that their ability to understand and know some English had had a great deal to do with their selection.?

Rhee did a thorough job of ignoring practically to a man those that had come to the fore during military government days. He set up his own hierarchy. And there's no love lost between the first group who considered themselves indispensable and the Koreans who were about to take over. That was the basic problem we faced at that particular time.

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Dean Rusk (1909-1994)

Rusk is supposed to have made the suggestion, in 1945, that Korea be divided into US and USSR spheres at the 38th parallel.

1945 Joined Department of State. Worked in office of United Nations Affairs.

1949 Deputy Under Secretary of State

1950 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs


John M. Allison (1905-1978)

1937 US consul at the American embassy in Nanking

Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

1952-1953 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

1953-1957 US Ambassador to Japan


Robert A. Fearey (1918-2004)

Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Special assistant to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

1941-1942 Private secretary for Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo and Washington, D.C. Interned at embassy until exchanged for Japanese embassy staff, in Africa, in 1942.

1942-1945 Washington, State Department, Far East postwar planning

1945-1946 Tokyo, Special Assistant to Ambassador George Atcheson, US Political Adviser to General MacArthur

1946-1950 Department of State, Japanese Desk Officer

1950 Special Assistant to Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Peace Treaty planning

1950-1951 Assistant to Ambassador Dulles in negotiation of peace treaty Japanese Peace Treaty in Washington, Tokyo, and London

1951 Technical secretary under John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson at signing of San Francisco Peace Treaty


Samuel W. Boggs (1889-1954)

State Department geographer at the Office of Intelligence and Research

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Chronology

When talking about "ROK-Japan talks" one has to imagine dozens of people involved in several kinds of talks at various stages of the talks. As I am here not interested in fishing and other such issues, the following chronology lists, in addition to the advanced negotiations and background developments, only the 4 series of talks most closely related to status and treatment.

Meetings

The items in the chronology are colored according to the following cateogies.

Advance negotations   事前交渉   사전교섭
ROK-DS/SCAP-Japan ★ September 1951 ★ KRN 76, KRN 78
Main (Plenary) Conference (Preliminary)   本会議   본회의
10 meetings ★ 20 October to 4 December 1951 ★ KRN 77, JPN 3-63
Legal Status Committee   在日韓人の法的地位委員会   재일한인의 법적지위 위원회
36 meetings ★ 30 October 1952 to 1 April 1952 ★ KRN 81
Formal Korea-Japan Conference
Main (Plenary) Conference (Basic Treaty)   本会議   본회의
5 meetings ★ 15 February to 4 [21] April 1952 ★ KRN 82
Basic Relations Committee   基本関係委員会   기본관계위원회
8 meetings ★ 22 February to 1 March 1952 ★ KRN 80
Documents   Related SCAP, Japanese, and Korean documents
Legal actions   Japanese laws and other legal actions affecting status

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Chronology of talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea
Status developments and preparations, 9 August 1945 to 20 October 1951
Plenary and status subcommittee meetings, 20 October 1951 to April 1952
9 August 1945 to 20 October 1951 pre-talk developments

9 August 1945
10 August 1945

Japan wants peace

The Republic of Korea, established on 15 August 1948, took 9 August 1945 to be the day Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, and hence the liberation of Korea (Chōsen) from Japanese rule. However, Japan did not formally surrender until 2 September 1945, and this is the date from which the Allied Powers reckoned the applicability of the terms of surrender, including the liberation of Korea.

On this date, the United States dropped an atomic bombing on Nagasaki, and the emperor ordered his government to appeal to the Allied Powers for peace. On 10 August 1945, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Japanese minister in Berne to request Switzerland to transmit a message to the United States, Great Britain, and China expressing the emperor's wish for peace under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, so long as the declaration does not compromise the emperor's position as a sovereign ruler.

See Japan's peace overture and the Allied response in the "Declarations and treaties" article.

10 August 1945
11 August 1945
12 August 1945

America's reply

The United States received Japan's message through the Swiss embassy in Washington, D.C. on 10 August 1945, and the next day it transmitted to Japan a reply which stated what the Allied Powers would expect of the emperor and the government of Japan under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration it expected of Japan under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, including a provision that authority of the emperor and the government of Japan would be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The reply also required that the emperor order his forces to cease operations and surrender, and to authorize and ensure that his government and his imperial headquarters will sign the terms of surrender.

See Japan's peace overture and the Allied response in the "Declarations and treaties" article.

14 August 1945
15 August 1945

Japan ceases fire

ROK would later take 15 August 1945 as the day Korea was liberated from Japan.

On 14 August 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration as qualified by the reply from the United States on behalf of the Allied Powers, and a recording of the emperor's announcement that he had accected the Potsdam Declaration was broadcast through the country.

Early in the morning of 15 August 1945, the emperor ordered his commanders to cease hostilitites and surrender. This is the day memoralized in Japan as "end-of-war day" (終戦日 sūsenbi).

See Imperial rescript ending war for details.

2 September 1945
Japan surrenders

The Allied Powers and Japan regarded 2 September 1945 as the official day of surrender, but ROK refused to adopt this date as the legal benchmark for the separation of Korea (Ch'#333;sen) from Japanese rule. However, this was the date the Allied Powers and Japan used to draw a line between Koreans in Japan regarded as Japanese, and those regarded as aliens. And in Japanese law today, it figures in the definition of Special Permanent Residents, a demographic cohort of aliens in Japan who were in the prefectural Interior on or before this date, and continued to reside in Japan, and their Japan-born descendants.

On this day, Japan signed the general Instrument of Surrender with the Allied Powers aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay. This date marks the formal start of the Allied Occupation of the prefectural Interior of Japan, which would continued until 28 April 1952. But it was also the date of issue of Imperial Headquarters General Order No. 1, in which the emperor ordered the systematic surrenders of other parts of Japan, including Formosa (Taiwan) and Korea (Chōsen), to designated Allied Commanders.

The Allied Powers and Japan used this date to draw a line between Formosans (Taiwanese) and Koreans (Chosenese) in Japan who were considered "Japanese" and those who were considered "aliens" during the occupation years. Japan used this date to accord those who had lost Japan's nationality when the Occupation ended a special "Potsdam Law" status (126-2-6) tantamount to a perpetual status of permanent residence.

See Instrument of Surrender and General Order No. 1 for details.

3 November 1945
JCS 1380/15

On this day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., representing the Allied Powers, issued a Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, in which "Japan" was defined as including the four main islands and about 1,000 smaller adjacent islands. "Formosan-Chinese" (sic = Formosans) and "Koreans" were not included in the term "Japanese".

See JCS 1380/15 directive on "Japan" and "Japanese" excluding "Formosan-Chinese" and "Koreans" for details.

1 November 1945
SCAPIN-224

This SCAPIN (SCAP Instruction) established Reception Centers and priorities for the repatriation of Koreans (Chosenese) and Chinese (ROC nationals) in Occupied Japan, and of persons formerly domiciled in Formosa (Taiwan) and the Ryukyus (Okinawa) -- all of whom were regarded as "non-Japanese" for repatriation purposes.

See SCAPIN-224 Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan for details.

29 January 1946
SCAPIN-677

This SCAPIN defined "Japan" without Taiwan, Karafuto, Korea, and other "outlying" territories. The Ryukyus (Okinawa) were also excluded from Occupied Japan. A second SCAP directive on "Japan" issued on 22 March 1946 stated that "Japan" also included Izu and Nanpo islands.

See SCAPIN-677 Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan for details.

20 November 1946
Koreans who stayed
are now Japanese but
treaties will decide
their future status

In early November 1946, the press reported that SCAP had said that "the nationality of Koreans in Japan shall be determined through their recognition as its nationals by a government which shall be duly established in Korea in the future" and that "Koreans who refuse to return to their homeland under the SCAP repatriation program will be considered as retaining their Japanese nationality until such time as a duly established Korean government accords them recognition."

On 20 September 1946, SCAP dismisses such rumors in a statement which clarified that "Korean nationals remaining in Japan after 15 December 1946 must obtain Japanese citizenship are entirely incorrect. The Occupation Authorities have no intention of interfering in any way with the fundamental rights of any person of any nationality in regard to retention, relinquishment or choice of citizenship."

See SCAP statement on Koreans in Japan for details.

2 May 1947
Alien Registration Order

The Alien Registration Order (ARO) -- the last imperial order to be promulgated under the 1890 Constitution -- was promulgated and and came into force on 2 May 1947, the day before the new constitution came into force. The order did not include Taiwanese or Chosenese in its definition of aliens, for at the time they were Japanese. However, it deemed them as "aliens" for the purpose of its application, which included also exit and entry of the country.

See Alien Registration Order for details.

15 August 1949
Sebald's dispatch
894.4016/8-1549
No. 554

William Sebald, chief of the Diplomatic Section (DS) of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), issues a "Status of Koreans in Japan" dispatch, which refers to a 2 May 1949 checknote circulation in which "it was recommended that Headquarters interpose no objection to registration by the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan of Korean residents in Japan since 2 September 1945 and that registered Koreans who had relinquished Japanese nationality be entitled to the status of foreign nationals in Japan."

The dispatch reports that "This study with minor amendments was submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval" and then states that "It has been decided by the Chief of Staff that this project should not be undertaken and that action on this problem should be deferred for an indefinite period" -- which effectively ends ROK's bid to enroll Koreans in Japan into its nationality prior to a bilateral agreement with Japan.

The dispatch then confirms SCAP's policy that, until Japan and ROK conclude a bilateral agreement,

The status of Koreans legally in Japan, other than those who hold valid documentation issued by the Korean Government, remains unchanged and they will accordingly continue to be considered Japanese nationals for the purpose of treatment; there is no basis on which Koreans legally in Japan other than those who hold valid Korean documentation can be treated as other than a Japanese.

See Sebald's 15 August 1949 "Status of Koreans in Japan" dispatch for details.

Fall 1950
KDMJ treaty study
KRN 76: 62-72
NKBK 76: 22-28

October 1950, the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ) prepared a detailed report of its study of legal status problems of "Overseas Koreans in Japan". The study included a comprehensive review of historical -- but particularly recent -- conventions in treaties that involved territorial transfers following, usually, wars. The report also reviewed changes in the status of Koreans in Occupied Japan under SCAP directives and related Japanese laws.

In October 1950 -- barely one month after the Battle of Incheon in what would continue to be a see-saw war of uncertain outcome on the peninsula -- ROK and KDMJ were still reeling -- and would continue to reel to the end of the Occupation of Japan -- from the refusal of the Allied Powers in 1949 to recognize ROK as an Allied nation and allow KDMJ to engage with Koreans in Japan on the assumption that they were its nationals.

There were already movements underway to draft a Peace Treaty with Japan, which would not include ROK. And ROK realized that eventually it would have to negotiate a separate treaty with Japan. KDMJ's brief included making preparations for such negotiations.

See Fall 1950 ROK on status of "Overseas Koreans in Japan" for details.

Summer 1951
ROK English memo
KRN 78: 49-51
NKBK 78: 11-13

ROK, having failed to persuade SCAP to recognize claims that Koreans in Japan were its nationals, and that it had a right to formally enroll them in its nationality, continued to object to SCAP's view, which Japan of course was obliged to follow, that Koreans who had stayed in Occupied Japan were Japanese. In the meantime, Japan -- seeing the handwriting on the wall as peace treaty preparations began -- decided its best option was to recognize that, concomitant with its loss of Chōsen (Korea) and Taiwan (Formosa), Chosenese and Taiwanese would lose its nationality, but Chosenese and Taiwanese in Japan could then naturalize if they wanted to (again) be Japanese.

In September 1952, ROK -- knowing that Japan would insist that Koreans will lose their Japanese nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect -- insisted that Koreans already "threw off the Japanese yoke" in 1945.

See Summer 1951 ROK contemplates four measures for details.

10 August 1951
ROK memorandum
to DS GHQ/SCAP
KRN 78: 52-56
NKBK 78: 14-18

ROK, in a 5-page memorandum to the Diplomatic Section of GHQ/SCAP, declares that "Korean residents" [of Japan] means Korean race -- ROK's english term for 民族 (minjok) -- and insists that all that need to be done is for SCAP to declare them Koreans. The implication is -- Why do we need to negotiate their nationality status with Japan

See 10 August 1951 ROK : All Koreans are ROK nationals for details.

24 August 1951
KDMJ and DS/SCAP internal memo
KRN 78: 64-72
NKBK 77: 23-25

The file also includes a translation of the proceedings of a meeting concerning the legal status of Koreans in Japan between DS and LS and G-2 representatives and ROK representatives, held on 24 August 1951, in which SCAP representatives made it clear that nationality determinations were "beyond the scope of SCAP's authority".

See 24 August 1951 SCAP : Nationality outside SCAP's authority for details.

10 September 1951
ROK internal memo
KRN 77: 9-14
NKBK 77: 3

ROK, in a 6-page memo written in Korean, apparently as an internal memorandum, exhaustively reviews the options of nationality choice provisions in earlier treaties concerning territorial transfers following wars.

The writer, Yu Chin O, who would be one of ROK's chief negotiators in the 1st round of ROK-Japan talks, concluded that international conventions didn't apply to Korea, Koreans in Korea, or Koreans in Japan. Korea's "liberation" by the Allied Powers made it a special case.

See 10 September 1951 ROK on international conventions for details.

8 October 1951
ROK internal memo
KRN 78: 111-124
NKBK 78: 31-33
Yi 2007: 27-81

On 8 October 1951, a month Japan and the Allied Powers had the Peace Treaty in San Francisco, and just 12 days before the 1st preliminary meeting in 1st round of ROK-Japan talks, ROK's Minister of Justice presented President Syngman Rhee with a choice of two contingency agreements concerning the nationality of Overseas Koreans in Japan.

The 1st of the two contingency agreements provided for "nationality recovery" -- meaning that "Oveseas Koreans in Japan" would be recognized as having recovered the nationality lost when Korea was annexed by Japan. Accordingly, they would be recognized as ROK nationals.

The 2nd contingency agreement provided for "nationality choice" -- meaning that "Overseas Koreans in Japan" would be recognized as Japanese nationals, but be given a choice to become ROK nationals.

Note that the "nationality choice" contingency did not conform to conventional provisions in territorial transfer agreements. A conventional choice agreement would have included Koreans in ROK who might have reason to want to be Japanese -- and Japanese both ROK and Japan who might have reason to want to Korean.

Needless to say, the adoption of the 2nd contingency would have contradicted ROK's position that Koreans in Japan were already its nationals, as well as it contentions about the illegality of the Japan's annexation of Korea. My impression is that the contingency was presented as the 2nd contingency in order to be complete -- knowing that Syngman Rhee would never endorse it.

See 8 October 1951 ROK's nationality choice contingencies for details.

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October 1951 talks

20 October 1951
10:20 - 10:45 a.m.
Preliminary
1st Meeting
DS/SCAP
JPN 3-63: 1-24
KRN 77: 46-59
NKBK 77: 14-19

Representatives of Japan and ROK met for the first time for the purpose of negotiating a normalization treaty and various agreements. Thee parties meeting through the good offices, as well as at the office, of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP.

Japan delegates (8)   Chief representative Iguchi Sadao (井口貞夫), representatives Chiba Kō (千葉皓), Tanaka Mitsuo (田中三男), Hiraga Kenta (平賀健太), Ushiroku Toraro (後宮虎郎), Satō Nissh (佐藤日史), Imai Minoru (今井実), Saji Makoto (佐治誠)
ROK delegates (8)   Chief representative Yang You Chan (梁裕燦), representatives Shin Sung Mo (申性模), Kim Yong Shik (金溶植), Yu Chin O (兪鎮午), Limb Song Bon (林松本), Karl Hong Kee (葛弘基),assistants Kim Dong Jo (金東祚), Kim Tae Dong (金泰東), legal advisor Dr. Oliver
SCAP observers (6)   (DS) William J. Sebald, John P. Gardiner, Edward Anderberg, William H. Sullivan, Stanley S. Carpenter, Richard B. Finn

Sebald led the meeting with a brief speech then turned the talk that urged both the delegates of Japan and ROK to cooperate in the interest of normalizing Japan's and ROK's relationship. (KRN 77: 56, NKBK 77: 16, JPN 3-63: 16-17)

A press release dated 20 October 1951 characterized the conference as "a series of sessions arranged by SCAP's Diplomatic Section" what would "discuss as their initial item of business the nationality of an estimated 600,000 Koreans now residing in Japan." It went on to describe Sebald's opening speech like this (KRN 77: 57, NKBK 77: 17, JPN 3-63: 23-24)

    Ambassador W.J. Sebald, Chief of SCAP's Diplomatic Section, opened the first session with a brief statement and then turned over the business of the conference to the delegations. Representatives of SCAP's Diplomatic Section will attend the meetings as observers but will not take an active part in the discussions.

See 20 October 1951 Talks begin with cautious hope for transcriptions of, and commentary on, all three opening statements.

22 October 1951
10:07 - 11:38 a.m.
Preliminary
2nd Meeting
JPN 3-63: 25-40
KRN 77: 60-69
NKBK 77: 20-22

SCAP observers (7)   (DS) McDonald, Gardiner, Anderberg, [Stanley] Carpenter, Sullivan, Finn, (LS) Bassin
ROK delegates (8)   Chief representative Yang You Chan, representatives Karl Hong Kee, Yu Chin O, Limb Song Bon, Kim Dong Jo, assistant legal advisor Dr. Oliver, assistants Kim Tae Dong, Park [Dong Jin] secretary (朴 [東鎮] 秘書)
Japan delegates [Omitted from MOFA conferee list]

ROK puts three broad issues on the table, beginning with problems related to the legal status of "Kankokujin in Japan". According to Takasaki, ROK used the general term "Kankokujin in Japan / Chōsenjin in Japan" (在日韓国人・在日朝鮮人 Zainichi Kankokujin / Zainichi Chōsenjin), but was not at all consistent, and generally referred to "Kankokujin in Japan" -- meaning Koreans in Japan it assumed were, or would be, its nationals (Takasaki 1996, page 25).

See 22 October 1951 Burying hatchets, real and imaginary for transcription of, and commentary on, William H. Sullivan's report on the proceedings of this session.

24 October 1951
10:11 - 11:23 a.m.
Preliminary
3rd Meeting
JPN 3-63: 41-54
KRN 77: 70-78
NKBK 77: 22-25

SCAP observers (5)   (DS) McDonald, Gardiner, Anderberg, [Stanley] Carpenter, Sullivan
ROK delegates (10)   Chief representative Yang You Chan, representatives Kim Yong Shik, Karl Hong Kee, Yu Chin O, Limb Song Bon, Kim Dong Jo, legal advisor Dr. Oliver, assistants Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, Park secretary
Japan delegates [Omitted from MOFA conferee list] [ROK minutes state "Same as at previous meeting"]

This meeting was given practically entirely to the issue regarding the title to ships pending between Japan and Korea, which was the subject of a 10 September 1951 memorandum from SCAP's Diplomatic Section to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and SCAPIN-2168 to the Government of Japan dated 11 September 1951 concerning Korean Registered Vessels. As this was not the proper subject of the conference, the two sides agreed that the issue would best be taken up in a subcommittee established for that purpose.

See notes to 22 October 1951 Burying hatchets, real and imaginary for transcriptions of 10 and 11 September 1951 memorandum and SCAPIN-2168.

25 October 1951
10:03 - 11:21
Preliminary
4th Meeting
JPN 3-63: 55-66
KRN 77: 79-87
NKBK 77: 26-28

SCAP observers (4)   (DS) McDonald, [Stanley] Carpenter, Sullivan, (LS) Bassin
ROK delegates (10)   Chief representative Yang You Chan, representatives Kim Yong Shik, Karl Hong Kee, Yu Chin O, Limb Song Bon, Kim Dong Jo, legal advisor Dr. Oliver, assistants Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, Park secretary
Japan delegates [Omitted from MOFA conferee list] [ROK minutes state "Same as at previous meeting"]

At this 4th session of the main (preliminary plenary) conference, Japan declared 3 principles that would effect the status of Koreans in Japan -- (1) All would lose Japan's nationality and obtain ROK's nationality when the Peace Treaty came into force, (2) whether a person is a Korean resident of Japan would be determined by the person's family register, and (3) as aliens they would then be able to naturalize.

ROK would object to (1) because it considered Koreans in Japan to already be its nationals. It had no objection to (2), and considered (3) Japan's business as a sovereign state.

See 25 October 1951 Japan puts three cards on the table

29 October 1951
ROK internal memo KRN 81: 42-43
NKBK 81: 23-24

This ROK document amounts to a 7-point status agreement proposal. The points, in short, are (1) ROK confirms that Koreans in Japan, who are not in Japanese registers, are its nationals, (2) ROK nationals in Japan from before 9 August 1946 will ipso facto be permanent residents (PRs), (3) This and other rights of such Koreans will extend to descendants and persons they marry, (4) Korean PRs will be guaranteed all universal human rights and same treatment as Japanese, (5) Korean PRs will be guaranteed full and unlimited property rights whether they stay in Japan or leave, (6) Japan may deport Koreans sentenced for period of one or more years with prior agreement of ROK, and (7) Any ROK national in Japan may apply for naturalization within one year and acuire Japanese nationality notwithstanding provisions of Japan's 1950 Nationality Law.

The document is clearly a draft, and there is no evidence that it was ever polished or otherwise presented to Japan.

See 29 October 1951 ROK's 7-point "nationality question" draft for details.

30 October 1951
10:21 - 11:10 a.m.

Preliminary
5th Meeting
JPN 3-63: 67-80
KRN 77: 88-99
NKBK 77: 29-32

There is no roster of conferees in received MOFA documents for this session. ROK's minutes list the following conferees.

ROK delegates (8)   Representative Kim Yong Shik, Yu Chin O, Limb Song Bon, observer Dr. Oliver, Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, Kim Yong Ju (金永周), Chon Gak Su (全斗銖)
Japan delegates Same as at previous meeting
SCAP observers (6) [DS] McDonald, Sullivan, [Stanley] Carpenter, Gardiner, [LS] Bassin, [unidentified US official] Petduk (en route to post in Korea) (向韓赴任途中)

The record of proceedings for this session is attributed to "J. E. MacDonald / Observer" of DS/SCAP, though Sullivan, the designated minutes taker, was present.

At this 5th session, the two sides agreed to the intent of the Japanese government Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a press release assuring Koreans in Japan that the recent "Cabinet Order for Immigration Control" to be implemented from 1 November -- 2 days hence -- would not immediately apply to them.

Ambassador Yang, head of the Korean delegation, would also issue a press statement concerning the progress being made in the bilateral talks.

The two sides then agreed to convene, that afternoon, the 1st Legal Status Subcommittee meeting. Yu Chin 0 would head the Korean delegation. Tanaka Mitsuo would head the Japanese delegation.

The meetings would be informal. There would be no need to write reports on each meeting. The subcommittee would make recommendations to the main conference.

SCAP observers would not attend the subcommittee meetings unless asked. This would help keep the meetings informal.

The Japan side asked if there was any objection to conducting the subcommittee meetings in Japanese. Members of the Korean delegation -- other than those like Yang, who had left Korea before its annexation -- were bilingual, and several had graduated from Interior universities. Yang, however, would not be attending the subcommittee meetings. Nonethelss, the Korean side replied that it would use an interpreter "as a formality".

Japanese and Korean reports show that the Legal Status Subcommittee would be concerned with "nationality [and] treatment" (国籍処遇 kokuseki shogū).

See 30 October 1951 MOFA Immigration Control Order press release for transcriptions of MOFA's and Yang's press statements.

30 October 1951
11:20 - 12:12 a.m.
DS/SCAP

Status Committee

1st Meeting
KRN 81: 44-52
NKBK 81: 25-26

The first meeting of the nationality and treatment committee -- aka "legal status subcommittee" -- was convened 10 minutes after the adjournment of the main plenary conference meeting on the morning of 30 October 1951 (see above).

Japan delegates (4)   Representative Tanaka Mitsuo, members Hiraga Kenta, Imai Minoru, observer Saji Makoto
ROK delegates (6)   Representative Yu Chin O, members Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, observers Limb Song Bon, Chon Gak Su, Kim Yong Ju

Meeting begins with protocol and delves into various issues. Yu Chin O greets everyone through an interpreter. ROK side first wants information -- statistics -- on Koreans in Japan.

Appellation   ROK raises long-standing "Kankokujin" (韓国人) versus "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人) appellation issue. Japan maintains that, under its laws, all people ROK calls "Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑) or "Koreans" by any name (韓国人 Kankokujin, 韓人 Kanjin) in Japan, Japan regards as "Chosenese". If someone registers as "Kankokujin" that's fine, but in Japan's eyes, neither label signifies a political affiliation. However, from this point, Japan's delegates generally uses term "Kankokujin" in documents related to ROK-Japan talks.

Illegal entry   Ilegal entrants coming directly from North Korea haven't been caught. If from North Korea, they are probably coming through South Korea. Women and children increasing (statistically), probably because men, who are more likely to be habitual illegal entrants, more easily evade registration, so mainly women are caught.


At this meeting, Japan proposed to classify Kankokujin (ROK nationals) in Japan as "other aliens" (ほかの外国人 hoka no gaikokujin). ROK demanded that they be treated as "Special aliens" (特殊外国人 tokushu gaikokujin), since ROK viewed them as "the dropped seeds [left children] children of Japan's colonial rule of Chōsen" (Takasaki 1996, page 27).

The Immigration Control Order, promulgated on 4 October 1951, was due to come into force in two days, i.e., from 1 November 1951. Visa statuses would not come into effect until the peace treaty came into force, when Japan would regain its sovereignty and diplomatic rights.

Koreans (Chosenese) were not yet aliens as defined by this law. But assuming they Japan's Japanese nationality, the question arose as to what their status of residence would be as aliens under the law.

My understanding (Takasaki does not go into details) is that Japan was referring to the 4-1-16 status of residence -- a miscellaneous category within which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then oversaw border (exit-entry) control, could define various statuses. ROK was demanding the creation of a special legacy status.

30 October 1951
3:00 p.m.

Press statements

At the 5th main (preliminary plenary) meeting during the morning of 30 October 1951, at which subcommittees were established (see above), ROK and Japan agreed to the release of two press statements that afternoon, one by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one by ROK's head delegate Yang You Chan.

MOFA's statement was intended to reassure Koreans in Japan that the Immigration Control Bureau would not immediately apply to them -- and even when it did, "good aliens" would have nothing to worry about.

Yang's statement attempts to assure Koreans that the ROK-Japan Talks are busily working toward assuring the protection of their "civil liberties". The most revealing remark, however, is Yang's revelation that each of the two governments had agreed to "recognize the treatment of the matters concerning the personal status relations by the other Government pursuant to its national law" -- which, at the time, was at best a tentative agreement.

See 30 October 1951 MOFA's Press statement on Immigration Control Order for transcriptions of both press statements.

31 October 1951
2:13 - 4:45 p.m.

Status Committee

2nd Meeting
KRN 81: 53-63
NKBK 81: 26-28

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before
ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O, Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, Chon Gak Su, Kim Yong Ju

Legal status   The Japan side says Koreans in Japan will lose Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty comes into effect, but they will retain Japan's nationality until then. However, under terms of Potsdam Declaration, Korea is outside Japan's territory, hence Japan's governmental rights don't extend there, and after the establishment of ROK, it has de facto become a state. After the war, in principle they there was no change in the status of "Overseas Koreans in Japan" (ROK's term). While under some laws they have been treated the same same as Japanese, under other laws they have been treated on a par with aliens.

The ROK side said that, unrelated to the Peace Treaty, it's Nationality Law applied to Overseas Koreans in japan. What, the ROK side asked, were the legal foundation for Japan's claim that they acquried its nationality? The Japan side cited the Korea-Japan Union [Annexation] Treaty, and said that those born after the treaty acquried Japan's nationality under customary law.

Top  

November 1951 talks

2 November 1951
2:18 - 4:46 p.m.
DS/SCAP

Status Committee

3rd meeting
KRN 81: 64-89
NKBK 81: 29-34

Japan delegates (4)   Representative Tanaka Mitsuo, members Hiraga Kenta, Imai Minoru, observer Saji Makoto
ROK delegates (7)   Representative Yu Chin O, members Kim Dong Jo, Hong Chin Gi, Kim Tae Dong, Han Gui Yŏng, observers Limb Song Bon, Chon Gak Su

This meeting featured a pitched verbal battle between the key delegates, who debated the most contentious status and treatment issues. The ROK archives include a fascinating blow by blow account that reads as though it might have been transcribed from a tape or wire recorder.

See 2 November 1951 Yu vs Tanaka & Hiraga sparring match for details.


ROK demands (1) permanent residence rights, (2) no forced deportation, and (3) national treatment (内国民待遇 naikokumin taigū), among other rights, for Kankokujin (ROK nationals) who had been residing in Japan from on or before 9 August 1945.

Japan rejected the demand for "national treatment" -- which would have created a class of aliens it would have to treat like its own nationals. Such a status would have been tantamount to -- though not actually -- "dual nationality".

ROK -- in what was perhaps a negotiation ploy -- then pressed for permanent residence rights. Japan balked, saying it would not perpetuate the unusual existing conditions created by the past four decades. This provoked strong reactions from ROK, and Japan -- also in what was perhaps a negotiation ploy -- agreed to the permanent residence rights.

What's in a date

9 August 1945 is both the date Nagasaki was bombed and the date the Soviet Union formally entered the war against Japan. Here, though, it is the date that Japan first offered to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The United States Army Military Government in Korea had later ordered that Chōsen-registered vessels be transferred from Japan to ROK as of this date. The Potsdam Declaration demanded Japan's unconditional surrender, partly under the terms of the Cairo Declaration, in which the Allied Powers had declared their intent to liberate Korea.

Hirohito ordered his commanders to cease fire on 15 August 1945, and Japan and the Allied Powers signed a general surrender agreement on 2 September 1945. The latter date is taken as the formal day on which the Empire of Japan delegated its sovereignty to the Allied Powers, in particular to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. SCAP assumed control of the government of Japan on this date, when the Allied Occupation of Japan legally began. Japan would not regain its sovereignty until the Occupation ended when the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect from 28 April 1952.

These two dates -- 2 September 1945 and 28 April 1952 -- legally book end the Occupation of Japan as the period during which Japan's sovereignty was suspended and its entire legal system was subjected to the authority of the Allied Powers, a legal entity unto itself, which exercised extraterritorial rights in Japan and proxied Japan's foreign affairs.


7 November 1951
2:00 - 5:28 p.m.

Status Committee

4th Meeting
KRN 81: 90-105
NKBK 81: 34-37

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (8)   Representative Yu Chin O, Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, Hong Chin Gi, Han Gui Yŏng, Chon Gak Su and others, Limb Song Bon, and Karl Hong Kee head observer

Nationality   The ROK side held that when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Korea-Japan Union [Annexation] Treaty lost effect, hence Koreans separated from Japan's nationality (日本国籍を離脱した Nihon kokuseki o ridatsu shita). However, the Japan side stated that, because there had been no legal measures in SCAP's policy (SCAPの方針に法的装置がなかった SCAP no hōshin ni hōteki sഅchi ga nakatta) [regarding the natinality of Koreans], it was determined by Japan's domestic law, hence they have retained Japan's nationality, and they would separate from it when the Peace Treaty came into effect [and Korea was formally separated from Japan]. For the Japan side, by recognizing that status relation changes (migrations between Chōsen and Interior registers) would not change after Peace Treaty effectuation, made its understanding of nationality [in accordance with its domestic register laws] as also good for the same of preventing confusion [created by the dual nationality that would arise for former Chosenese in Interior registers].

8 November 1951
2:09 - 2:58
Preliminary
6th Meeting
JPN 3-63: 81-96
KRN 77: 100-116
NKBK 77: 33-37

SCAP observers (3)   [DS] Hawley, Sullivan, [LS] Bassin
ROK delegates (7) [8]   Chief representative Yang You Chan, [representatives] Yu Chin O, Karl Hong Kee, Limb Song Bon, assistants Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, observer Hong Chin Gi [According to ROK minutes] Pak Dong Chin [secretary]
Japan delegates [6] [According to ROK minutes] Representatives Chiba, Tanaka, Hiraga, others Ushiroku, Imai, Saji

"residents in Japan of Korean descent"

A "Proposal by the Japanese side on the general Conference of 8 Nov. 1951" recommends that "a conference be convened in Tokyo in early spring of 1952 to discuss and establish basic matters concerning mutual relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea including:" (JPN 3-63: 95, KRN 77: 109, NKBK 77: 35)

  1. establishment of diplomatic relations.
  2. establishment of nationality of residents in Japan of Korean descent.
  3. commencement of negotiations for settlement of claims between Korea and Japan.
  4. commencement of negotiations on fishing rights.
  5. commencement of negotiations on transfer of marine cables.
  6. commencement of negotiations of treaty of commerce and navigation, and establishing of relevant principles to be followed pending conclusion of such treaty (such as principles of most-favored-nation treatment, etc.)
  7. other items to be agreed upon.

This is one of the very few references in contemporary documents to "Koreans in Japan" as "residents in Japan of Korean descent". It stands out here because "descent" would not have mattered in the eyes of any Japanese law that would have had a bearing on determining the nationality of "Koreans in Japan".

The copies of Japan's agenda proposal in ROK's and Japan's archives are in English only, and I have found no unambiguous representations of the "Korean descent" metaphor in either Japanese or Korean language documents.

The Korean minutes of this meeting represent Item b. in the proposal as follows (KRN 77: 103).

2. 在日韓人의国籍確定協議開始(

At the time, 在日韓人 or 在日韓国人, and 在日韓僑, were respectively the most common ROK references to "Koreans in Japan" and "Overseas Koreans in Japan". By this time, Japan -- though it continued to use mostly 在日朝鮮人 and at times 在日鮮人 in its internal documents -- generally followed ROK's usage of 在日韓人 and 在日韓国人in proposals it presented in the ROK-Japan talks.

The distinction between 韓人 and 韓国人 is anything but clear in contemporary documents. If there was at times a disctintion, the former referred to "Koreans" by descent in the eyes of the Republic of Korea, whereas the latter referred to "Koreans" as a manner of nationality in ROK's eyes. When it came time to finalize usage in the drafts of the status agreement, vestiges of the former were replaced by the latter to indicate, which referred to persons in Japan who ROK would regard as possessing its nationality, and who Japan would recognize as ROK's nationals on the basis of certifications of registration issued by an ROK agency.

ROK's Nationality Law regarded "Koreans in Japan" as potentially its nationals even if they were in a prefectural household register, which made them Japanese in the eyes of Japan's domestic laws. By the time of this meeting, the two states had bridged this difference in their perception of the origin of their respective nationalities -- based in part on "descent" in ROK's view but based on "household register status" in Japan's view -- by agreeing that their respective domestic laws would determine the nationality./p>

"early next spring"

The ROK side then made a proposal to convene formal Property and Claims agreement talks in Tokyo on 24 November 1951, Fishery agreement talks in Pusan on 5 January 1952, and Commerce and Navigation treaty talks in Tokyo on 24 January 1952.

The ensuing discussion, though, centered on differences of opinion about the purpose of the preliminary talks and the time table for formal talks.

Yang You Chan, the head of ROK's delegation, stated that, in recent meetings with Prime Minister Yoshida Shiegru and Iguchi Sadao, the head of Japan's delegation, that he had received their concurrence that it was necessary to resolve all problems prior to the effectuation of the Peace Treaty.

Chiba Kō, the alternative head of Japan's delegation, who was acting for Iguchi at this meeting, maintained that Japan's aim in this early round of talks was to establish principles. Japan, he said, would not be ready to negotiate final procedures until "early next spring". He offered 4 February 1952 -- which happens to be a Monday -- as the date Japan had in mind to convene a formal basic treaty conference. The date of the effectuation of the Peace Treaty was not then known.

Yang worried that Japan was intentionally dragging its feet. He did not think the problems were so difficult that Japan needed more time.

Chiba insisted that the Japanese government was extremely busy making other preparations for Peace Treaty effectuation and needed more time to preare for detailed negotiations with ROK. He saw the preliminary meetings as extremely useful in determining the parameters of the issues and coming to terms over principles. He also reiterated Japan's position that it was not necessary to have agreements on every issue before normalization.

9 November 1951
2:17 - 4:05 p.m.

Status Committee

5th Meeting
KRN 81: 106-111
NKBK 81: 37-38

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (8)   Same as before.

ROK had mentioned nationality choice as an option . . .
but clarified that it had not formally proposed such a choice

Nationality   "There was a question from the Japan side in response to what the ROK representative [Yu] said, that there is room to recognize nationality choice (国籍選択を認める余地がある kokuseki sentaku o mitomeru yochi ga aru), and . . .

". . . on the ROK side, there was a reply that it was possible to consider choice issues under international precedents in connection with treatment issues, but it had not formally proposed [nationality choice, and by mutual agreement the debate on principles (原則論 gensokuron) [of nationality issue] was for the time being suspended."

12 November 1951
10:20 - 11:29
Preliminary
7th Meeting
JPN 3-63: 97-111
KRN 77: 117-125
NKBK 77: 38-39

SCAP observers (2)   [DS] Sullivan, [LS] Bassin
ROK delegates (8)   Chief representative Yang You Chan, representatives Kim Yong Shik, Yu Chin O, Karl Hong Kee, Limb Song Bon, assistants Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, observer Hong Chin Gi [According to ROK minutes, "Same as at previous meeting except General Consul Kim had returned to country and was absent" -- yet Kim Yong Shik was not present at the previous meeting but is present at this meeting according to MOFA's roster]
Japan delegates [According to ROK minutes, "Same as at previous meeting"}

The meeting quickly returned to the discussion at the previous meeting concerning what ROK's chief delegate Yang You Chan considered to be Japan's efforts to drag things out. He became notably impatient with Chiba Kō's patient reiteration of the reasons for Japan's time table, which hinged on the start of the formal conference from Febrary 1952 (JPN 3-63: 104, page 2 of Sullivan's record).

He stated that, very frankly, he thought by placing both [ROK's and Japan's] stories on the table this conference could have been cleared up in one week asked again what assurance there was the same thing would not occur next February.

Chiba reiterated that a Treaty of Amity, or a Treaty to Establish Fundamental Principles, or a basic treaty by whatever name need not embrace all matters. This, too, irritated Yang, who wanted everything settled (JPN 3-63: 107, page 5 of Sullivan's record).

Speaking as a physician, he [Yang] felt that the whole affair should be completely cleared up or else that it should not be done at all."

Yang simply refused to accept that the Japanese delegation was a liason group that had to report to all concerned government agencies, which in turn had to consult with each other, before Japan could commit itself to a treaty or agreement (JPN 3-63: 107, page 5 of Sullivan's record).

Yang . . . stated his feelings were terribly hurt by this turn of events. He thought that both sides would put their cards on the table [and make decisions without delay].

Yang did not comprehend the extent to which the government of Japan -- unlike the wartime government of ROK -- a study of what I would call "bureaucratic democracy in action". Chiba toward the end of meeting, Chiba -- regarding his position vis-a-vis concerned government departments -- told Yang this by way of stressing his strictly liaison role (JPN 3-63: 110, page 8 of Sullivan's record).

. . . "what we tell you is what they tell us" . . .

Of interest here is that 2 days later, on 14 November 1951, at the 8th session of the Legal Status Subcommitte, Tanaka Mitsuo, who headed Japan's delegation to this committe, arrived late on account of having been rebuked for failing to sufficiently liaison with concerned agencies, and he had to retract some parts of an earlier proposal. See 14 November 1951 (pm) MOFA's Tanaka leaps before he looks.

Chiba, a seasoned career Ministry of Foreign affairs administrative officer, understood the pitfalls of being a mediator. As a councilor at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. on 7 December 1941, he had shared the blame for the delay in Japan's conveying its declaration of war to the United States.

12 November 1951
2:39 - 4:37 p.m.

Status Committee

6th Meeting
KRN 81: 112-123
NKBK 81: 38-40

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (6)   Yu Chin O and 5 others (以下六名).

There was considerable discussion status of residence and permission for permanent residence rights. The ROK side was demanding "'matter-of-course and uncondition' permanent residence bestowal" (「当然かつ無条件」の永住権付与 "tōzen katsu mujōken" no eijūken fuyo). The Japan side wondered if that meant Japan would have to bestow permanent residence on "violent revolutionary elements" (暴力革命分子 bōryoku kakumei bunshi), since its Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order had provisions for deportation of subversive elements.

The Japan side stated that, if it applied the conditions of Article 22 of the order, only about 10 percent of Koreans in Japan could be permitted to permanently reside in Japan. But it was prepared to mitigate the conditions when it came time to change them. It would also permit indigent persons (貧困者 hinkonsha), [the only condition being that anyone permitted permanet residence rights] "had to be a "good person" (「善良な者」"zenryō-na mono"). The Japan side couldn't "commit" to ROK's "unconditional" demand because it was a "policy issue" (政策問題 seisaku mondai).

The ROK side acknowledged that it would recognize the exception of "heinous destructive elements" (悪質破壊分子 akushitsu hakai bunshi) -- so it would "literally" (文字通り mojidōri) be "unconditional".

Deportation issue

Japan requested ROK's cooperation regarding the deportation of violent revolutionary elements, and ROK residents suspected of harming the friendly relations of the two countries. Japan's desire to deport Koreans it considered undesirable, because of their criminal or political activities, continued to be a thorny issue.

In the KRN 81 file, which covers all 36 meetings of the Legal Status Subcommittee, one side or the other used the following phrases with varying frequency to describe various kinds of "subversive elements" mostly in political terms. ROK and Japan absolutely shared their fear and detest of revolutionary communism -- which had driven the Republic of China off the continent, and was attempting to drive the Republic of Korea off the peninsula. And where would ROK go? And what would become of Japan if ROK lost the Korean war? The stakes were high.

暴力革命分子 violent revolutionary elements
暴力革命等分子 violent revolutionary and other elements
暴力分子 violent elements
極悪分子 extremely bad elements
極端な分子 extremist elements
悪質破壊分子
政治的破壊分子 politically destructive elements
左翼系分子 left-wing related elements
赤色分子 red elements
共産分子 communist elements
共産破壊分子 communist destructive elements
共産悪質分子 communisty heinous elements
悪質共産分子 heinous communist elements
悪質的共産分子 heinous-esque communist elements
悪質共産系列分子 heinous comunist affiliated elements
在日共産系列悪質分子 communist affilated heinous elements in Japan
韓人共産分子 Korean communist elements
在日韓僑間に紛争を起こす何人かの分子 various elements who foment strife between Overseas Koreans

14 November 1951
10:30 - 12:24 a.m.


Status Committee

7th Meeting
KRN 81: 124-129
NKBK 81: 40-41

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (?)   Yu Chin O representative, Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) member(s), representative Legal [Status Subcommittee] member(s).

This first of two meetings held on the came day focused on a summary by the Japan delegation of points the two sides had supposedly agreed, in the 6th meeting, concerning the nationality problem. The minutes, which are entirely translated on this page, show how the Korean delegation contested some of the contentions in the Japanese summary, which was dated 13 November 1951, the day between the 6th and 7th meetings.

The minutes show that ROK fundamentally disagreed with Japan's understanding of dual nationality.

However, regarding the effects of marriages between "Koreans" and "Japanese" as the minutes would have it, ROK conceded that, under Japan's laws, which unlike Korea's family laws had had provisions for son-in-law adoption, Korean men who had been adopted into a Japanese family as a son-in-law would not lose Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect, and hence become dual nationals. The two sides agreed to make provisions for dealing with this problem. However, by the time they got to the point of drafting an actual status agreement, they had agreed to leave all nationality issues to their respective domestic laws.

See 14 November 1951 am Intermarriage and dual nationality for details.

14 November 1951
3:08 - 4:26 p.m.


Status Committee

8th Meeting
KRN 81: 135-137
NKBK 81: 47

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (?)   Same as before.

The Korean minutes for this meeting note that Tanaka Mitsuo, the head of Japan's delegation to the committee, arrived late. According to the minutes, Tanaka announced that he would have to retract part of the position statement the Japan side had previously made. He explained that he had not engaged in sufficient liaison with relevant Japanese government agencies, and had been scolded. The minutes of the meeting consist of a list of points that the Japan side proceded to qualify.

See 14 November 1951 am Intermarriage and dual nationality for details.

17 November 1951
10:15 - 11:15 a.m.

Status Committee

9th Meeting

20 November 1951
2:14 - 3:05 p.m.

Status Committee

10th Meeting

KRN 81: 142-146
NKBK 81: 52

The ROK archive minutes of these two meetings are combined in a single report as brief as the meetings.

Japan delegates (4)   Same as before.
ROK delegates (6)   Representative Yu Chin O returned to country and not present, therefore Hong Chin Gi [acting representative], Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, each members, observers Whang Boo Kil, Han Gui Yŏng, member(s).

Problem of how to express acceptance of effects of
inter-territorial personal status register movements

Nationality   Regarding nationality issue principles (among other topics) discussed at the two meetings, the "espression problem concerncing [how to phrase] [mutual] approval [acceptance] [of the effects of] [household register] movements under [due to] personal status laws [i.e., inter-territorial register migrations]" spanned both meetings, and both sides presented and discussed more than 10 revision proposals, but in the end they determined [the phrasing] as though separately (身分法上移動是認に関する表現問題で両次にわたって、十余種の修正案を双方で提示討議したが、結局別添のように決定した).

The 20 November 1951 Legal Status Subcommittee progress report devoted 2 paragraphs to the agreement between ROK and Japan that "Japanese" who had left a register in "Japan" because of a personal status relation act with a "Korean" would acquire Korean nationality, while the opposite would be true for a "Korean" who had entered a register in "Japan" because of marriage to, or adoption by, a "Japanese".

See 20 November 1951 Legal Status Subcommittee progress report for interim report on progress in this committee.

? November 1951

Status Committee

11th Meeting

This meeting is not listed on the index of File 81 in the ROK archives (KRN 81, NKBK 81), and there are no reports on this meeting in the file, which jumps from Meetings 9 and 10 to Meeting 12.

22 November 1951
3:22 - 4:45 p.m.
Preliminary
8th Meeting
JPN 3-63: 112-129
KRN 77: 126-149
NKBK 77: 39-53

SCAP observers (2)   [DS] Sullivan, [LS] Bassin
ROK delegates (7)   Chief representative Yang You Chan, representatives Kim Yong Shik, Yu Chin O, Karl Hong Kee, Limb Song Bon, assistants Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong, observer Hong Chin Gi ※
Japan delegates [According to ROK minutes, "Same as at previous meeting"}

※ ROK's minutes state "Same as at previous meeting except General Consul Kim [Yong Shik] had returned to country and was not present". However, MOFA's roster for the previous 7th meeting does not list Kim Yong Shik as present, while the roster for this 8th meeting lists him as present.

ROK's minutes of the proceedings of this 8th session of the preliminary Main (Plenary) Conference of the ROK-Japan talks, after noting that it was Thursday, remark that it was the day of the "American fall harvest thanks festival" (米国秋収感謝祭). Sullivan's record of the proceedings for this meeting make no reference to the day being a holiday in American eyes.

At this session, the heads of ROK's and Japan's delegations went head to head in a debate of status issues. The debate took place 2 days after the Legal Status Subcommittee submitted had submitted its progress report to the main committee.

See 22 November 1951 Yang and Chiba debate status issues for an account of the exchange.

28 November 1951
Preliminary
9th Meeting
JPN
KRN 77: 150-160
NKBK 77: 53-55

Japan delegates (8)   Iguchi Sadao (井口貞夫), Chiba Kō (千葉皓), Tanaka Mitsuo (田中三男), Hiraga Kenta (平賀健太), Ushiroku Toraro (後宮虎郎), Satō Nissh (佐藤日史), Imai Minoru (今井実), Saji Makoto (佐治誠) (all representatives)
ROK delegates (8)   Yang You Chan (梁裕燦), Shin Sung Mo (申性模) Kim Yong Shik (金溶植), Yu Chin O (兪鎮午), Limb Song Bon (林松本), Karl Hong Kee (葛弘基) representatives, Kim Dong Jo (金東祚), Kim Tae Dong (金泰東) assistants, Dr. Oliver legal advisor
SCAP observers (6)   William J. Sebald, John P. Gardiner, Edward Anderberg, William H. Sullivan, Stanley S. Carpenter, Richard B. Finn (all DS/SCAP)

(Not consulted) 日韓会談第九回会合 一九五一年一一月二八日, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, November 28, 1951, National Diet Library, 日韓国交正常化問題資料, 第1期 (1945年〜1953年), 第1巻、[63], pages 116ff.

30 November 1951
10:26 - 12:30 a.m.

Status Committee

12th Meeting
KRN 81: 153-166
NKBK 81: 59-62

Japan delegates (4)   Tanaka Mitsuo, Hiraga Kenta, Imai Minoru each a member, Saji Makoto observing member.
ROK delegates (4)   Yu Chin O representative, Kim Dong Jo, Kim Tae Dong each members, Limb Song Bon representative.

The Korea side asked if the Japan side had liaisoned with relevant government agencies. The Japan side replied that it had circulated the report(s) from the previous meeting(s) but hadn't been able to obtain a unified decision on issues raised the report(s).

There then ensued a highly interesting exchange between the two sides regarding ROK's demand that Japan accord Koreans in Japan a special alien status, and Japan's insistance -- while agreeing to study the matter -- that this would be difficult.

See 30 November 1951 ROK says Koreans in Japan "not immigrants" for details.

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December 1951 talks

3 December 1951
10:08 - 12:38 a.m.

Status Committee

13th Meeting
KRN 81: 167-179
NKBK 81: 62-64

Japan delegates (5)   Tanaka, Hiraga representatives, Imai member, Suzuki Director of 2nd division of [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Exit-enter-country (Immigration)] Control agency (鈴木管理庁第二部長), Kawakami secretary (川上事務官).
ROK delegates (4)   Yu Chin O representative, Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) members, Limb Song Bon representative.

This is the first time the Japanese delegates outnumbered their Korean counterparts at a Legal Status Subcommittee session.

The main topics of this session were deportation and residence rights. Tanaka introduced the two new faces -- Suzuki and Kawakami -- both of whom were Enter-country [Immigration] Control Agency (入国管理庁) officials. The agency had been called the Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Agency (出入国管理庁)" until 1 November 1951, when the new Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order (出入国管理令) came into force. It was part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as GHQ/SCAP viewed border control and alien registration -- though domestic matters -- as closely related to foreign affairs.

Koreans, still Japanese, would not be subject to the Immigration Control Order (OCO) until they lost Japan's nationality. But the Japan side had invited Suzuki and Kawakami to the conference to explain to the Korean side the workings of the new order.

Causes for deportation

Kawakami led off with an overview of ICO Article 24, which concerns deportation. The minutes summarize 15 points, which in the Korean version exausted the 14 Korean consonants plus one. Yi translated the "ka na ta ra ma . . . ha マ" (가 나 다 라 마 . . . 하 マ) to to "a i u e o . . . se so" (あ い う え お . . . せ そ).

The causes for deportation most likely to affect Koreans in Japan were poverty and subversive activities. The Korea side continued to feel that the entire article should not apply to Koreans in Japan, or that some provsions could be relaxed for Koreans -- such as giving those receiving livelihood assistance (生活扶助 seikatsu fujo) a few months to find work before ROK would be obliged to accept them.

Japan held that in fact few provisions would apply, and it felt that the two sides could come to an understanding. It wanted to standardize expulsion determination times. However, if there were matters that needed clarification, statute measures could be taken.

Minimizing "stateless persons, unregistered persons"

Suzuki took over the disucussion of the registration issue -- meaning the issue of how to treat Koreans who refused to regsiter with an ROK mission. He wanted to know how ROK would go about registering Koreans and within what period, and what would be done about those who refused to reguster.

Yu Chin O said the ROK embassy and consulates would register Koreans and forward notices of registration to the Japanese government, and hoped this would gain them the right to permanently reside in Japan. He noted that "that registration results until now have not been good is because, whether one registers or not, there have been no practical effects, but if after this [Japan were] to hold that through registration with an ROK agency in Japan right of residence would be recognized, it would probably raise [produce] good results" (従来の登録の成績が良くなかったのは、登録をしてもしなくても実効がなかったせいだが、今後駐日韓国機関の登録によって居住権が認められるとすれば、良好な成績を上げられる).

Tanaka hoped to hear from the Korea side a concrete plan as to how ROK would register Koreans, and how it hopes that Japan would bestow rights of residence. He said he hoped the two sides would cooperate to produce favorable results. Both sides wanted to maximize registrations.

Yu Chin O said that unless Japan agreed to bestow permanent residence, ROK could not study a concrete plan.

Tanaka said that if permanent residence was unconditional, there was no need for registration. But Japan would recognize a right of residence on the condition of registration. The registration process, however, would have be clear and precise, otherwise there would be confusion. The two sides would have to study how minimize the number of "stateless persons, unregistered persons" (無国籍者、無登録者 mu-kokuseki-sha, mu-tōroku-sha).

4 December 1951
10:18 - 10:48 a.m.
Preliminary
10th Meeting
Last preliminary
plenary session

JPN
KRN 77: 161-170
NKBK 77: 55-60

Japan delegates (8)   Iguchi Sadao (井口貞夫), Chiba Kō (千葉皓), Tanaka Mitsuo (田中三男), Hiraga Kenta (平賀健太), Ushiroku Toraro (後宮虎郎), Satō Nissh (佐藤日史), Imai Minoru (今井実), Saji Makoto (佐治誠) (all representatives)
ROK delegates (8)   Yang You Chan (梁裕燦), Shin Sung Mo (申性模) Kim Yong Shik (金溶植), Yu Chin O (兪鎮午), Limb Song Bon (林松本), Karl Hong Kee (葛弘基) representatives, Kim Dong Jo (金東祚), Kim Tae Dong (金泰東) assistants, Dr. Oliver legal advisor
SCAP observers (6)   William J. Sebald, John P. Gardiner, Edward Anderberg, William H. Sullivan, Stanley S. Carpenter, Richard B. Finn (all DS/SCAP)

See 22 October 1951 Burying hatchets, real and imaginary for transcription of, and commentary on, William H. Sullivan's report on the proceedings of this session.

(Not consulted) 日韓会談第一〇回会合 一九五一年一二月四日, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, December 4, 1951, National Diet Library, 日韓国交正常化問題資料, 第1期 (1945年〜1953年), 第1巻、[63], pages 122ff.

6 December 1951
3:08 - 5:04 p.m.

Status Committee

14th Meeting
KRN 81: 180-192
NKBK 81: 65-67

ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O representative, Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) members, Karl [Hongkee] representative, Yi Iru secretary observer.
Japan delegates (4), recorder (1), government officials (at least 4)   Tanaka Mitsuo and Hiraga Kenta representatives, Imai Minoru member, Saji Makoto observer, recorder
Competent officials of the Ministry of Transportation, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Foreign Investment Committee [FIC], and the Patent Ministry [Ministry 省 sic = 庁 Office].

In these minutes, unlike earlier minutes, the Korea delegation is listed first.

Yi Iru (李一雨 b1920), after completing Keijō 1st Ordinary Higher school (京城第一高等普通学校), graduated from the law department at Chūō University in Tokyo. After the war, he became an ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, was with the Korean Diplomatic Mission to Japan from 1950 to 1952. At the time of the talks he appears to have the head of MOFA's [Archives and] Documents Section (文書課長) and held the rank of secretary (書記官)

The Patent Ministry (特許省 Tokkyoshō) becomes the Patent Bureau (特許局 Tokkyokyoku) in the body of the minutes. There never was a ministry, and from 5 May 1949, when the Ministry of Commerce and Industry became the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Patent Bureau became the Patent Office (特許庁 Tokkyochō).

At this meeting, the Japanese officials, including at times the Japan-side delegates, summarize the effects that loss of Japanese nationality would have on some -- but not many -- Koreans. The Japan side responded to questions from the Korea side regarding numbers of Koreans who might be effected, and how restrictive laws might be revised to permit affected Koreans to continue to possess the qualifications they presently had as Japanese.

See 6 and 7 December 1951 Nationality loss effects clarified for details.

7 December 1951
2:10 - 4:18 p.m.

Status Committee

15th Meeting
KRN 81: 193-205
NKBK 81: 67-70

ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O representative, Limb Song Bon representative, Karl [Hongkee] representative, [Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) members.
Japan delegates (4), government officials (at least 4)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Imai Minoru member, Saji Makoto
Competent officials of the Ministry of Fianance Customs Bureau, the Securities and Exchange Commission Ministry [Commision Ministry 会省 sic = 会 Commission], the Fisheries [Marine Products] Agency, and the Radio Regulatory Bureau.

At this session, a follow-up the previous session, Japanese officials representing other Japanese government organs reported how the status of Koreans in Japan would be affected by laws under their supervision. Much of the meeting focused on financial, property, and tax matters.

The minutes end with the note that, in order to speed up the agreement, it was time for "both sides to submit concrete written proposals on based on deliberations up to now."

See 6 and 7 December 1951 Nationality loss effects clarified for details.

12 December 1951
10:20 - 11:40 a.m.

Status Committee

16th Meeting
Mitsubishi Shoji
KRN 81: 206-218
NKBK 81: 70-72

ROK delegates (7)   Yu Chin O representative, Limb Song Bon representative, Karl [Hongkee] representative, Kim (Dong), Hong Chin Gi members, Yi Iru, Chang Un Gŏl (張潤傑), both secretary observers.
Japan delegates (5)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Saji Makoto member, Imai Minoru, Kanbara Tomihiko (神原富比古) observer, recorder
Competent officials of the Ministry of Transportation, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Foreign Investment Committee [FIC], and the Patent Ministry [特許省 sic = 特許庁 Patent Office].

Mitsubishi Shoji Building

This is the first indicication in the Korea-side minutes for the Legal Status Subcommittee that a meeting was held in the Mitsubishi Shoji Building (三菱商事ビルディング Mitsubishi Shōji Birudingu). Earlier minutes stated that meetings were held at DS/SCAP. But the Diplomatic Section was officed in the Mitsubishi Shoji Building.

Status of "final proposal drafts"

1st Korea proposal

Japan delegation chief representative Tanaka explained that there a few points related Japanese ministries did not agree to, and the Japan side's final proposal draft (最終案) was still in the process of production but would be completed in a few days.

Korea delegation chief representaive Yu reported that the Korea side had also broadly considered the Japan side's opinions, and without deviating from the home country government's basic line (本国政府の基本的な線から外れない程度で), the Korea side had produced its final proposal draft. The Korea side distributed its draft with the understanding that it had not yet been cleared with the home country government. Yu added that the ROK side had endeavored to approach the Japan side's opinions as closely as possible, but that some points remained far in distance from the Japan side's views.

The Japan side asked the Korea side whether it had considered when an agreement of the kind it was proposing should come into effect. The Korea side replied that it could come into effect on the day the Peace Treaty came into effect.

The two sides then began discussing on-going issues related to status and treatment. The first two issues were related to nationality, and registration related to verifying nationality and securing rights of residence. The Japan side made reference to the Korea-side draft.

See 12 December 1951 ROK's 1st legal status proposal for details.

15 December 1951
10:20 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.

Status Committee

17th Meeting
Mitsubishi Shoji
KRN 81: 219-231
NKBK 81: 72-74

ROK delegates (6)   Yu Chin O representative, Limb Song Bon representative, Kim (Dong), Hong Chin Gi members, Kim (Tae) member, Chang Un Gŏl, secretar.y
Japan delegates (5)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Imai Minoru, Kanbara Tomihiko, Saji Makoto, and additionally Kamishiro (神代 Shindai) from the Financial Bureau (理財局) of the Ministry of Finance.

The Japan side distributed the nationality law part of its agreement proposal, the full draft of which it said it would distribute in a few days. The two sides had each state would determine the nationality of "Koreans in Japan" in accordance with its own domestic laws, in order to avoid conflict over their different nationality principles. The problem remained as how to phrase a nationality clause so that it did not imply that the two sides were agreeing to a shared principle of nationality.

Most of the rest of the meeting was given to livelihood protection and deportation -- especially the deportation of indigents receiving livelihood assistance. The Korea side had proposed that Japan not deport anyone without ROK's "consent", but agreed to the Japan side's request that deportation be based on "liaison" and "deliberation" between the two states.

See 15 December 1951 "Consent" vs "liaison and deliberation" for details.

18 December 1951
3:05 - 4:00 p.m.

Status Committee

18th Meeting
Mitsubishi Shoji
KRN 81: 244-256
NKBK 81: 77-79

ROK delegates (6)   Yu Chin O representative, Hong Chin Gi member, Kim (Dong) member, Kim (Tae) member, Dr. Karl [Hongkee], Chang Un Gŏl, secretary.
Japan delegates (4)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Kanbara Tomihiko, Saji Makoto.

1st Japan proposal

Japan-side representative Tanaka distributes Japan's "Japan-side proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan" (在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側提案) to the Korea-side representative, and generallye explains each of its 5 sections.

1. Nationality (国籍)
2. Residence rights (居住権)
3. Leave compulsion [Deportation, Expulsion] (退去強制)
4. Treatment issues (処遇問題)
5. Taking out withdrawal baggage and sending money (引揚荷物の持出及び引揚者の送金)

See 18 December 1951 Japan's 1st legal status proposal for details.

19 December 1951
2:22 - 4:07 p.m.

Status Committee

19th Meeting
Mitsubishi Shoji
KRN 81: 263-271
NKBK 81: 88-89

ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O representative, Hong Chin Gi member, Kim (Dong) member, Kim [Tae] director (部長), Chang Un Gŏl, secretary.
Japan delegates (4)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Kanbara Tomihiko, Saji Makoto.

The Korea side suggested changing phrasing of nationality provision in proposal Japan submitted at the meeting on the previous day, from "loss of Japanese nationality" and "acquisiton of Korean nationality" to "acquisition and loss of nationality" as something to be determined the Japan's and Korea's domestic laws. This made the domestic determination of the nationality of Koreans in Japan completely reciprocal in letter and spirit.

Japan accepted Korea's suggestion, and reflected the rewording in its 21 December 1951 and subsequent drafts.

See 21 December 1951 Japan's 2nd legal status agreement proposal for details.

Civil servant pensions

Japan-side's Kanbara reported that the current law does not provide "onkyō" (恩給) pensions, a special pension scheme for civil servants, to people who are not Japanese. The law would therefore need to be amended for the 1,837 Koreans who were currently receiving such pensions as Japanese. The figure, he said, embraced "south and north Korea" (南北韓 Nan-Boku Kan). (KRN 81: 270, NKBK 81:89).

Nan-Boku Kan almost certainly reflects the nomenclature preferred by the ROK delegate who wrote the minutes. A Japanese delegate would most likely have said "Nan-Boku Chōsen" (南北朝鮮) or "Nan-Boku Sen" (南北鮮). Even today, Japanese generally refer to the peninsula as "Chōsen" and do not speak of the northern part of the peninsula as part of "Kankoku".

21 December 1951
2:10 - 4:22 p.m.

Status Committee

20th Meeting
KRN 81: 272-280
NKBK 81: 89-91

2nd Japan proposal

ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O representative, Hong Chin Gi member, Kim (Dong) member, Kim (Tae) member, Karl [Hongkee] representative.
Japan delegates (4)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Hiraga Kenta representative, Kanbara Tomihiko, Saji Makoto Foreign Affairs secretary (外務事務官).

The Japan side distributed a revised draft of its 18 December 1951 proposal with the same 5 sections.

1. Nationality (国籍)
2. Residence rights (居住権)
3. Leave compulsion [Deportation, Expulsion] (退去強制)
4. Treatment issues (処遇問題)
5. Taking out withdrawal baggage and sending money (引揚荷物の持出及び引揚者の送金)

The Japan side explained the main changes as follows.

  1. In consideration of the time limit for the Korea side to register Koreans in Japan, the time limit for application for permanent residence was increased from 1 to 2 years.
  2. Persons receiving assistance under Livelihood Protection Law would not be given permanent residence but would be required to apply for permission to reside for within 3 years.

Regarding deportation, the Japan side reportedly explained its revisions like this.

  1. Lepers and mentally ill people were very few. Not only would it be difficult to actually expel them, but even if they were actually to be dispelled, [their explusion] would probably not give rise to problems. Therefore, it excluded them from the provisions for "advance liaison" (事前連絡 jizen renraku).
  2. The 18 December 1951 proposal provided that livelihood protection would not continue. But the amended proposal would allow it to continue for 1 year after the agreement comes into effect. and explusion would be determined by prior deliberation with Korea.

This 2nd Japan-side proposal was quickly ammended by a 3rd proposal the following day.

See 21 December 1951 Japan's 2nd legal status agreement proposal and 22 December 1951 Japan's 3rd legal status agreement proposal for details.

22 December 1951
11:50 - 12:24 a.m.

Status Committee

21st Meeting
KRN 81: 281-290
NKBK 81: 91-92

3rd Japan proposal

ROK delegates (5)   Yu Chin O representative, Hong Chin Gi member, Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) members, Limb Song Bon representative.
Japan delegates (3)   Tanaka Mitsuo representative, Kanbara Tomihiko, Saji Makoto Foreign Affairs secretary.

Apparently Hiraga Kenta was no present at this meeting.

The Japan side distributed its 3rd proposal, amending the 2nd proposal it had submitted at the previous day's meeting. The new version had 4 rather than 5 sections, and two of surviving sections had simpler titles, as follows.

1. Nationality (国籍)
2. Residence rights (居住権)
3. Treatment issues (処遇問題)
4. Measures toward withdrawers (引揚者に対する措置)

The Japan side explained the main changes as follows.

  1. The independent section "Compulsion of leave [deporation, expulsion]" (Section 3 of 18 and 21 December 1951 proposals) was deleted, and was simplied within the "Residence rights" section (Section 2 of earlier drafts).
  2. Where the previous draft gave indigent persons a time-limited right-of-residence, the new draft gives them permanent residence.

This 3rd draft was immediately touched up as a 4th draft, dated the following day, 23 December 1951.

See 22 December 1951 Japan's 3rd legal status agreement proposal and 23 December 1951 Japan's 4th legal status agreement proposalfor details.

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January 1952 talks

16 January 1952

Status Committee

22nd Meeting

21 January 1952

Status Committee

23rd Meeting

24 January 1952

Status Committee

24th Meeting

2nd Korea proposal

26 January 1952

Status Committee

25th Meeting

5th Japan proposal

29 January 1952

Status Committee

26th Meeting

6th Japan proposal

31 January 1952

Status Committee

27th Meeting

Top  

February 1952 talks

1 February 1952

Status Committee

28th Meeting

7th legal status proposal
1st Korea-Japan status agreement draft

4 February 1952

Status Committee

29th Meeting

6 February 1952

Status Committee

30th Meeting

7 February 1952

Status Committee

31st Meeting

15 February 1952
14:15 - 15:10 p.m.
Basic Treaty
1st Meeting
MOFA, Room No. 419
KRN 82: 11-15

The 1st session of the formal "Japan-Korea Conferece" convened for the purpose of putting together an actual basic (normalization) treaty and package of agreements. All manner of issues remained sensitive. ROK representatives were particularly unhappy with Japan's reluctance to treat ROK as a material and spiritual victim of past colonial rule.

This 1st session was attended by 11 or 13 Korean and 15 or 16 Japanese conferees, according to the simple name lists in the English summary of the session (smaller numbers) and separate, more detailed lists (larger numbers).

See 15 February 1952 conferees in "Personae dramatis" section for details.

The meeting established procedures. (1) The official languages were Japanese, Korean, and English were recognized as official languages. (2) The listening side would be repsonsible for interpreting. (3) Summary records of proceedings of plenary sessions, and of sessions of the sub-committees that would be established, were to be prepared in English, alternately by each delegation.

The Japanese delegation proposed the following 7 agenda items (KRN 82: 13).

  1. Establishment of basic relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, including diplomatic relationship.
  2. Settlement of question on nationality and treatment of residents in Japan of Korean descent.
  3. Disposition of properties and claims of Japan and the Republic of Korea and their nationals.
  4. Conclusion of agreement on fisheries.
  5. Commencement of negotiations on division of submarine cables.
  6. Commencement of negotiations on a treaty of commmerce and navigation.
  7. Settlement of pending questions on vessels.

16 February 1952
10:05 - 11:30 a.m.
Basic Treaty
2nd Meeting
MOFA, Room No. 419
KRN 82: 31-34

At this 2nd session of the 2nd formal plenary session of the Japan-Korea Conference, the two sides agreed to the following 6-point agenda.

  1. Establishment of basic relationship between Japan and Korea, including diplomatic relations.
  2. Disposition of properties and claims of Japan and the Republic of Korea and their nationals.
  3. Conclusion of agreement on fisheries.
  4. Conclusion of agreement on division of submarine cables.
  5. Commencement of negotiations on a treaty of commmerce and navigation.
  6. Other matters.

Questions concerning "the nationality and legal status of the Korean residents in Japan" and "vessels" would be referred back to the plenary committee if for some reason they "failed to reach agreement in their resective subcommittees, which had been established the previous year by the preparatory plenary committee.

Subsequent discussion resulted in the establishing of subcommittees for items (b) and (c), hence the formation of the "Property and Claims Subcommittee" and the "Fisheries Subcommittee". Item (a) -- "basic relations" -- was scheduled for discussion at the next (3rd) session).

20 February 1952
10:15 - 10:45 a.m.
Basic Treaty
3rd Meeting
MOFA, Room No. 419
KRN 82: 55-56

At this very brief 3rd session of the Japan-Korea Conference, the two sides agreed to establish a Basic Relations Committee [subcommittee] to draft the normalization treaty.

The next (4th) session was not scheduled, presumably because it would be scheduled after the three subcommittees determined when they would be able to make initial reports. This turned out to be 24 March 1952.

22 February 1952
Basic Subcommittee
1st Meeting
(KRN 80: 5-11)

This first session of the Basic Relations Committee convened between 10:15-12:00 at Room No. 419, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo.

The conferees of the Japanese delegation were Katsumi OHNO (chief delegate), Kenta HIRAGA, Mitsuo TANAKA, Koh CHIBA, Shigeru HIRTOA, Masao OHSATO, and Toshio MITSUDO.

The Korean delegates were YU Chin O (chief delegate), LIMB Song Bon, YIU Tai Ha, KIM Dong Jo, CHOI Kyu Hah, and CHANG Yoon Kul.

The chief delegates of each party exchanged opening addresses.

Agreements were made conerning procedural matters, including the following agreements on official languages and summary records.

c. Japanese, Korean and English languages would be used as official languages at this committee, under the principles set forth by the First Plenary Session.

d. Summary records of every session of this committee shuld be prepared in English by the representative Delegations alternately nd Mr. Kenichiro NISHIZAWA, Secretary of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. CHANG Yoon Kul, Third Secretary of the Korean Mission were appointed the responsible officials for the above task.

The Japanese side presented a "Draft Treaty of Amity" and made a couple of corrections in Articles 4 and 5, which concerned nationality and treatment.

27 February 1952
Basic Subcommittee
2nd Meeting
(KRN 80: 13-15)

ROK's chief delegate Yu wondered if "amity" in the "Draft Treaty of Amity" was the proper word. He also questioned the focus on "new relationship" without any reference to historical matters. Japan's chief Delegate Ōno thought the two states should focus on their future friendship.

ROK's Yu wondered why Japan's draft introduced new principles not in Article 12 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ōno replied that the Peace Treaty required Japan to accord Korea most-favored-nation or national treatment to only to the extent that Korea accorded such treatment to Japan, this was too restrictive. It would be better for the two countries to facilitate intercourse through clauses on "freedom of Entry and Exit".

29 February 1952
Basic Subcommittee
3rd Meeting
(KRN 80: 17-19)

Article 4 of Japan's Draft Treaty of Amity concerned the "affirmation of nationality, etc.". The Korean side expressed its desire to "reserve the inclusion of this article until an agreement in principle was reached at the committee for the question of nationality and treatment."

In the 1st Session, when resenting its Draft Treaty of Amity, Japan's delegation had corrected the draft as follows.

Article 4 -- "those Koreans" became "all Koreans include those"

Article 5 -- "mentioned in the said paragraph" became "who have resided continuously in Japan since any time prior to September 2, 1945"

The Korean side stated that these corrections "would not be necessary, because the affirmation [of nationality] would only be made for Koreans residing in Japan and that the Korean Delegation would prefer 'August 9th, 1945' to 'September 3nd, 1945."

Both parties agreed to leave the two articles undecided for the time being.

Top  

March 1952 talks

5 March 1952
Basic Subcommittee
4th Meeting
(KRN 80: 21-27)

ROK's chief delegate Yu presented to the Japanese side its "Draft Basic Treaty between the Republic of Korea and Japan" as annexed to the summary report for this 4th session. The ROK side explained the many ways in which its draft differed from Japan's draft.

Article III of the ROK draft read as follows (English text ROK 80-25, Korean text ROK 80-29, [red] comments and structural translation mine). The Korean text, paginated and archived following the English version, is written on Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (大韓民國駐日代表部) folio manuscript paper.

Article 3 of ROK's 5 March 1952 draft of Basic Treaty
English text Korean text Structural translation

Article 3   The Republic of Korea and Japan confirm that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Government of the Empire of Korea and the Government of Imperial Japan [sic = the Empire of Japan] on and before August 22, 1910 are null and void.

第三條  大韓民國과日本國은一九一〇年八月二十二日以前이臼 [舊] 大韓帝國과日本國間에締結된모든條約이無效임을確認한다

Article 3   The Republic of Korea and Japan confirm that all treaties concluded between the former Empire of Korea and the former Empire of Japan on or before 22 August 1910 are without effect [null and void].

"null and void"

Japan refused to accept ROK's "null and void (無効 J. mukō K. muhyo) as worded. By 1965, Article III had become Article 2, and the wording had significantly changed.

The final phrase of the Korean version of the 1965 basic treaty is the same as that of the 1952 version except that 無效임 (myhyo im) has become 이미무효 (imi muhyo im). The ever important adverb "imi" (already) has been inserted to qualify the coupula "im" (is/are).

English   already null and void
it is confirmed [by this treaty] that XXX are already null and void

Japanese   もはや無効である   mohaya mukō de aru
that XXX are already without efficacy is confirmed [by this treaty]

Korean   이미 무효임  imi muhyo im
[this treaty] confirms that XXX are already without efficacy

See 1965 Japan-ROK normalization treaty for details.

ROK contended that the annexation was illegal because it had been forced. Japan argued that such a clause in the treaty would "impart an unnecessary stimulus from the aspect of the psychology of the people of Japan" (Takasaki 1996, page 36, my translation). Takasaki surmised that, in fact, Japan considered the clause to be unwarranted, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the annexation to have been lawful, not to mention the fact that Chōsen (Korea) had long been globally recognized as a territory of Japan.

I would add to this the fact that the manner in which the Allied Powers had treated Formosa (Taiwan), Korea (Chōsen), and other parts of Japan's sovereign empire, that they too collectively viewed these territories as lawfully part of Japan. The Allied Powers had seen no reason to stipulate in either of these instruments that the treaties which had caused Formosa and Korea to become parts of Japan were null and void.

At the time Japan was negotiating a normalization treaty with ROK, it was also negotiating a peace treaty with ROC, to be signed on 28 April 1952. Article IV of this treaty confirmed that "all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have become null and void as a consequence of the war" (official English version). The phrasing in the ROC treaty is conventional, as declarations of war are usually taken as causes for nullifying treaties.

Articles 4 and 5

Articles 4 and 5 in Japan's 22 February 1952 draft were reduced to the following contingency phrasing in Article VI of ROK's 5 March 1952 draft.

Article VI   (When satisfactory agreement is reached by the committee on Nationality and Treatment of Korean Residents in Japan, then it will be provided in this Article.)

6 March 1952

The Cabinet of the government of Japan -- in Cabinet A No. 44 of 6 March 1952, titled "Matters concerning procedures for naturalization of Chosenese and Taiwanese who are civil servants" -- requests the Attorney General's Office to arrange for Chosenese and Taiwanese national and local civil servants, who at the time are still Japanese, to apply for permission to naturalize in advance of their being aliens. When the Peace Treaty comes in to effect, they will lose their Japanese nationality, and hence their jobs, which require that they be Japanese. As they are not yet aliens, they are technically not able to apply for naturalization, but the Cabinet asks the Attorney General's Office to make an exception so that they will not lose their jobs.

12 March 1952

The Attorney General's Office -- in Civil Affairs A No. 270, titled "Regarding procedures for naturalization of Chosenese and Taiwanese who are civil servants" -- instructs regional Legal Affairs Bureaus to expedite exceptional and simplified naturalization applications from Chosenese and Taiwanese civil servants in their regions.

12 March 1952
Basic Subcommittee
5th Meeting
(KRN 80: 35-39)

ROK's chief delegate Yu alluded to the basic treaty as a "peace treaty" and Japan's chief delegate Ōno objected to calling it a peace treaty -- it was a "treaty of amity".

Article 3 (Article III) got a lot of attention.

Ōno stated that the Japanese side wanted to strike the article for the following reasons (transcribed as received, ROK 80-37).

(a) As all treaties and agreements between Japan and the Empire of Korea had expired, it would make no sense to insert such provisions;
(b) It would be unnecessary to stir up unpleasant remembrance of the past with such provisions, when, as a matter of fact, no one would deem these treaties or agreements be valid at present;
(c) Such vague provisions which did not describe exactly the time of being "null and voic" would permit different interpretations and make situation complicated:

ROK's Yu was paraphrased in the summary to have responded that . . .

. . . the unpleasant remembrance would, contrary to the statement of Mr. OHNO, be cleared out by such provisions, and that according to Korean peoples' interpretation all these treaties and agreements had been null and void since beginning, but merely the confirmation of "null and void" was described in this article without referring to the time of voidance to avoid the complicated situation which might arise from the enforcement of this interpretation, and the Korean Delegates would not agree the idea to delete this article.

Yu is alluding is saying ROK views everything null and void from the start, but won't stipulate that, for if that interpretation was enforced, there could be huge legal reprecussions.

18 March 1952

Status Committee

32nd Meeting

2nd Japan-Korea Agreement draft

Advanced working status agreement draft

20 March 1952

Status Committee

33rd Meeting (a.m.)
34th Meeting (p.m.)

22 March 1952
Basic Subcommittee
6th Meeting
(KRN 80: 41-44)

Consultations on both sides resulted in a joint "Draft Treaty of Amity between Japan and the Republic of Korea" which Japan's chief delegate Ōno presented.

Concerning Article of 3 of this draft (no copy was annexed), the summary remarks as follows (KRN 80: 42, transcribed as received).

Leaving the details of the problems of nationality of Korean Residents in Japan to an agreement to be drafted at the Committee on the Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan, a simplified provision was inserted.

Yu insisted the name of the treaty should be "Basic Treaty" as it would stiulate the the "basic relations" between the two countries. Hence "basic" would have a more "fundamental and wider" sense than "amity".

Article 3 (Article III) of the ROK draft had been moved to Paragraph 3 of the Preamble, but apparently "null and void" was not used, for Yu reportedly said "the word, 'null and void' would be clearer, more fundamental and simpler" (KRN 80: 43) -- presumably than what Japan was proposing.

24 March 1952
10:10 - 11:50 a.m. Basic Treaty
4th Meeting
KRN 82: 82-88

At this 4th plenary session of the Korea-Japan Conference, the delegates of both sides reviewed summary reports the 3 subcommittees -- Basic Relations Committee, Claims Committee, and Fisheries Committee.

The rest of the meeting was given to a veritable inquest by the Korea side of the Japan side's possition on property and claims. The summary record includes this statement (KRN 82: 84).

The Korean Delegation expressed its view that, unless Japan withdraws its claims over Japanese physical assets in Korea, this conference would not bring out any results.

This remark -- which pitches ROK's "all or nothing" stance against Japan's "step-by-step" approach" -- essentially marks the start of the breakdown in the 1st round of ROK-Japan talks.

See 24 March 1952 Rok-Japan Conference 4th Plenary Session for an annotated transcription of the entire 7-page English summary of the proceedings of this 4th plenary session. The annotations include links to related articles, including the 29 April 1952 U.S. Department of State reply to a query Yang You Chan, ROK's ambassador the the United States cum chief delegate at the Korea-Japan Conference, sent DOS on 25 March 1952, immediately following this tense 4th session, concerning Japan's stance on Japanese property in ROK.

26 March 1952
Basic Subcommittee
7th Meeting
(KRN 80: 46-47)

Regarding the name of the treaty, the Korean side reiterated its opinion that it should be "Basic Treaty".

"null and void"

Regarding Paragraph 3 of the Preamble, the ROK side stated that "do not regulate the relationship . . ." . . . "is insufficient and should be to the effect that these treaties and agreements were null and void."

In reference to the expression regarding the treaties and agreements between the Empire of Korea and Japan, Mr. OHNO expressed the Japanese side's intention to use only such words as "the treaties and agreements are at present ineffective," and Mr. YU stated that the Korean side would like to insert an expression to the effect that the treaties and agreements had been null and void from the beginning.

Paragraph 3 of the Preamble in the Japanese draft read as follows (KRN 80: 52), my transcription and structural translation).

また、日本国と旧大韓帝国との間に締結されたすべての条約及び協定が日本国と大韓民国との関係において効力を有しないことを確認するので、

And whereas [we] confirm that none of the treaties or agreements between Japan and the former Empire of Korea have any force or effect in [present] relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,

"not nationals of Japan"

Regarding Article III (Article 3), which concerned the status of Koreans in Japan, the ROK delegation expressed its opinion that "Japan affirms that Korean residents in Japan are not nationals of Japan" is not necessary.

Article 3 of the Japanese draft read as follows (KRN 80: 53), my transcription and structural translation).

第三条   大韓民国は、日本に居住する韓人が大韓民国国民であることを確認する。

Article 3   The Republic of Korea confirms that Koreans residing in Japan are nationals of the Republic of Korea.

29 March 1952

Status Committee

35th Meeting

3rd Japan-Korea Agreement draft

At 35th meeting of the subcommittee on nationality and treatment, Japan and Korea agreed to a "Draft of Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the nationality and treatment of ROK Koreans in Japan" (在日韓人の国籍及び処遇に関する日韓協定案 Zainichi Kankokujin no kokuseki oyobi shogū ni kan suru Nik-Kan kyōtei an). This draft would be slightly edited at the 1 April 1952 meeting (next).

See 29 March & 1 April 1952 Nearly final status agreement drafts for details.

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April 1952 talks

1 April 1952

Status Committee

36th Meeting
Last basic treaty
plenary session

KRN 82:

4th (last-known) Japan-Korea Agreement draft

At the 36th meeting of the subcommittee on nationality and treatment, Japan and Korea agreed to a slightly but significantly edited version of the 29 March 1952 text of the ROK Koreans in Japan" (在日韓人の国籍及び処遇に関する日韓協定案 Zainichi Kankokujin no kokuseki oyobi shogū ni kan suru Nik-Kan kyōtei an) which. Some revisions reflect the fact that differences in opinion on some points of contention remained to be resolved in future deliberations. (Takasaki 1996, page 34).

See 29 March & 1 April 1952 Nearly final status agreement drafts for details.

2 April 1952
Basic Subcommittee
8th Meeting
Last session
(KRN 80: 51-54)

The received summary of this session includes only the first of what appear to be at least 2 but probably 3 or 4 pages. The only paragraph in the "Proceeding" section reads as follows (transcribed as received, ROK 80-51).

(1) In response to Mr. OHNO's request to express the opinion of Korean side on the reference draft made by the Japanese side, Mr. YU stated as follows, saying that the Korean Delegation did not receive the instructions in this connection from the home Government yet:

The page ended here and there were no following pages. Following this page, and ending ROK 80, is a 2-page Japanese text of the Japanese draft -- parts of which I've cited in my commentary on the 7th session of 26 March 1951 (above).

I gather from this and other comments that there is a perception on Japan's side of procrastination on the ROK side. Other testimony suggests that the Basic Treaty negotiations were doomed from the start on account of differences between the two parties that would persist over the following years, and to some extent even after they managed to make a few compromises in the basic treaty they signed in 1965.

4 April 1952
Basic Treaty
5th Meeting
Last

17 April 1952

Japan proposes that the two parties compromise by signing a treaty covering what they were able to agree upon at that point, and leave other issues for future talks. ROK, however, insisted that Japan sign a general treaty accepting its demands. (Takasaki 1996, page 37)

18 April 1952

Japan proposes that the talks be discontinued until after the peace treaty came into effect. An ROK spokesman observed that ROK would not continue the talks so long as Japan refused to rescind its right to make claims [demands] on ROK (Takasaki 1996, page 37).

Japan had proposed in February that both sides waive their claim rights regarding assets (ibid. 32). By March ROK was taking the view that continuation of talks was meaningless so as the claim-rights issue remained unresolved, and on 8 April Yang You Chan, ROK's chief delegate, remarked that Japan, if it wished to show its sincerity, should rescind its claim rights (ibid. 37).

19 April 1952

Civil Affairs Bureau of Attorney General's Office issues notification "Concerning the disposition of nationality and family register matters regarding Chosenese, Taiwanese, and others, associated with the effectuation of the Treaty of Peace".

24 April 1952

At what was to be their last meeting until 1953, Japan proposed that the two countries indefinitely postpone their talks. ROK regarded this as unilateral but was not able to refuse. (Takasaki 1996, page 37).

28 April 1952

San Francisco Peace Treaty comes into effect

As stated in the 19 April 1952 Attorney General's Office notification, Chosenese and Taiwanese lose the nationality of Japan, based on the separation of Chōsen and Taiwan from Japan's national territory pursuant to the Peace Treaty.

On this day, Kanpō (官報) announced the naturalizations of 70 persons, including 51 Chōsenese, 17 ROC nationals, 1 American, and 1 stateless individual. The Chosenese and Chinese are presumed to have been civil servants. See Expedited naturalizations for details.

Talks would not resume, again in Tokyo, until 1 April 1953, a few months before the signing of the armistice (27 July 1953) in the Korean War. A normalization treaty and status agreement would not be signed until 1965. The terms of status agreement came into effect in 1966. See Japan-ROK settlements affecting subnationality in the "Territorial settlements" article on this website for details.

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Legal status and treatment

The following documents show how representatives of ROK and Japan viewed the "nationality problem" -- so differently that, in the end, they agreed that nationality was not a suitable topic for discussion at their bilateral talks.

The documents substantiate an argument I have been making for many years -- long before they became available much less came to my attention -- that there was nothing "unilateral" about Japan's treatment of the nationality of Koreans in Japan after World War II in the sense that many others have claimed -- that Japan had somehow violated international conventions. During the 1990s, when I was clearing my head of the cobwebs of my undergraduate and graduate indoctrination in the history of Northeast Asia, I began to perceive that -- given ROK's attitude toward the legality of Japan's annexation of Korea as Chōsen -- ROK, unless forced to do so, would never have accepted a territorial transfer treaty, much less one with provisions for nationality choice.

During the 2000s, as I read reports in Japanese, some of them written by witnesses to the early round of ROK-Japan talks, the rift between ROK and Japan over the nationality issue become clearer. And as I began to understand, for the first time, the territorial implications of Japanese nationality -- its intrinsic association with population registers that represent the "demographic" component sovereign territory -- I began to understand why it made perfect legal sense for Chosenese and Taiwanese to lose Japanese nationality as an effect of the territorial separation of Chōsen and Taiwan from Japan.

Status agreement proposals and drafts

All of the following documents consist of drafts of an agreement between the Republic of Korea and Japan concerning the status and treatment agreement of Koreans in Japan. The drafts include early unilateral proposals as well as bilateral drafts at various stages of the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talks, down to the final draft dated 1 April 1952.

Translations

Documents which originated in Korean were translated into Japanese by Yi Yangsu. The English translations of Yi's translation, and of documents that originated in Japanese, are mine.

Transcriptions

Transcriptions of the texts of Yi Yangsu's Japanese translations of Korean documents are cuts and pastes from the pdf files created by Nik-Kan Kaidan Bunsho Kai, All transcriptions of the texts of Japanese and English documents are mine, based on images from NKBK's pdf files and the original ROK tif files on which the NHBK files are based. All texts have been from slightly to radically reformated to accommodate presentation on this website. Unless otherwise noted, all markup and commentary are mine.

See ROK and Japan archives for a guide to the document sources, my citation formula, transcription and translation standards, and markup scheme.

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Fall 1950 ROK on status of "Overseas Koreans in Japan"

ROK archives include documents which show that, as early as October 1950, its officials in Japan were studying issues related to the legal status and treatment of what called "Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑 K. Chae-Il Hangyo J. Zai-Nichi Kankyō).

File 76 (KRN 76, NKBK 76) includes the following document dated October 1950.

対日講和条約에関한基本態度와그法的根拠
対日講和条約に関する基本態度とその法的根拠
Basic attitudes concerning an amity treaty with Japan and their legal foundations

The document was produced at the "Amity treaty with Japan study committee" (対日講和調査委員会) of the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (駐日代表部案). The address scribbled on the neatly written title page of the document is 東京都中央区京橋三丁目 / 大同ビル / 国際法律事務所 -- meaning that, while the title and text of the document were written in Korean, the address was written in Japanese, probably later. The archival cover sheet, written in a different hand, has 근거 rather than 根拠 at the end of the title, suggesting laziness rather than inability on the part of the archivist to write the graphs.

The contents page lists 13 topics, the 10th of which is as follows (KRN 76: 6, NKBK 76: 1).

在日韓僑의国籍及居住移転問題 (抄)
在日韓僑の国籍及び居住移転問題 (抄)
Problems of nationality and residence change of Overseas Koreans in Japan (Extracts)

The documents in this part (KRN 76: 62-72, NKBK 76: 22-28) review all the reasons why the status problem of "Overseas Koreans in Japan" is not as easy as it might seem.

In the following summary, I will cite and translate Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of the original Korean text, which I have also consulted.

The status problems of "Overseas Koreans in Japan"

Topic 10 has 4 parts, 3 of which are substantial, and the 4th of which -- a list of treaties and demographic data -- is significant.

Part 1 -- "Legal status of Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑の法的地位) -- introduces issues related to their legal status like this (KRN 76: 63, NKBK 76: 22, and Yi Yangsu 1977: 71; English translation mine).

Overseas Koreans in Japan of course are nationals (国民 kokumin) of the Republic of Korea, but it cannot be asserted that they hold the nationality (国籍 kokuseki) of the Republic of Korea. This -- no matter what theories Japanese scholars attempt to attach [to their contentions to the contrary] -- is an immovable fact. Therefore, in the effects of the legal status of Overseas Koreans, various difficult problems are piled [in a mountain].

Part 1 goes on to summarize how SCAP had treated the legal status of such Koreans until then (i.e., circa fall 1950).

Part 2 -- "Problems concerning the independence of conquered and annexed states and residence changes of their nationals who are settled in the former controlling (ruling, governing) country" (被征服被併合国家の独立と旧支配国内に居留していたその国民の居住移転に関する問題) -- briefly reviews status issues related to the independence of the Philippines, a number of South American colonies, and several British colonies as late as 1949 -- before turning to Europe, where the focus turns to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of states like Poland and Yugoslavia. (KRN 76: 65-67, NKBK 76: 23-24)

Part 3 -- "Nationality problems and residence change problems of Overseas Koreas in Japan" (在日韓僑の国籍問題と居住移転問題)

Part 4 -- "Reference" (参考) -- consists of reference materials, beginning with a list of 12 treaties and articles relevant to territorial change -- both cessioned territory and separation and independence. The list begins with the 1662 "Betoru (?) Treaty" (ベトル Betoru < 베틀 Petŭl) of 1662 between Italy (伊) and Switzerland (端西), and ends with the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy (対伊平和条約).

The list includes the following 3 treaties in which Japan was a party (KRN 76: 69, NKBK 76: 25).

  1. 1875 Karafuto-Chishima Exchange Treaty (樺太・千島交換条約) [between Japan and Russia]
  2. 1905 Portsmouth Treaty (ポーツマス条約) [between Japan and Russia]
  3. 1909 Agreement Concerning Chientao (間島に関する条約) [between Korea represented by Japan and China]

The "agreement" (協約) concerning Chientao -- generally called a "treaty" in English -- had provisions for the status of Koreans in Chientao (間島 Jiàndăo, K. Kando, J. Kantō), a district in eastern Manchuria along the Tumen river on the border between China, then under the Ching (Qing) Dynasty, and the Empire of Korea. Korea was then a dependency of Japan, which proxied its foreign affairs, hence my characterization of the agreement. Most reference I have seen describe it as a treaty between Japan and China, but formally that was not the case.

Missing from the list of treaties was the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty (下関条約) between Japan and China, which included provisions for the cessioning of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan, and changes of status for people residing in these related territories.

The appended sources also include a breakdown of Japan's "alien" (外国人) population as of 30 July 1948, according to which there were a total of 635,142 foreigners defined as other than Occupation Personnel. Their "nationality" and other statuses included China (20,421), Taiwan (14,558), Korea (591,410), White Russians (343), Stateless (579).

There are statistics on the number of Korean in Japan receiving livelihood assistance (no figures) or are unemployed (no figures), and a breakdown of criminal cases involving 9,556 Koreans being detained, as of March 1950, including 2,423 who were awaiting court decisions (2,356 men, 67 women) and 7,133 (7,101 men, 32 women) who had already been convicted. and criminal Koreans by sex who detained pending outcomes of court. And finally there is breakdown of Korean entrepreneurs (55,023) by (apparently) the capital size of their operations.

Other documents in the file also show that, as of the end of 1950, there was no shortage of awareness that treaties and other agreements involving territory typically generally stipulated rules for determining the statuses and status changes of residents of the territories. By 1951, however, the governments of both Korea and Japan -- essentially also the Allied Powers -- understood that the recognition of the "independence" of Korea, and rules for determining the status of Koreans in Japan -- and let us not forget also the status of Japanese in Korea -- would have to be unconventional.

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15 May 1951 DS/SCAP on status of Koreans in Japan

The Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan was chronically concerned about rumors of proposals to deport from some to many, if not all, Koreans in Japan to the peninsula, which would have meant the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south. Mid 1951 marked the peak controversy among SCAP officials like G-2 (Intelligence) chief Charles A. Willoughby (formerly Adolf Charles Weidenbach 1892-1972) and Legal Section chief Alva C. Carpenter. Willoughby, an ardent Charles A. [Anthony] Adolf Charles Weidenbach, Willoughby in anti-Communist who advocated, with support from some Japanese officials, ridding Japan of subversive elements among Koreans in Japan -- and officials such as Alva Carpenter, chief of SCAP's Legal Section, who said it couldn't be done legally.camp and those who, apart from their political views, who anti-communist fervor among SCAP and Japanese officials 1951 was Never mind that (1) there was a war going on between ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north, (2) Koreans in Japan had opted to remain in 1946 when given an opportunity to leave, (3) they could still leave but most had family and livilhood reasons to stay, (4) many, though mostly from southern privinces, were politically aligned DPRK, which had started the war, and (5) mass deportation of the roughly 600,000 Koreans in Japan at the time would have imposed considerable difficulties for SCAP and Japanese authorities, to say nothing of ROK, whose population at the time was roughly 21 million.

15 May 1951 DS/SCAP on status of Koreans in Japan
(1) Only violators of Alien Registration Law, if illegal entrants, can be deported
(2) Only Koreans entering after 2 September 1945 to be aliens under Immigration Law

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of a scan of the original English document (KRN 78: 7, NKBK 78: 3). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Diplomatic Section

    The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, presents its compliments to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan and has the honor to refer to conversations held between Minister Kim and Ambassador Sebald on March 26, 1951 concerning the possibility of deporting to Korea from Japan certain Korean residents of Japan.

    The Mission is advised that this matter has been discussed within this Headquarters and with the cognizant Japanese authorities to determine the legal limitations that might govern such action as Minister Kim proposed. It has been determined from these discussions that it is not possible under current Japanese law to deport from Japan any persons other than those aliens who violated the [1947] Alien Registration Law [sic = Order] as a result of illegal entry into Japan.

    It is understood, however, that the new [1951] Japanese Immigration Law now pending before the Diet will make provision for the deportation of certain categories of undesirable aliens and of those convicted of illegal activities. It should be noted, however, that insofar as Korean residents of Japan are concerned, this law will apply only to those Koreans who have entered Japan since September 2, 1945, and that all other Koreans in Japan can not be classified as aliens until some definitive action has been taken to determine their exact nationality status.

Tokyo, May 15, 1951

To the
  Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan,
    Tokyo.

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Summer 1951 ROK on nationality of Koreans

During the months and weeks leading up the Peace Conference in San Francisco and the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan on 8 September 1951, the Republic of Korea was busy preparing for the eventuality of having to normalize its relationship with Japan, which would require that the two countries negotiate settlements to a number of thorny issues. For ROK, the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan was not a high priority issue. Nonetheless, its delegates in Japan put considerable effort into clarifying their position -- which, for the most, determined the outcome of subsequent talks about nationality, rights of residence, personal property rights, deportation, and other issues related to legal status and treatment.

The following transcription is of a 3-page English typescript document found in ROK archives between a memorandum from the Diplomatic Section (DS) of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) to the Korean Diplomatic Mission to Japan (KDMJ), dated 15 May 1951, and a memorandum from the KDMJ to DS of GHQ/SCAP dated 10 August 1951. The document appears to be written from an ROK point of view.

Summer 1951 Nationality of Koreans in Japan
Japan insists Koreans will lose their Japanese nationality in 1952 . . .
but ROK insists Koreans already "threw off the Japanese yoke" in 1945

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 78: 49-51, NKBK 78: 11-13). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

1. Nationality of the Koreans

Regarding the nationality of the Koreans, the Japanese delegation is of the insistent opinion that it is with the coming into force of the Japanese peace treaty that the Koreans resident in Japan lose their Japanese nationality and acquire the Korean nationality. However, the Korean delegation does not think that way. That is to say, the Koreans threw off the Japanese yoke when Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 and acquired the Korean nationality when the government of the Republic of Korea was established. This acquisition of the Korean nationality was legally completed with the coming into force of the Korean Nationality Law in December, 1948. In this connection, there was actually no difference whether the Koreans were in Korea or in Japan.

The independence of ROK was not merely de facto but was formally recognized by the decision of the UN General Assembly as well as individually by the majority of the democratic nations all of which recognition renders the independence of Korea legal. Article 2 of the Japanese peace treaty does not empower Japan to do more than confirming these legal effects already established.

II. Legal Status of the Korean residents in Japan

The Korean residents in Japan may be divided in the following two categories:

a) Residents since prior to August 9, 1945
b) Entrants since August 20, 1945
c) [sic]

The Koreans in Japan belonging to the above 2 categories have the following legal status:

Category b:   Entrants in this category are being accorded by the Japanese Government the exact treatment given to all foreign nationals, i.e., 1) they have no suffrage nor eligibility, 2) they are required to register as aliens, and 3) they are under restrictions as other foreigners are in regard to acquisition of properties in Japan and 4) in regard to business activities.

Category a:   Residents in this category have 1) no suffrage nor eligibility and 2) are required to register as aliens as those in category b.; however, they undergo no restrictions at all with regard to acquisition of properties and business activities. This means that they are different from ordinary foreigners in Japan; in other words, they are accorded national treatment by the Japanese Government despite their being foreigners. In fact, they have been receiving the same treatment as that given the Japanese nationals in all respects of living, business activities, acquisition and possession of properties, financial measures, taxation, food ration, police control etc. except respecting suffrage and eligibility, as mentioned above. While they have not enjoyed the usual privileges enjoyed by the aliens, they at the same time had rights which were not granted aliens.

It is the desire of the Korean government that such legal relations now existing in regards treatment being accorded the Korean residents in Japan be maintained by the Japanese Government.

Summer 1951 ROK contemplates four measures

III. Proposals of the Korean Delegation

Proposals of the Korean government with regard to the legal status of Korean residents in Japan may be summarized as follows:

a) The Korean Government demands no more than the normal treatment accorded to aliens for the Korean residents who entered Japan on or after August 10, 1945 as well as those who will enter Japan hereafter. They will be governed by all Japanese laws and rules applicable to foreigners.

b) As for those who have been residents in Japan since before August 9, 1945 the Korean government holds the following view:

1. They should be granted the right of permanent residence in Japan ipso facto and without going through any formalities as well as the right to depart from Japan freely. Such rights should be extended to their descendants.

2. They should be guaranteed the human rights pursuant to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the enjoyment of property right, freedom of business activities and education, all other rights including the right to work and living, they should be accorded the same treatment that accorded the Japanese nationals.

In addition, they should be granted the freedom of establishing schools for the sake of educating the Korean students. In such schools, education will be carried out in accordance with the education policy of the ROK.

3. In case of their departure from Japan, they should be guaranteed the right to retain or dispose of their properties in Japan without any restriction whatsoever and should have the right to carry with them their movable properties. The properties carried or disposed of should come under no restrictions whatever as regards their kind, quantity or value, nor should they be taxed.

4. Deportation should not be applicable to the residents of this category. Those however who have committed felonies such as attempts to overthrowing the Japanese government by force should be deported with the consent of the Korean government.

IV. Reasons why those who have been resident in Japan since
   before August 8, 1945 are entitled to special status.

a) These people had entered Japan not as aliens and naturally not on the regular entry procedures for foreigners.

"These people had entered Japan not as aliens"

In other words, "These people had entered Japan as Japanese".

Since Chōsen (Korea), Taiwan (Formosa), and Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin) were parts of Japan, along with the prefectural Interior, Chosenese (Koreans), Taiwanese (Formosans), and Karafutoans entered the Interior as Japanese.

But the writer cannot say "These people had entered Japan not as aliens but as Japanese". The writer believes "These people were never Japanese but always Koreans, but under Japanese rule, as imperial subjects, they were not aliens."

b) The majority of them were brought to Japan by the Japanese government under its responsibility as compulsory laborers or the like.

"The majority were brought . . . as compulsory laborers . . ."

The myth of forced-laborer origins has already begun.

The myth of forced laborer origins

The widespread myth that the population of Koreans who remained in Japan's prefectures after World War II, had originated mainly in conscripted or otherwise compulsory labor, had already begun. In fact most came to Japan to find work, or to take advantage of other opportunities, not available on the peninsula. This is not to romanticize conditions in the Interior, or to deny the economic problems some people on the peninsula faced on account of Japan's policies, but the fact is that the majority of Koreans who remained in the prefectures had freely settled there and had brought or started families there. Practically all those who were forced to come to Japan as laborers, most of them in the late 1930s and early 1940s, returned to Korea shortly before or after the end of the war.

c) As described above their special status is now being recognized by the Japanese government.

d) It is admitted that the poverty of a part of these people constitute a certain amount of burden on the Japanese government. But those were originally poor people who were brought to Japan for her own benefit and use, and who were later thrown into unemployment by the changing economic conditions of Japan herself which in turn brought burden to the Japanese government. Therefore, these so-called destitutes cannot be deported merely because they are a burden to the Japanese government.

V. As regards entrants since August 10, 1945 who have not complied with the necessary procedures

The Korean government does not request any special treat as a right but has the following desires:

a. Although their entry into Japan was not in conformity with the regular entry procedures, those who have proved, during the course of their residence in Japan, to be capable of maintaining their livelihood and of being law-abiding should be granted permit to reside continuously in Japan.

b. Those who have entered Japan after the outbreak of the Korean war -- June 27, 1950 -- without going through legal procedures should not be treated with any drastic measures but with such measures as may be compatible with the spirit of international refugee relief until the settlement of the war.

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6 August 1951 Japan : Chosense, Taiwanese will lose nationality

6 August 1951 Japan : Chosense, Taiwanese will lose nationality

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 78: 52-56, NKBK 78: 14-18). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

10 August 1951 memorandum from Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan to DS, GHQ/SCAP

  

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10 Aug 1951 Japan : Domestic "Chosenese" will become aliens

10 August 1951 Japan : Domestic "Chosenese" will become aliens

10 August 1951 Japan : Domestic "Chosenese" will become aliens

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 78: 52-56, NKBK 78: 14-18). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

10 August 1951 memorandum from Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan to DS, GHQ/SCAP

  

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10 August 1951 ROK : All Koreans are ROK nationals

Among the many English typescript documents relating to the nationality of Koreans in Japan, in the Republic of Korea (ROK) archives, are the following two documents, the first a 2-page memorandum from from the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ) to the Diplomatic Section (DS) of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), the second a 3-page statement on Korean nationality that appears to be attachment to the memorandum. These documents are followed by shorter memoranda dated 12 August and 14 August 1951.

The gist of the two documents is that ROK considered Koreans in Japan to be its nationals -- period. No ifs, ands, or buts. ROK had been formally established on 15 August 1948, quickly became a widely recognized sovereign state, and is Nationality Law had promulgated and in effect since 20 December 1948 -- for nearly 4 years -- and it determined that all Koreans, including those in Occupied Japan, were ROK nationals.

10 August 1951 Koreans in Japan are ROK nationals
The term "Korean residents" [of Japan] means Korean race . . .
and all that need be done is for SCAP to declare them Koreans

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 78: 52-56, NKBK 78: 14-18). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

10 August 1951 memorandum from Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan to DS, GHQ/SCAP

  The Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and with reference to its note of May 3, 1949 requesting clarification on the nationality of the Korean residents in Japan, has the honor to express further its opinion and desire as follows:

  The problem of nationality and of protection of industrial rights of the Koreans who have been residing in Japan from before August 9, 1965 [Note: Typescript is manually underscored] should be considered in the light of human rights under the natural law and also of historical homogeneity of the Korean people as well as the historical conditions under which they were obliged to reside in Japan.

"August 9, 1965"

Whose hand this date sublined I do not know.
His sentiments are in the scribble though.

"historical homogeneity of the Korean people

This consideration of Koreans as being a "homogeneous people" is underscored by later references to Koreans as a "race" (see below).

  The nationality of the Korean residents in Japan therefore should not be decided on optional basis in connection with their birth place or present domiciles, nor should it be decided to acquire desired [Korean / ROK] nationality by separating from Japan. This should be settled by a recovery of their original Korean nationality consequent to the establishment of the independent and sovereign nation of the Republic of Korea as its government has taken action to recognize the nationality of those residents in Japan as her citizens. This new SCAP memorandum is desired to carry the following vital points:-

  1. Those Korean residents who have continuously resided in Japan from before August 9, 1945 [Note: Typescript is manually underscored] but who have excluded themselves from the application of Japanese Census Registration Law should be confirmed of their automatic acquisition of the nationality of the

Republic/

To the
  Diplomatic Section
    General Headquarters
      Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
        Tokyo


2

Republic of Korea as from August 15, 1948; those Korean residents who have continuously resided in Japan from before August 9, 1945 and who have come under the application of Japanese Census Registration Law will be allowed to acquire the nationality of the Republic of Korea if they so wish and if they make proper applications to that aim.

  (The term "Korean residents" mentioned above means Korean race.)

"Korean residents" means Korean race

The writer is undoubtedly thinking "Han minjok" (韓民族 J. Kan minzoku") in Korean, referring to the Korean "[racioethnic] nation" hence "race" in the broader anthropological sense of the word. Though such racialization was common, and while similar racial metaphors occasionally appeared in SCAP, Japanese government, and other contemporary documents, this was not legalese, nor was it diplomatic diction, and would probably have raised the brows of William Sebald and other Diplomatic Section officials.

  2. Those who have acquired the nationality of the Republic of Korea will enjoy freedom of residence as other aliens in Japan and will be guaranteed freedom of religion, freedom of racial education, freedom of business and enjoyment of private rights in accordance with the principle of equality between alien and vernacular subjects.

"freedom of racial education"

This expression reflects "minjok kyoyuk" (民族教育 J. minzoku kyōiku) in Korean. The Japanese expression for private Korean schools in Japan that foster "national" or "ethnic" pride is "minzoku gakkō" (民族学校). The term "minzoku" (民族) is commonly used attributively with words like food, clothing, music, dance, spirit, ideology, and other such things to imply "national" or "ethnic" -- and "people" and "peoples" in their racioethnic senses are commonly translated "minzoku" in Japanese. Ditto for Korean and Chinese.

  3. Those who have acquired the nationality of the Republic of Korea will be granted freedom of exit from Japan and be guaranteed protection of private property rights including the right of disposal, right of removal and tax exemption privileges in case of property removal from Japan to Korea.

  If the Diplomatic Section agrees to these fundamental points as indicated above, this Mission is fully prepared to undergo further negotiations in regard to detailed procedures as may be required in order to materialize the subject issue.

  Diplomatic Section's early reaction on the above suggestions will be highly appreciated.

Tokyo, August 10, 1951

Date of memorandum

The date is fully one month before the Peace Conference between the Allied Powers and Japan, and signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan, in San Francisco. The Korean Diplomatic Mission to Japan is essentially dictating what ROK would demand of Japan when, two months later, at the urging of the Diplomatic Section, delegates of the two states set out to negotiate an agreement concerning the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan. KDMJ seems to be hoping that DS will side with its position and persuade SCAP to use his authority to see that ROK gets what it wants, possibly with the help of provisions in the Peace Treaty. Though the treaty was not part of SCAP's portfolio, he was certainly in a position -- as was DS -- to influence the terms of the peace treaty, even though ROK was not qualified to participate.

Document associated in archives with 10 August 1951 memorandum from KDMJ to DS

Unreadable underscored title

1. Legal status of [Koreans] [under] [unreadable words].

  A. Although it is stated that . . . Japanese nationality, the legal basis as to how they came under the Japanese nationality is quite different from that [making the] Japanese [having the] Japanese nationality. [In other words], the Japanese are entitled to Japanese nationality in accordance with the provisions of the Japanese Nationality Law, while the Koreans came under the Japanese nationality merely as a result of the Korea-Japan annexation treaty. The question arising [as] on what legal basis the Koreans born after the annexation had come to acquire the Japanese nationality is unanswerable except to say that they had acquired it by custom or by common law.

  The reason why the Japanese had never [made] the Nationality Law applicable to the Koreans is obvious. [1] Firstly, the Japanese did not want to give the Koreans the status of the Japanese; even the Korean residents in Japan were not allowed to become Japanese unless they were married to Japanese women and given the status of "nyufu" or "yoshi". [2] Secondly, Koreans were not allowed to abandon the Japanese nationality while the Japanese enjoyed the freedom of renouncement. This discrimination was devised only to control the Koreans who might be engaged in independence movement against Japan. In China, the Japanese authorities had the right to arrest, try and execute the Koreans as Japanese nationals under extraterritoriality there.

[1]   The 1st contention is odd. The writer is shifting from legal to non-legal diction. The "Japanese" he claims "Koreans" could become only through marriage or adoption is popular non-legal "translationese" for "Interiorite" (内地人 Naichijin), which is sometimes also quaintly characterized as "Japanese proper". The Nationality Law, originally an Interior law, was extended to Taiwan within a few months of its promulgation and enforcement in 1899 -- and it operated in Taiwan the same way it did in the Interior (内地 Naichi). A domestic common law governed private matters, such as marriage and adoption, between Japanese affiliated with different legal territories within Japan's sovereign dominion -- the prefectural Interior, Taiwan, Karafuto, and Chōsen. Some Chosenese and Taiwanese men could enter Interior registers as an "incoming husband" (入夫 nūfu) or "adopted son" (養子 yōshi), but an Interior woman who married a Chosenese or Taiwanese man was more likely to migrate to her husband's Chōsen or Taiwan register -- just as most Interior wives migrated to their husband's register in the Interior, Taiwan, or Chōsen. For the same reason, most Chosenese brides of Interior or Taiwan grooms migrated to their husband's Interior or Taiwan register. It was all about family law -- and had nothing to do with the Nationality Law. Even if Japan's Nationality Law had been applied in Chōsen, Chosenese could not naturalize as Japanese because they were already Japanese.

[2]  The 2nd contention is both odd and paranoid. Japan's Nationality Law had no provisions for renunciation until 1916 -- the result of pressure from the United States to accommodate Americans demand that children born in the United States to Japanese immigrants to renounce, if they wished, their Japanese nationality so as to alleviate American fears of dual nationality, especially among the the American-born offspring of Asian immigrants who were racially barred from naturalization. Taiwanese could renounced Japanese nationality because the Nationality Law operated in Taiwan, where there also subversive elements. There does not seem to be any causal relationship between subversion and nationality. Aliens involved in an independence movement in Japan (including Taiwan, Karafuto, and Chōsen), or outside Japan, would have been treated as subversive elements no matter their nationality. The writer's reference to "China" is surely Manchuria, where Japan had had difficulties with China regarding Koreans as subjects of Korean during the period that the Empire of Korea was a Japanese dependency and Japan was responsible for representing Korea and protecting Koreans out Korea. After the annexation of Korea as Chōsen in 1910, Japan of course had jurisdiction over Chosenese -- as it did over all Japanese -- residing in parts of Manchuria where Japan had legal jurisdiction and was otherwise free to "police" its own nationals.

  B. The Koreans were not given to enjoy the guarantee of Rights of the Japanese Constitution. In spite of the fact that the Guarantee of Rights meant a rule of law by which a citizen's [sic = subject's] freedom could not be restricted or infringed upon except by the laws enacted by the Nationality Assembly or the Parliament, the freedom of the Koreans were jealously restricted by "seirei" -- the orders of the Governor General of Korea [sic = Chōsen] -- as Korea was legally treated as a different region where the application of the Japanese [sic = Interior] Laws were excluded. Before the surrender of Japan, she was a "constitutional monarchy", although very incomplete, and bestowed the Guarantee of Rights to her citizens [sic = subjects] within the scope which precluded the Koreans.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to vote was extended to all eligible Japanese males including Chosenese and Taiwanese when universal male suffrage was adopted in 1925. Chosenese and Taiwanese residing in the prefectural Interior were treated on a par with Interiorite residents of local election districts with regard to suffrage rights. Pak Ch'un'gŭm (朴春琴 박춘금 Boku Shunkin 1891-1973) was twice elected to the House of Representatives. See Diet member Pak Ch'un'gum for a detailed overview of the development of rights of suffrage in Japan under the 1890 Meiji Constitution.

  C. The Koreans were never given franchise. The belated promulgation of the Law of April 1, 1945, claiming to give them franchise was never brought into effect.

The writer is referring to an imperial edict and related revisions of the House of Representatives Members Election Law and the House of Peers Order. Similar claims that Koreans were never given rights of suffrage were made during the subject talks between ROK and Japan. See 22 November 1951 Yang and Chiba debate status issues and related note on rights of suffrage of Chosenese and Taiwanese in the Empire of Japan.

  D. The Koreans were not subject to the compulsory [military] service. In the desperate hours of the Pacific War, however, Koreans were forcibly brought into the service in the name of volunteers, although the greater part of the Korean manpower was mobilized for industrial force.

Military service conscription laws were extended to include Chosenese and Taiwanese during the Pacific War as the writer says. However, Chosenese from 1938 and Taiwanese from 1942 became eligible for special enlistment in the Army, and from 1943 they could register on Navy enlistment rolls. The National [Labor] Conscription Ordinance was enforced in the Interior from 15 July 1939, and in Chōsen, Taiwan, Karafuto, and the South Sea Islands from 1 October 1939. The mobilization of Chosenese labor peaked before the start of the Pacific War.

  E. The legal status of the Korean residents in [Manchuria] in the past

  Unreadable line were granted special privileges under extra-territoriality in [unreadable words] special treaty, the Koreans were put under the jurisdiction of Chinese judicature, pursuant to Sino-Japanese agreement on "[Chientao]" district, dated September 4, 1904 [1909?}.

The Chientao problem

The "Chientao Agreement" of 4 September 1909 was formally between Korea and China. At the time, the Empire of Korea was a protectorate of Japan, which was responsible for conducting Korea's foreign affairs and protecting Koreans outside Korea, including Koreans in Manchuria.

Article 4 of the 1909 agreement recognized that "Koreans residing north of the Tumen River and engaged in agriculture shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese officials on the territory. Chinese officials shall treat the Koreans and Chinese with equality as regards payment of taxes and in the enforcement of the laws . . . ."

China later claimed that Japan, after it annexed Korea as Chōsen in 1910, excessively "interfered" in cases involving Koreans, even though the treaty continued to be in force. Japan claimed that the Koreans had become Japanese, but China considered those in Chientao to be Koreans.

The "Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" of 25 May 1915 gave Japanese considerable freedom of movement and activity in South Manchuria. In Japan's but not in China's understanding, "Japanese" included "Koreans". Japan therefore contended that the 1915 treaty rendered no longer applicable provisions in the 1909 agreement regarding Koreans.

See "Memorandum on The Status of Koreans in the Three Eastern Provinces", Document No. 5, Peiping, June 1932, for an overview of China's stand on Korean status issues in northeast China from the late 19th century to about 1930.

  F. Concluding from above, the Koreans had a sui generis legal status and were distinctively discriminated from the Japanese under the Japanese dominion. Under any circumstances, the Koreans were clearly and collectively discriminated.

II. Situation of Korean residents in Japan.

  A. Most of the Koreans in Japan were taken into Japan and mobilized for forced labor at the Japanese munitions factories for about twenty years [from] the so-called "Manchurian Incident" to the end of the Pacific War. Consequently, they lost their economic foundation [in] Korea and were obliged to remain in Japan. Although they have been leading a very poor life, they have not been able to enjoy the benefits of Japan's social security system because their legal status has not been determined.

The Pacific War ended 14 years after the Manchurian Incident. The writer's claim that most Koreans who came to the Interior were forced to come or to do what they did when they arrived has no foundation if by "force" he means the state or other organization. That most Koreans who remained in Japan had "lost their economic foundation in Korea" is true at least for those who actually had an economic foundation on the peninsula. Many who remained had come to the prefectural interior looking for a foundation in life. Not a few who remained were born in the prefectures.

Koreans in the Interior by occupation, 1920, 1930, 1940

職業 Occupation                1920     1930     1940     1940 %

        農業 Agriculture      1,287   20,058   27,584     5.26 %
      水産業 Marine products    594    1,444    4,115     0.78 %
        鉱業 Mining           5,534   16,304   68,883    13.12 %
        工業 Manufacturing   19,428  138,144  272,495    51.92 %
        商業 Commerce         1,773   26,848   83,075    15.83 %
      文通業 Transportation   4,113   20,986   38,101     7.26 %
  公務自由業 Civil service      372    1,474   12,474     2.38 %
               and free vocations
その他有業者 Others with      2,109   31,372   14,841     2.83 %
               occupations
  家事使用人 Domestic workers     4    3,368    3,310     0.63 %

総数 Total                   35,214  259,998  524,878   100.00 %

Source: Morita 1997, page 127, Table 25.
My formatting, translations, and percents

As of the end of December 1948, the breakdown of Koreans in Occupied Japan by the industry of their occupation was as follows.

Koreans in Japan by occupation, End of December 1948

                               1948     1948 %

官公吏及び公務員              1,700     0.27 %
Government officials and
  civil servants
会社員及び出版書籍業          9,500     1.53 %
Company staff and
  publishing industry
工業及び繊維業                6,500     1.04 %
Manufacturing and
  textile industries
商業 Commerce                15,000     2.41 %
農業 Agriculture              5,500     0.88 %
漁業及び製塩業                1,238     0.20 %
Fishing and salt making
自由及び土建業              155,000    24.89 %
Free and construction
無業 (老人、主婦、嬰児)     118,282    18.99 %
Workless [Jobless] (elderly,
  housewives, infants)
残余は全部失業者            310,000    49.78 %
The are rest all
  unemployed

           Total            622,720   100.00 %

Source: KRN 78: 36, NKBK 78: 36.
My formatting, translations, percents, and total

The same source shows the following breakdown of Koreans in Occupied Japan by income as of the end of September 1950.

Koreans in Japan by occupation, End of December 1948

                                      1950     1950 %

自由生活者                         483,574    89.29 %
(一定な職業のない者、
   浮動生活者)
Free living persons
(Persons with no fixed
   occupation, persons
   with floating life)

小企業者 Small enterprises          53,371     9.85 %
(一万円以上五拾万円程度) 約十%弱
(10,000 to 500,000 yen) < 10 %

中企業者 Middle enterprises          4,473     0.83 %
(五拾万円以上一千万円程度) 約一%弱
(500,000 to 10,000,000 yen) < 1 %

大企業者 Large enterprises             179     0.03 %
(一千万円以上)
(10,000,000 yen and above)

在日韓僑総人口数                   541,597   100.00 %
Overseas Koreans in Japan
Total general population

Source: KRN 78: 135, NKBK 78: 36.
My formatting, translations, and percents

  In view of the above mentioned historical circumstances under which they had come to reside in Japan, they should be granted freedom of continued residence in Japan and full private right in accordance with the spirit of the declaration of human right of the United Nations after their acquisition of the nationality of the Republic of Korea has been confirmed by the SCAP authorities.

The writer wrongly assumes that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had the authority to arbitrarily confirm that Koreans in Japan were ROK nationals. SCAP had made the position of the Allied Powers clear a number of times -- that the future nationality of Koreans in Japan would be determined by bilateral agreements between concerned parties.

III. Justification on the Nationality Problem of the Korean residents in Japan.

  A. According to the general principles of the International Law, the people that have been residing in the conceded territory retain their original legal status until such time as when a peace treaty is concluded, in accordance with which treaty, their nationality is decided.

  In the case of Korea, however, it is different. Korea has been liberated from the Japanese destitution following the formal acceptance by the Japanese of the Potsdam Declaration on August 15, 1945, as a result of which the Korean people automatically left the Japanese nationality.

  The sovereign government in Korea, however, was not immediately established and therefore the nationality of the [unreadable words] December 20 [unreadable words] the nationality of the Republic of Korea.

  A. The justifiability of the above [unreadable words] has been verified by the [unreadable word] as follows:

  After the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, all the Japanese nationals in Korea were ordered to evacuate from Korea, deprived of the right to acquire the Korean nationality and to reside in Korea, while the Korean residents in Japan were allowed continued residence in Japan with freedom to depart at any time. As mentioned above, the Korean residents in Japan received treatment different from that given the Japanese under the SCAP's policy.

  In accordance with SCAP [Directive] No. 1, dated 3 November [1945], the Korean residents in Japan were [unreadable words] liberated people, separated from the political legal relations to Japan. As a result, legislatively, they have been deprived of their right to vote and to be elected since December 17, 1945, which rights had been given to the Korean residents in Japan during the Japanese [unreadable word] (Japanese Election Law No. 100). Judicially, they have been granted the right to receive the review by SCAP in the criminal case pursuant to SCAP memorandum dated March 19, 1946 concerning review of final sentences by Japanese Government imposed upon Koreans and certain other nationals; and administratively, they have been treated as non-Japanese or foreigners under the Registration Law of Foreigners in Japan dated May 2, 1947 (Imperial Ordinance No. 207). [Endorsement] of their personal status for travel outside Japan has been made through this Mission.

"SCAP Directive No. 1, dated 3 November" appears to be the writer's characterization of Joint Chiefs of Staff 1380/15 dated 3 November 1945, the provisions of which were reflected in a number of SCAP directives. See JCS 1380/15 directive on "Japan" and "Japanese" excluding "Formosan-Chinese" and "Koreans" for its text and relevant SCAP directives.

"Japanese Election Law No. 100" was promulgated on 17 December 1945. See 1945 law revising 1925 election law for text of relevant parts and commentary.

"SCAP memorandum dated March 19, 1946" appears to refer to SCAPIN 757 dated 19 February 1946. See SCAPIN 757 Review of Sentences Imposed Upon Koreans and Certain Other Nationals for text and commentary. See also SCAPIN 756 Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction for related SCAPIN, according to which Koreans are subject to Japanese rather than military occupation courts in most cases.

"Imperial Ordinance No. 207" refers to 1947 Alien Registration Order (ARO), which see for text and commentary. The ordinance, promulgated on 2 May 1947, was the last imperial ordinance to be issued by Hirohito. The ordinance came into effect immediately, except a few provisions which came into effect the following day, on 3 Mary 1947, when the new Constitution came into effect. The timing of the ARO with the new Constitution was not a legal coincidence.

  In addition, it is to be [reminded] that the SCAP's announcement No.11 [sic] 1946 says [sic] "the nationality of Koreans in Japan shall be determined through the recognition as its nationals by a government which will be duly established in Korea in the future".

The writer is alluding to an announcement reportedly made on 11 November 1946, which apparently was followed by a 12 November press release stating that Koreans who had not repatriated "will be considered as retaining their Japanese nationality until such time as a duly established Korean government accords them recognition." On 20 November, however, SCAP issued a statement denying rumors that Koreans in Japan "must obtain Japanese citizenship" and claiming that "The Occupation Authorities have no intention of interfering in any way with the fundamental rights of any person of any nationality in regard to retention, relinquishment or choice of citizenship." See SCAP statement on Koreans in Japan for the text of the statement and commentary.

  In conclusion, it is hereby stated that since the nationality of the Koreans has already been decided by the promulgation of the Republic of Korea's Nationality Law, the problem of the nationality of the Korean Residents in Japan must not be discussed any further. The only need to be met is the legal confirmation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to this effect.

Tone of memorandum and attachment

The last line of the 3-page attachment reflects the tone of the 2-page memorandum. The Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ) is all but ordering SCAP to reverse its theretofore policy of regarding Koreans in Japan as Japanese nationals, and to declare with the full weight of his legal authority that in fact they are irrefutably ROK nationals.

As it turned out, ROK and Japan began to get along on the status issue only when Japan agreed, undoubtedly to its great relief, that nationality was not a suitable subject for bilateral discussions in the case its loss of Chōsen under the terms of surrender. Their nationality would be entirely at the mercy of the domestic laws of the two states -- except that, once ROK and Japan had normalized their relationship, Japan would have the right to require Koreans in Japan, who wished to be treated in Japan as aliens of ROK nationality, to show evidence that in fact ROK recognized them as its nationals -- a passport or other certification of nationality. In other words, individual Koreans in Japan would remain "Chosenese" (朝鮮人 Chōsenjin) until they registered as ROK nationals with an ROK agency in Japan. In this sense, ROK had to compromise its position that all Koreans in Japan had already become its nationals as an automatic effect of its Nationality Law.

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24 August 1951 SCAP : Nationality outside SCAP's authority

On 24 August 1951, ROK made a final but unsuccessful attempt to get SCAP to back its claim that Koreans in Japan were its nationals. The peace treaty had been drafted but was being refined in preparation for the upcoming peace conference and signatures. ROK had wanted to, but was not allowed, to participate.

SCAP's Diplomatic Section (DS) had already informed the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ) that ROK and Japan needed to convene direct talks in order to determine the legal status and treatment -- beginning with the nationality -- of Koreans in Japan. SCAP's attitude toward their nationality had long been a sore point with KDMJ, but it had not yet given up its hopes that it could convince SCAP to simply declare that all Koreans in Japan were ROK nationals in accordance with ROK laws.

KDMJ, in a communication dated 21 August 1951, expressed its desire that "a preliminary confab with the authorities of the Diplomatic Section be held at 10 a.m., August 23, 1951, Friday at the Diplomatic Section (KRN 78: 63; image not included in NKBK 78).

ROK's minutes on the meeting date it as having been held at DS/SCAP from 10:00 to 10:55 a.m. on 24 August 1951.

SCAP representives included:

Mr. W.H. Sullivan (DS)
Mr. R.B. Finn (DS)
Mr. J. Bassin (LS)
Maj. E.G. Tobin (G-2)

Second Secretary Sullivan precided over the meeting.

As listed in ROK's August 1951 request and in the 24 August minutes, ROK's representives included:

Dr. Hong Kee Karl, Counselor (葛弘基 参事官)
Mr. Chin O Yu, Legal Advisor (兪鎮午 法律顧問)
Mr. Tai Dong Kim, Head of Political Section (金泰東 一等書記官) [First Secretary]
Mr. Kyu Young Hahn, Third Secretary (韓奎水 三等書記官)

The 21 August 1951 request stated that "Ambassador Shin" might also attend. According to the minutes of the meeting, he was not there.

The copy of the minutes in ROK's archives was one attached to a cover letter from Ambassador Shin Sung Mo (申性模 Sin Sŏ Mo 1891-1960) to his boss, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (外務部長官) [external affairs department chief officer], which was dated, like the minutes, 24 August 1951 (檀紀四二八四年八月二十四日 Dangi 4284-8-24). At the time, the ROK government was in Pusan, where it had taken refuge after the start of the Korean War.

The minutes are the most important evidence of the nature of the running dispute between the Republic of Korea and the Allied Powers over the nationality of Koreans in Japan. They illustrate more than any other document the diametrically opposed views of the two entities -- ROK insisting that Koreans in Japan were its nationals because it was a sovereign state and its Nationality Law made them its nationals -- and the position of the Allied Powers, articulated by the legal and diplomatic sections of SCAP, that they were still Japanese and would remain so until a treaty determined otherwise.

tr class="white"> tr class="white"> tr class="white">
24 August 1951 Meeting between ROK's KDMJ and SCAP's DS
Even were SCAP to acknowledge ROK's stance on the nationality of Koreans in Japan
matters of such long-term significance were "beyond the scope of SCAP's authority"

Source and markup

The following Japanese text of the summary of the 24 August 1951 meeting between KDMJ and DS/SCAP is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 78: 67-72, NKBK 78: 23-25). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

The report, as received, is divided into 8 numbered parts, each of which relates an exchange between the two parties in the form "ROK said: / SCAP said:". The numbered English subtitles, the structural English translation, and the underscoring, other highlighting, and commentary are mine.

The English terms in parentheses are as received in both the Korean text and the Japanese translation. In my English translation, I show them first, followed by the Japanese translation of the Korean text in parentheses -- i.e., I show the Sino-Korean = Sino-Japanese expressions as glosses of the English expressions, which is what they actually were.

Yi Yangsu's translations of the Korean texts in the ROK archieves are very close. At times, he glossed Sinific (Sino-Korean = Sino=Japanese) expressions that are no longer familiar today.

Korean and Japanese

On the whole, Korean and Japanese syntax -- the flow of words and phrases in sentences, the order of the words and phrases and the ways they are marked to indicate logical connections -- is identical. Most of the Korean participants in the ROK-Japan talks were well educated in both languages, and for all means and purposes, Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese expressions, including the graphs with which they were written, were identical.

Yi Yangsu's main work was to translate hangŭ postpositions and conjugations into kana equivalents. Which is not to say it was easy. His postwar education in Japan, though partly in Korean schools, would not have exposed him to every linguistic detail he encountered in the documents, and he had to decipher the manuscripts of many hands.

The Korean text of the following report uses so many Chinese graphs that most Koreans today would not be able to read it. Most Japanese, though knowing no Korean, could make more sense out of the text than Koreans -- simply from the flow of Chinese characters. There is even sufficient information in the ordering of the characters -- and in the way they are "puncutated" by hangŭ within the larger context -- that a reasonably educated Japanese reader would perceive that ROK and SCAP have different views of nationality -- and might even be able to guess how their perceptions differ.

See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

在日韓人法的地位に関する予備会議経過報告
[檀紀四二八四年] 八月二十四日午前十時 ― 仝五十五分
DS/SCAP に於いて

Progress report on preliminary talks concerning the legal status of Koreans in Japan
24 August [1951], 10:00 - 10:55 a.m.
At DS / SCAP

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

1. SCAP ★ ROK and Japan must directly negotiate the legal status of Koreans in Japan

1. 開会冒頭司会者から、本件は日本政府と直接交渉で決定せよというSCAPの根本方針は不変なので近い間に直接会談することを希望するという発言があった。

1. From the chairman, who opened the meeting with a statement, there were remarks that, as for this matter [negotiations on the legal status of Koreans in Japan], SCAP's basic policy [vis-a-vis ROK] -- "Decide [their status] through direct negotiations with Japan" -- was unchanged, so [SCAP] desires that [ROK and Japan] will soon engage in direct talks.

2. ROK ★ They've already been decided by Potsdam Declaration

2. これに対して葛博士から本会開催を同意したことに対して謝意を表すると前提し、本件はポツダム宣言によって既に決定した問題なので、日本政府との直接交渉で解決するのではなく、SCAP覚書で決定できることを強調した。

2. In response to this [1.], Dr. Karl, first expressing his thanks regarding [SCAP's] consent to host the meeting, stressed that, as for this matter [= the nationality of Koreans in Japan], because it is a problem that has already been decided in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, it is not to be determined by direct negotiations with the government of Japan, but can be decided by a SCAP memorandum.

3. SCAP ★ Potsdam Declaration decided only that Korea would be independent

3. これに対して法律局ベーシン氏は、ポツダム宣言は国籍問題とは関係がないということ。即ちポツダム宣言により韓国が主権国家として独立し、韓国国籍を制定して、韓国人の後裔は現在いかなる地域に存在しようが、韓国国籍を所持すると規定したとしても、本韓国国籍法を日本政府がそのまま受諾するよう強制できない。二重国籍と無国籍は避けなければならないので、日本政府と交渉して韓国国籍法に日本が合意するなら、問題は解決するだろうという答があった。

3. In response to this [2.], Legal Section's Bassin said that the Potsdam Declaraion was unrelated to the nationality problem. In other words, even though pursuant to the Potsdam Declaration [the Republic of] Korea had established its independence as a sovereign state, and had enacted a Nationality Law, and [its Nationality Law] stipulated that descendants of Koreans no matter in what region they now exist possess Korean nationality, Korea could not force Japan to accept Korea's Nationality Law as it was. There was a reply [from SCAP] that since dual nationality and statelessness had to be avoided, were Japan [ROK] to negotiate with the government of Japan and Japan to agree to Korea's Nationality Law, the problem would probably be solved.

"dual nationality and statelessness had to be avoided"

I would guess that Bassin was speaking from the point of view of conventional provisions in territorial tranfers concerning nationality. I would also guess that he was not talking about state interests as much as about "human rights".

It is commonly assumed that nationality choice provisions for displaced persons are about "human rights". But the "human rights" (such as they were) are best viewed as secondary to state interests.

Nationality choice provisions are better understood as serving mainly the interests of states. Most states did not then -- and do not today -- welcome (1) communities of possibly hostile aliens within their borders, (2) statlessness within their borders, or (3) people anywhere who possess their nationality in addition to another nationality.

As for "human rihts" -- contemporary nationality choice provisions gave states the right to require that any resident who qualified for a choice of nationality, who chose other than the state's nationality, leave the state. Moreover, such provisions were generally reciprocal.

4. SCAP ★ Far Eastern Commission permitted Japan to negotiate -- not determine -- nationality

4. 日本政府が講和条約発効前にいかなる問題を交渉決定する権限を有するかという韓国側質疑に対して、SCAP側でも異論がなかったが極東委員会に権限があるもので、日本政府は決定権限を付与されたのではなく、韓国政府との本件交渉を許容されたということである。

4. In response to the query from a Korean side -- "Did the government of Japan have the authority to negotiate any problem whatever before the effecuation of the peace treaty?" -- the SCAP side had no objection but the Far Eastern Commission had authority -- and it was not that Japan had been given the authority to decide anything, but that it had been permitted to negotiate this matter (本件) [nationality] with the government of Korea.

"the Far Eastern Commission had authority"

The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established in Washington in December 1945 by the foreign ministers of the major Allied Powers. In principle, the United States, as the leading Allied Power, prepared directives in accordance with FEC determinations, and transmitted them to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo. In practice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which directly oversaw SCAP, and other U.S. government agencies, are known to have directly influenced GHQ/SCAP in ways that made the Occupation of Japan a hightly Americanized operation.

Nonetheless, formally -- seen here -- SCAP (as an institution) was very aware that it did, in fact, represent the Allied Powers, which in turn represented a multination) authority that was guided by international precedents when it came to postwar settlements.

See Far Eastern Commission on this page for further details about the commission and its operations.

5. ROK ★ Didn't SCAP's administration of Japan mean it had control over Japan?
  SCAP ★ Determining nationality is "beyond the scope of SCAP's authority"

5. 日本の管理(CONTROL)はSCAPの主管ではないかという反問に対して、管理(CONTROL)というより責任(RESPONSIBILITY)取るというものなので、本件のように長久な将来に影響する性質(LONG TERM SIGNIFICANCE)がある件は、SCAP の権限外だ(BEYOND THE SCOPE OF SCAP'S AUTHOLITY)。本範囲に関してはSCAP 自身でも疑義があったが、米国政府とFEC の明示司令により、国籍問題はSCAPの権限外ということが明白になったということだ。国際法原則上、平和条約に随伴する案件決定(PEACE SETTLEMENT)は占領当局権限外ということは、日本政府も知っていることだろうという説明があった。

5. In response to [ROK's] return question -- "As for the control (管理 kanri) of Japan, was not SCAP the administrator?" -- [SCAP replied that] it is a matter of taking responsibility (責任 sekin) more than of control (管理 kanri) -- so as for matters which have long term significance (長久な将来に影響する性質 chōkyū-na shōrai ni eikyū suru seishitsu) [quality of affecting the long (perpetual)], such as this matter [nationality], [they] are beyond the scope of SCAP's authority (SCAP の権限外だ SCAP no seigen-gai da) [outside the authority of SCAP]. Concerning this range [of authority], SCAP itself had doubts [questions], but in accordance with the express commands of the government of the United States and FEC [Far Eastern Commission], that the nationality problem was clearly outside the authority of SCAP became clear. There was an explanation [from SCAP] that -- regarding the matter that, under principles of international law, the peace settlement (平和条約に随伴する案件決定 heiwa jōyaku ni suihan suru anken kettei) [deciding matters (questions) associated with (germane to) the peace treaty] was outside the authority of the Occupation Authorities -- Japan also probably knows [this].

"beyond the scope of SCAP's authority"

This is very interesting and convincing characterization of SCAP's ultimate authority in Occupied Japan. As an agent of the Allied Forces, SCAP was reponsible for reconstructing Japan to the point that it resume being a responsible sovereign state. SCAP achieved its goal by enlisting the cooperation of what was left of the government of the Empire of Japan. While it was under SCAP's control and jurisdition, SCAP was not an omnipotent authority. It was responsible to the Allied Powers, and to the terms of surrender -- and, ultimately, to the sworn expectations of Allied Powers to jointly sign a common peace treaty with Japan.

Peace treaties were the business of victors in wars, and their purpose was to settle old and new disputes -- including disputes over territory. New territorial disputes arise when postwar borders are changed, even if only to redress earlier changes in borders. Territories changed flags, but the more difficult problem was what to do with people who -- after a territory changed flags -- what to do with people who found themselves in a territory other than the one they had reason to feel they belonged to.

This was why "nationality" was regarded as a "fundamental problem" (See 8. below). And it qualified as a matter which had "long term significance" -- a matter that would influence the lives of people in perpetuum -- the lives of Koreans in Japan, who in the eyes of the Allied powers were still Japanese. ROK would have to play by the rules -- and the rules required bilateral talks and formal agreements between concerned states.

And SCAP was responsible for bringing the concerned states together for especially the purpose of resolving nationality issues, which it deemed to be more important than property and other issues.

AUTHORLITY

The Korean text has AUTHORITY.

6. ROK ★ Not change of nationality but just confirmatin
  SCAP ★ Even if you convinced us we couldn't help you

6. 兪鎮午氏が a, 韓国人の日本国籍は日本人の日本国籍と根本的に違うという点、及び本件は国籍の変更でなく確認の問題(MATTER OF CONFIRMATION)という点を敷衍(詳しく)説明したところ、SCAP側では確認であれ確定(ESTABLISHING)であれを問わずSCAP では取扱できない。もし韓国側が本会議でSCAP側代表を完全に説服(CONVINCE)したとしても、SCAP側は何ら決定できない問題だと断言した。

6. Where [When] Mr. Yu Chin O explained amplyfying (in detail) on the point that (a) the point that the Japanese nationality of Koreans and the Japanese nationality of Japanese are fundamentally different, and (b) the point that this matter [of nationality that we are discussing] is not a change of nationality but a matter of confirmation (確認の問題 kakunin no mondai) [problem of confirmation] -- the SCAP side [said] whether its confirmation or establishing (確定 kakutei) it couldn't be dealt with [accepted] by SCAP. [The SCAP side] declared that, even if the Korean side completely convinced (説得した settoku shita) [persuaded] the SCAP side at this conference, it is a problem about which the SCAP side cannot decide anything.

"fundamentally different"

Yu Chin O -- KDMJ's legal advisor -- wrote and spoke at length about how Koreans, though Japanese nationals, had a legally inferior status as Koreans -- both under Japan's rule and in Occupied Japan under SCAP's rules. His argument confuses nationality as a fundamental status of equal value as a status for all who possess it -- with treatment, which is based on multiple statuses -- such as sex, age, competency, and territorial (including polity) affiliation within the state of nationality.

The Chosenese (affiliates of Chōsen) and Interiorites (affiliates of the prefectural Interior) were both Japanese, on account of possessing Japanese nationality. Their difference in Chōsen and Interior (Naichii) status made a diffference -- at times -- in treatment. They were treated the same when it came to suffrage. They were treated differently when it came of private matters such as marriage.

The list of same treatment in some cases, and different treatment in others, goes on. One of the items on the list is that, because the Interior Nationality Law was not extended to Chōsen, Chosenese could not renounce their Japanese status -- unlike Japanese of Interior or Taiwan regional status. But this, too, was a matter of the difference in the quality of their territoriality, not in the quality of their nationality.

"matter of confirmation"

ROK's adamance on this point -- face to face with SCAP -- would characterize its aggressive opposition to Japan's position, which of course was like SCAP's, during the preliminary rounds of talks that would begin in 2 months.

explained amplyfying (in detail)

Yi Yangsu directly translates 敷衍説明#54620; (puyŏn sŏmyŐng han) as 敷衍説明した (fuen setsumei shita), and parentethnically glosses 敷衍 (fuen) as 詳しく (kuwashiku).

(a) . . . (b) . . .

The Korean text clearly has the letter "a" with spaces top and bottom. Yi Yangsu represents this as "a,". Assuming it was meant to mark the 1st point (点), I would guess that the writer inadvertently forgot to mark the 2nd point "b".

7. ROK ★ What about your memorandum on the treatment of Taiwanese in Japan?
  SCAP ★ Their fundamental legal status is the same as of Koreans in Japan

7. 最後に韓国側が在日台湾人の法的地位に対してSCAP 覚書を出した経緯を質問したのに対して、SCAP 側では中国政府もこれまた韓国と同一な国籍法で要請があったが、中国が日本に治外法権がないことは同一な立場から拒否したが、政治的その他考慮から結局中国代表部が六ヶ月内に登録証を発給した者に対しては、日本の刑事裁判管轄権(CRIMINAL JURISDICTION)から除外するという覚書を出したのであり、根本的法的地位\においては在日韓国人とまったく同一だという説明があった。

7. Finally, in response to the Korean side having asked about the particulars of [SCAP's] having put out a memorandum regarding the legal status of Taiwanese in Japan, on the SCAP side there was an explanation that -- [from] the government of [the Republic of] China] too there had been a request [to regard all Taiwanese in Japan as its nationals] with a nationality law identical to Korea's -- but [SCAP] had refused, from the identical standpoint, that China did not have extraterritorial rights in Japan -- and regarding persons to whom from political and other considerations eventually the Chinese Mission [representive office] [in Japan] issued certificates of [nationality] registration within [the period of] 6 months [permitted by SCAP] -- SCAP put out a memorandum saying that [such Taiwanese] were excluded [exempted on account of their ROC registration] from the criminal jurisdiction (刑事裁判管轄権 keiji saiban kankatsu ken) of Japan -- [but] in [terms of their] fundamental legal status, [it] is exactly the same as of Koreans in Japan.

"China did not have extraterritorial rights in Japan"

True -- China (ROC) as a state did not have extraterritorial rights in Japan in that it was not allowed to apply its laws in Japan in the form, say, of a consular court. However, the Allied Powers collectively constituted an extraterritorial authority in Japan. And Allied Nationals -- nationals of the Allied Powers who had defeated Japan -- were generally protected from Japanese courts, and had other privileges in Occupied Japan that were tantamount to extraterritorial treatment. SCAP simply declined to view the Occupation Authority which it represented -- its military command, its military courts, the special rations it distrubuted to Allied Nationals -- the various borders it drew between "we the victors" and "they the vanquished" -- as a form of extraterritoriality.

"fundamental legal status"

If the Korean minutes accurately represent what SCAP officials said, I doubt very much that the Korean delegation was convinced by its logic. How could the "fundamental legal status" of Taiwanese (Formosans) and Chosenese (Koreans) have been the same if (1) ROC had been allowed to register Taiwanese as its nationals, and as a result those who registered were exceptionally protected from Japanese courts, while (2) ROK had not been allowed to register Chosenese, and Chosenese remained subject to Japanese courts?

Until losing Japan's nationality in 1952, Chosenese and Taiwanese in shared the single common, overarching, and "fundamental legal status" of being Japanese nationals. They also shared the common status of being Japanese nationals of territories that had not been part of Japan's prefectural Interior, which became Occupied Japan minus a couple of prefectures and small islands.

However, the territories of Chōsen (Korea) and Taiwan (Formosa) were themselves of different status in terms of to and by which states they were surrendered and occupied. "China" (ROC) was classified as one of the "United Nations" which had declared war on Japan (aka the "Allied Powers") -- and hence its nationals, including Taiwanese in Japan who had been issued registration certificates, were United Nations Nationals, and as such they received extraterritorial protections under SCAP's authority. On the other hand, "Korea" -- referring to the "state" that the peninsula would have become had it remained undivided -- was classified as one of the "Special Status Nations" along with Austria, Italy, and Siam (Thailand). This substatus made a world of difference in the ultimately different treatment of Chosenese and Taiwanese in Occupied Japan.

See the following SCAP directives and statements for examples of the sort of distinctions SCAP made in determinations of who was subject to trial in a Japanese court.

1946-2-19 SCAPIN-756 Execise of Crimnal Jurisdiction
SCAPIN-757 Review of Sentences Imposed Upon Koreans and Certain Other Nationals
20 November 1946 SCAP statement on Koreans in Japan

SCAPIN-1543 on registration of Chinese nationals

SCAPIN-1543, dated 25 February 1947, and titled "Registration of Chinese Nationals", was initiated by the Legal Section (LS) of GHQ/SCAP. The instruction informed the Japanese government that bearers of Chinese national registration certificates would be considered United Nations nationals for purposes of exercising criminal jurisdiction.

See 1947-2-25 SCAPIN-1543 Registration of Chinese Nationals for details.

8. SCAP ★ Sebald says to "separately, and quickly, resolve nationality problem"

8. 本会談結果を大使に報告し適後連絡するという韓国代表発言に対して、SCAP 司会者から結果は正式公文で通知することと、シーボルト大使も本件が根本問題だと重要視しているが、財産問題等と分離して国籍問題だけは別途、早急に解決することを希望するという意見陳述があって閉会した。

Regarding the remark by a Korean representative that [the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan would report the results of the meeting to the ambassador [Ambassador Shin Sung Mo] and later liasison with [contact] [SCAP], from the SCAP chairman, there was an opinion and statement that, as for the results, [SCAP] would inform [KDMJ] with a formal official letter -- and that Ambassador Sebald also stresses that this matter [nationality] is a fundamental problem, and he desires that [you] separate [it] from property problems, and just the nationality problem -- separately, and quickly, resolve [it], and [the chariman] closed the meeting.

"just the nationality problem -- separately, and quickly, resolve [it]"

二百の瞳に、同時に、面白がられたか。

The language drips with urgency. The subcommittee set up to resolve the nationality problem did its job. By the beginning of April 1952, ROK and Japan had a status agreement that would have resolved both the nationality problem and the problem of how to treat qualified ROK nationals in Japan. Japan was willing to sign what was ready to sign and leave other problems for later. ROK -- alone -- held the legal status agreement hostage to property and other issues.

適後 later

The Japanese translation has 適後 (tekigo) -- a compound I cannot confirm. The first graph of the Korean text is written in a semi-cursive style that could be 適 (teki) but might be another character. It could be (but does not quite look like) 直 (choku), which would make the compound 直後 (chokugo), meaning "right after" or "soon after".

Top  


10 September 1951 ROK on international conventions

They don't apply to ROK"

The Republic of Korea regarded the nationality of Koreans in Japan as a non-issue that did not qualify as a topic for bilateral discussion. SCAP and Japan, following SCAP, might think otherwise, but ROK knew -- or at least its principle legal adviser at the time, Yu Chin O, insisted he knew -- that theretofore international conventions in cases of territorial changes following wars -- such as those that settled nationality issues after World War I -- did not apply to the case of Korea.

On 28 July 1951, Yu Chin O (兪鎮午) flew from Pusan in the Republic of Korea to Tokyo in Occupied Japan to assume his post as legal adviser to the Representative Office of the Republic of Korea in Japan (大韓民国駐日代表部法律顧問兪鎮午), otherwise known as the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ). Among his reports to the ROK government was a long "Japan dispatch report" (日本出張報告書) to the Director of the Political Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務部政務局長), dated the 10th day of the 9th month of the 4284th year of Dangi (檀紀四二八四年十月八日) or 10 September 1951).

The report, in Korean (KRN 77: 4-30) has been translated by Yi Yangsu into Japanese (NKBK 77: 2-6). The following is an extract of the most important part of Yu's report, which concerns his view of the applicability of international conventions regarding the determination of nationality concomitant with territorial changes following wars. Yu would would lead ROK's delegation in a number of its early negotiations with Japan regarding the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan. ROK's attitude toward the nationality issue was essentially shaped by Yu's views, which were widely shared by ROK's political leaders.

While SCAP and Japan shared a very different understanding of the nationality status of Koreans in Occupied Japan, even their understanding -- by the time the ROK-Japan talks got under way on 20 October 1951 -- was that nationality choice would not be on the table -- unless Japan unilaterally made provisions in its own laws for Koreans to continue to be nationals of Japan without naturalization. Otherwise they would lose their nationality and have to naturalize.

Yu's 10 September report is divided into two parts, the first on "Nationality problems of Overseas Koreans" (在日僑胞の国籍問題)", the second, longer part on 、"Problems of claim rights including property and claims of Korea and Koreans against Japan and Japanese (日本及び日本人に対する韓国及び韓国人の資産及び債権を含む請求権の問題外観). Yu concluded that while the nationality issue was important, the property issues were considerably more difficult. He anticipated that they would involve entanglements with Japan, and would not be easily resolved in a short period of time.

The nationality part covers the following titled but unnumbered topics (numbers and translations mine)

  1. 問題の沿革
    Background of the [nationality] problem
  2. 国籍と利害関係
    Nationality and interests
  3. 国際法上の慣例
    Conventions of international law
  4. 在日韓国人の登録問題
    Registration problems of Koreans in Japan
  5. 在日韓国人の居住と営業権問題
    Residence and business rights problems of Koreans in Japan
  6. 在日韓国人の財産搬出問題
    Property removal [from Japan] problems of Koreans in Japan
  7. 在日韓国人に対する日本政府の当面政策
    Present policies of Japanese government toward Koreans in Japan

Yu's remarks under the 3rd topic -- Conventions of international law -- are as follows.

10 September 1951 ROK on international conventions
Heretofore provisions for territorial changes following wars
don't apply to Korea, Koreans in Korea, or Koreans in Japan

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 77: 9-14, NKBK 77: 3; also Yi 2007: 75-76). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

国際法上の慣例
Kokusaihō-jō no kanrei
Conventions of international law

一方戦争の結果、領土の変更または新国家の成立がある時に、その領土内に居住している住民、または本籍をその領土に置いている人の国籍が、国際法上どのように取扱かわれるかを見ると次の通りだ。

As a result of war, when there is a change of territory or an establishment of a new state, how the nationality of residents residing within the territory, or of people whose principle domicile is located in the territory, is treated under international law, is viewed as follows.

"principle domicile"

The writer is talking about two kinds of people. The 1st kind are people residing in the territory as its residents regardless of the locality of their "honseki" (本籍), whether within the territory or elsewhere. The 2nd kind are residents of other territories whose "honseki" is within the territory.

A person's "honseki" is the polity with which a person is considered to "originally" or "primarily" be domiciled as a matter of state affiliation, and possibly also as a matter of affiliation with a territory within a state. In international law, a person's "honseki" is generally taken to be a person's "nationality" -- again with the proviso the "honseki" may actually come down to a legal jurisdiction or "subnationality" within a state.

People with household registers (戸籍 koseki) within Chōsen (Korea) were Japanese by nationality but Chosenese (Koreans) by "honseki" subnationality when it came to applications of laws between territories with Japan. Similar status distinctions within the same overarching nationality are found in numerous countries.

American citizens legally domiciled in Japan have U.S. nationality, hence under Japanese law their "honseki" is the United States. But when it comes to international private law, their "home country law" will be the state in the United States where they had been or may still be most closely affiliated. That state's laws may apply to certain civil matters involving the person in Japan, such as the inheritance of real estate the person may own in Japan. Each state has its own "laws of laws" regard ling legal relationships with other states of the United States, as well as with foreign states.

一番目

  領土変更の場合にその変更される領土に居住する人たちの国籍は、講和条約が成立する時までは従来の地位を維持するのが国際法上の原則だ。これを韓国の場合に適用するなら、韓国にいる韓国人も講和条約が成立する時までは日本国籍をそのまま保有するというのが従来の国際法上の原則だ。

  しかしこのような従来の原則は韓国の場合には適用できないし、韓国にいる韓国人は今回の講和条約締結前に既に事実上だけでなく、法律上でも日本国籍を離脱して韓国国籍を取得したのである。それは韓国が日本のポツダム宣言受諾に因って、既に実質的に日本の支配を離れ、一九四八年八月十五日の大韓民国政府樹立に因って韓国の独立は既に法的に確定したからだ。同年十二月二十日法律第十六号国籍法の公布は韓国国民の国籍を形式的に確認した措置だった。

1.

  In the event of territorial change, as for the nationality of the people who reside in the territory that is is changed, maintaining the hitherto status until a peace treaty is effected is a principle of international law. If this is applied to Korea, then that Koreans in Korea also [as well as Overseas Koreans in Japan] would retain Japan Nationality as is until a peace treaty is effected is a hitherto principle of international law.

  However, this sort of hitherto principle cannot be applied to the case of Korea, for Koreans in Korea, before the conclusion of the [San Francisco] Peace Treaty this time, had already, not only de facto, but also de jure, separated from Japan nationality and acquired the nationality of the Republic of Korea. That is because Korea, due to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, had already substantially [essentially, materially] separated from Japan's control, and due to the establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948 the independence of Korea had already been legally decided. The promulgation of [ROK's] Nationality Law (Law No. 16 of 20 December the same year) was a measure that formally confirmed the nationality of the Korean nation [of Korean nationals].

二番目

  日本にいる韓国人の地位はどうなのかといえば、第一次世界大戦後には類似した場合に処した人たちには国籍の選挙権を認め、本国国籍を選択する人たちは一定期間内に、本国に住所を移転するように要求されるのが例だった。即ちこれを韓国の場合に適用すれば、日本にいる韓国人は講和条約後に韓国国籍と日本国籍の両者の内ひとつを選択する権限を付与される代わりに、韓国国籍を選んだ場合には一定期間内に韓国に退去しなければならないのである。

  しかし以上のような措置を取るためには、日本にいる韓国人が今もなお日本国籍を持っ ているとするSCAP 及び日本政府の見解が正しいということを前提としなければならないが、本人はこの種の見解に同意できない。即ち日本にいる韓国人も、既に韓国国籍を取得したのであり、ただそれを日本政府が確認することだけが残っているのである。領土変更の場合に国籍問題が起き、それが講和条約に依って最終的に処理されるのが従来の国際法P13 上の例ではあるが、それは講和条約が戦闘行為の終了後幾らもしないですぐに締結される場合に限られのである。しかし韓国の場合には対日講和条約締結までに、六年という長い時間がかかり、その間に韓国の日本支配からの離脱、大韓民国の独立、その国際的承認等の政治的及び法的変化が起きた。国籍だけでなく領土変更それ自体も、普通の場合には講和条約で初めて変更が行われるのだが、韓国の場合には韓国の独立は既に成立した事実であり、今回の講和条約に依って初めて形成されたのではない。同じように在日韓国人の韓P14 国国籍取得も、既に実質的には行われたのであり、今回韓日間にある種の条約ないし協定が成立するとしても、それは単純に過去の事実を確認する効果しか持たないものと見るべきだろう。在日韓国人は既に韓国国籍を取得したのであり、残った問題はその事実を日本政府が確認することだけだ。

  万一日本側が、在日韓国人の日本国籍に固執するならば一種の二重国籍の問題になるだ ろう。

2.

  If saying [asking] what about the status of Koreans in Japan, as for people dealt with in similar cases following World War I, that [states] recognized suffrage (election rights) of nationality, and that people who chose their home-country nationality were required to move their domicile to their home-country within a specific period of time, were (have been) the rule (convention) [in international law]. In other words, if applied to the case of Korea, as for Koreans in Japan, in return for being imparted (given) the power (right) to chose one among the two [nationalities] Korea nationality and (or) Japan nationality after the Peace treaty, in the case they chose Korean nationality they would have had to remove to (leave Japan for) Korea within a specific period of time [after making their choice].

  However, in order to take (adopt) the above sort of measure, [one] must presuppose that the view (understanding) of SCAP and the Government of Japan, that Koreans in Japan even now have Japan nationality, to be correct -- but this person [I, the writer, we] cannot consent to this kind of view. In other words, Koreans in Japan also, have already acquired Korea nationality, and what remains [to be done] is only [for] the Government of Japan to confirm (recognize) this. In the case of territorial change nationality problems arise, and that they are finally disposed of in accordance with [provisions in] a peace treaty is the hitherto rule (convention) of international law -- but that is limited to cases in which the peace treaty is concluded without delay immediately (soon) after the end of the hostile acts. However, in the case of Korea, up to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan, took the long time of 6 years, and during that [period] Korea's separation from Japan control (rule), the independence of the Republic of Korea, Japanese control (rule) of Korea, and political and legal changes of its [ROK's] international acknowledgment (recognition) et cetera occurred. Not only nationality but territory change itself, in ordinary cases change would first take place with a peace treaty, but in Korea's case, [it] is a fact that the independence of Korea was already established, and [ROK] was not first formed (constituted) in accordance with this time's [San Francisco] Peace Treaty. Similarly, the Korea nationality acquisition of Koreans in Japan as well, had already substantially (essentially, materially) taken place, and even if this time a treaty and an agreement of some kind between Korea and Japan are established (concluded), they probably ought to be viewed as something which merely have the effect of simply confirming facts of the past. Koreans in Japan have already acquired Korea nationality, and the problem that remains is for the Government of Japan to confirm that fact.

  Should perchance the Japan side cling to (persist in) [its view of] the Japan nationality of Koreans in Japan, then it would probably become a kind of dual-nationality problem.

Korea, Koreans, Republic of Korea, Korean nation [nationals]

"Korea" (韓国 K. Hanguk, J. Kankoku) is ROK's generic term for the entire peninsular country regardless of its government -- Empire of Korea, Empire of Japan, US and USSR military governments, or the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). At the time, ROK and DPRK were at war and claimed each other's territories. The Republic of Korea (大韓民国 K. Tae Han Min Guk, J. Dai Kan Minguk) or "Great Korea People's Country" contrasts with the Empire of Korea (大韓帝国 K. Tae Han Teguk, J. Dai Kan Teikoku) or "Great Korea Emperor's Country".

"Koreans" (韓国人 K. Hangukin, J. Kankokujin) is ROK's generic term for Koreans. "Kanjin" (韓人 K. Hanin, J. Kanjin) is also used. "Koreans" may or may not include "Overseas Koreans" (韓僑 K. Hangyo, J. Kankyō), which was commonly used in contemporary Sino-Korean to refer to "Overseas Koreas in Japan" (在日韓僑 K. Chaeil Hangyo, J. Zainichi Kankyō) defined as those who had been in the prefectural Interior of Japan when the war ended and continued to reside in Japan.

The term 国民 (K. kungmin, J. kokumin), is used to refer to a "person [affiliate] of a country" hence "national" -- but also the collectivity of people hence "nation". In principle, this used of "nation" is in reference to a "civil" nation as opposed to a "racioethnic" nation or race (民族 K. minjok, J. minzoku), as in "Korean nation/race" (韓民族 K. Han minjok, J. Kan minzoku).

"separated from, separation from"

Terms expressed by the Sinific graphs 離 (K. i, ri, K. ri) and 離脱 (K. 이탈 ital, rital, J. りだつ ridatsu) mean "separation" -- as in "Korea's separation from Japan" (韓国の日本からの離脱 Kankoku no Nihon kara no ridatsu).

The Japanese verb "hanareru" (離れる) and its Korean equivalent is generally used intransitively, but the Sino-Japanese verb "ridatsu suru" (離脱する) and its Sino-Korean equivalent are used both transitively and intransitively. Hence 国籍を離脱する (kokuseki o ridatsu suru) can mean "renounce nationality" if the act is volitional, or "separate from nationality" if not voluntary. Other conjugations of these verb forms can add "passive" or "causative" nuances.

Here, of course, the parallel actions of "separation of Korea from Japan" and "separation of Koreans from Japanese nationality" are simply effects of legal acts.

common metaphors

I have translated a Japanese translation of a Korean text which I have not seen. Assuming that Yi Yangsu's translation has faithfully mapped the Korean metaphors into Japanese -- then of interest here is that we have an ROK document dated 10 September 1951, a day after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (8 September California time, 9 September Tokyo or Seoul time) using the same metaphors that would be used in the notification issued by Japan's Attorney General's Office on 19 April 1952, which stipulated (my translation, see Separation and choice: Between a legal rock and a political hard place for details).

(一)朝鮮及び台湾は、条約の発効の日から日本国の領土から分離することとなるので、これに伴い、朝鮮人及び台湾人は、内地に在住している者を含めてすべて日本の国籍を喪失する

(1) As for Chōsen and Taiwan, because from the day of the effectuation of the treaty they will be separated from the territory of Japan, associated [concomitant] with this, Chosenese (Chōsenjin) and Taiwanese (Taiwanjin), including those who are living in the Interior (Naichi) all will lose the nationality of Japan.

The full formal title of Law No. 71 of 1991, promulgated on 10 May 1991 and enforced from 1 November 1991, is as follows (my structural translation).

日本国との平和条約に基づき日本の国籍を離脱した者等の出入国管理に関する特例法

Special provisions law concerning the control of the exit-and-entry-of-the-country of persons who based on the Treaty of Peace with Japan separated from the nationality of Japan and others

In this law, which consolidated several special statuses for qualified aliens who had been Japanese but lost their Japanese nationality on 28 April 1952 into a single Special Permanent Resident (特別永住者 Tokubetsu eijūsha) status, refers to such people as "Peace Treaty Nationality Separatees" (平和条約国籍離脱者). Again, this is my structural translation, which attempts to preserve the "separated from" sense of the "ridatsu shita" (離脱した) metaphor in this context.

de facto versus de jure dates

ROK and Japan generally agree with regard to when the separations took place de facto but fundamentally disagree as to when they took place de jure. For most practical purposes, the determination of the day of legal effect has been a matter of domestic law. Japan's understanding was essentially informed by the stance of the Allied Powers, which did not recognize that Koreans who had in Japan's prefectures had lost their Japanese nationality before the effectuation of their Peace Treaty with Japan -- in which, of course, the Republic of Korea was not qualified to participate -- partly because ROK was only one of two states which claimed to be Korea's successor state and was at war the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), its rival, which like ROK had not been founded until 3 years after the end of the Pacific War -- but mainly "Korea" had been part of the Empire of Japan against which the Allied Powers had declared war on 1 January 1942.

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8 October 1951 ROK's nationality choice contingencies

在日韓僑の国籍に関する協定要綱
Zainichi Kankyō no kokuseki ni kan suru kyōtei yōkō
Outlines of [two possible] agreements concerning nationality of Overseas Koreans in Japan

Months before the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan in San Francisco on 8 September 1951, the Republic of Korea began preparing for the eventuality of having to normalize its relations with Japan and, in the process, solve a number of thorny problems related to property and other claims, territory and fishing rights, and the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan.

On 8 October 1951 -- a month after the signing of the treaty, and just 12 days before the first meeting between ROK and Japan, ROK's Minister of Justice presented President Syngman Rhee with a choice of two contingency agreements concerning the nationality of Overseas Koreans in Japan.

The following summary of the memorandum, and presentation and translation of the texts of the two contingency agreements, are based on KRN 78: 111-124, NKBK 78: 31-33, also Yi 2007: 27-81. See ROK and Japan archives for details.

8 October 1951 memorandum to Syngman Rhee

The two contingency agreements -- the first for "nationality recovery", the second for "nationality choice" -- were attached with other "reference materials" (参考資料) to a memorandum dated the 8th day of the 10th month of the 4284th year of Dangi (檀紀四二八四年十月八日) or 8 October 1951), from ROK's Minister of Justice (法務部長官) [legal affairs department chief officer] to the State Council Chairman (国務会議議長).

The contingency agreements were not merely attached to the memorandum but very its substance. The "subject" (件) of the memorandum was "the consideration of an outline of the agreement concerning the nationality problem of Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑の国籍問題に関する協定の要綱審議).

The memorandum asks the President of the State Council to consider the attached suggestions concerning the "nationality affiliation of about 550,000 Koreans residing in Japan" (日本に居住している約五十五万名の韓国人の国籍帰属). It then summaries each of two alternative proposals as follows (KRN 78: 113-114, NKBK 78: 31, and Yi 2007: 77; my ellipses, structural translations, and highlighting).

1. 在日韓僑全部に韓国の国籍を取得させると同時に、日本で永久に居住できる権利と、 また自由に退去できる権利を付与し・・・
  to let/have/make all Overseas Koreans in Japan acquire the nationality of Korea, and at the same time, impart the right to be able to perpetually reside in Japan, and the right to be able to freely leave [remove] [from Japan] . . .

2. 一九四五年八月九日以前から日本に居住する者で、その後まで続けて日本に居住した韓国人全部を日本国籍を持つものと認定し、彼らに一定の期間内に韓国国籍を選択できる権利、即ち国籍選択権を付与し・・・
  recognize that all Koreans who were persons residing in Japan from on or before 9 August 1945, and who until after that have continuously resided [in Japan], have Japan's nationality, and impart to them the right to be able to choose Korea's nationality within a given period, in other words the right of nationality choice . . .

The memorandum states that while it would be advantageous for all Overseas Koreans in Japan to become ROK nationals, Koreans who might want to naturalize in Japan might have difficulty satisfying some of the conditions for naturalization in Japan's Nationality (promulgated and enforced in 1950), and others might have difficulty staying in Japan under the deportation provisions of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order that will come into force from 1 November that year (1951). This means that Japan "could let naturalize , and could let reside, only so-called 'desirable Koreans'" (いわゆる「望ましい韓国人」だけを帰化させることもできるし居住させることもできる), while it "could easily expel to Korea 'undesirable Koreans'" (「望ましくない韓国人」に対しては容易に韓国に追放できる).

The memorandum observes that, because Japan's territory would shrink after the peace treaty, Japan's biggest political problem was the population problem (人口問題). It's policy will continue to be to favor the migration of Japanese overseas, but will also be to get foreigners it is unhappy with -- [such as] Koreans [who break Japan's laws and advocate revolution] -- to return to their home country. So Japan will want to solve both the population problem and the security problem (治安問題) in a single stroke. If Korea asserts itself from this point of view [and proposes that all Overseas Koreans in Japan be made to acquire ROK nationality and be allowed to perpetually reside in Japan], Japan will probably agree -- but . . .

・・・われわれがこの案を採択するならば、日本にいるわが韓僑の永住権を確保するために、「外国人出入国管理令」のような一方的な追放はこのような韓国人に、少なくとも大韓民国の同意なしには適用できないようにしなければならないでしょう。

. . . if we adopt this plan. in order to secure permanent residence rights for our Overseas Koreans in Japan, regarding [provisions for] unilateral expulsion as [in Japan's] "Alien Exit-entry-country (Immigration) Control Law, we must make it such that [Japan] cannot apply the law to such Koreans [with permanent residence] -- at least without the consent of the Republic of Korea.

The memorandum says "there is worry that [efforts on our part to limit it's right to expel aliens] will encounter Japan's stubborn opposition" (日本の頑強なる反対に逢着する憂慮があります). Hence the provisional addition to the 1st agreement proposal, that Koreans in Japan -- after Japan acknowledges that they are ROK nationals -- would be able to choose the nationality of Japan within 3 years.

The memorandum regards the 2nd agreement proposal -- to recognize that Koreans in Japan retained Japanese nationality, but give them right to "choose [Korean] nationality" -- is probably "unreasonable (unfair, unjust)" (不当) -- but such an agreement would conform with precedents in international law regarding "nationality affiliation problems" (国籍帰属問題) -- such as in the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and other countries in Europe following World War I and the Versailles Treaty (ヴェルサイユ条約).

But if treaties like those in Europe were adopted in the case of Japan and Korea, Koreans in Japan who did not choose ROK nationality within a specific period would be Japanese, and Japan would have have to accept them without regard to whether they were desirable or undesirable. And only those who with a love of their ancestorland (祖国愛) would desire to become nationals of Korea.

In the closing line, ROK's Minister of Justice asks President Rhee to determine which of the two [plans to solve] the nationality affiliation problem of Overseas Koreans in Japan [he would like ROK's delegates to recommend at the upcoming ROK-Japan talks] (在日韓僑の国籍帰属問題に関して上述した、ふたつの中のどちらを選ぶかということを決定していただくことを願うものであります).

And the record shows that Syngman Rhee chose Plan 1 -- which recognized that all Koreans in Japan were ROK nationals who deserved to rights of permanent and perpetual abode on a par with Japanese nationals, who could not without prior consent of ROK be expelled from Japan.

The outline of the two contingency plans was the first of the following 5 attachments.

別添資料
Attached materials
1. 在日韓僑の国籍に関する協定要綱
   Outlines of agreement concerning nationality of Overseas Koreans in Japan
2. 占領期間中、韓国人に対する法的措置概要
   Summary of legal measures concerning Koreans during period of Occupation [of Japan]
3. 在日韓僑の動態
   Dynamics of [statistics on] Overseas Koreans in Japan
4. 外国人出入国管理令の要点
   Main points of [Japan's] Alien exit-enter-country [immigration] control order
5. 日本国籍法抄
    Japan's Nationality Law (extracts)

1951 pre-talk outline of two possible agreements concerning
the nationality and treatment of Overseas Koreans in Japan

How Koreans might have been given a choice of nationality
if that had been what the negotiating parties had wanted

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 78: 121-124, NKBK 78: 33; Yi 2007: 80-81). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓僑の国籍に関する協定要綱
Zainichi Kankō no kokuseki ni kan suru kyōtei yōkō
Outlines of agreements concerning nationality of Overseas Koreans in Japan

第一、「全般的国籍回復の場合」

1. "In the event of general recovery of nationality"

"recovery of nationality"

The term "recovery of nationality" (国籍回復 kokuseki kaifuku) refers the a reacquisition of a nationality that was previously possessed but lost. Many nationality laws have provisions for recovering nationality, especially if passively lost. Volitionally lost nationality is another matter. Here the term is used to refer to the recovery of nationality passively lost as an effect of a territorial cession -- in this case, the incorporation of the Empire of Korea into the Empire of Japan in 1910.

第一条   日本国は一九四五年八月九日以前から日本に居住している韓人(韓日合併条約により日本の国籍を取得し、その後外国の国籍を取得していない者とその子孫)は大韓民国の国民であることを承認する。

Article 1   Japan acknowledges that Koreans who have been residing in Japan from on or before 9 September 1945 -- (persons who, pursuant to the Korea-Japan Merger Treaty, acquired the nationality of Japan, and after that [since then] have not acquired the nationality of another country, and their descendants) -- are nationals of the Republic of Korea.

"Koreans"

Article 1 does not define "Koreans" (韓人 Kanjin) other than as persons who acquired Japan's nationality after the annexation and have remained Japanese. This is clearly not in accord with Japan's definition, which would define Koreans as members of Korea's household registers. Japan's domestic laws would also regard such "Koreans" as "Chosenese" (朝鮮人 Chōsenjin), again defined as members of Chōsen (朝鮮) family registers.

The term suggests that "Koreans" are the "people" (人 jin) of a "Korea" (韓) defined not as the "country of Korea" (韓国 Kankoku) but as a "racioethnic nation" (民族 minzoku). "Koreans" may have acquired Japan's nationality, but that alone did not make them "nationals" of Japan if "nationals" is invested with extralegal "racioethnic" qualities.

In many Occupation-era documents, the term "Korean" is applied even to members of prefectural Interior registers, which defined "Japanese" in Occupied Japan, who had formerly been in Chōsen (Korean) registers. Some ROK English documents speak of the "Korean race" as something which transcends civil status. See Article 1 in the 2nd alternative treaty (below).

The terms "same wombers" (同胞 dōhō" and "overseas wombers" (僑胞 kyōhō) also appear in contemporary documents. The former of these two terms is widely used today in ROK laws which make special provisions for aliens who are perceived to have ancestral ties to the "Korean [racioethnic] nation" (韓民族 kan minzoku, 朝鮮民族 chōsen minzoku).

"Japan-Korea Merger Treaty"

In Japanese domestic law, the treaty would be called "Japan-Korea Union Treaty" (日韓併合 Nik-Kan Heigō Jōyaku) rather than "Korea-Japan Merger Treaty" (韓日合併条約 Kan-Nichi gappei jōyaku). Apart from possible semantic distinctions between "merger" and "union" and "annexation" in English, Korean nationalists today regard the treaty as having become null and void retroactive to the day of its effectuation in 1910, on account of it having been forced upon the Empire of Korea and thereby should be considered illegal. The Republic of Korea actually recognized the effects of the treaty -- at least up to 9 August 1945, which ROK -- but not Japan -- regarded as the point at which Japan ipso facto lost Chōsen (Korea) as an effect of Japan signaling its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

"nationality of Japan" / "nationals of the Republic of Korea"

The language in the treaty does not specifically link being a "national" (国民) of a country as having the country's "nationality" (国籍 kokuseki). The title of this 1st alternative treaty, however, suggests that "Korean" in Japan would be recognized as "nationals" of the Republic of Korea on account of their recovering the nationality of "Korea" represented by the "Republic of Korea". Presumably the recovery Korean nationality would occasion a loss of Japanese nationality.

"descendants"

Here the familiar compound of "child" and "grandchild" (子孫 shison) is used for "descendants". Article 1 of the 2nd alternative treaty uses a pair of more technical compounds representing "direct lineal / lower relative" (直系卑属 chokkei hizoku), meaning "lineal descendant" as opposed to "lineal ascendant" or (直系尊属 chokkei sonzoku), which represents "direct line higher relative" (see below).

第二条   日本国は前条の大韓民国の国民が日本に永久に居住する権利と、またいつでも大韓民国に退去する権利を保障する。
  日本国は前条の大韓民国の国民に対しては、大韓民国の同意なしには、如何なる理由によっても強制に退去させることはできない。

Article 2   Japan guarantees the right of nationals of the Republic of Korea in the preceding article to perpetually reside in Japan, and the right to leave [Japan] for [remove to] the Republic of Korea at any time.
  Japan, regarding a national of the Republic of Korea in the preceding article, without the consent of the Republic of Korea, shall not be able to forcibly cause [the person] to leave for any reason.

第三条   日本国は前条によって日本に居住する大韓民国の国民に対して、その不動産、漁業権、鉱業権、企業権などその他一切の財産権の所有と、経済的活動において日本人と同一な保護を受けることを保障する。

Article 3   Japan, in accordance with the preceding article, regarding nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan, guarantees [them] the possession of immovable assets, fishing rights, mining rights, business rights et cetera and all other property rights, and [that] in [their] economic activities [they] will receive protection identical to Japanese.

第四条   日本国は第一条の大韓民国の国民が日本を退去する場合に、彼が所有していた不動産、漁業権、鉱業権、企業権など、その他一切の財産権を自由に処分し、その動産を自由に携帯できる権利を認定し、またこれに対しては一切の課税をしないことを保障する。

Article 4   Japan, in the event a national of the Republic of Korea leaves Japan, recognizes the right [of the person] to freely dispose of immovable assets, fishing rights, mining rights, business rights et cetera that he has possessed, and all other property rights, and guarantees not to impose any taxes whatever on these [properties].

(本の修正案)

第0条   日本国は第一条の大韓民国の国民に対して、本条約発効後三年以内に日本の国籍を選択できる権利を認定する。

(Proposal for amending this article treaty)

Article 0   Japan, regarding a national of the Republic of Korea in Article 1, recognizes the right to be able to choose the nationality of Japan within 3 years after the effectuation of this treaty.

"be able to choose the nationality of Japan"

Nothing has been said about whether "Koreans" in Japan have lost the "nationality of Japan" as a matter of now being "nationals of the Republic of Korea". During the 3-year period within which they could have chosen the nationality of Japan, would they have continued to possess a "residual" or "latent" nationality of Japan -- in addition to their status as a "national" of ROK? If so, then would a "choice of nationality" have been retroactive to the effectuation of the treaty, so in effect they would have never lost Japan's nationality? Or would they have lost it when becoming "nationals" of ROK, and then regained it from the date they chose the "nationality" of Japan?

Territoriality of nationality

The problem is that the "nationality of Japan" as a matter of being a "Korean" with Japanese nationality included the quality of "Korean territoriality" and subjection to Korean territorial laws, which included Korean household register laws and related Korean family laws. Choosing "Japanese nationality" under the treaty would have actually meant "changing" to a different quality of Japanese nationality -- from one with a "Korean" quality to one with an "Interior" quality based on prefectural household register laws and related prefectural family laws.

"Japanese nationality" sounds like a single status, but in fact it varies in quality according to the territory on which it is based. Japanese nationality is ultimately territorial. It is attributed as an effect of being a member of a municipal household register in Japan -- meaning Japan's sovereign dominion -- which included "Korea" (Chōsen). Once "Korea" was separated from "Japan", "Koreans" would be separated from Japanese nationality -- and the only question was "when" the separation of territory occurred. ROK took the date to be 9 August 1945, if not 15 August 1945. Japan (and the Allied Powers) took 2 September 1945 as the date of provisional separation, and 28 April 1952 as the date of formal separation -- hence the latter date is the date on which, in Japan's legal understanding, "Koreans" (Chosenese) and "Formosans" (Taiwanese) "lost" (喪失した sōshitsu shita) -- or "separated from" (離脱した ridatsu shita) Japanese nationality.

Legally, "Koreans" in post-treaty Japan could not "retain" (保有する hoyū suru) Japanese nationality because they were not members of family registers in Japan. Their "choice" option would have required that they migrate to a register in Japan -- a register which, unlike a "Korean" register, was subject to "Japanese" laws.

No provisions for nationality migration

There were no provisions in Japan's Nationality Law for such migration -- nor need there be. Conventionally, such provisions are made in treaties, which become part of a country's body of laws when ratified and enforced.

Treaty provisions are usually very general and leave particulars to domestic laws. Japan would have needed to provide enforcement regulations -- rules and procedures for establishing a family register in a prefectural municipality pursuant to the provisions in the treaty.

Conformity with existing Family Register Law

Presumably a new register would have to conform to provisions in the Family Register Law -- or the law would have to be revised to accommodate agreed to considerations, such as the forms of names and other constraints related to family law. In general, though, the state whose nationality is chosen determines the procedural rules and is free to apply its domestic status laws -- in Japan's case, its Family Register Law

Koreans, under Korean law at the time Korea was part of Japan, kept their natal clan surnames after marriage, and there could be several different surnames in the household register of large extended family. Prefectural Interior law in Japan, however, required a married couple and their minor children to bear the same family name, and all members of an extended family that shared the same register would have the same family name.<

So "choosing Japanese nationality" would have been a matter of simply checking "Japan" in a "nationality choice" box. It would have entailed some serious paperwork, and possibly a name change.

第二、「国籍選択の場合」

2. "In the event of nationality choice"

"nationality choice

The term "nationality choice" was used in the 1st alternative treaty (above) in reference to the right of ROK nationals in Japan, as defined in Article 1 of the 1st alternative treaty, to choose the nationality of Japan within 3 years of the effectuation of the treaty. Here it is used to refer to the right of "Koreans" in Japan as defined in Article 1 of either alternative treaty to chose ROK nationality with 3 years of the treaty's effecutation.

第一条   日本国は一九四五年八月九日以前から日本に居住する韓人(韓日合併条約により日本の国籍を取得し、その後外国の国籍を取得していない者とその直系卑属)に対して、本条約発効以後三年以内に大韓民国の国籍を選択する権利を認定する。

Article 1   Japan, regarding Koreans who have been residing in Japan from on or before 9 September 1945 -- (persons who, pursuant to the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty, acquired the nationality of Japan, and after that [since then] have not acquired the nationality of another country, and their lineal descendants (直系卑属 chokkei hizoku)) -- recognizes [their] right to choose the nationality of the Republic of Korea within three years of the effectuation of this treaty.

"choose the nationality of the Republic of Korea"

The 1st alternative treaty was predicated on passive and en masse "nationality recovery" (国籍回復 kokuseki kaifuku) by all people in Japan defined as "Koreans" in Article 1 of either alternative treaty. The 2nd alternative treaty appears to be predicated on all "Koreans" in Japan passively retaining the nationality of Japan unless they individually indicated their desire to acquire ROK nationality.

Here the "nationality choice" problem is a bit different. If "Koreans" (韓人 Kanjin) is taken (as it often is) to refer a person who is "racially" Korean, then such a person in a municipal register in Japan would have had to migrate to an ROK register, and hence the quality of the status -- possibly even their name -- would change. However, the vast majority of "Koreans" in Japan were "Chosenese" in "Chōsen" registers -- hence would not have needed to migrate to a new register. Certain "Japanized" aspects of their registers might have been changed under ROK's laws, which sought to "Koreanize" aspects of family laws that had been somewhat "Japanized" under Japanese rule.

In other words, for most "Koreans" in Japan, had they decided to choose ROK nationality, the "quality" of their "ROK nationality" -- based on membership in a Korean family register -- would have been essentially the same as the quality of their "Japanese nationality" -- which had also been based on membership in a Korean register. Only "Koreans" who chose ROK nationality as a member of a prefectural Japanese register would have had to "migrate" to an ROK register, and thereby be subjected to ROK rather than Japanese register laws and related family laws.

第二条   日本国は前条により大韓民国の国籍を選択した大韓民国の国民に、日本に永久に居住する権利と、またいつでも大韓民国に退去する権利を保障する。

Article 2   Japan, to nationals of the Republic of Korea who have chosen the nationality of the Republic of Korea pursuant to the preceding article, guarantees the right to perpetually reside in Japan, and the right to leave [Japan] for [remove to] the Republic of Korea at any time.

第三条   日本国は第二条により日本に居住する大韓民国の国民に対して、その不動産漁業権、鉱業権、企業権などその他一切の財産権の所有と、経済的活動において、日本人と同一な保護を受けることを保障する。

Article 3   Japan, regarding nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan pursuant to Article 2, guarantees [them] the possession of their immovable assets, fishing rights, mining rights, business rights et cetera and all other property rights, and [that] in [their] economic activities, [they] will receive protection identical to Japanese.

第四条   日本国は第二条により日本に居住する大韓民国の国民が日本を退去する場合に、彼が所有していた不動産、漁業権、鉱業権、企業権など、その他一切の財産権を自由に処分し、その動産を自由に携帯できる権利を認定し、またこれに対しては一切の課税をしないことを保障する。

Article 4   Japan, in the event a national of the Republic of Korea who resides in Japan pursuant to Article 2 leaves Japan, recognizes the right of [the person] to freely dispose of immovable assets, fishing rights, mining rights, business rights et cetera that he has possessed, and all other property rights, and guarantees not to impose any taxes whatever on these [properties].

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20 October 1951 Talks begin with cautious hope

SCAP'S Sebald: "a spirit of calm and sincere purpose"

Japan's Iguchi: "a start, however small, will have been made"

ROK's Yang: "we must not permit ourselves to fail"

10 sessions of the preliminary plenary conference between ROK and Japan were held between 20 October and 4 December 1951.

Records of proceedings

The preliminay plenary conference, unlike the Legal Status Committee and other subcommittees which it established, was considered "formal", and hence formal records of the proceedings of its meetings were made in English. Japanese and Korean were also official languages.

The conference was set up and facilitated by SCAP's Diplomatic Section, and some of its officials would attend all 10 meetings. Their role was to observe, and nothing they might say would be binding. However, William H. Sullivan was designated the official reporter, and his name appears on the record of proceedings of all meetings except the 5th, which was written by J.E. MacDonald. The Japan-side and the Korea-side generated their own reports for internal use in Japanese and Korean.

Conferees

The following Japan-side and ROK-side delegates and SCAP-side observers attended opening session of the preliminary plenary conference (JPN 3-63: 3-4).

Japan delegation

首席代表 外務次官 井口貞夫
Iguchi Sadao, chief representative, Foreign affairs vice minister

代表 外務事務官 千葉皓
Chiba Kō, representative, Foreign affairs administrative official

代表 入国管理庁実施部長 田中三男
Tanaka Mitsuo, Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Agency, Enforcement Department director

代表 法務府民事局主幹 平賀健太
Hiraga Kenta, representative
Attorney General's Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, deputy director

代表 外務省管理局総務課長 後宮虎郎
Ushiroku Toraro, representative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Control Bureau, General Affairs Section, director

The Control Bureau of the former Ministry of Interior (内務省) was transfered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省) following SCAP's breakup of the Interior Minister. In 1943, the exterior territories, beginning with Chōsen and Taiwan, were from fully to partially placed under the administrative authority the Interior Minister, which until then had jurisdiction over only the prefectural Interior (内地 Naichi). The Foreign Ministry was thus in charge of

代表 外務省条約局法規課長 佐藤日史
Satō Nisshi, representative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Bureau, Legal Section, director

Assistant 代表 外務事務官 今井実
Imai Minoru, assistant representative, Foreign affairs administrative official

Assistant 代表 外務事務官 佐治誠
Saji Makoto, assistant representative, Foreign affairs administrative official

Republic of Korea delegation

首席代表 梁祐燦
Yang You Chan, head of delegation

代表 申性模
Shin Sung Mo, representative

代表 金溶植
Kim Yong Shik, representative

代表 兪鎮午
Yu Chin O, representative

代表 林松本
Limb Song Bon, representative

代表 葛弘基
Karl Hong Kee, representative

Assistant 金東祚
Kim Dong Jo, assistant

Assistant 金泰東
Kim Tae Dong, assistant

Legal Advisor Dr. Oliver

SCAP (Diplomatic Section) observers

William J. Sebald
John P. Gardiner
Edward Anderberg
William H. Sullivan
Stanley S. Carpenter
Richard B. Finn

Three statements, three messages

As is clearly seen from the content of the three statements, Sebald's and Iguchi's are characteristic of positively toned impersonal diplomacyese. Yang's, in sharp contrast, is more personal, more colorful, more creative -- and also more honest in its frank admission of the existence of negative nationalistic sentiments.

Sebald's statement

Sebald's says as much as he should and little if any more. He's wants the two parties to hammer out an agreement that will get them started on a normal relationshp. He makes it clear that the most important task before the two delegations is for them to determine "the nationality and legal status of those Koreans who are resident in Japan" -- by themselves. He stresses that SCAP will observe the negotiations, and possibly give advice, but will not interfere.

The two countries will be on their own. The status issue -- and all other issues they are free to raise and discuss -- are theirs, not SCAP's. SCAP, representing the Allied Powers, has no standing -- except to urge that they endeavor to resolve at least the status issue by the time the terms of the Peace Treaty come into effect sometime probably early the following year.

Iguchi's statement

Iguchi's statement shows that he -- possibly with the help of editors -- knew exactly how to chop wordier 4-page drafts down to a perfectly pitched 3-page statement that makes no reference to anything possible negative except "problems of mutual concern". He sees the conversations as a start which, however, small, will lay a foundation for a lasting bilateral relationship.

Iguchi understands that question of "the legal status of Koreans residing in this country" arise out of the Peace Treaty. He also makes it clear that the "the question of nationality" will "eventually" lead to "the quetion of making a basic . . . agreement" to establish a formal relationship between the two countries.

Iguchi knows that the question of nationality is paramount, because states are essentially defined by the nationality they recognize of those they consider their nationals. The first step toward establish a normal diplomatic relationship is usually, therefore, to recognize each other's sovereignty in the form of recognizing each other's nationality. For Japan, this entailed the need to clarify the status of "Koreans in Japan" -- who were still, in Japan's (and SCAP's) view, Japanese nationals.

Iguchi also knows that, in ROK's view, Koreans in Japan had either never been Japanese nationals, or were freed from the "yoke" of Japanese nationality the moment Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaraion. But he also knows it is not his position to say this -- and that this first meeting is not the place to delve into particulars. He very intentionally strives not to be contentious.

Yang's statement

Yang's statement runs a full 5-pages, at least 2 of which consist of emotional opinions on issues which -- if related at all to the purpose of the conference -- are matters to save for later. It would have been diplomatic to briefly allude to the period during which -- until 5 years ago -- had been under Japanese control. But to dwell on the hostility of Koreans, in a manner that must have come across as reflecting his own hostility -- was not something a seasoned diplomat would do.

Yang, by education and experience, is totally unlike most of the other Korean delegates, who are more like most of the Japanese delegates -- people who have spent their entire years in Japan, including for 35 years that "Korea" was a part of Japan called Chōsen. Yang -- in all but nationality -- was an American. He was, moreover, a physician, and was personally an aggressive, no-nonsense, and principled achiever. He also had a way with words. He was speaking English as a virtual native language, and had a gift -- like Syngman Rhee -- for oratory.

Yang's statement is easily twice as powerful as Iguchi's, which is twice as powerful as Sebald's, which is pretty much to just the point.

On the plus side, Yang's statement cleared the air. His medical metaphors was apt. He knew who he was representing other than himself. He didn't want the Japan delegation to have any illusions that the Republic of Korea would be as "generous" as the Allied Powers.

On the negative side, his emotional victimist overview of Japan's rule of Korea as Chōsen must have embarrased some of his fellow delegates -- who, unlike Yang, had lived in the Empire of Japan as Japanese and Chosenese, had studied at Interior universities, worked in imperial agencies, and hoped that Japan would win the war.

Source and markup

The following texts of Sebald's, Iguchi's, and Yang's statements -- all in English -- are reformatted transciptions of scans of copies of the original double-spaced typed texts of the statements by Sebald (JPN 3-63: 16-17), Iguchi (JPN 3-63: 5-7), and Yang (JPN 3-63: 18-22). The same folder in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives includes a 1st and 2nd draft of Iguchi's statement.

The ROK archives include single-spaced copies of Sebald's and Iguchi's statements, but appear to lack a copy of Yang's statement (Sebald KRN 77: 56, NKBK 77: 16; Iguchi KRN 77: 58-59, NKBK 77: 18-19). The texts on the received scans (if not the original copies) are partly obscure and otherwise difficult to read.

See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Opening Statement by Ambassador W. Ju. Sebalt [sic = Sebald]
at the Korean-Japanese meeting on Oct. 20, 1951.

    It is a genuine pleasure to me to be able to say a few words preliminary to the discussions which you gentlement are about to undertake. At a time when violence is so prevalent throughout the world, it is reassuring to be present when the representatives of two nations sit down in a spirit of calm and sincere purpose to seek solutions to their mutual problems. I feel confident that there is no difference between the Republic of Korea and Japan which can not be solved in this way.

a spirit of calm and sincere purpose

Sebald is hoping that a sincere sense of purpose -- to resolve especially the nationality and legal status issues by the time the Peace Treaty comes into effect -- will override the impulses of either side -- but particular of the Republic of Korea -- to let emotions stand in the way of the agreements that need to be made.

    Since the Supreme Commander's Headquarters has taken the initiative in arranging these talks I feel it proper to review the circumstances which have led us to this conference table.

    All here will recall that the original intent of our invitation was to bring together both your governments so that you might independently seek a determination of the nationality and legal status of those Koreans who are resident in Japan. In such a setting the Japanese Government has stated that it had full power to negotiate and if possible to conclude agreements without the specific approval of the Supreme Commander.

independently seek a determination of the nationality and legal status of those Koreans who are resident in Japan

The Diplomatic Section (DS) of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), was formally responsible for all of Japan's foreign affairs. However, Japan and the Allied Powers had already signed a peace treaty, which would come into force as soon as it was ratified by the required number of signatory states. While Japan would not regain its sovereignty until the Peace Treaty came into force, SCAP determined that Japan should be permitted to negotiate settlements with the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea as though it already had full diplomatic powers -- i.e., the right to independently conduct its own foreign affairs without the mediation or representation of a third party.

full power to negotiate and if possible to conclude agreements without the specific approval of the Supreme Commander

Japan would not be able to sign a treaty with ROC or ROK until the Peace Treaty came into effect. But in the meantime, it was free to negotiate any terms it could with these two states -- concerning not only nationality and legal status but other issues -- without SCAP's approval.

    Although both governments accepted this invitation, the Korean Government subsequently requested that the scope of the proposed discussions be expanded to consider ways and means for the solution of all problems outstanding between Korea and Japan. This Headquarters agreed to lend its good offices to an expansion of these talks for the purpose of developing an agenda out of which it is hoped that ways and means to solve these outstanding problems can be found. The Japanese Government has greed to the expanded scope of the talks and has indicated a desire to be informed of the Republic of Korea's proposals concerning these subjects.

    With these understandings clearly in mind, it is anticipated that the representatives assembled here today will have the opportunity to expand more fully on their Governments' positions at this table. In this connection I would like to make clear the the function and status of the observers who will be assigned to these talks on behalf of the Supreme Commander. These officers will not take an active part in the proceedings or express binding propositions on behalf of this Headquarters. Their functions will terminate with the scope of the talks which I have outlined above. It is assumed that subsequent bilateral negotiations between the Governments of Korea and Japan will be arranged directly between the two parties at the mutual convenience of each.

These officers will not take an active part in the proceedings or express binding propositions on behalf of this Headquarters.

SCAP's officers might, when asked, make suggestions or give advice, regarding any issue. But in principle, they would have no say in the course of the talks.

Japan, of course, had no say in whether SCAP would observe the conference, as Japan's sovereignty was still in SCAP's hand.

While SCAP had no authority over ROK as a state, as custodian of Japan's sovereignty, and as the mediator of Japan's foreign affairs, it had the authority to allow or disallow ROK to post a diplomatic mission in Occupied Japan, and to determine the parameters of the mission's activities in Japan.

When agreeing to DS's request that it negotiate with Japan, ROK specifically requested that SCAP officials be present. Bilateral negotations are not always limited to the negotiating parties, and given the circumstances -- in which the Allied Powers had "liberated" Korea from Japan's rule -- the presence of Allied representatives would have been expected.

Before the Peace Treaty treaty was finalized and signed, ROK believed that SCAP had more authority than it actually did regarding nationality, and ROK tried -- unsuccessfully -- to avoid nationality negotiations with Japan. Japan took it forgranted that, because SCAP still held its sovereignty, SCAP could still impose conditions on the negotiations -- though the conditions would have to be consisent with the terms of the already-signed Peace Treaty, which had made no provisions for, or stipulations about, nationality.

    I am sure that all you gentlemen are keenly aware of the serious import which these talks hold for the peoples of both your nations. I am sure that you will serve both your Governments and your peoples with distinction. I wish you the greatest measure of success as a foundation for lasting amity between your two nations.

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Address by Mr. Sadao Iguchi
at the Meeting of Korean and Japanese Representatives
on October 20, 1951

Your Excellencies and Gentlemen,

    It is indeed a great pleasure for us to meet His Excellency Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador to the United States, and other representatives of the Republic of Korea at this meeting today, which was made possible through the good offices of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

    I feel this meeting to be a momentous event, as it is the first occasion on which representatives of the Japanese Government are in their own capacity meeting with representatives of the Republic of Korea for conversations on problems of mutual concern, and also for the fact that a start, however small, will have been made in laying the foundations for a lasting relationship between our two countries.

a start, however small, will have been made

This statement reflects both Japan's and SCAP's wish that Japan and ROK would expedite a nationality and status agreement as the vital first step toward normalizing their relationship -- after which they could take as much time as needed to settle other issues.

    As you know, we in Japan are now proceeding to the ratification of the Peace treaty with the Allied Powers which happily for us was signed recently in San Francisco, and it is our hope that by early spring next year the necessary number of ratifications will have been obtained, causing this instrument to come into force and enabling Japan to join with others as a sovereign nation in the promotion of the common welfare and the maintenance of international peace and security. It, therefore, seems opportune that we should now start thinking of preparing the various arrangements which will be necessary to implement the terms of the Peace Treaty.

    In this connection, I am particularly happy that the opportunity has been afforded us to enter into discussion with Korean representatives on a question arising out of the Peace Treaty, namely, that of the legal status of Koreans residing in this country. I think a discussion of what that legal status should be once the Peace Treaty comes into force and of what measures, legal and otherwise, would be necessary to conform with any change in legal status, would be very profitable.

a question arising out of the Peace Treaty, namely, that of the legal status of Koreans residing in this country

This is an extremely significant statement, in that it acknowledges that the Peace Treaty -- while providing for the separation of Korea (Chōsen) and Formosa (Taiwan) from Japan -- makes no stipulations regarding the question of the legal status of Koreans (Chosenese) and Formosans (Taiwanese) residing in Occupied Japan, who are presently Japanese.

In other words, the Peace Treaty implicity raises questions the answers to which it implicity leaves to the devices of Japan and concerned states -- which turn out to be the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China.

what measures, legal and otherwise, would be necessary to conform with any change in legal status

The phrase "any change in legal status" leaves open the possibility that there might not be any change in legal status -- i.e., residentially qualified Koreans and Formosans in Japan might continue to be Japanese. Should, however, their legal status change, then the question becomes what sort of measures -- legal and otherwise -- would be necessary to facilitate their change in status.

"Legal" measures would include laws or ordinances or other government actions, such as directives and orders, based on statutes or customary laws. "Other" measures would include less formal actions taken in the name of a bilateral "gentlemen's agreement" or of a unilateral "policy".

    It is, furthermore, my understanding that the Korean representatives have the intention to make some proposals concerning the development of agenda and the investigation of ways and means for the negotiation of all problems outstanding between our two countries. We are glad to have the opportunity to study whatever proposals may be made and shall be only too happy to give them serious consideration.

    I feel that discussion of the question of nationality will in any case eventually lead us to the question of a basic and lasting agreement to regulate the future relations of our two countries. Not only the cultural and economic ties which have for centuries bound us closely together, but also the circumstances in which we find ourselves today, seem to point to the desireability of establishing a basis for formal relationship as soon as the Peace Treaty comes into force. Although this thought has been in my mind for some time, I am afraid we as representatives of our Government are not prepared for the moment to go very far into this matter, particularly, as we shall for some time be preoccupied with matters bearing on the ratification of the Peace Treaty itself. But I think that the matter of a basic agreement is one of major importance which should nevertheless be included in any agenda for future negotiations between our two countries. We would appreciate it very highly if the Korean representatives would be good enough to givs us their views on this subject. Their views will receive the most serious consideration on our part, and will I am sure give us a start in paving the way to the opening of negotiations for such an agreement at an early date.

    In closing, I would like to renew my greetings to the representatives of the Republic of Korea and to assure them of our good will and sincere desire to work out mutually satisfactory solutions to the various questions which will come up, I would like also to take this opportunity to express the profound gratitude of my Government to the good offices of the General Headqarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in making possible this as meeting and for the facilities which have generously been provided, particularly the assistance of the officers of the Diplomatic Section who I understand will be present at the coming sessions.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

October 20, 1951

OPENING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOU CHAN YANG
AT THE KOREAN-JAPANESE CONFERENCE.

    I am sure we are all aware of the truly historic significance of this meeting, as we gather here to open the first conference to be held between our two nations in more than forty years. I connot avoid the feeling that the centuries of the long past are somehow looking over our shoulders. We must seek redress for the mistakes of former times and build together a program that will help the future to atone for the past.

    Nature itself placed Korea and Japan side by side on the map of the world. Geography has created ties between our two nations which nothing wrought by human hands can undo. Here we stand; only one hundred and twenty-five miles apart, close neighbors, and for that reason destined whatever we may plan or do to march on toward the future with our hopes and fears more or less intertwined.

    There are factors in our past history which are not pleasant to remember. I want to talk with you frankly about this, for frankness is the best basis for the development of honest friendship. We have no intention of presenting to you an outer mask which will conceal the true feelings in our hearts. We want to say to you exactly what is in our minds and we hope you will respond by telling us precisely what you think and feel. In this spirit, and in this spirit only, can we settle down with confidence to work out the solution of the problems that still confront us.

    I cannot say to you that we Koreans are going to wipe the past out of our minds. To say this would only be an empty form of words, for human beings are not passive slates from whose memories events may be erased.

    What I can say -- and I say it with the utmost earnestness and sincerity -- is that we are hopeful we shall be able to work out together a pattern of future relationships which will be so mutually satisfactory to out two peoples that the past will gradually fade away into insignificance.

    We have a responsibility to our own and to future generations to lay here in this Conference the beginnings of a secure foundation upon which the peoples of Korea and Japan can stand through all the years ahead on a basis of mutual confidence, trust, and respect. This task is of such importance that we must not permit ourselves to fail.

This task is of such importance that we must not permit ourselves to fail.

This would prove to be the most ironic remark in all of the opening statements made at this 1st session of the preliminary plenaray conference. Yang's attitude toward Japan -- expressed throughout the talks in undiplomatic outbursts of impatience and intolerance -- would prove to be the most intractible barrier to success in the talks.

    The years of Japanese occupation left us with problems which cannot be easily solved. From 1905 to 1945 [← Manually underlined in received copy] we were not masters of our own house and we could not build the kind of structure we desired.

1905 to 1945

The manual unscoring in the received copy was most likely made by someone on the Japan side. Yang's characterization of the Japan's "occupation" of Korea as having begun in 1905 is radical.

Japan's informal "protectorship" of the peninsula began long before Chosŏ became the Empire of Korea in 1897. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was an expression of this earlier informal protectorship.

The formal semi-protectorship began with the 1904 defense agreement the Empire of Japan made with the Empire of Korea during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which was also essentially over Korea. The 1905 diplomacy agreement marked the start of the formal full protectorship, and the 1907 domestic affairs agreement gave Japan supervisory authority and advisory privileges over some of Korea's domestic affairs.

Japan did not annex Korea -- from which point Korea lost its sovereignty and became Chōsen, an integral part of Japan -- until 1910.

Japan discharged its protetorship responsibilities through the Residence-General of Korea (RGK) from 1906. After the annexation, this office became the Government-General of Chosen (GGC), which as its name implied governed Chōsen as a legal territory within Japan's sovereign dominionn, in the same manner as Taiwan was governed by the Government-Genera of Taiwan (GGT).

Our economic processes were tied closely and inexorably into those of Japan and were made to serve as subsidiaries to Japanese development. As a result, our industrial development was unhealthy and was so devised that it should not be able to stand alone.

    Similarly, during all those years our own people were barred from technical and managerial training and experience such as is indispensable to any progressive society.

    These are handicaps which now have to be overcome. The opportunities wliicn were denied to more than a full generation of our people must now be sought in fullest measure for today and for all the years ahead.

    This is the sum of the feelings of our people. Without forgetting the past, we want to live side by side with Japan as equal and sovereign neighbors in the world's community of free nations. On this basis both nations should profit and in this spirit both peoples should prosper.

    I shall not attempt to specify these questions now. But I should like to indicate that a fair and full settlement of Korea's just claims will constitute the only basis upon which we can turn from the past to contemplate together thd building of a better future.

a fair and full settlement of Korea's just claims will constitute the only basis upon which we can turn from the past to contemplate together thd building of a better future

Whether "claims" here refers to all issues, or mainly to property issues, is unclear. Either way, this statement seems to imply that a "fair and full settlement" of its "just claims" was a prerequisite to normalization. In the end, ROK refused to sign completed legal status and vessels agreements because Japan was resisting its property claims and rejecting its unilateral adoption of the "Rhee Line" in lieu of the "MacArthur Line" which in effect defined the territorial waters of the two countries.

ROK's position on nationality was from the start incompatible with Japan's, and very early in the talks, "nationality" became a non-issue. ROK had in fact agreed to negotiate nationality and legal status only in order to be able to secure -- on its own terms -- settlements over fishing, property, and other issues it considered of paramount importance.

    The period which lies immediately ahead will demonstrate irrevocably the direction in which the peoples of Asia shall go. The choice is between the new fair play of democracy and the old self-seeking militarism. The question we and all other Asian nations must ask is whether Japan has fully and without reservation accepted the necessity and desirability of dwelling beside us in equal partnership and with mutual respect and safeguards for the welfare of us all. There can be no special advantages, no favored people in the time that lies ahead.

    The problem of supporting our various populations on a decent standard of living is a problem for all of us alike, and no nation can have priority in its solution. Japan needs markets; so does Korea. Japan needs access to raw materials; so do we. Japan needs further industrialisation to support its population; and so does Korea. These are serious problems. But an even more pressing one has arisen.

    The real challenge of today is the threat of Communist aggression. In Asia Korea is the key battleground on which that threat is being met and on which it must be defeated. On our soil is being fought the battle that may, and indeed that must, result in winning the war for all the free peoples of the Far East. Ours is the exposed outpost upon which the heaviest blows are falling, and from which the enemy can and must be turned back before he strikes further into other free lands.

    In any military arrangements that are made for Asia and the Far East, this key fact must be taken into account. Our nation is paying a fearful price in suffering, destruction and death to stand as a bulwark against further Communist advance. Under these circumstances we cannot be indifferent to the Communist Party in Japan, nor can we deny that it worries us somewhat. For we all know that international communism is one vast subversive machine, obeying one master, and threatening all free men everywhere.

    When the challenge came to us, we chose the side of freedom, even though the cost was immeasurably great, and on that ground we proudly stand. We do not intend to deviate from the role of sovereign responsibility which we have assumed at so tragic a price.

    So, to our confreres [= colleagues, peers] the Japanese, we should like to say: We have never in our long history attacked you. We do not intend to do so. You have attacked and against our will engulfed us.

Both of our nations have entered within this present generation into great wars. Your was to submerge freedom, ours was to preserve it. These are significant factors which cannot be ignored. To refrain from stating them might seem to be more gracious and polite. But as a physician I have long known that enclosed and covered sores are the ones that fester most dangerously. And even a limited experience in diplomacy has served to teach me that the same is true in the relations of nations.

But as a physician I have long known that enclosed and covered sores are the ones that fester most dangerously. And even a limited experience in diplomacy has served to teach me that the same is true in the relations of nations.

This very apt remark -- following a simple statement to the effect that the rivalries between China, Russia, and Japan had not been kind to Korea, and the past half century had been particularly difficult for Koreans with a sense of national pride -- would have been far more effective in the present diplomatic setting than Yang's long diatribe.

    Let us not deceive; let us not pretend. We cannot avoid a certain amount of reserve until we may be positively assured that the past is not to be repeated in the future.

    But we have no desire to live with backward vision. The hope for both of our peoples is that a new constructiveness and mutuality of interests may replace the antagonisms and injustices of the past. The opportunity presented by this conference must not be minimized nor missed. Let us strive together here to lay a sound foundation by first solving the accumulated problems that confront us and on that ground to build new confidence and new trust.

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22 October 1951 Burying hatchets, real and imaginary

ROK's Yang: "said . . . the "hatchet should be buried""

Japan's Chiba: "questioned only "whether there was a hatchet to bury""

Japan's Chiba: "logically . . . Koreans . . . should lose Japanese nationality and gain Korean nationality . . . would [ROK] take on full responsibility for Koreans resident in Japan if they lose their Japanese nationality?"

ROK's Yang: "even including Communists . . . some [Koreans in America] chose India rather than Korea as a destination for their deportation . . . there may be some Korean residents who desired to retain Japanese nationality"

The 2nd preliminary plenary session of 22 October 1951 marked the start of actual talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea. At these talks, we see the sort of give and take that would lead to an agreement over general principles of nationality and status by the end of the year.

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (JPN 3-63: 33-40). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

A few letters along the left margin of the scans of the received text are missing. I have shown plausible reconstructions in [uncolored square brackets].

RECORD OP PROCEEDINGS
October 22, 1951

    The delegates assembled at the conference table at 10:07. Ambassador [Yang] opend [sic = opened] the discussion by referring to the unsettled question of chairmanship for the meeting. He suggested the establishment of a chairman as a position which would be rotated between the two delegations. He asked the Japanese delegation as "hosts" to accept the chair for the first meeting and to determine a plan of rotation. Mr. Chiba replied by asking whether it had been established as the sense of the meeting that a chairman was needed. He suggested instead that both sides designate spokesmen who would carry on the discussions for their Governments without the formal regulation of a chairman.

    Ambassador Yang suggested that there might be matters such as voting which would require the chairman's regulation but indicated that if the Japanese delegation had firm objections to the establishment of a chair he would be willing to agree not to have one. Mr. Chiba suggested that the meetings start without a chairman as a matter of trial with the understanding that a rotating system could be established if the necessity became clear.

    This understanding was agreed upon and Mr. Chiba asked Dr. Yang if he would care to open the discussion of subjects. Dr. Yang replied with a statement which he indicated was a personal expression of his views. He said that he felt the success of the conference depended upon an attitude of frankness and sincerity, that the "hatchet should be buried" in order to make a lasting basis for understanding between the peoples of Korea and Japan.

Yang said the "hatchet should be buried"
Chiba questioned only "whether there was a hatchet to bury"

This is a good example of how mixing metaphors can be dangerous. Yang is suggesting that "The time had come for ROK and Japan to make peace. Later (see below), Chiba rhetorically asked, "Were we at war?"

The answer, of course, was no. The two states were not settling disputes following an end to hostilities.

Yang shared Rhee's position that ROK's roots went back to the Provision Government of Korea (PGK) in exile, which had declared war against Japan. Japan, however, viewed ROK as a postwar entity which had become the successor state of half of Japan's former territory of Chōsen.

On other ocassions during the talks as well, the Korea side used metaphors that gave the Japan side the impression ROK thought it was negotiating a peace treaty with Japan, rather than a treaty to establish normal diplomatic relations. none of which were related to settling disputes following an end to hostilities between the two states.

    He then proposed an agenda for the talks, as follows:

1. Organization of the conference. [sic]

2. Adoption of agenda

a. Legal status of Koreans in Japan
b. Execution of SCAP's note dated 10 Sept 1951
c. Development of agenda and ways and means for the future negotiation

3. Ad hoc matter [sic]

SCAP's note dated 10 Sept 1951

This refers to a DS/SCAP memorandum to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan dated 10 September 1951, and SCAPIN-2168 to the Government of Japan dated 11 September 1951, both of which concerned the return to Korea of certain Korean vessels then being operated by Japanese companies.

A subcommittee to the ROK-Japan talks was convened from 30 October 1951 to work out an agreement concerning the vessels. The vessels agreement, like the status agreement, was ready to sign in April 1952. But like the status agreement, it would become a victim of the termination of the talks on 25 April 1952. And the return of the vessels would continue to be a bone of contention when the talks resumed in 1953.

See SCAPIN-2168 following the minutes of this 2nd meeting for transcriptions of both the memorandum and the SCAPIN.

    Dr. Karl explained that the inclusion of Item 2b resulted in the time limitation placed by SCAP upon action with respect to those vessels to be returned to Korea and hoped the Japanese would not object to its inclusion in the agenda. Mr. Chiba asked for time for the Japanese delegation to consult among themselves.

    After a few minutes delay for consultation, Mr. Chiba replied that the Japanese delegation was prepared to meet squarely with the representatives of Korea and asked for reciprocal sincerity on the Korean part. In what he described as a personal statement, he agreed entirely with Dr. Yang's expression concerning the success of the conference and questioned only "whether there was a hatchet to bury".

    With regard to the proposed agenda, Mr. Chiba indicated that it was the Japanese understanding that only two general subjects would be discussed:

1. The legal status of Koreans resident in Japan; and

2. Agenda as well as ways and means for the solution of outstanding problems between Korea and Japan.

    Because of this, he was not prepared, at the moment, to discuss at this table the question of those ships referred to by the Korean delegation. He said the Japanese Government understood that the Korean Diplomatic [Miss]ion in Japan was charged with the responsibility for this action and felt that the matter should be handled on that level. However, he was prepared to ask his Government for instructions concerning that point. Dr. Yqng replied by indicating that he thought it well to discuss the question of ships at this table because of the time limit involved. Mr. Chiba replied that, in that instance, it should be included under Item 2c. Dr. Karl stated that only eighteen days remained for discussion of these ships and that inclusion under Item 2c might delay the action beyond the time limitation.

    In that instance, Mr. Chiba suggested that it be discussed on a separate basis, perhaps by the same members, but not as an element of these talks.

Dr. Karl agreed that this would be a wise procedure and said that "other members" of the delegations could discuss it possibly in another place.

    Mr. Chiba asked if it was the intent that the ships should be discussed before the question of legal Status. Then Dr. Karl replied firmly in the negative and indicated that perhaps the matter could be taken up simultaneously with the discussion of nationality, but by other representatives meeting elsewhere. Mr. Chiba felt that this could be worked out after discussions with SCAP and with his Government.

    Mr. Chiba then indicated that this constituted his reply to Dr. Yang's initial statement and, if it was satisfactory, his Government [wa]s prepared to go into the question of nationality. Dr. Yang asked him [t]o proceed.

    Mr. Chiba stated that at the outset his Government wished to propose, as a general principle, that by Article II of the Japanese Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers, Japan recognizes the independence of Korea and that it logically follows that those Koreans resident in Japan should lose Japanese nationality and gain Korean nationality. In implementing this principle, however, his Government was faced with serious practical considerations. The first of these was the question of what Government would be responsible for the protection of these Koreans in such matters [as] courts of law. He indicated that this was no reflection on the competence of the Republic of Korea, that all of Japan's sympathies are with the Republic of Korea and that it is Japan's sincere hope that Korea will some day be united. However, Japan can not ignore the fact that there are two Governments in the territory of Korea and that Japanese information was that the loyalties of those Koreans resident in Japan were not necessarily united.

it logically follows that those Koreans resident in Japan should lose Japanese nationality and gain Korean nationality

would [ROK] take on full responsibility for Koreans resident in Japan if they lose their Japanese nationality?

there may be some Korean residents who desired to retain Japanese nationality

The logic is simply that an individual's Japanese nationality derives from membership in a household register affiliated with a municipality within Japan's sovereign dominion. Japan regarded the loss of its nationality by Chosenese and Taiwanese as a natural legal effect of its loss of Chōsen and Taiwan under the terms of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty. Whether Chosenese and/or Taiwanese who stood to lose Japan's nationality might be given an opportunity to choose to remain Japanese nationals was another matter -- one that would hinge entirely on whether Japan and ROK, or Japan and ROC, chose to include a choice option in a bilateral treaty or agreement.

It is clear from these minutes -- and there are indications elsewhere -- that Japan had not entirely ruled out the possibility that provisions might be made for a choice of nationality. This in no way contradicted the logic of Koreans losing Japan's nationality concomitant with the effecutation of the Peace Treaty. It meant only that, predicated on their loss of Japan's nationality, Koreans who might wish to continue to be Japanese could -- pending a bilateral agreement to such a effect -- be given an opportunity to establish a household register in Japan.

the question of what Government would be responsible for the protection of these Koreans

Japan can not ignore the fact that there are two Governments in the territory of Korea and that Japanese information was that the loyalties of those Koreans resident in Japan were not necessarily united

Japan made a clear distinction between the sort of ideological "recognition politics" on which ROK was basing its argument, and the "real politics" of actual control and jurisdiction. Taiwan posed no problem, because it was entirely under the control and jurisdiction of the Republic of China (ROC), which claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China -- nevermind the fact that the ROC government was in Taiwan because it had been forced to flee the continuent and abandoned all other Chinese provinces to the control and jurisdiction of the People's Republic China (PRC).

ROK, however, had never legitimately had control and jurisdiction over the provinces of "Korea" (Chōsen) north of the 38th parallel, which like it or not -- and despite United Nations proclamations about ROK's being the sole legal government on the peninsula -- were part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). During parts of the Korean war, physical control of the territory shifted with the battle line, but at the time, United Nations forces, including the armies of ROK and the United States, were under orders not to attempt to militarily capture the northern provinces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This frustrated Syngman Rhee and other Korean leaders who wanted to do what MacArthur wanted to do and almost succeeded in doing -- i.e., drive DPRK's and PRC's military forces across the Yalu river into China, thereby unifying the peninsular under ROK.

Japan was not about to alienate Koreans in Japan who supported DPRK, and therefore -- while nominally recognizing Koreans in Japan as ROK's nationals -- stopped short of treating them as ROK nationals unless, when it because possible to do so, they voluntarily registered as ROK's nationals with an ROK agency in Japan.

    In view of the foregoing, his Government had two questions to ask:

  1. Could it be assumed that the Republic of Korea would take on full responsibility for Koreans resident in Japan if they lose their Japanese nationality?
  2. Could the Japanese Government be informed if the Korean Government had any plans in preparation for the assumption of this responsibility?

    Dr. Yang replied by reviewing Mr. Chiba's statement of the loss of nationality upon ratification of the Peace Treaty and of the existence of two Governments in Korea. However, he pointed out that one was a puppet Government of the North under Communist domination, and that his Government was recognized by the United Nations as the Republic of Korea, without territorial limitations. He indicated that the Peace Treaty mentions "the Republic of Korea" and that he was certain Japan did not intend to recognize the puppet Government but rather the Republic of Korea which is recognized by the United Nations.

    Turning to the substance of Mr. Chiba^s questions, he answered that the Republic of Korea is willing to assume full responsibility for all Koreans resident in Japan, even including Communists. With reference to the Communists, he indicated that there were only a small minority who were very noisy.

    With regard to plans toward the assumption of this responsibility, he stated that it was his personal intention to go among the Korean Nationals in Japan impressing upon them that they must become not only good Koreans but also good residents of Japan by full cooperation with the Government of Japan and obedience to its laws.

    Once the nationality had been definitely established, Dr. Yang expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would recognize the "full responsibility of the Republic of Korea for its nationals". [In] particular, he suggested that any disturbance by Communist elements should receive "full justice" and that any "drastic action" should be worked out with the Republic of Korea.

    In working on this problem of nationality, Dr. Yang suggested the establishment of a committee to be composed of men intimately acquainted with the problem, which committee would report back to the plenary session of delegates with recommended action.

    In reply to Dr. Yang's statement, Mr. Chiba asked first that it be noted for the record that the Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers [doe]s not make particular reference to the Republic of Korea, but uses consistently the word "Korea". Mr. Chiba indicated that this wording would have no effect upon his Government's political decisions, but that it was a matter of legal terminology. He then referred to newspaper reports concerning an interpellation in the Diet during the course of which the Japanese Government stated it would "undoubtedly recognize the Republic of Korea".

uses consistently the word "Korea"
a matter of legal terminology

Chiba's qualification of Yang's remark is correct. The San Francisco Peace Treaty mentioned neither ROC nor ROK -- nor could it have, given the different reasons neither state was a party to the treaty. In the treaty, "China" and "Korea" are entities unto themselves. Japan's term in the treaty for "China" is 中国 (Chūgoku), in reference to what had been the Republic of China, but had become both ROC and PRC. Its term for "Korea" was 朝鮮 (Chōsen), referring to the peninsular territory that the Allied Powers had liberated as "Korea" -- which had become ROK and DPRK.

Japan's legal term for the peninsula regarded as its former territory continues to be "Chōsen". And Koreans in Japan who are part of the postwar legacy population and their Japan-born descendants -- who have not yet registered as ROK nationals or acquired another nationality -- continue to be classified as affilates of "Chōsen", and in this sense remain "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人) or "Chosenese".

    He [Mr. Chiba] went on to state that he was very happy to learn that the Republic of Korea would assume responsibility for all Koreans resident in Japan and that he was particularly happy to know that Dr. Yang was personally going to look into the matter during his stay in Japan. He felt that this action would be of great merit in easing the problem.

    With respect to Dr. Yang's request for "full Justice" in the treatment of Koreans resident in Japan, Mr. Ghiba gave assurance that his Government was fully prepared to accord to Koreans all those privileges given to other aliens in Japan. With regard to Dr. Yang's request that t[he] Japanese Government confer with the Republic of Korea concerning [d]rastic action he indicated that in specific cases his Government would be prepared to talk on these problems but trusted that Dr. Yang had not intended to extend such consultation to matters which the Japanese Government feels to be internal problems.

    As a preliminary explanation of his views, Mr. Chiba felt that it would be profitable to exchange information on the nationality problem through a joint consnittee of the type suggested by Dr. Yang but that he would have to refer the matter to his Government for instructions.

    Dr. Yang said that he intended to appoint a committee of six to study the nationality problems and hoped that the Japanese Government could appoint a similar group so that the conference would have the benefit of the greatest amount of information available on the subject. As an example, he indicated that there may be some Korean residents who desired to retain Japanese nationality and he would wish to be informed of their attitude before taking action.

there may be some Korean residents who desired to retain Japanese nationality

It is not clear that Yang, or members of the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, or anyone in the Japanese government, every conducted a survey among Koreans in Japan as to what their attitudes were toward "nationality" and whether, if given a choice, some might have opted to abandon their household register in "Korea" (Chōsen) in favor of establishing a register in Japan, and thereby continue to be Japanese.

    He expressed his gratitude to Mr. Chiba for the statement that full justice would be accorded Korean residents in the same measure as all other alien residents of Japan. He was also grateful for the statement concerning consultation upon action involving Korean residents and assured Mr. Chiba that his Government did not intend to interfere in internal problems of the Japanese Government.

    He went on to cite the example of consultation afforded his Embassy in Washington by the Government of the United States with respect to certain Koreans resident in the United States who caused disturbances there. He stated that some of these desired to exercise an option [gr]anted them under United States deportation laws which provides for the choice of a country to which they could be deported and indicated that some of these people chose India rather than Korea as a destination for their deportation. He suggested that consultation in matters such as this might be helpful to both Governments.

some of these people chose India rather than Korea as a destination for their deportation

India, of course, would have had to agree to receive such Koreans.

    Mr. Chiba stated that he understood the Korean Government's desires and would convey them to his Government. He proposed, if there were no further business, that the meeting be adjourned and that the next meeting be concerned with the details of nationality such as definitions of Korean [res]idents and other technical matters. He stated that he would be able to give a reply before the end of the day concerning the proposals for a committee to study the problems and suggested that the plenary group tentatively agree to reassemble on Wednesday.

definitions of Korean [res]idents and other technical matters

A technical matter indeed. Contrary to the popular use of "Koreans in Japan" to refer to everyone in Japan who is regarded as "Korean" for any plausible reason -- nationality, status of residence, or putative race -- Japan and ROK were negotiating the nationality and legal status of people (1) were Japanese by nationality and (2) Chosenese by regional household register status, and who (3) had been residing continously in prefectures of Occupied Japan from the day hostilities ended. For technical (i.e., legal) reasons, Japan prefered the day it formally surrendered and the Occupation began.

    Dr. Karl asked whether the answer concerning the committee on the return of vessels to Korea could be made within the day. Mr Chiba thought it could be done and agreed to advise Korean delegates through the Korean Mission at a later hour.

     After a discussion of matters to be conveyed to the press, the meeting adjourned at 11:38 A.M.

W. H. Sullivan
Observer

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10 September 1951 DS/SCAP memorandum to KDMJ

11 September 1951 SCAPIN-2168 on "Registered Korean Vessels"

The 10 September 1951 DS/SCAP memorandum to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and the 11 September 1951 SCAPIN-2168 to the Government of Japan, concerned the return to Korea of certain Korean vessels then being operated by Japanese companies.

A subcommittee to the ROK-Japan talks was convened from 30 October 1951 to work out an agreement concerning the vessels. The vessels agreement, like the status agreement, was ready to sign in April 1952. But like the status agreement, it would become a victim of the termination of the talks on 25 April 1952. And the return of the vessels would continue to be a bone of contention when the talks resumed in 1953.

Source and markup

The following texts are reformatted and edited cuts and pastes from uncorrected electronic adaptations of copies of the original documents in ROK archives, as posted by 동북아역사재단 -- 東北亜歴史財団 North East Asia History Foundation (NAHF) through its resources on 예비회담 -- 韓日会談 ROK-Japan talks. See ROK and Japan archives for particulars.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

Diplomatic Section

    The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Korean Diplomatic Mission is Japan and has the honor to refer to the latter's note of August 10, 1951 and to previous correspondence between the Mission and this Headquarters concerning the return to Korea of certain vessels now in Japanese curtody.

    In review of the terms of the Korean Vesting Decree issued by the United States Military Government in Korea, this Headquarters has determined that those vessels which were of Korean registry on August 9, 1945 rightfully fell within the scope of the Korean Vesting Decree and were thereby included in those assets transferred by the United States Army Military Government in Korea to the Republic of Korea by times of the Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea on Initial Financial and Property Settlement, of September 11, 1948.

    Consequently, the Japanese Government has been instructed as of this date of deliver, in an "as is where is" condition, these vessels and the ownership thereof to the Mission for the Republic of Korea.

    This action is not intended to prejudice or exclude any other claims which the Republic of Korea may desire to make against Japan in respect of vessels alleged to have been in Korean waters on or about August 9, 1945. However, it should be understood that any such claims will have to be made directly against the Japanese Government at an appropriate date.

It is suggested that the Mission undertake to make arrangements directly with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to effect transfer of title to vessels mentioned above. Such arrangements should be commenced within sixty days from this date.

Tokyo, September 10, 1951

To the Korean Diplomatic Mission, Tokyo


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

11 September 1951
AG 560 (7Sop 51) CPC/OD
SCAPIN-2168

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
SUBJECT: Korean Registered Vessels

    1. The Japanese Government is directed to return immediately to the Government of the Republic of Korea all vessels which were registered in Korea as of 9 August 1945. This action is required notwithstanding previous memoranda from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers which approved reorganization plans of Japanese companies in possession of certain of these Korean registered vessels at the time.

    2. The vessels are to be delivered in Japan, "where is" and "as is" to the authorized representative of the Government of the Republic of Korea. A formal receipt, copy of which is enclosed, is to be executed at the time of delivery. The Japanese Government will communicated with the Korean Diplomatic Mission and make arrangements for the delivery of the vessels and the signing of the restoration receipt.

"where is" and "as is"

The "where is, as is" stipulation was to make sure that the Japanese government instructed the companies not to strip or otherwise damage the vessels, which they were to return to the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan from the ports, and in the condition, they were in at the time.

    3. Two copies of the properly executed receipt will be submitted to the Office of the Civil Property Custodian, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers within three (3) days after. delivery of the vessels.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER
C.C.B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
Incl
Receipt (For addressee only)

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25 October 1951 Japan puts three cards on the table

By 1951, before the beginning of the negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers that led to the drafting and signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 August that year, Japan was aware that it would have to negotiate a normalization treaty and status agreement directly with the Republic of Korea (ROK). By the time it signed the Peace Treaty, Japan was also fully aware that a conventional treaty with ROK would not be possible.

ROK had not been qualified to be a party to the Peace Treaty. The treaty confirmed that Japan had abandoned all claims to "Korea" (Chōsen), but it didn't -- because it couldn't -- designate a successor state. ROK could claim that it was the successor state, and that the United Nations had recognized it as the only lawful government on the peninsula. But it could not claim to have control and jurisdiction over the "Korea" that constituted the former Japanese territory of "Chōsen". And this posed a practical as well as a legal problem for Japan, since numerous "Koreans" (Chosenese) in Japan claimed to support the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the provinces north of the 38th parallel of latitude.

Long before the SCAP-brokered talks between Japan and ROK began on 20 October 1951, ROK was aware that Japan would (1) regard Chosenese (and Taiwanese) in Japan as having lost their Japanese nationality on the day the terms of the Peace Treaty came into effect, and (2) from that day, they would become aliens, and (3) as aliens be able to naturalize if they wished to become Japanese again. Japan formally informed ROK of these three basic principles on 25 October, at the 4th conference in the talks (see transcription of proposal below).

SCAP, representing the Allied Powers, had determined, before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, that Japan and ROK would have to negotiate their own settlements, and after the conclusion of the treaty SCAP had no choice but to leave the determination of the nationality of Koreans in Japan to ROK and Japan. Japan's 3 principles were both uncontested and incontestable -- mainly because they constituted a legal solution, through Japan's domestic laws, to differences in ROK's and Japan's (and SCAP's) legal contentions about the nationality status of Koreans in Japan prior to and after Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers.

Japan (and SCAP) considered Koreans in Japan to still be Japanese at the time ROK and Japan began negotiating the future status of Koreans in Japan on 20 October 1951. ROK considered them to have already lost Japan's nationality -- if ever they could be said to have truly possessed it. ROK had already ruled out the application of conventional nationality choice provisions, and Japan as well understood that conventional provisions would not have worked without ROK's reciprocity.

The first of several conferences were devoted to determining an agenda and procedures for subsequent conferences. The status and treatment of Koreans in Japan would be given first priority, hence a status agreement would be negotiated in a sub-committee dedicated to nationality, permanent residence, deportation, and other related issues. Japan's proposal, as embedded in the following record of the proceedings of the 25 October 1951 meeting, was made before the 1st session of the Legal Status Subcommittee on 30 October 1951.

25 October 1951 Japan puts three cards on the table
Koreans in Japan, qualified by household register status,
would lose Japanese nationality but be able to naturalize

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (JPN 3-63: 60-67; KRN 77: 87, NKBK 77: 28). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
October 25, 1951

    The delegates assembled at the. conference table at 10:03 a.m. Dr. Yang asked Mr. Chiba if he would care to open the discussion. Mr. Chiba agreed and opened his comments with the Japanese Government's proposal related to those discussion [sic = discussions] concerned with the transfer of ships. The Japanese Government proposes that a conference he held, commencing October 30, between representatives to be appointed by the Republic of Korea and officers designated by the Japanese Government. The subject for the conference would be as follows: "Questions Concerning Title to Vessels Pending Between Japan and Korea".

    In developing this proposal, Mr. Chiba indicated that the Japanese Government intends to appoint about five men; one from the Foreign Office, three from the Ministry of Transportation, and one from the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Transportation would be responsible for arranging the exact time and the place of the meeting.

    Dr. Yang asked if it were intended that these representatives would have the authority to make final decisions concerning these ships or whether they would merely make recommendations to be reported to this conference. Mr. Chiba replied that it was intended that these representatives be fully empowered to decide the issues involved in their talks.

    Dr. Yang indicated that although the proposal was generally acceptable to the Republic of Korea, he considered that the decisions of these representatives should be reported to this conference. Mr. Chiba asked if this referred only to the final decisions arrived at by the representatives or whether it included progress reports concerning their talks. Dr. Yang replied that he had in mind only the final decision, or the lack of final decision, accomplished by the representatives.

    After consultation with his delegation, Mr. Chiba indicated that the Japanese Government would agree to such a final report since it would be a matter of interest to this conference in its consideration of agenda. If an agreement is reached by the experts concerning the transfer of vessels, there would be no need to discuss this problem as an item of agenda for future bilateral negotiations.

    It was therefore agreed that the Japanese proposal be accepted with the condition attached by the Korean delegation and with the additional stipulation introduced by Dr. Yang that the representatives could use any language in their discussions understandable to the participants.

    Mr. Chiba then turned to the question of nationality. He referred to the previous Korean proposal that a Joint committee be established to discuss nationality questions informally apart from this conference table. Before accepting the Korean proposal in this form, Mr. Chiba indicated that the Japanese Government would prefer to arrange informal talks between those persons designated by the Korean Government and those officers of the Japanese Government familiar with the specific items of discussion.

    Dr. Yang found this proposal acceptable and suggested that it be done in the most feasible way in order to achieve the most comprehensive and satisfactory results.

    Mr. Chiba then suggested that the Korean delegation advise the Japanese Government exactly what particulars they wished to discuss in order that arrangements could be made to introduce the proper persons into the discussions.

    Dr. Yang thought this could be done and requested that the Japanese delegation likewise indicate the items which they considered it desirable to discuss.

    Mr. Chiba stated that it was his understanding that the representatives in these informal talks should be more or less concerned with fact-finding. Such facts would then be made available to their governments and would be helpful in future negotiations. Considering that as a separate proposal, he felt that the pinciples concerning nationality could be discussed directly by this conference simultaneously with the informal fact-finding talks. Specifically, he considered that the principles concerning nationality could be brought under consideration immediately.

    Dr. Yang asked if it were meant by this proposal that the principles concerning nationality should be resolved before a consideration of the legal status of the Koreans could be discussed. Mr. Chiba replied that the principles of nationality embraced the legal status of Korean residents. Dr. Yang, on the other hand, replied that the legal status embraced much more and particularly concerned itself with the treatment of Koreans resident in Japan. Mr. Chiba suggested that it might be more helpful in understanding his point of view if he could introduce into the conference the principles which the Japanese Government had in mind. He handed out mimeographed sheets containing the following statements:

mimeographed sheets containing the following statements

A copy of the mimeographed handout can be found in ROK archives (KRN 77: 87, NKBK 77: 28). Sullivan reproduces the entire text of the handout, except the two lines following the 3 points, which read "Proposed by Japanese delegates on 25 Oct. 1951 / Korea - Japan Conference".

1. All Koreans in Japan shall lose the nationality of Japan and obtain the nationality of the Republic of Korea on the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

2. Whether or not an individual is a Korean resident in Japan shall be determined by the family register concerned.

3. Naturalization will be permitted in accordance with the provisions for naturalization as stipulated in the Law of Nationality in force in Japan.

the family register concerned

Whether an individual Korean in Japan qualified as a "Korean resident of Japan" for purposes of the ROK-Japan status agreement, would be determined by the individual's Chōsen family register, a copy of which -- or equivalent record of which -- was generally on file in the municipality in Japan in which the individual had legally registered as a resident. The original household registers, of course, were under the control and jurisdiction of local registrars in Chōsen, in a province in either ROK or DPRK.

In any event, the information recorded in an individual's local registration file in post-Occupation Japan would show whether the individual had been legally residing in Japan since on or before the day from which the person's status would be determined -- 9 August 1945 from ROK's point of view, 2 September 1945 from Japan's (and SCAP's) point of view. After Japan and ROK normalized their relationship -- perhaps not entirely but at least to the point at which Japan permitted an ROK legation in Japan to mediate civil status actions of Koreans in Japan who ROK recognized as its nationals -- the individual would also be able to obtain a copy of his or her household register in ROK through the ROK mission.

the Law of Nationality in force in Japan

This refers to the 1950 Nationality Law, which replaced the 1899 Nationality Law. The 1950 law, a revised version of which is still in force, requires that applicants for for permission to naturalize meet 6 general requirements. The first 5 were the same as in the 1899 law, and they are still today fairly "world standard" conditions. The 6th condition, concerning the applicant's history of advocacy of violent overthrow of the Constitution or the government established thereunder, was introduced during the Allied Occupation, largely through the influence of U.S. concerns in its own domestic laws about subversive -- especially revolutionary communist -- elements.

The 1950 Nationality Law operates in the same manner as its 1899 predecessor, in that there are no provisions for nationality acquisition or loss related to territorial transfers. Such matters are generally the subject of treaties. See 1950 Nationality Law in the "Separation and choice" article for contemporary comments on the law, and 1950 Nationality Law: One step forward, two steps backward the Japanese and English texts of the law.

    In explanation of these principles, he indicated that these were the basics proposals of the Japanese Government concerning the legal status to be established for Korean residents. He went on to say that his government felt the matter of treatment to be accorded to Korean residents was a special problem and one to be discussed separately. It was his proposal that the question of treatment should be discussed [informally] by the aforementioned representatives [Legal Status Subcommittee] meeting informally while this [preliminary plenary] conference formally considered the principles.

    Mr. Kim [Yong Shik?] indicated that he felt that the question of treatment to be a fundamental principle that needed to be discussed before firm dicision [sic = decision] was reached. Mr. Chiba agreed thatthe treatment of Korean residents was a fundamental problem but not a problem directly concerned with nationality status. He said that such questions were usually resolved in treaties of amity and commerce.

the treatment of Korean residents was a fundamental problem but not a problem directly concerned with nationality status

This is essentially true. Once there is an agreement to a "principle of nationality" -- such as whether Koreans remain Japanese, become ROK nationals, or are given a choice -- other issues follow. If the two states agree to a "principle of nationality" such as Japan had proposed in Item 1 of its 3-point proposal, then Koreans in Japan become aliens, and the question then becomes how they should be treated.

    Mr. Kim [Yong Shik?] implied that the Korean problem is a special one - a little different than the problem of other nationalities in Japan, and, although usually included in a treaty of commerce, he felt it should be, in this instance, discussed as an aspect of legal status. Mr. Chiba asked whether it was a correct understanding of the Korean position that the question of treatment should be resolved as a precedent to the determination of Korean nationality.

    Dr. Yang replied by saying that it would be well to review the situation of Koreans in Japan. He felt that all present were aware that the Koreans in Japan constitute a special problem, that their case is different from other aliens. He felt that this should be recognised in this conference and should be discussed as a matter relating to the basic problem of nationality. He cited as an example the question of permanent residence in Japan and proposed that Korean residents should not be required to apply and register for permanent residence since they were obviously already here. Such problems, he felt, were all interrelated with nationality and the discussion here should be comprehensive of such problems.

    The Japanese delegation took a few minutes to discuss among themselves. At the end of this time, Mr. Chiba asked Dr. Yang if the discussion on the treatment of Koreans would have any effect on the three principles which he had previously tabled.

    Dr. Yang replied that the Korean intention was not to limit the discussion merely to the determination of nationality but to enter into such problems as whether permanent residence would automatically be recognized, whether the ownership and protection of property could be guaranteed, and whether liberties would be supported and preserved,, or if it was the intention of the Japanese Government to deport all Korean residents immediately [after] the transfer or [sic = of] their nationality was accomplished.

>deport all Korean residents immediately [after] the transfer or [sic = of] their nationality was accomplished

Yang is either concerned about recent rumors of mass deporation -- or he understands that, in conventional treaties that make provisions for nationality choice, states reserve the right to request that any resident who chooses another state's nationality move to the other state.

Yang may also understand that the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) essentially forced people it considered "Japanese" on the basis of their possession of household registers in the prefectural Interior to "repatriate" from Korea to Occupied Japan. Japan would sometimes allude to this as though say that, if it were to reciprocate, it could compell the "repatriation" of all Koreans in Japan to the peninsula.

    Mr. Chiba agreed that these problems should be discussed but felt they should have no effect upon the three principles which the Japanese Government had introduced. It was the Japanese desire to discuss them first in this conference, and to discuss treatment of Koreans elsewhere. Dr. Yang suggested that the three principls be expanded, to include a fourth which would deal with the treatment of Koreans. Alternatively, Mr. Kim [Yong Shik?] stated it would be well to recognise that the treatment of Koreans is an element of Principle Number 1.

it would be well to recognise that the treatment of Koreans is an element of Principle Number 1

This is essentially what happened. Japan would compensate residentially qualified Koreans who lost Japanese nationality with permanent residence and continuation of certain rights and qualifications not available to general aliens.

    Dr. Yang summed up the Korean position by stating that a mere discussion of nationality would not reach the basic point. He said that the people concerned, that is the Korean residents, were more interested in the actual fact of treatment than the formal principle of nationality. He ended by saying that, "I would be, too, if I were in their position".

the people concerned, that is the Korean residents, were more interested in the actual fact of treatment than the formal principle of nationality

The problem with Yang's allegation is that many Koreans in Japan appear to have been upset by the notion that they were still "Japanese" under Japanese law. And many also seem to have felt more allegiance toward DPRK than ROK. So I would think they would have been very much interested in the "principle of nationality" that ROK and Japan would adopt to determine their nationality.

In any event, a change of nationality is also a form of "treatment". Other forms of treatment, again, would depend on nationality -- whether a national of Japan, ROK, DRPK, or another state.

    Mr. Chiba referred to the record of procedures [sic = proceedings] from Monday's [22 October 1951, 2nd] meeting and indicated that he had previously assured Dr. Yang in reply to his request for "full justice", that Korean residents would be entitled to treatment equal to that of all other aliens. He enquired whether the Korean delegation felt that these residents were entitled to something more.

    Dr. Yang replied that he felt the position of Koreans was different from that of other aliens and that they should be accorded some privileges not given to others. He felt it would be beneficial to Japan if they were treated with some slight privileges not necessarily through legislation. At any rate he felt there must be an improvement upon their present status.

    Mr. Chiba, after consultation with his delegation, indicated that discussions of these points would require the greatest care since they might establish precedents for requests from other countries.

    Dr. Yang replied that he did not think this would result since other nationals had never been in the same circumstances as the Koreans in Japan. If they were, he felt that they should also receive special treatment. He was not asking for anything impossible, only an opportunity for the pursuit of happiness, property rights and permanent residence - things which would make the Koreans better residents of Japan.

    Mr. Chiba agreed with the importance of the question, particularly in regard to the future relations between the two countries, and repeated his proposal that the representatives of the two governments, meeting informally [text missing] these problems, should handle the question. Dr. Yang stated that such a proposal would be satisfactory if the representatives in their informal talks were given a frame of reference agreed upon by this conference.

    Mr. Chiba, after consulting with his delegation, asked whether permanent residence and property rights were the only two special privileges which the Koreans sought. Dr. Yang replied that these were the main points but that there were others. He stated that Koreans in Japan have become part of the Japanese community. Residence and property rights were the principle privileges but others affecting their community existence should also be considered.

Koreans in Japan have become part of the Japanese community

This was the pretext for ROK's insistence that Japan extend "national treatment" to the "Koreans in Japan" to which a status agreement would apply. Unlike general aliens, such Koreans would be treated more like Japanese.

    Mr. Chiba said the Japanese proposal was still that these matters should be discussed by the sub-group in an informal meeting, with a study of the treatment presently accorded Koreans and of the treatment which the Japanese Government proposed subsequent to change in nationality. He felt that the Korean ideas could be presented in those discussions and some exchange of views could be worked out as a basis from which to proceed, He suggested that the Korean delegation study this proposal and that the meeting adjourn until next weak. After a short discussion concerning the resumption of the talks, it was agreed to adjourn at 11:21 A.M. with the next meeting scheduled for 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October 30th.

W. H. Sullivan
Ovserver [sic = Observer]

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29 October 1951 ROK's 7-point "nationality question" draft

This document consists of proposals concerning the nationality, status, and treatment of Koreans in Japan. It appears to have been written about a week after the start of the ROK-Japan talks on 20 October 1952. It is the most remarkable of all the documents attributable to the ROK delegation in the talks. However, I have seen no evidence that the proposals, as written, were actually made. The document has the earmarks of a draft.

ROK views of post-annexation "Korea" and "Koreans"

The proposals were made entirely from the position that (1) "Korean nationals" were never "Japanese"; (2) most "Korean residents in Japan" were brought to Japan by force; and (3) all had been struggling for "national independence".

Quasi "nationality choice" provision

The proposal includes a de facto "nationality choice" option for qualified Koreans in Japan who, according to the proposal, having lost Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect, would be permitted to naturalize within one year after the status agreement came into effect without fulfilling the requirements of the provisions for naturalization in Japan's 1950 Nationality Law.

29 October 1951 ROK nationality question proposals
Quasi "nationality choice" provision would have given Koreans in Japan
1 year within which to "naturalize" without meeting usual requirements

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 81: 42-43, NKBK 81: 23-24). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

  Proposals [of? on] the Nationality Question

1. The Government of the Republic of Korea confirms the fact that the Korean nationals who reside within the territory of Japan but who are excluded from the application of the Japanese Census Registration Law possess the nationality of the Republic of Korea.

Census Registration Law refers to Japan's Family Register Law. Korean nationals are "Koreans" defined as members of the "Korean nation" defined racioethnically -- i.e., members of the "Korean race" regardless of nationality.

2. Nationals of the Republic of Korea who have been residing in Japan from before 9 August 1945 will have the right of permanent residence in Japan ipso facto [ typed underscoring ] and without the requirement of any formality, as well as the right of exit from Japan to the Republic of Korea and to other areas.

Japanese and Korean versions of date translate "from on or before 9 August 1945". By 1965, ROK would amend this to on or before 15 August 1945, and by 1991, Japan would amend the date from on or before 2 September 1945.

3. The rights and privileges extended to Korean nationals who have been residing in Japan from before 9 August 1945 will also accrue automatically to their descendants. and to any persons whom such Korean nationals may legally marry.

Who edited the received typescript is not clear. The idea that not only descendants, but also a spouse, would acquired the same quality of alien status and treatment as an ROK national is interesting. It is also problematic. Presumably here "Korean nationals" refers to people with ROK nationality regardless of their racioethnic ancestry. Their spouse, if not also an ROK national, could be Japanese, French, Nigerian whatever. The most likely non-Korean spouse, however, would be Japanese.

4. The nationals of the Republic of Korea who have the right of permanent residence to Japan will be guaranteed the protection and security of human rights by the Japanese Government in the spirit of realizing the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and will enjoy the same rights and privileges as are or may be extended to the nationals of Japan,. including #### [ typed overstriking ] civil rights, [ manual underscoring ] ### [ typed overstriking ] property rights, and co-equal opportunities for economic activities.

5. The nationals of the Republic of Korea will be entitled to retain continuously and to dispose freely of their properties under their possession in the territory of Japan, without suffering any restrictions., [ manual insertion → ] whether they remain in Japan, return to Korea, or emigrate elsewhere. They may carry with them their movable properties of every description. No limit will be set on the kind or the quantity of [ manual insertion → ] [ or the value ? ] of the properties which may be disposed of or removed by Korean nationals under the provision set forth above. No tax or duty whatsoever will be imposed upon them in connection with the disposal or removal of such properties.

6. After consultation with the Republic of Korea, and subject to its agreement, Japan may deport any Korean national who has been duly sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for a period exceeding one year, providing that the execution of such sentence has not been suspended or revoked.

ROK generally insisted that Japan not have the right to unilaterally deport people in Japan who it considered its nationals, if they were part of the "from on or before 9 August 1945" cohort. The object of this proposal seems to be to restrict the criterion of deportability to an actual penal sentence of more than 1 year -- which in effect protects most other Koreans who would otherwise be deportable, including those unable to support themselves.

7. Any national of the Republic of Korea who ##### [ typed overstriking ] makes application for naturalization to Japan within a period of one year after the coming into ###### [ typed overstriking ] force of this convention between Korea and Japan shall acquire the nationality of Japan upon such application notwithstanding the provisions of the Nationality Law of Japan.

Quasi "nationality choice" proposal

I have no evidence that the proposals in this 29 October 1951 document were ever formally made or even informally discussed between ROK and Japan at their 1951-1952 talks. This particular proposal directly contradicts other ROK statements made about nationality -- to wit, a state's nationality is its own business -- ROK has the right to determine that Koreans in Japan are its nationals -- Japan has the right to determine the parameters and conditions of its own nationality -- hence nationality was not a suitable topic for bilateral talks about the status and treatment in Japan of people it insisted were already ROK nationals.

To have made this particular proposal would have put ROK in the position of telling Japan what to do with its nationality. Since the status agreement would enter into as a law, this proposal -- had it been a condition in the agreement -- would make the acquisition or "re-acquisition" of Japanese nationality a legal right -- not a matter of position -- hence not "naturalization" as defined in Japan's Nationality Law.

Such a provision would have been stipulated as a "transitional measure" in the supplementary provisions of the agreement. The 1-year period was consistent with European-style nationality-choice provisions.

Even if a Korean who wanted to "naturalize" under the provision had been required to submit an "application for permission to naturalize" the application could not -- taking the proposal at its word -- have been disapproved by the Minister of Justice exercising his discretionary authority. The application would have been tantamount to a "notification of nationality acquisition" according to which the notifier would acquire Japanese nationality "automatically" through the operation of the law once the notifier's qualifications were confirmed. In other words.

[ Handwritten date ] 29 Oct. '51        

[ Page 2 ]

  Objectives

    1. All Koreans resident in Japan must be recognized to be citizens of the Republic of Korea.

Chief grounds: ROK is recognized by UN as "Only lawful government" in Korea. Japanese recognition of north Korean regime would be an unfriendly act toward ROK.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) was then at war with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both states claimed to represent the same territory and people but the United Nations then recognized only ROK. The UN simultaneously admitted to the two countries in 1991 as independent state entities representing separate territories and separate peoples. Today Japan is free to recognize DPRK on a par with ROK. The relationship between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) developed differently. PRC replaced ROC as "China" in the United Nations in 1971, and Japan switched its "China" recognition from ROC to PRC in 1972. PRC considers Taiwan its province and does not recognize the right of "Taiwan" to succeed as an independent entity. There would be repercussions if the United Nations were to re-admit ROC as a state, and were Japan to re-recognize ROC as other than a non-state entity.

    2. All Koreans resident in Japan must be assured of right of continuing residence as "friendly aliens".

Chief grounds: Large proportion were brought to Japan as compulsory laborers. Many have lived here a decade or more, severing their natural economic ties with Korea, and establishing their natural homes here. Since they came to Japan while a special relationship existed between the two countries, it is proper that they be allowed to remain her under special arrangements.

The logic of "friendly alien" is certainly odd. In one breath, ROK has insisted that recognition of DPRK would constitute an "unfriendly act". In the next breath, it is hoping that Japan will treat Koreans in Japan as "friendly aliens" -- presumably even the majority who are appear to be siding with DPRK. The use of here and came signify a point of view from within Japan. The Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan was based in Tokyo, and the subjects are Koreans in Japan. Of interest here, though, is the acknowledgement that Japan had become the "natural home" of many Koreans in Japan. Though Korea might be the "homeland" of Koreans in Japan in the perverse racioethnic sense of the word, it was not necessarily their "natural home". The ROK delegation was not advocating that they "return" to the peninsula. It was hoping they would remain in Japan.

    3. Koreans resident in Japan should be freed from the necessity of paying fees for alien registration.

Chief grounds: same as those cited for 2, above.

    4. Koreans resident in Japan should be allowed to take their property from Japan without payment of any export tax and without restrictions on the kinds or amount of such property.

Chief grounds: the property is their's [sic], acquired under competitive conditions unusually disadvantageous to them. Although not Japanese, and in fact struggling against Japan to regain their national independence, they nevertheless were subject to all the heavy war taxes levied by Japan.

The writer is insistent that "Koreans resident in Japan" were not really Japanese, and appears to believe that -- as Koreans -- they must have been collectively struggling to regain their "national independence".

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30 October 1951 MOFA Immigration Control Order press release

The 5th of the 10 sessions of the 1951 preliminary plenary talks convened on the morning of 30 October 1951. At this session, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan essentially agreed to an agenda and subcommittee procedures. The conference began at 10:20 that morning -- 20 minutes late on account of delays in the arrival of the Japanese delegation. The conference adjourned at 11:10, and sub-committee meetings briefly convened from 11:20.

The plenary session agreed to release two press statements. One, from the Japanese government, was intended to dispell rumors that Koreans in Japan were about to be treated as aliens subject to deporation, under the provisions of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order, which would come into effect 2 days hence, on 1 November 1951. The other, from Ambassador Yang, concerned progress being made in the discussions on the future status of Koreans in Japan.

MOFA Immigration Control Order press release

As agreed to in the 5th meeting of the preliminary plenary conference on the morning of 30 October 1951, later that day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following press statement on the Immigration Control Order that would come into force in 2 days.

30 October 1951 MOFA Immigration Control Order press release
Control Order will not immediately apply to Korean residents
Japanese Government does not intend to limit unreasonably
the peaceful and orderly residence of law-abiding aliens

Source and markup

The following texts are reformatted transcriptions of scans of copies of the Japanese and English versions of the MOFA press releases in MOFA's archives (Japanese JPN 3-63: 79, English JPN 3-63: 78 Annex "A", 80 "Press Release"). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

English version of 30 October 1951 Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release

Press Release

Public Information Division
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1951

STATEMENT ON JAPANESE-KOREAN TALKS

    The Chief of the Public Information Division, Mr. Akira Miyazaki, today issued the following statement on the Japanese-Korean talks which are now in progress in Tokyo:

    "There appears to be some misunderstanding in certain quarters as to the object of the conversations now going on between representatives of the Japanese Government and the Republic of Korea, in particular as regards the publication of the Cabinet Order for Immigration Control from November 1st.

    "In view of the fact that questions relating to the nationality and residence of Koreans in Japan are being discussed in these conversations, it should be made clear that the above-mentioned Cabinet Order will not immediately become applicable to Korean residents. In this connection, the Japanese Government desires it to be understood that it does not intend to limit unreasonably the peaceful and orderly residence of

the publication of the Cabinet Order for Immigration Control from November 1st

Government Order No. 319 was "published" and thereby "promulgated" on 4 October 1951. It would "come into effect" or "be enforced" from 1 November 1951.

The term in the Japanese version is "jisshi" (実施), meaning to "implement" or "enforce" and the like.

will not immediately become applicable to Korean residents

This -- and the equivalent expression in the Japanese version -- imply that application of the Immigration Control Order is -- if not imminent -- just a matter of time. In other words, Koreans in Japan would eventually lose Japan's nationality -- not that many thought of themselves as Japanese.

law-abiding aliens

This -- and the Japanese version meaning "good aliens" (善良な外国人 zenryō-na gaikokujin") -- is an undisguised warning that "bad" aliens have something to worry about if they hope to find a secure future in Japan under the Christmas tree.

Japanese version

Structural English translation

昭和二十六年十月三十日
外 務 省 情 報 部

情 報 部 談

  目下進行中の日韓会談の内容、特に十一月一日実施の出入国管理令の適用について、一部に誤解がある模様であるが、右管理令は日韓会談において国籍、居住等について協議されている関係もあり直ちに在留韓国人等に適用されないのみならず、日本政府としては善良な外国人の平穏な居住を不当に制限する意図はない。

  尚日韓会談は友好 進歩中であり、従前から引続き本邦に在住する韓国人の居住その他の処遇については小委員会を設けて具体的な検討を開始することとなつた。

30 October 1951
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Department

Chief of Information Department report

  Regarding the content of the Japan-Korea Talks currently in progress, in particular the application of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order to be implemented on 1 November, it is a pattern in which [it appears that] there are some misunderstandings in part [of society], but regarding the right [above] Control Order -- there is a connection [in which] [related to the fact that] regarding nationality, residence et cetera [they] are being deliberated in the Japan-Korea talks -- and not only will [the Control Order] not immediately be applied to Koreans and others staying [in this country], but the government of Japan has no intention of unreasonably limiting the peaceful residing [in this country] of good aliens.

  Furthermore, as for the Japan-Korea Talks, they are progressing amicably, and regarding the residence and other treatment of Koreans who have from the past been continuously residing in this country, [the Japan-Korea Talks] have created a subcommittee and [it] has come to commence [has begun] a concrete examination (consideration) [of residence and other treatment].

Koreans and others staying [in this country] . . . aliens

The term "zairyū" (在留) implies the "remaining" or "staying" in a country of someone who is not affiliated with the country -- i.e., an alien sojourner. Note that, at the time, Koreans in Japan were still Japanese -- albeit they were partly alienated for purposes of the Alien Registration Order. The MOFA announcment assures Koreans that they will not be alienated under the Immigration Control Order -- at least now while they are still Japanese.

The term for "Korean" (韓国人 Kankokujin) is not the term the Japanese government would ordinarily use in such an announcment. Here the term is undoubtedly used to placate the ROK delegation, which in principle (though apparently not invariably) spoke of "Kankokujin" (韓国人) or "Kanjin" (韓人) rather than "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人) or "Senjin" (鮮人). Presumably "and others" (等 nado, tō) alludes to "Koreans" in Japan who consider themselves "Chōsenjin". No mention is made of "Taiwanjin" (台湾人), who for similar reasons were still Japanese and would not be subject to the Immigration Control Order until they became aliens.

Koreans who have from the past been continuously residing in this country

This alludes to the definition of "Koreans in Japan" as Koreans who have been continuously residing in the prefectures from on or before the end of hostilities between Japan and the Allied Powers.

Here the term for "reside" is "zaijū" (在住) rather than "kyojū" (居住). Both mean "being and living in" a particular place. The former is more general and abstract in the sense of "existing in", while the later more concretely connotes "residing in" as a matter of having settled into a residence.

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Yang's press statement on bilateral talks

Yang You Chan (梁祐燦), ROK's ambassador to the United States, who had come to Tokyo from Washington, D.C. to head ROK's delegation to the ROK-Japan talks, released the following 2-page statement to the press on the afternoon of 30 October 1951 following the 5th session of the plenary conference and the 1st session of the Legal Status Subcommittee meetings held that morning.

30 October 1951 Yang's press statement on bilateral talks
Personal status relations between nationals of ROK and Japan
would be governed by the domestic laws of the two countries

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 77: 98-99, NKBK 77: 31-32). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Statement by Ambassador You Chan YANG
For release at 3:00 p.m., Oct. 30, 1951

 Representatives of the Republic of Korea are currently meeting with the representatives of the Japanese Government to study means of ensuring full rights of Korean nationality, property protection and restoration, normal opportunities for business activities, guarantees against arbitrary deportation, and enjoyment of equal civil liberties for the Korean population in Japan.

 An agenda for the consideration of other pending problems between the two Government [sic] is also slated for discussion and is expected to be drawn up as part of the present Conference. Concurrently, a committee has been appointed to confer with Japanese spokesmen concerning the question of the return of certain ships to Korea.

 I am satisfied that the Conference is proceeding with full recognition on both sides of the importance of solving these problems and of there by (sic = thereby) laying a foundation for future, harmonious and mutually advantageous relations between the Korean and Japanese nations.

 However, for the purpose to stabilize (sic = for the purpose of stabilizing, in order to stabilize) the mutual personal status relations, involving the nationals of the two countries, it was finally agreed on the point that it would be proper for each Government to recognize the treatment of the matters concerning the personal status relations by the other Government pursuant to its national law.

personal status relations

So-called "[personal] status relations" (身分関係 mibun kankei) refer to civil statuses resulting from interpersonal "status actions" (身分行為 mibun kōi) such as alliances of marriage and adoption, as well as from dissolutions of such alliances. When Chōsen (Korea) was part of Japan, Chōsen subjects were Japanese, and so all status actions between Chosenese and other nationals of Japan -- whether subjects of Taiwan or of the prefectural Interior -- were actions between Japanese. They were "inter-territorial" rather than "inter-national" -- and were subject to applications of appropriate territorial laws.

treatment of personal status relations pursuant to national law

Since "Korea" was already no longer part of "Japan" -- or would soon no longer be part of Japan -- such personal status actions would henceforth be between people of different nationalities -- i.e., nationals of the Republic of Korea (which claims sovereignty over all of "Korea") or "Koreans" -- and nationals of Japan (reduced to the former prefectural Interior) or "Japanese". Accordingly, "personal status relations" involving Koreans and Japanese would have to be determined by relevant laws of the two countries.

Yang was reporting here that ROK and Japan had already agreed that such matters would be treated by each country in accordance with its own national -- i.e., domestic -- laws. These laws would include -- as do the domestic laws of all countries -- laws of laws that determine which country's laws in international private matters such as marriage, adoption, divorce, and inheritance and other property issues involving individuals of different nationalities. In effect,

In other words, Yang was saying that the "status issues" to be discussed and settled between the two countries in forthcoming bilateral talks would not involve issues related to "status relations" governed by domestic "private law" or "personal law" or "family law" or whatever, but would be left the realm of international private law, which is ultimately a matter of domestic law. Koreans in Japan would be subject to Japan's domestic laws -- which, under Japan's considerations of international private law, might also involve the application, by a Japanese authority or court, of ROK laws, or even of legacy Imperial Japanese Interior or Chōsen laws or ordinances. Ditto for ROK's treatment of Japanese residing in ROK -- that is, ROK would treat their private matters in accordance with its domestic laws, including provisions in its laws for the application of Japanese laws in certain matters.

The "status issues" of concern to ROK and Japan in their bilateral talks would be (1) "nationality" -- which also quickly turned out to be a "non-issue" -- and (2) the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan as resident aliens -- which became the sole status issue.

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2 November 1951 Yu vs Tanaka & Hiraga sparring match

This 3rd session of "Subcommittee on the Legal Status of Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑法的地位分科委員会) was convened at 2:18 p.m. on Friday, 2 November 1951, at the offices of the SCAP's Diplomatic Section.

The conference began with a statement by ROK chief representative Yu Jin O, who insisted that there was no "nationality problem" but only a "legal status" problem. He asserted that ROK's Nationality Law, promulgated and enforced in December 1948 as a domestic measure -- shortly after the establishing of ROK in August 1984 -- extended "personal sovereignty" to overseas Koreans in Japan.

"SCAP says treat Koreans who don't return the same as Japanese"

It couldn't be plainer. The Allied Powers are a legal entity unto themselves -- and SCAP is their chief law enforcement officer -- their sheriff -- in Occupied Japan.

2 November 1951 3rd meeting in legal status talks
Sparring over principles and technical points of law
a matter of formalities, not of political intent

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 64-89, NKBK 81: 29-34). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Note on English translation

I have translated only the state affiliations of the names of the speakers and the words attributed to them with quotation marks. I have shown the Japanese text as received -- but have generally not translated or otherwise represented -- the running commentary on who was being addressed, and whether what someone said was a proposal, rebuttal, or whatever.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

第三次会談   1951年11月2日 (金)

開会 午後2時18分 於けるDS/SCAP

出席者

日本側
代表 田中光男
委員 平賀健太
〃 今井実
参観 佐治 誠

韓国側
代表 兪鎮午
委員 金東祚
〃 洪璡基
〃 金泰東
〃 韓奎永
参観 林松本
〃 全斗銖

午後4 時46 分閉会

3rd Talk   2 November 1951 (Friday)

Convened: 2:18 p.m. at DS/SCAP

Attendees

Japan side
Representative Tanaka Mitsuo [Ministry of Foreign Affairs}
Member Hiraga Kenta [Ministry of Justice]
 " Imai Minoru
Observer Saji Makoto

ROK side
Representative Yu Jin O (Legal system office director] 1906-1987)
Member Kim Dong Jo [1918-2004]
 " Hong Chin Gi [1917-1986]
 " Kim Tae Dong
 " Han Gui Yŏng
Observer Limb Song Bon
 " Chon Gak Su

Adjourned 4:46 p.m.

Prelude to debate

ROK's chief delegate Yu Jin O stated that the only issue in ROK's eyes was how Japan would treat Overseas Koreans in Japan -- meaning Koreans who had been in the prefectures when the war ended and had continued to reside in Occupied Japan.

Yu implored Japan to treat Overseas Koreans in Japan differently from other aliens, beginning with a right of permanent residence that would extend to their descendants. ROK wanted Japan to treat them on a par with Japanese nationals -- so-called "national treatment" -- to accord them all rights guaranteed Japanese nationals by Japan's Constitution -- except, naturally, political rights or future obligations of military service.

Deportation in principle was acceptable but ROK was concerned about some of the provisions in Japan's Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Order, which had just come into force, and already applied to aliens, but not to Koreans because they were still Japanese. The deportation provisions would not apply to them until they became aliens. ROK wanted Japan to make special considerations for unemployed and impoverished Koreans. ROK would cooperate in the deportation of subversive Koreans, but only with its consent.

Japan's representative, Tanaka Mitsuo, stated that Japan could promise, in accord with the principles of international law, that after determining the nationality of Koreans in Japan, it would not effect discriminatory treatment -- it would not treat them less favorably than general aliens. Tanaka said the proposal [made by Yu] represented some fundamental issues, and Japan could not decide them alone, and Japan would raise questions and study any all points that weren't clear. He worried that, when accepting [the demands made in] this [proposal], other countries might demand of Japan most-favored-nation treatment, which would be problem [if Japan accorded Koreans in Japan national treatment].

From this point, the following debate -- mostly between Yu on and Tanaka, closely followed by Hiraga, but also other delegates on either side. I have named Hiraga rather than Tanaka in the title because he was the principal legal status spokesman for Japan.

△ わが側兪鎮午代表は、在日韓人以外の外国人は入国時外国人として入国したものだが、在日外国人で入国時に日本人としてしたと、前記の要求をできるのは台湾人の他にいないと言った。

ROK Yu: Aliens other than Koreans in Japan, are persons who, when entering the country [Japan], entered the country as aliens, but . . . no one other than Taiwanese . . . [no quotes]

△ 日本側代表田中が続けて言うには、それなら厳格な再審査が必要だというのに対して

Japan Tanaka: If so a rigorous reinvestigation is needed. [no quotes]

△ わが側兪鎮午代表は、外国人登録があるではないかと反問した。

ROK Yu: Is there not alien registration? [no quotes]

△ これに対して日本側代表が「外国人登録はひとつの標準になるだけで、在日韓人に対しては如何だろう」と言ったのに対して

Japan: "Alien registration is just one standard; what about towards Koreans in Japan?"

△ わが側兪鎮午代表は、「それは日本に入って来た人をいうことなのか? われわれは継続して居住する者を≠言う」と話した。

ROK Yu: "You're saying people who entered Japan? We're saying "those who have continuously resided [in Japan]."

△ 日本側田中代表が反問するには、「在日韓人は自由帰国だが、在韓日人は強制退去されたのに、この人たちの入国を互恵的にしてくれるのか」と言ったのに対して

Japan Tanaka: "Koreans in Japan would be free to return to [their] country [Korea], but though Japanese in Korea were [submitted to] compulsory departure, would [ROK] reciprocally [allow them again] entrance-to-the-country [ROK]?

△ 韓国側兪鎮午代表が答弁するには、「それは通商条約時の将来の問題なので、今回の会議では従来の未決の件の解決だけだ」と話した。

ROK Yu: "As that's a future problem for the time of the Commercial Treaty, at this time's conference it's [we're] just settling hitherto unsettled matters."

△ わが側金東祚代表が言及するには、「現在在韓日人は強制退去はされていないでいる」と言ったのに対して

ROK Kim Dong Jo: "At present, Japanese in Korea, compulsory departure [expulsion, deportation] is not being done."

△ 日本側代表田中は、「日本は少数民族を引き受けることになり、強制退去もできず、自国民でもない数十万の人を引き受けるのは重大な問題だ」と言った。

Japan Tanaka: "That it would come to Japan receiving [members of] a minority [racioethnic] nation [race], receiving several hundreds of thousands of people who are not its own nationals, without compulsory departure being possible, is a huge problem."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表は、「悪質者を退去させるのは良い」と言及したのに対して

ROK Yu: "It would be good to cause heinous ones to leave."

△ 日本側平賀代表「これは相互保障の問題であり原則的に同じだが、ただし土地法は相互主義を適用している」と言った。

Japan Hiraga: "This is a problem of mutual security and is in principle (essentially) the same; however, the Land Law applies the principle of mutuality."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「それも通商条約の問題で、韓国でも米国人に許可することを日本人に禁止するのではないということだ」と言ったのに対して

ROK Y: "This too is a problem of the Commercial Treaty, and there is no prohibiting of Japanese what is permitted of Americans."

△ 日本側代表田中「現在所有している財産だけを言うのか、或いは今後取得するものも言うのか」と反問したのに対して

Japan Tanaka: "Are you referring to only presently possessed assets, or to things that would be acquired after now?"

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「日本人と同一に取扱って欲しいということだ」と言った。

ROK Yu: "[I'm] saying that [we] want [you to] treat [Koreans in Japan] the same as Japanese."

△ 日本側平賀代表はこれに対して、「国籍変動時期において在日韓国民は、日本政府としては平和条約発効前までは日本国籍を持っていると考え、ただしポツダム宣言後の韓国の独立等に因って、実質的に外国人待遇をして来たし、また国際慣例もそうだ」と言及した。

Japan Hiraga: "At the time of nationality change, as for Koreans in Japan, the Japanese government considers that Koreans in Japan, until prior to the effectuation of the Peace Treaty, have Japan Nationality; however, due to the independence of the Republic of Korea after the Potsdam Declaration, [they] came to be substantially (essentially) alien treated, and international conventions are also thus."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「従来、国際慣例は終戦と一緒に平和条約が締結されるものだが、西暦一九四八年八月十五日大韓民国政府が樹立し、十二月十日韓国が唯一の合法政府に承認され、その後一九四九年一月以後米英等二十九ヶ国の正式承認を得た故に、韓国の独立は事実上ではなく法的に独立したものであり、日本とも通商海運協定が締結されているのに、在日韓僑が日本国籍なら在韓韓人も日本国籍という矛盾した結論になる」と言ったのに対して

ROK Yu: "Until now, international conventions are things in which a peace treaty is concluded together with the end of a war, but on 15 August 1948 on the western calendar the Republic of Korea government was established, and on the December 10 ROK was recognized [by the United Nations] as the sole legitimate government [on the Korean peninsula] -- and because after that since January 1949 [ROK] has gained the formal recognition of United States, Great Britain, and [in all] 29 states, ROK's independence is something independent not de facto but legally -- and since the Commerce and Navigation Agreement [between ROK and various states] was concluded with Japan as well [through SCAP's proxy] -- it comes to the contradictory conclusion that, if Overseas Koreans in Japan are [of] Japan nationality [then] Koreans in Korea also are [of] Japan nationality."

"Overseas Koreans in Japan" / "Koreans in Korea"

Yu is saying that, if those who are being defined as "Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑 Zainichi Kankyō) are, as SCAP and Japan (following SCAP) contend, then "Koreans in Korea" (在韓韓人 Zaikan Kanjin) are also Japanese -- meaning that he himself would be Japanese -- and he is certain that he is not Japanese. His argument is predicated on the assumption that it is not possible to differentiate between (1) Koreans who had remained in Japan's prefectures after the war, and (2) all other Koreans. As reflected in SCAP's policies, the Allied Powers made such a distinction. Yu simply does not want to recognize the distinction, because to recognize it would be to admit that Koreans actually did become Japanese in 1910 -- and this something which Yu and his compatriots are disputing.

△ 日本側平賀代表が言うには、「日本の平和条約条文による韓国独立の承認は条約発効時からであり、それは法的、形式的にそういうもので、実質的には出入国管理令不適用も、日本としては在日韓人が外国人ではないという理由から、条約発効前には不可能なだけでなく、また婚姻等においても法例等で別に差異がなく、形式的問題だがその時期が明確であることを要する」とした。

Japan Hiraga: Recognition of ROK's independence, pursuant to the articles of the Peace Treaty with Japan, is after treaty effectuation -- that is legally, formally so -- and substantially (essentially) the non-application of the [1951] Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order [to Koreans in Japan] -- [which as you know entered into force yesterday (1 November 1951)] -- from [for] the reason that to Japan Koreans in Japan are not aliens -- is impossible before treaty effectuation, and in marriages et cetera as well the [1898] Rules of Laws (法例 Hōrei) et cetera are not particularly different -- its a formal problem, but it is necessary that that time [i.e., the time when Japan's recognition of ROK legally begins] is clear."

"Koreans in Japan are not aliens"

Hiraga is telling Yu that Japan cannot exempt Koreans in Japan from the 1951 Immigration Control Law until it applies to them. It didn't apply to them at the time because, as Hiraga says, they are not aliens. It won't apply to them until the peace treaty comes into effect, when they will lose Japanese nationality and become aliens.

Even under the 1947 Alien Registration Order, Koreans and some Taiwanese in Japan are not formally aliens, but are only "regarded" as aliens for the purpose of the registration order.

"Rules of Laws"

This was Japan's "laws of laws" for determining applicable law in international private matters, which includes marriage, divorce, adoption, inheritance, and all manner of private affairs between people of different nationalities. The date a law comes into force, and the date of an event a law might refer to as a criterion for application, are vital to the interpretation and operation of a law. These are the sort of "technicalities" and "formalities" that legal bureaucrats, and enforcement agencies and officers, including courts, must deal with all the time.

△ これに対してわが側兪鎮午代表「原則問題だけ合意できれば、そういう技術的問題の合理的解決は容易だろう」と言った。

ROK Yu: "If [we] can agree [on] problems of principle, then a rational resolution of such technical problems will probably be easy."

△ 日本側平賀代表が続けて言うには、「昨年日本の国籍法改正で、婚姻では国籍を喪失しないと規定されているので、身分上困難な具体的な例が発生しただけでなく、今まで日本人と婚姻した韓人は日本人になったと信じて選挙権を行使したが、時期を遡及すると選挙結果にも波及、影響するが、人情にも合致するだろう」とした。

Japan Hiraga; "Last year the revision of Japan's Nationality Law, as it was provided that [one] would not lose [Japan's] nationally through marriage, not only have concrete examples of status difficulties-wise occurred, but Koreans who have married Japanese until now believing they had become Japanese have exercised suffrage rights, but if [we] were to retroact the time [that Japan formally recognized ROK], [to do so would] extend to and effect even election results, but that would probably be consistent with human feelings."

△ これに対して兪鎮午代表「技術的なことは解決可能だが、以前に話したように在日韓人の国籍が日本籍なら法律上、独立した在韓韓人も日本国籍という矛盾が発生するが、ただわれわれは日本政府が在日韓僑の取り扱いにおいて、特殊な取り扱いをしたと思う」と言った。

ROK Yu: "Technical problems are solvable, but as [I've] said before, the nationality of Koreans in Japan, if Japan status [nationality] (日本籍 Nihonseki), legally, [for] independent Koreans [i.e., Koreans in ROK] too the contradiction of Japan nationality would occur, but as for us, [we] think that the Japanese government, in the treatment of Overseas Koreans, has effected special treatment."

△ 日本側田中代表、スキャップが帰国しない韓人は日本人と同一に取扱えと言うから、日本籍だと考えたものだ」と言ったのに対して

Japan Tanaka: Because SCAP says treat Koreans who don't return [to their] country the same as Japanese, [we've] considered [them] to be [of] Japan nationality."

△ わが側洪代表「日本側の要求通りにするならば、合併条約が有効だということになるが、条約の無効化は色々な事態によるものであり、ポツダム宣言の受諾その他で、条約でなくても条約が消滅できるので、消滅したと見なければならないだろう」と言い、

ROK Hong: "Of [we] do as requested of the Japan side, it would become a matter of [recognizing that] the annexation treaty (合併条約 gappei jōyaku) having effect, but as for the invalidation of the treaty [it] is something due to various affairs -- from [the effects of Japan's] acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and other [such actions], though [the Potsdam Declaration] is not a treaty, the [annexation] treaty can vanish [lose effect], hence [we] probably ought to view [it] as having vanished [become null and void]."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表が続けて言及するには、「韓国が日本の主権から何時離脱したかを討議したが、宮澤氏の新憲法解説その他にも明瞭に九月二日になっている」とした。

ROK Yu: "We've deliberated as to when Korea separated from Japan's sovereignty (日本の主権から離脱したか Nihon no nanji shuken kara ridatsu shita ka), but in Mr. Miyazawa interpretation of the new [Japanese] Constitution and elsewhere it has lucidly become 2 September [1945] [when Japan signed the General Instrument of Surrender]."

△ これに対して日本側田中代表「スキャップの方針が台湾人に限って中国国籍を取得させ(兪鎮午代表国籍ではないと反駁した)、スキャップの占領管理下の韓人は未決定だとしたし、スキャップ占領地域外の韓人は日本の主権外であるだけでなく、別個の身分で取扱って来た」と言ったのに対して

Japan Tanaka: SCAP's policy caused the gaining of China [ROC] nationality only for Taiwanese ([ROK] representative Yu Chin O refuted that it was not nationality), and held that [the nationality of] Koreans under SCAP Occupation Control was not yet determined, and only are Koreans outside the SCAP Occupation Zone outside the sovereignty of Japan [which is presently in SCAP's hands], but came to treat [Koreans in Japan] as a separate status (別個の身分 bekko no mibun)."

△ わが側洪代表「スキャップのそんな文書はない」と反駁した。

ROK Hong [refuted]: "There is no SCAP document like that."

△ これに対して日本側平賀代表は「それは実利のない問題なので、法的形式的限界だけ立てれば良い」と言った。

Japan Hiraga: "As that is a problem without utility (practicality), it would be good if [we] form [an agreement, policy] just [within] legal and formal limits."

△ 兪鎮午代表「平和条約第二条は宣言的なのだが、スキャップとの関係を如何に見て、今まで締結して来た韓日間の諸協定を如何に考えるか」と質問したのに対して

ROK Yu: "Article 1 of the Peace Treaty [providing that Japan abandons all claims to Korea et cetera] is declaratory, but how do [you] see its relationship to SCAP, and [how] do you think about the various agreements between ROK and Japan that have come to be concluded up to now?"

△ 日本側田中代表は「降伏条約が中間にあって来るものだ」と言い、平賀代表は「平和条約発効時にしようというもので、純技術的見地から出たもので政治的意図はない」と答弁した。

Japan Tanaka: "Surrender treaty [General Instrument of Surrender] is something that comes in the middle."

Japan Hiraga: "[Our position] is [simply] to [recognize the independence of Korea] at the time of Peace Treaty effectuation, it comes from a purely technical viewpoint, there is no political intent."

△ わが側洪代表が、国籍法改正の理由を問い合わせると

ROK Hong: "If I may inquire (ask) the reasons for the Nationality Law revision . . ."

△ 日本側平賀代表「国際慣例を追っただけで、重要なことは居住権問題ではないのか」と反問したのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "It just follows international conventions -- as for what is important, is it not right of residence problem?"

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「その時期は表現しなくても可で、国内法で双方措置をすれば良い」と案文を朗読。「日本側の提案は選択権を排除しようという意図ではないか」と再度反問したのに対して

ROK Yu: "As for that that time [when Korea (we) became independent and Japan recognizes its (our) independence], not expressing it would be fine, effecting mutual measures in [our] domestic laws would be good."

△ 日本側平賀代表「身分変動は認めるが、そうだ」と言った。

Japan Hiraga: "Status changes would be recognized, [that's] so."

△ これに対してわが側兪鎮午代表「原則が決定すれば認定もできるので、技術的なことは後でしよう」と提案すると

ROK Yu [proposes]: "If principles are determined [now] recognition [finding] [a solution] is also possible, so technical matters, let's do [deal with them] later."

△ 日本側平賀代表「二重国籍、無国籍がないようにしよう」と言い

Japan Hiraga] "Let's do [it] so as there is no dual nationality, statelessness."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表、これに同意した。

ROK Yu: [I] consent to this. [Reported]

△ 日本側田中代表「国籍確立後の既得権利処理と、日本内に二種の外国人が居住することになると、会談の結論を得るのが難しいと思われるので、管理令を除いて破壊分子追放「サブバーシブ」(SUBVERSIVE)は協力するということは、確立時の問題と将来継続的な問題と区別するのがどうだろうか、また鉱業法等の権利も、現有権の認定と将来の自由とは、別個の問題だ」と言ったのに対して

Japan Tanaka: "The disposition of already-gained rights after nationality establishment, and if it comes to two kinds of aliens residing within Japan, it is thought that obtaining a solution in [these] talks] will be difficult, so as for destructive [subversive] element pursuit (破壊分子追及 hakai bunshi tsuikyū) 'sabubaashibu' (SUBVERSIVE) outside [except through] the [1951 Immigration] Control Order, as for cooperating, how about differentiating the problem of the time of [nationality] establishment, and future continuing problems? -- And rights of [under] the Mining Law et cetera too, and recognition of presently existing rights and freedom of the future, are separate problems."

△ わが側洪代表が言及するには「それは容態の問題ではなく、主体的だと思う」と言った。

ROK Hong: "That's not an problem or condition (state, circumstance), but a subjective problem, I think."

△ 日本側平賀代表「適用日時において八月九日を主張すれば、自動的に管理令が適用されるので、在留資格申請をしなければならない」と言ったのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "If [you] assert August 9 [1945] as the date of application, the [Immigration] Control Law will automatically by applied, and [Koreans in Japan] will have to do (effect), make) a status of residence application."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「国籍だけ決定するならば結局は、何等決定しないのと違いないことになる」と答弁した。

ROK Yu: "If [the date is regarded as] determining only nationality then ultimately, it becomes a matter of being no different from not determining anything."

△ これに対して日本側平賀代表「領土の変動は住所者に対して国籍を定めるのが国際慣例なのだが、平和条約だけでは在日韓人の日本籍の喪失にならないので、これをP84 決定する必要がある」と言ったのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "As for changes of territory determining the nationality toward [of] domiciled persons [in a treaty] is [a matter of] international convention, but as simply by the Peace Treaty it will not become a loss of Japan status [nationality] of Koreans in Japan, there is need to determine it."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「国籍選択権を付与すれば良い」と言った。

ROK Yu: "It would be good if [you?] [we?] give [bestow on them] a nationality choice right."

△ これに対して日本側平賀代表「それは領土の割譲時の選択権の例ではないかと思われ、在日韓僑の件は国際先例がないではないか」と反問したのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "It is that that is that not a choice right of time of cession (割譲 katsujō) of territory? -- Is the case of Overseas Koreans in Japan not [one] that has no international precedent?"

△ わが側洪代表「第一次大戦後のポーランド等を先例にすれば、日本籍を持って韓国籍を選択できるようになるではないか」と聞くと、即

ROK Hong: "If [we] take Poland et cetera after World War I as a precedent, would it not become such that [they] possess Japan status [nationality] and chose ROK status [nationality}?"

△ 田中代表「それは結局待遇問題だから、決定をしなければ無国籍者だけ出るではないか」と答弁したので

Japan Tanaka: "Because that's ultimately a treatment problem, if [we] don't determine [their nationality] will not just stateless persons appear [result]?"

△ わが側洪代表「住所主義によって日本籍を取得すれば良い」と言った。

ROK Hong: "According to the domicile doctrine (jus domicili) it would be good if they acquire Japan status [nationality]."

△ これに対して日本側平賀代表が言うには「ヨーロッパでは区分が難しいが、わが韓日間は血統で区別が明確ではないか? 平和条約第二条を如何に解釈するのか」と聞くのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "In Europe the dividing (classifying) is difficult, but between our Korea and Japan is not differentiation by blood blood line [lineage] clear? How would [you] interpret Article 2 of the Peace Treaty [providing that Japan renounce all claims to Korea}?"

△ わが側兪鎮午代表「退去の実例は米国でもごく少数ではないか」と反問

ROK Yu: "Are actual examples of leaving (departure) even in Europe not very few?"

△ これに対して日本側田中代表「わが日本側も、そんなに多数を退去させないだろうし、これは研究中の問題になり、将来二種の外国人を認めるのは難しいので、本委員会で解決する問題ではない」と答弁した。

Japan Tanaka: "Our Japan side too, probably won't cause the leaving (departure) of [expel] that many."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表、外国人の地位に関して「これは通商条約によって変動するのではないか?」と聞いたのに対して

ROK Yu: "Will this [the status of Koreans as aliens] not change due to the Commerce Treaty?"

△日本側田中代表「国籍取得時に所有する権利を認めることは理解できるが、将来も保障するというのは問題だ」と答えただけでなく、「管理令第二十二条に規定された条件を緩和するなら検討するが、全然適用もできなくして強制退去もできなくするなら委員会開催の意味がないので、将来出入国管理令が適用されるという原則に立って永住許可、又は退去強制も過酷なので緩和するというなら考慮することができる」と答えた。

Japan Tanaka: "Recognizing rights of possession at time of nationality acquisition [we] can understand (accept), but assuring [such rights] in the future as well is a problem." . . . "[We] will consider mitigating (relaxing) the conditions provided in Article 22 of the [Immigration] Control Law, but if make it [such that] neither application [of Article 22] or compulsory departure [we] is possible then there is no meaning in convening a committee [to deliberate deportation cases], hence -- standing on the principle that in the future the Immigration Control Law would be applied -- considering residence permission, and because leave compulsion is harsh, mitigating [conditions], can be done."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表、これに対して「結果はそうなるとして、管理令の適用排除を意味するのではなく、永住許可というのも一回だけなので、結局このようなことを言うのではないか」と聞いての対して

ROK Yu: "Assuming that the results become so, not in the sense of excluding application of the [Immigration] Control Law, but because permanent residence permission is one time only, are you not ultimately saying this sort of thing?"

△日本側田中代表「永住許可が付与されても管理令は適用されるのに、永住許可者がどうやって海外旅行時にも自由に行動できるのか?」と反問

Japan Tanaka: "Though the [Immigration] Control Law would be applied, even though permanent residence permission were given (bestowed), how would a person permitted to permanently reside [in Japan] be able to freely behave even when traveling abroad?"

In other words, a Korean in Japan, after losing Japan's nationality and becoming an alien with permanent residence, could still be deported for engaging in subversive or other deportable activities outside Japan.

△ これに対してわが側兪鎮午代表、「永住権、財産権、及び退去においての特例を規定して欲しいというものであって、管理令を全面的に拒否することを言っているのではない」と答弁した。

ROK Yu: "[We] want [you] to provide special provisions for permanent residence right, property rights, and leaving, and are not saying to entirely rejecting the [Immigration] Control Law."

△ 日本側田中代表「外人の九割が韓人なのに、九割を除くのは重大なことで、毎日陳情書が入って来るのに、その中には居住権喪失を心配しているのであって、将来の生活保障までは要求しないでいる」と言ったのに対して

Japan Tanaka: "Though 90 percent of [all] outlanders [aliens] are [will be] Koreans, accepting 90 percent [from application of the Immigration Control Law] would be a serious matter -- while everyday petitions [to the government] come in, [and] among them [some people] worry they will lose their right to reside, [but no one] is demanding up to (as far as, to the extent of) future livelihood security (a guarantee of life in the future)."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表、「もう少し明確にして、合意、不合意を確実にせよ」と要請すると

ROK Yu: "Make [your position] a little bit more clear, [your] agreement or disagreement certain."

△ 日本側田中代表「研究してみる」と答弁し

Japan Tanaka: "[We] will study (everything)."

△ わが側洪代表が「登録費、日本円二千円を生活保護貰っている者が支払えるのか」と聞いたのに対して

ROK Hong: "Can a person receiving livelihood protection [public assistance, welfare] pay the [alien] registration fee, 2,000 Japan yen?"

△ 日本側田中代表「すぐ生活に不安を与えないだろうし、これは将来討議する問題なので、すぐには難しい」と答えた。

Japan Tanaka: "It probably won't immediately impart anxiety in livelihood (living, life), [but] as this is a problem for future deliberation, it would be difficult [to resolve it] immediately."

△ 最後に日本側平賀代表から、「一九四五年八月九日以後不法入国した者に対する処遇はどうしたら良いのか」と質問したのに対して

Japan Hiraga: "As for the treatment of persons who illegally entered the country [Japan] after 9 August 1945, what should we do?"

△ 日本側田中代表「厳格にすれば不法入国者が相当出るだろう」と言い

Japan Tanaka: "If [we] do [it] rigorously (strictly) considerable [numbers of] illegal entrants will appear [be discovered]."

△ わが側兪鎮午代表は、「可能な保護を要請すると同時に、一定期間日本に居住し生活安定を得て、日本国法を違反していない者に対しては居住させ、六月二五日(朝鮮戦争勃発)以後の入国者はわが韓国法に違反するが、避難民救済精神で取り扱っていただくように望む」と言った。

ROK Yu: "At the same time [we] request possible protection, [we also] desire that, toward those who have gained resided in Japan for a specific period and have obtained livelihood stability, and are not violating Japan's laws, to let them [continue to] reside [in Japan], and that though entrants after 25 June [1950] (the outbreak of the Korean war) are in violation of Korea's laws, [you] treat them in the spirit of refugee relief.

ROK is acknowledging that entrants who have illegally entered Japan after the start of the Korea War are also violators of its laws, became they left the country illegally.

△ これに対して日本側田中代表「これはスキャップの命令違反になるので、スキャップの権限委譲さえあれば管理庁長官の特別許可で、そのような人たちは大幅の特例を設置して考慮しても良い」と答えた。

Japan Tanaka: "This would be a violation of SCAP's orders, so long as there is a transfer of SCAP's authority [to the Immigration Control Agency], with the permission of the director of the [Immigration} Control Agency, as for such people, it would be good to consider establishing broad special measures."

Japan's Tanaka indicates that the conference will be reconvened at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 7 November, ROK's Yu consents, and at 4:46 p.m. the meeting adjourns.

Top  


14 November 1951 (am) Intermarriage and dual nationality

14 November 1951 was an especially busy day for delegates of the Legal Status Subcommittee, who convened their 7th meeting in the morning and their 8th meeting in the afternoon.

I am here translating and commenting on the entirety of Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of the Korean summary of the proceedings of the 14 November 1951 meeting. I have also translated the letter under cover of which the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo sent a copy of the minutes to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pusan. I also refer to the Korean text of the minutes, and the Japanese document which, having been the topic of discussion at the meeting, was attached to the minutes.

14 November 1951 (am) Intermarriage and dual nationality
ROK absolutely does not agree with Japan's understanding of dual nationality
Under Japan's domestic law adopted-sons-in-law will not lose its nationality

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 125-129, NKBK 81: 40-41). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Korean text

The minutes of this 7th meeting, like most of the minutes of the 1951-1952 round of ROK-Japan talks, are written on Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan folio manuscript paper in various hands. They fill nearly 2 sheets which fold into 4 pages (pages 126-129). Yu's cover letter, transmitting the minutes to ROK's foreign minister in Pusan, is written on the 1st (right) half of another sheet of KDMJ manuscript paper, which constitutes the 1st page (page 125). The sheets were probably B4 size, hence the 3 sheets would have folded to B5 size. The sheets were vertically ruled to accommodate 12 columns (lines) of text per page.

Formatting

Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation does not attempt to represent the formatting of the Korean document. In the following presentation, I have shown how the Korean document clearly separates ROK's paraphrasing of Japan's understanding, and shows its comments in a block of intended text.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

韓日会第十五号

檀紀4284 年(1951年)11月16日

対日講和会談大韓民国代表団

団長 梁祐燦
外務部長官 貴下
第七次在日韓僑法的地位分科委員会に関する報告の件

標記の件に関して別添経過報告書を上達しますので査取いただくよう仰望するものです。

別添 第七次在日韓僑法的地位分科委員会経過報告書

ROK-Japan Talks Issue 15

Dangi 4284 (1951) 11-15 [15 November 1951]

Amity talks with Japan / Republic of Korea delegation

[From:] Head of delegation, Yang You Chan
[To:]   Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director [Minister], Mr.
[Re:]   Matter of report concerning 7th Overseas Koreans in Japan Legal Status Subcommittee

I bring to your attention the attached progress report concerning the above matter and respectfully request that you kindly accept and examine it.

Attached: 7th Overseas Koreans in Japan Legal Status Subcommittee Progress Report

第七次在日韓僑法的地位分科委員会経過
7th Overseas Koreans in Japan Legal Status Subcommittee proceedings

一、開会

1. Opening of meeting

11月14日(水曜日)午前10時30分

14 November (Wednesday) 10:30 a.m.

Dangi date

The parenthetic (1951) in Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of the Korean text is his own gloss of Dangi 4284 for the benefit of Japanese readers.

Official ROK documents at the time were generally dated in only Dangi (檀紀 Tangi) years. ROK continued to use the solar calendar that had become widespread in Chōsen under Japanese rule. But on 25 September 1948, Syngman Rhee adopted the Dangi system. The system counted years from the legendary founding of the first Korean state in antiquity by Dangun (檀君 Tangun), the mythical progenitor of the Korean racioethnic nation. The system was abolished on 2 December 1961 by President Park Chung Hee (朴正熙 Pak Chŏng Hŭi 1917-1979), and has been prohibited in ROK since 1 January 1962.

The fervently anti-Japanese Rhee wanted to stress that Korea was around 1600 years older than Japan, which from the Meiji era to the end of the Pacific War had officially counted years from the mythical founding of Japan by emperor Jinmu in 660 BC. While Rhee was living in exile in the United States, Park -- who overthrew Rhee's government in 1960 -- had proudly worn the uniform of Manchurian Imperial Army officer named Takaki Masao (高木正雄), who was partly trained at an imperial army academy in Tokyo.

See Tan'gun romanticism in the "Race" section of this website for details.

二、出席者

2. Attendees (Conferees)

日本側
前回と同一
[ 田中、平賀、今井及び佐治 ]

韓国側
兪鎮午代表、金(東)、金(泰)委員、代表法委員

Japan side
Same as previous time
[Tanaka (representive), Hiraga, Imai, and Saji]

Korea side
Yu Chin O representive, Kim (Dong), Kim (Tae) delegates, representative legal committee members

Attendees

The Korean delegation almost always outnumbered the Japanese delegation -- at times 2 to 1 -- and was more likely to change from meeting to meeting.

Japanese delegation

The minutes of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th meetings also stated that the Japanese delegates were the same as at the previous meeting. The 4 names shown here are as listed in the 4th meeting minutes, which show only their family names. The 1st and 3rd meeting minutes list them by their statuses on Japan's subcommittee delegation and their full names, as follows.

Representative Tanaka Mitsuo (田中光男) (
Member Hiraga Kenta (平賀健太)
 " Imai Minoru (今井実)
Observer Saji Makoto (佐治 誠)

Korean delegation

Here the names of the Korean delegates, like those of the Japanese delegates, are reduced to surnames -- except that those with the same surname are differentiated by the first graph of their given name in parentheses. However, as in most minutes, their positions are also shown. The 1st meeting minutes list the following 6 Korean delegates in attendance by their position on ROK's delegation.

Representative Yu Chin O (兪鎮午)
Member Kim Dong Jo (金東祚)
 " Kim Tae Dong (金泰東)
Observer Limb Song Bon (林松本)
 " Chon Gak Su (全斗銖)
 " Kim Yong Ju (金永周) [김영주 b1923]

There were 5 Korean delegates at the 2nd meeting, 7 at the 3rd meeting on 2 November at which Yu debated Tanaka and Hiraga on a variety of issues (see translations above), 8 at the 4th and 5th, and 7 at the 6th.

三、経過概要

3. Proceedings summary

ROK appraises Japan's understanding of points of agreement on nationality

前回第六次会議で決定した分科委員会で合意した諸点の成文起草案を、双方で交換検討し、日本側提出の国籍問題の件を平賀委員が説明した。(別添参照)

本件に関して韓国側からは、左の諸点を指摘し相当な討議が展開された。

Both parties exchanged and considered a written draft proposal of the vaious points determined at the previous No. 5 conference and agreed to in the subcommittee, and [committee] member Hiraga explained the nationality problem matter the Japan side submitted. (Attached reference).

Concerning this matter, from the Korea side, [ROK] pointed out the points to the left [below] and considerable deliberation unfolded.

"Attached reference"

This meeting is dedicated to an examintion of a summary prepared by the Japan side of points regarding nationality agreed to at previous meetings. The Korean version of the Japanese summary is attached to the minutes of the meeting for reference.

The copy in the ROK archive is written in Japanese on 2 sheets of KDMJ folio manuscript paper (KRN 81: 130-133, NKBK 81: 43-46). The text fills 3 pages and one line on the 4th page. In the left margin of the 1st are the characters 秘密 (himitsu) meaning "secret" (the 秘 is obscure), followed by 寫本 (shahon) meaning "copy" or "transcription" of another document, the a Shōwa date corresponding to 13 November 1951 (昭和二六.一一.十三 Shōwa 26-11-13). The manuscript is very neatly written and has only one correction.

The document has the following title.

日韓会議小委員会において両国代表間に見解一致を見た点について


On points seen in views in accord between representatives of both states at the ROK-Japan conference [legal status] subcommittee

The only topic subheading is 第一 国籍 (No. 1 Nationality). Nationality is subdivided into (一) and (二), and (二) is subdivided into (1) and (2). The following proceedings discuss "(II)(1) and (2)" first and (I) second.

ROK's appraisal of Japan's understandings of points in agreement

The minutes show first ROK's paraphrase of Japan's understanding, followed by -- in a block of indented text (as per Korean document) -- ROK's comments, mostly critical.

Adopted son-in-law system, dual nationality, status relation changes

1. 日本側草案の結論として出した(二)(1)及び(2)に関して

a. 日本側原案に「日本国との平和条約の最初の発効日」というのは、韓国側が日本国籍喪失時期に関する日本側の主張を容認しない以上、不当な文句である。

ROK− これに関して「本条約発効時」に修正しようという案、及び「一九四五年八月十日以後日本国との平和条約の最初の効力発生日に至る間」に修正しようという案等が提議され長時間討議されたが、結局「日本国との平和条約の最初の効力発生日に至る間において」を削除することに決定した。

b. 韓人の男と日本人の女との婚姻によって日本人の女が韓国国籍を取得するのは良いが、韓国親族法上婿養子等の制度がない故に、韓人の男がこのような原因で日本国籍を取得したものと日本側が措置した時、韓国国籍は自動的に喪失しない。

ROK− これは完全な二重国籍になるので、どちら側でも即時国籍離脱をするようになることを合意した。

c. 本籍地に身分関係異動を連絡して入籍、除籍の手続きをできない事例が多い。

ROK− 韓国側が本結論に同意する以上、本条約締結時に特殊協定をする必要があるという点に合意した。

1. Concerning (II)(1) and (2) put out as a conclusion of the Japan-side draft

a. As for the [phrase] "the first day of effectuation of the Peace Treaty with Japan" in the Japan-side draft, as the ROK side does not acknowledge the assertion of the Japan side concerning the time of loss of Japan's nationality, [it] is an improper phrase.

ROK− Concerning this [phrase] -- a proposal to amend it to "the time of effectuation of this treaty", and a proposal to amend it to "interval on or after 10 August 1945 up to the first day of the start of effectuation [coming into force] of the Peace Treaty with Japan" et cetera, were offered and deliberated for a long time, but in the end [we decided] to delete "in the interval up to the first day of of genesis of effect of the Peace Treaty with Japan".

b. For a Japanese woman to acquire Korea's nationality due to a marriage of a Korean man and a Japanese woman is all right, but because in Korea's family law there is no son-in-law adoption system et cetera, when the Japan side made measures that a Korean man by such cause [reason] acquired Japan's nationality, [he] will not automatically lose [it].

Meaning   b. Japan does not intend to reverse the effects of register migrations made when Korea was under Japanese rule as Chōsen, and Chōsen and Interior registers were linked through Japan's domestic Common Law. Hence a former Interior woman who married a Chosenese man, and moved to his Chōsen register, will acquire ROK nationality like everyone else in a Korean register, and lose Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty comes into effect. By the same token, a former Chosenese man who married an Interior woman, and entered her family register as a husband or son-in-law, will not lose Japan's nationality. If ROK does not recognize the legacy effects of husband and son-in-law adoption, then such men will be dual nationals.

ROK− As this will become total dual nationality, [we] agreed that one side or the other will come [adopt measures] to effect immediate nationality separation.

c. There are many cases in which [Koreans] have not been able to [carry out] procedures for entry into a register, [and/or] removal from a register, [by] liaisoning [communicating, reporting] status relation changes to [their] principle register locality [in Korea].

ROK−In addition to the Korea side consenting to this conclusion, it agreed to the point that there is need to effect a special agreement at the time of this treaty's conclusion.

"the first day of effectuation of the Peace Treaty with Japan"

Paragraph (a) of Article 23 of the Peace Treaty makes the following provision for effecuation.

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

In other words, the treaty would first come into force when Japan and 6 of the 11 listed states -- the United States and at least 5 other principle Powers -- had deposited ratifications.


"son-in-law adoption system"

During the period that Korea was ruled by Japan as Chōsen, elements of the Interior Civil Code and Family Register Law were introduced to Chōsen's family laws. One element concerned the adoption of a son-in-law by families who had no sons, or had sons but none deemed qualified to succeed to the head of household.

ROK, when drafting its own Civil Code and household register laws, eliminated elements that had been introduced by Japan, in favor of customary Korean family law. Hence ROK laws no longer had Japan-inspired provisions for husband or son-in-law adoption, or for singularity of family name within a household, or for tolerance of marriages between closely related kin.

Adopted son-in-law system no longer part of family law

Japan's customary and statute family laws had long made provisions families without male heirs to adopt a huband or son-in-law, or a young son who would in the future marry a daughter or a woman outside the family, in order to carry on the family name and livelihood. Some families even adopted a daughter who would then marry a man willing to enter the family as an adopted son-in-law, again usually for the purpose of immediately or eventually becoming its head of household.

After the war, pursuant to the 1947 Constitution, which extolled the dignity of the individual and the essential equality of the sexes, Japan heavily revised the family law provisions in its Civil Code and Family Register Law, effective 1948. The new family laws did away with all provisions for husband or son-in-law adoption. Couples still had to share the same family name, but they were free to decide which name, as the person first listed in a register no longer had head-of-household powers or privileges.

Some families, though, continue to want heirs to carry on their name. And while "son-in-law adoption" (婿養子 muko yōshi") is no longer a matter of law or legal parlance (except in legacy cases), the custom and word are alive and well.

Japan's and ROK's nationality laws

Japan's 1899 Nationality Law had provisions for husband and son-in-law adoption, which were first legalized in international alliances of marriage and adoption in 1873. Most nationality laws in the world at the time provided that a woman who married an alien would adopt her husband's nationality, but by the middle of the 20th century, that had become legally less fashionable.

Japan eliminated all provisions for nationality change due to marriage or adoption from its 1950 Nationality Law. However, ROK's 1948 Nationality Law -- partly modeled on Japan's 1899 law -- made provisions for a foreign woman to acquire ROK nationality through marriage to an ROK national (Article 2 Item 4 of 11 May 1948 Provisional Nationality Ordinance, and Article 3 Item 1 of 20 December 1948 Nationality Law).

Nai-Sen marriages

During the period that Korea was Chōsen, and Koreans were Japanese, marriages between Chosenese (朝鮮人) and Interiorites (内地人 Naichijin) became increasingly common. As many as 25 percent of marriages of Chosenese residing in the prefectural Interior when the Pacific War ended in 1945 were interterritorial Interior-Chōsen marriages (内鮮結婚 Nai-Sen kekkon). And about 25 percent of all such marriages involved adoptions of the Chōsen husband or son-in-law into an Interior register. Generally, however, an Interior wife moved to her husband's Chōsen register.

A 1968 study of Government-General of Chosen annual vital statistics reports from 1938-1942 revealed that, among 12,976 marriages of Chosenese residing in the prefectural Interior, some 7,518 (57.9%) were between Chosense, while 5,458 (42.1%) were between Chosenese (朝鮮人 Chōsenjin) and Interiorites (内地人 Naichijin). The husband was Chosenese in 5,242 (96.0 percent) of the Interior-Chosen marriages (内鮮結婚 Nai-Sen kekkon). The wife was Chosenese in only 216 (4.0 percent).

Interiorite wives entered their Chosenese husband's register and thus became Chosenese in 3,964 (75.6 percent) of such marriages, while Chosenese husbands entered their Interior wife's register and hence became Interiorites in 1,278 (24.4 percent) unions. Among the latter, some 937 (17.9 percent) did so as an "incoming husband" (入夫 nyūfu), while the other 341 (6.5 percent) did so as an adopted son-in-law (婿養子養子 muko yōshi).

Sources   Morita Yoshio 1996, page 76, from Chōsen geppō (朝鮮月報), No. 48, July 1968, based on annual Chōsen jinkō dōtai tōkei (朝鮮人口動態統計) reports. Totals and percent computations are mine. See Expedited naturalizations for source particulars and an overview of Morita's life and work. I have also examined annual Government General of Chosen (Chōsen Sōtokufu 朝鮮総督府) population reports, and a 1927 report GGC report that summarized data from 1911-1925. Jūgun ianfu・Nai-Sen kekkon (従軍慰安婦・内鮮結婚) [Military-attached comfort women・Interior-Chosen marriages], by Suzuki Yū (鈴木裕子), includes data from 1928-1937, which I have seen in CCG and other sources (Tokyo: Miraisha 東京:未来社, 20 March 1992, pages 75-76, 83). Suzuki, however, presses the mixed marriages into the service of her "critical" subtite -- "Sei no shinryaku・sensō sekinin o kangaeru" (性の侵略・戦後責任を考える)[On the invasion of sex and war responsibility]. I have collated all Annexation-period data, and annuan marriage data from the 1950s to the present, in an Excel file

Nationality and registers in Occupied Japan

All interterritorial register migrations implied changes in territorial status. Race and ethnicity were never elements of imperial Japanese law. "Chosenese" and "Interiorite" were civil statuses based only on register affiliation. Hence a Chosenese who migrated to an Interior register became an Interiorite -- and vice versa. After the Pacific War, territorial register changes became tantamount to nationality changes.

Because Chosenese and Taiwanese were still Japanese, marriages between people in either Taiwan (Formosa) or Chōsen (Korea) registers, and registers in Occupied Japan, continued to involve register migrations -- until the 1950 Nationality Law came into effect. In private matters that would otherwise have involved moving to another register, moves were no longer permitted between prefectural registers and Taiwan or Chōsen registers -- for the legal reason that Taiwan and Chōsen registers were outside Occupied Japan's legal control and jurisdiction, hence tantamount to foreign registers. The same was true of Ryukyu (Okinawa) registers.


"status relation changes"

"Status relation" (身分関係 mibun kankei) refers to a family relationship such as exists between between spouses, parents and children, and other kin relations defined by family law. Changes in such relations are occasioned by status actions (身分行為 mibun kōi) such as marriage and divorce, birth and death, and adoption. But status actions included also territorial changes -- which, in the case of state (national) territories, involved changes in nationality due to naturalization or renunciation, or to marriage or adoption. In principle, all related status changes (身分変動 mibun hendō) had to be recorded in household registers.

In the above interchange between ROK and Japan, the Japan side is reporting to the ROK side that, since the end of the war, Japan has not been able to liaison with Korea for the purpose of keeping Korea's household registers up to date regarding the private matters of Koreans residing in Japan.

Liaison between registrars in Japan's different territories

Household registers were maintained by municipal registrars within each territory of Japan -- the Interior (including Karafuto), Taiwan, and Chōsen, under territorial laws and ordinances. But municipalities also managed inter-territorial private matters -- marriages, divorces, births, deaths, adoptions and the like -- between Japanese affiliated with different territories, or on the behalf of a Japanese affiliated with another territory, pursuant to the 1918 Common Law (共通法 Kyōtsūhō). The Common Law provided rules for determining which territory's laws applied in a particular private matter involved people affiliated with different territories -- in the same manner that laws of laws determine applicable national laws in international private matters.

Inter-territorial private matters included, for example, a marriage between Interior and Chōsen subjects residing anywhere in Japan (Interior, Chōsen, Taiwan) or outside Japan -- or the birth of a Chōsen subject in the Interior or Taiwan. or the death of an Interior subject residing in Chōsen or Taiwan. Local registers send documents showing particulars to the municipality having jurisdiction over the "honsekichi" (本籍地) or "principle register locality" of the concerned person's family register.

Municipalities with each territory similarly liaisoned with one another. Such liaison remains an essential part of family register management in Japan today. Outside Japan, Japanese consulates mediate register matters for Japanese residing overseas.

Japan's ability to manage family register matters anywhere within its sovereign dominion presupposed its control and juristiction over the territories. Japan did not formally lose control and jurisdiction over Taiwan and Chōsen until it surrendered them to representatives of designated Allied Powers, shortly after it signed the general surrender on 2 September 1945. Two weeks before this, however, on 14 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced that Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration -- which meant that Formosa (Taiwan) and Korea (Chōsen) had been, or would be, "liberated" from Japanese rule.

In the wake of Hirohito's declaration that the war was over, the ability of Interior, Taiwan, and Chōsen registrars to communicate with each other for the purpose of managing interterritorial family matters quickly dissipated. By September 1945, liaison between Interior municipal registrars and Taiwan and Chōsen -- the bureaucratic flow of paperwork between Occupied Japan and its former territories -- stopped.

Postwar inter-territorial private matters

Of course, municipal registrars in Occupied Japan kept records of births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and other private matters involving resident Chosenese in makeshift local copies of their family registers. The marriage of a woman in an Interior register and a man in a Chōsen register, both residing in Occupied Japan, would be recorded in both her and his registers. But whether she moved to his register or he moved to hers -- or whether neither moved -- depended on when they married.

Before the start of the 1950 Nationality Law, one spouse moved to the other's register. After its start, they remained in their different registers. This was because the Ministry of Justice regarded Chōsen status as analogous to an alien status -- hence moving her to his register was tantamount to her losing Japan's nationality.

Nationality and territoriality were not the same. But they were structurally equivalent. Both were based on territory. And the semi-alienation of Chōsen territory from Japanese territory had the effect of semi-alienating Chosenese from Japanese nationality -- when it came to suffrage, repatriation, and alien registration and exit-and-entry.

Under family register laws -- or under the 1899 Nationality Law had he been an alien -- she would generally have acquired his territoriality -- or nationality. And, in some cases, he could have acquired gained her status. In other words, applying either kinds of laws would have had the same effects.

However, under the 1950 Nationality Law, a woman register under Japan's jurisdiction would have retained Japan's nationality even if she acquired an alien husband's nationality on account of the marriage. But an alien man or woman were no longer able to acquire Japanese nationality through marriage to a Japanese national. In other words, applying register laws would have contradicted the 1950 Nationality Law -- and compromised the implied right of a woman in a Japanese family to remain Japanese regardless of who she married -- which reflected the emerging international standard that a woman's nationality was independent of her husband's nationality.

Nationality loss, dual nationality, status relations

2. 日本側草案(一)に関して

全文を通じて一九四八年八月十五日大韓民国国籍を取得したということを日本が反対せず、平和条約発効時に在日韓人が日本国籍を喪失したという日本側主張を、韓国が反対しないとなっているので、両国が一九四八年八月十五日から平和条約発効時まで二重国籍を容認したものと解釈されるが、韓国側は二重国籍説に同意した事実は全くない

ROK− この問題に関しても長時間討議が続き、修正案も二、三種提議されたが、結局全文を削除し、左のように簡単にすることに決定した。

ROK-Japan agree
「韓国人及び日本人相互にわたる身分関係に関しては、両国政府は各その他の一方の国内法による取扱を承認する」

2. Concerning Japan-side draft (I)

Japan did not oppose the [ROK contention] throughout the text [of the draft] that [from ROK's point of view] [Koreans] had acquired Republic of Korea nationality on 15 August 1948 [when ROK was formally established] -- and because Korea did not oppose the Japan-side assertion [contention] that at the time of effectuation of the Peace Treaty Koreans in Japan lost Japan's nationality -- [this] is interpreted as [meaning] that both states acknowledged dual nationality from 15 August 1948 until the time of effectuation of the Peace Treaty -- but as for the Korea side, as for the [alleged] fact that [it] agreed to [this] dual nationality view [theory], [it] absolutely does not exist [but the Korea side absolutely does not consent to the Japan-side's theory of dual nationality].

ROK− Concerning this problem too, deliberation continued for a long time, and 2 or 3 amendment proposals were offered, but in the end [we] decided to delete the entire text, and make it simply as to the left [below].

ROK-Japan agree
"Concerning status relations that mutually span [involve both] Koreans and Japanese, the governments of the two states consent to treatment pursuant to each of the other's domestic laws."

"lost"

The Korean text has 日本国籍을喪失하였다는日本側主張 (Ilbon kukjŏk ŭl sangsil hayŏsstanŏn Ilbon-ch'ŭ chujang), which Yi Yangsu renders 日本国籍を喪失した日本側主張 (sōshitsu shita Nihon-gawa shuchō) in Japanese. Both correspond to "lost" or "have lost" in English.

The past tense would seem to reflect a viewpoint assumed after the signing, ratification, and effecuation of an ROK-Japan status agreement -- which would be after the Peace Treaty came into force -- hence after Koreans (Chosenese) in Japan had lost Japan's nationality.

Generally Japan talked about the loss of nationality as something which would happen in the future. However, Yi translated 日本国籍을喪失한以上 (Ilbon kukjok ŭl sangsil han isan) as 日本国籍を喪失した以上 (sōshitsu shita ijō) -- rendering what would seem to be "will lose" to "have lost" in Japanese (KOR 81: 95).

Elsewhere in the same file Yi translated 日本国籍을喪失함과同時에 (Ilbon kukjok ŭl sangsil ham kwa tonsi e) as 日本国籍を喪失すると同時に (Nihon kokuseki o sōshitsu suru to dōji ni), both of which clearly talk about the future effects of losing Japan's nationality.

Hiraga's viewpoint

The text of the "written draft proposal" submitted by Japan is probably the work of Hiraga Kenta, though presumably the ROK archives copy -- on KDMJ paper -- is one made by a Korean scribe. Hiraga was the resident expert on Japanese nationality at the Ministry of Justice, and as a principle member at practically all plenary and status meetings, he generally fielded questions about nationality and related status issues.

The "Attached reference" states that Koreans residing in Japan (日本国に在住する韓国人 Nihonkoku ni zaijū suru Kankokujin) "will possess Japan's nationality" (日本国籍を有し Nihon kokuseki o yūshi) until the Peace Treaty first comes into force, and that when it does come into force, they "of course will lose Japan's nationality" (当然に日本国籍を失う tōzen Nihon kokuseki o ushinau). The document couches forthcoming events in unconjugated verbs that translate "will" (KRN 81: 13-131, NKBK 81: 43-44).

四、閉会

4. Closing of meeting

午後二時三十分再會하기로하고十二時二十四分閉會함

午後二時三十分再会することにして十二時二十四分閉会した

[The delegates] decided to meet again at 2:30 p.m. and closed the meeting at 12:24.

Closing of meeting

The Korean transcription and Japanese translation are mine, as is the English translation. Yi Yangsu's translations of the Korean texts of the minutes generally reflect every detail, but here he omitted the text in the 4th part of the proceedings, which generally note the scheduling of the next meeting and the time the reported meeting was adjourned -- in the above manner.

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14 November 1951 (pm) MOFA's Tanaka leaps before he looks

The Korean minutes for the 8th session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, the 2nd of two meetings held on 14 November 1951, note that Tanaka Mitsuo, who headed the Japanese delegation to the committee, arrived late and explain why.

The minutes read as follows in Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation and in my structural English translation of Yi's translation. As elsewhere, the upper-case English terms are as recevied in the Korean document (KRN 81: 135, NKBK 81: 47

非常な顔色で遅刻入場した日本側田中代表は、今まで内部に充分な連絡なくCOMMITして、これを文書化したという理由で叱責されたということで、再び日本政府内部各省と充分に打ち合わせする時まで、既に提出した日本側案を撤回せよという命令を受けたということだった。

Japan-side [head] representative Tanaka [Mitsuo], who had entered the place [conference room] late with an uncommonly colored face, saying he had been scolded for the reason that, until now he had committed [to a position] without sufficient liaison within [internally], and documented this [committed it to a document], and [he] had received an order to withdraw the Japan-side draft [he] had already submitted until [he] had again sufficiently beat togeter [consulted] with each [relevant] ministry within the government of Japan.

The rest of the meeting was given to itemizing clauses in the draft that the Japan side proceded to qualify.

13 November 1951 document

The 4-page manuscript dated 13 November 1951, sandwiched between the minutes of the 7th meeting held that morning (see above) and the minutes of this 8th afternoon meeting in the ROK archives (KRN 81: 130-133, NKBK 81: 43-46), is related to the 7th meeting (see above).

14 November 1951 document

The minutes of the 8th meeting are followed by a copy of what appears to be a fuller Japanese proposal. The 4-page document is handwritten in Japanese on 2 sheets of Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan folio paper. Written in the upper right corner of the 1st page are the graphs 寫 (utsushi) or "copy" (transcription) in a circle and 秘密 (himitsu) or "Secret" in a box.

The draft has the following general title and 4 section titles (KRN 81-138-141, NKBK 81- 49-51).

在留韓國人の処遇に関する了解事項 (案)

昭和二十六年十一月十四日

Understood matters concerning the treatment of staying Koreans (Draft)

Shōwa 26-11-14 [14 November 1951]

第一 居住権問題
第二 退去強制問題
第三 内國民待遇問題
第四 引揚荷物に対する特別装置

No. 1   Resident rights problem
No. 2   Compulsion of leave [Deportation, Expulsion] problem
No. 3   Inlander [National] treatment problem
No. 4.   Special measures toward withdrawal baggage

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20 November 1951 Legal Status Subcommittee progress report

The origin of this document is unclear. I would guess from the quality of its English that the writer and/or editor had a native command of precise legalese that took into account the preference to refer to "Koreans" and "Japanese" as separate statuses despite the fact that "Koreans" in at least Japan were "Japanese". The typescript is edited in places and the markup includes occasions of bracketing "as Japanese" and "the loss of Japanese nationality" as though to demure on the literalness of these expressions (see comments below).

The tone is very neutral -- 3rd-party, non-lateral. The report may very well have been written by Sullivan.

The first page of the copy transcribed below, from ROK archives, is manually inscribed "Received: / 4:13 pm. / XYZ". The "XZY" initials appear to be J?D?K or F?D?K = perhaps "X Y Kim" if a Korean name. The English editing is spot on.

20 November 1951 Legal status sub-committee progress report
Quasi "nationality choice" provision would have given Koreans in Japan
1 year within which to "naturalize" without meeting usual requirements

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (KRN 81: 147-150, NKBK 81: 53-56). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Report on the progress of Negotiation by
the Sub-committee on the Legal Status
of
Korean Residents in Japan

Nov. 20, 1951.

  I. The Question of Nationality of Korean Residents
      in Japan

  The Japanese representatives stated their opinion that Korean residents in Japan would loose Japanese nationality as from the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Korean representatives took a different view. However, for the purpose to stabilize the mutual personal status relations, involving the nationals of the two countries, it was finally agreed:

  (1) A Japanese, in case by an act pertaining to personal status relations law with a Korean national he or she is [manually underscored; manually inserted "has been" struck out as possible revision of "is"] cause to be stricken from the census register of Japan, will acquire manually inserted "shall" crossed out as possible revision of "is"] Korean nationality.

  (2) A Korean, in case by an act pertaining to personal status relations law with a Japanese national he or she is [manually underscored; manually inserted "has been" struck out as possible revision of "is"] cause to be entered in the census register of Japan, will acquire manually inserted "shall" crossed out as possible revision of "is"] Japanese nationality.

Japanese . . . Korean national . . . Korean nationality
Korean . . . Japanese national . . . Japanese nationality

Keep in mind that -- at the time, under Japanese law, as endorsed by the Allied Powers through SCAP -- both "Japanese" and "Koreans" are "Japanese nationals" on account of possessing "Japanese nationality". As used here, these labels are "racioethnic" rather than legal. Japanese legalese would distinguish between "Chōsen-seki" (朝鮮籍) and "Naichi-seki" (内地籍) or Chōsen and Interior registers, and refer to their members as "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人) and "Naichijin" (内地人) or Chosenese and Interiorites. Both would have been "Japanese nationals" (日本国民 Nihon kokumin) on account of their possessing "Japanese nationality" (日本国籍 Nihon kokuseki) -- again, in the eyes of Japanese law. In other words, "Chosenese" became "Interiorites" (and vice versa) through marriage and adoption. It was not a question of state "nationality" much less one of affiliation with a racioethnic "nation".

personal status relations law
census register of Japan

The phrase personal status relation is a direct structural translation from a Japanese and equivalent Korean expression. "Personal status relations law" refers to provisions in the Interior Civil Code and and Family Register law and equivalent Chōsen ordinances, which governed alliances of marriage and adoption and other changes in "status relations" (身分関係 mibun kankei) both within and between these two territories. Taiwan, like Chōsen, had its status ordinances.

The phrase census register of Japan refers to a family register under the jurisdiction of a municipal polity within Japan's sovereign territory. Changes in status (身分変更 mibun henkō) constituted "status actions" (身分行為 mibun kōi) which, in cases of marriage and adoption, required moving out of one family's register and into the register of another family.

Taiwan and Chōsen also had "civil registers" called "family" or "household" registers (戸籍 koseki), which identified members by their status relationship with members of the same register and other registers. However, the laws that governs registers and personal status relations were different in each of the three major major territories of Japan -- the Interior (including Karafuto), Taiwan, and Chōsen.

In Japanese law, in reference to the sovereign dominion of the Empire of Japan between 29 August 1910 and 2 September 1945, "Japan" includes Chōsen and Taiwan along with the prefectural Interior (which included Karafuto). After this date, Japan was reduced to "Occupied Japan", which referred to only the Interior minus Karafuto, Okinawa, and a few islands that would have been part of Hokkaidō, Tokyo, and Kagoshima.

stricken from the census register of Japan
entered in the census register of Japan

What is not explained here is that "leaving an Interior ("Japan") register" and "entering a Chōsen ("Korea") register -- and vice versa -- were concomitant actions.

All alliances of marriage and adoption between people in different family registers in Japan require movement between the registers. If the registers are affiliated with different municipalities, the person who changes registers also changes local polity affiliation.

In the past, in Japan, when an marriage or adoption took place between families in different territorial registers, then the person who migrated from one register to the other changed not only their local polity but also their territorial status. And because Japanese nationality has been essentially linked with territory, the formal separation of Chōsen from Japan on 28 April 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, resulted in the separation of all people in Chōsen registers from Japanese nationality -- regardless of their putative "race" or "ethnicity" -- which, in any event, were not matters of "civil status" under Japanese law.

  II. The Question of the Right of Permanent Residence of Korean
      Residents in Japan

  (1) The Korean representatives contended that those Koreans who have been residing in Japan since before the termination of the war should be granted the right to reside permanently in Japan as a matter of course and without any procedure, whereas the Japanese representatives asserted that such Koreans should be subject, like any other alien, to the application of the Immigration Control Order.

  (2) The Korean representatives further contended that, though the Immigration Control Order should naturally apply to the Koreans entering Japan after the war's ending, those residing in the country since before the war's ending should be excluded, as hitherto, from the application of pertinent provisions of that Order. Although the Japanese representatives expressed their opinion that the principle that the Immigration Control Order should apply to the Korean residents since before the termination of the war, could not be waived, the question was under consideration as to whether or not there was a necessity for providing any exemption, as a temporary [stopgap?] transitional measure, [ manual edit ] to the provisions of the said Order regarding the conditions and procedures for permanent residence, and the collection of fees required in applying for permanent residence.

The "Immigration Control Order had just come into effect on 1 November 1951 but did not yet apply to Chosenese (Koreans) who had been in Japan when the war ended and remained. It did apply to those who had left and re-entered Japan with ROK documents.

  III. The Question of National Treatment of Korean Residents
      in Japan

  The Korean representatives maintained that the Korean residents in Japan had already received the same treatment as the Japanese nationals for six years since 15 Aug. 1945 9 Aug. 1945 [ manual insertion of dates including change of date ] except in respect of such political rights and duties proper to Japanese nationals as suffrage and that this treatment would, therefore, be continued in the future as well.

  With reference to this, the Japanese representatives stated that they had no intention to accord such special treatment to the Korean residents, but that if the Korean side would insist on such treatment they would be willing to confer on the matter at the time of conclusions of a Japanese-Korean treaty of commerce and navigation, provided such treatment be [ manual insertion ] in accordance with the generally accepted international practice and in conformity to the principle of reciprocity. However, the Japanese representatives indicated that with respect to those specific kinds of rights or status, which are either restricted or denied, in the case of aliens, but which are being actually enjoyed by the Korean residents "as Japanese," [ typed quotation marks] there was room for considering the adoption of some temporary special measure in order that the Korean might not suffer unduly in this regard through "the loss of "Japanese nationality" [ hand inserted quotation marks] on their part.

The editorial insertion of the quotation marks around around first "Japanese nationality" -- amending this to "the loss of Japanese nationality" -- was probably to treat this expression on a par with "as Japanese". Does the marking of "as Japanese" imply "so-called Japanese" in the senses that they have have already been partly alienated -- and full alienation is merely a formality? Does "the loss of Japanese nationality" similarly imply that Koreans in Japan have already lost Japanese nationality de facto -- and its de jure loss is merely a formality?

  IV. The Question of Disposition and Shipment of Property on
      Occasion of Repatriation

  The Korean representatives desired that, in case of the Korean Residents' evacuation to their homeland, (1) they be allowed free disposition of their property for the sake of repatriation, and no tax be imposed on the property so disposed of, (2) and that no limits be set to the kind, quantity, and value of the baggage of a repatriate and no tax be imposed thereon. The Japanese representatives stated that (1) specific articles such as narcotics should properly be placed under control, and (2) that no smuggling should be committed under the pretext of shipping personal property. On these points the Korean representatives ==== [ machine overstriking of unreadable letters ] voiced assent. On the other hand, Tthe Japanese representatives further stated that there was yet room for further study regarding this problem, as a whole.

  V. The Question of Deportation

  The Korean representatives stated that, though the provisions pertaining to the deportation of aliens under the Immigration Control Order should not be applied to the Korean residents in Japan, they had no objection [ manual underscoring ] to the deportation of those guilty of such vicious crime as of attempting to effect the overthrow of the government by force or violence, when proven in consultation with Korean Government, and that therefore the Korean Government would be ready to [manual overstriking ] cooperate in the deportation of such offenders. The Japanese representatives stated that the provisions of the Immigration Control Order, which has been drawn up in accordance with international usage, should apply to the Korean residents as well, but that they had no intention to unjustly limit the residence of bona fide Koreans, and accordingly there should arise no occasion for a mass deportation of Koreans under the said Order. Thereupon, the Korean representatives pointed out that, if so, the enumeration of so many causes for deportation in the Immigration Control Order would seem incongrous.

The deportation issue was thorny from the start. Of interest here is the willingness of ROK to accept subversive elements that Japan wished to deport -- though apparently ROK would reserve the right to refuse to accept those it felt Japan could not prove were actually subversive. Keep in mind that ROK would not likely treat very kindly a truly subversive Korean -- i.e., a Korean who supported DPRK's "revolutionary war" against ROK. In any event, Japan is assuring ROK that -- contrary to certain proposals by a handful of SCAP and Japanese government officials to "undesirable" (including leftist) Koreans in Japan en masse -- it had no intention of doing so.

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22 November 1951 Yang and Chiba debate status issues

Whether Koreans were ever Japanese -- or were still Japanese at the time -- was one of the more contentious issues between ROK and Japan in their 1951-1952 status and treatment talks. Today, over 60 years later, the two states continue to fundamentally disagree over the legality of Japan's annexation of Korea as Chōsen in 1910. Legal or not, its political and social effects were real. Koreans became Chosenese, and Chosenese were subjects and nationals of Japan. And, in legacy law in Japanese courts, they remained Japanese until 1952.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), when negotiating with Japan in 1951-1952, attempted to impose its illegality thesis on the negotiations, but Japan would have nothing of it. The Allied Powers, while not defending Japan's annexation of Korea as Chōsen in 1910, accepted that its effects had been legal -- Korea had become part of Japan, its affiliated inhabitants had become Japanese.

SCAP -- and Japan as well -- could agree with the ROK Mission in Japan that ROK was a sovereign state -- that it had already established its sovereignty over at least the provinces of the Korean peninsula it controlled -- and that it's jurisdiction in that part of Korea had already confirmed that its inhabitants were ROK nationals. Koreans who had remained in Occupied Japan, however, were another matter.

Koreans in Japan, for whatever personal or family reasons, had forfeited an opportunity to leave Japan and claim their nationality on the Korean peninsula. In effect, they had chosen to remain Japanese -- at least until formal deliberations and agreements between Japan and ROK determined otherwise. The apparent leaning of so many Koreans in Japan toward ROK's rival in the northern provinces, though most Koreans in Japan were affiliated with southern provinces, complicated the status issue from Japan's point of view. Japan was not prepared to accept ROK's demands that Japan recognize all Koreans in Japan having ipso facto become ROK nationals on account of provisions in ROK's Nationality Law.

Koreans in Japan were living in Japan. ROK's Nationality Law did not operate in Japan, and could not operate without an agreement between the two states as to how it would operate. ROK eventually accepted this position because its comported with the meaning of sovereignty and the rules that governed relations between sovereign states.

Under its domestic laws, accountable only its its state ideology, ROK could claim that Chōsen that Japan had already entirely relinquished its claims of sovereignty over the peninsula. But under international law, as interpreted and practiced by the Allied Powers in their breakup of the Empire of Japan, the separation of "Korea" (Chōsen) from Japan would not become formal until the Peace Treaty came into effect. And until then, the household registers of Koreans in Japan were still technically causes for Koreans in Japan to be considered Japanese nationals -- pursuant to Japan's territorial attribution of its nationality.

In the meantime, the future status of Koreans in Japan would be at the mercy of an agreement between Japan and ROK. Their legal status was nominally the most important item on the agenda of the bilateral talks. The Japan and ROK delegations included legal bureaucrats who occasionally engaged in the sort of debates that keep university law students up all night with a case of beer to nourish their heated arguments. The delegates at the ROK-Japan talks got high on their own legal ideology.

8th Preliminary Plenary Conference

The most dramatic and interesting exchange of opinion took place on the occasion of the 8th Conference in the ROK-Japan talks on 22 November 1951, a Thursday. The meeting convened at 3:22 in the afternoon and adjourned at 4:45.

The Japan side that day included Chiba, Tanaka, Hiraga, Imai, and Saji. The ROK side included Yang, Kim Yong Shik, Yu, Lim, Karl, Pak, Kim Dong Jo, Hong, Hwang, and Kim Tae Dong. The SCAP DS observer was Sullivan.

The Record of Proceedings of the meeting run 10 pages (KRN 77: 140-149, NKBK 77; 43-53; NKBK pdf file pagination includes 1 blank page; transcription, markup, and commentary mine).

22 November 1951 Yang-Chiba nationality debate

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
November 28, 1951

  The delegates assembled at the conference table at 3:25 P.M. Dr. Yang asked Mr. Chiba if he would open the discussions. Mr. Chiba replied by indicating that the nationality sub-committee report was still being typed and would not be ready for several minutes. He suggested that the conference turn to other matters until such time as the report was ready.

[ Rest of 1st page and pages 2-6 of 10-plus page report omitted ]

[ Continued from end of paragraph at top of page 7 ]

   . . . It was then agreed to go on to the report of the nationality sub-committee which had been completed during the prior discussions.

  Dr. Yu Chin O, in submitting the sub-committee's report, made the follow[ing] statement:

[ Dr. O's statement highlighted here to facilitate reading. ]

  "The Sub-Committee on the Korean Residents in Japan was appointed and called to commence its business at the Conference of whole on the 30th of October and opened on 11:30 A.M. at that date and have had 10 meetings to date. At the 1st and 2nd Meetings which were held on 30th and 31st of Oct. respectively, the Japanese side explained the treatment of these Koreans in the past and the present circumstances as well as the provisions of the [pending] Japanese Immigration Order.

  "At the 3rd Meeting held on Nov. 2, Korean representatives presented their views of the subject. On 7 Nov., having studied the previous proposal made by the Korean side, Japanese representatives made clear their counter-views on this subject at the 4th meeting. The 5th meeting was called to open on 9 Nov. for the discussion of detailed technical points regarding the removal of personal properties which are to be carried with these Koreans who would repatriate.

  "Since both sides clarified their views fully during these sessions, it was agreed to prepare written statements of these views in order to facilitate the further discussion. The 6th and 7th meetings held on 12 Nov. and 14 Nov. respectively for further study of the written statements prepared by both sides and decided to submit the same [?] to the Main Conference. It was also suggested at the 7th meeting that both sides draft the join-report on the matters which have been agreed upon at the meetings. The 8th and 9th meetings on the afternoon [sic] of Nov. 14 and 17 were solely devoted to study and trim the draft of the said joint report of which final draft was adopted at t[he] Nov. 20th's tenth meeting. This final draft is the report which we have just presented here.

  "Therefore, this Joint Report is a summary of the views discussed and the matters agreed on at the sub-committee and the detailed views of both sides are attached to this report. As these attached documents here have been prepared separately by the parties, it is our desire to use these statements for the reference.

  We feel that the sub-committee on the legal status of Koreans in Japan have finished its business as it has presented its joint report." (A copy of the joint report, Japanese statement and Korean statement are attached).

  At the completion of this statement, Mr. Chiba asked for clarification on one point. He said it was his understanding that the Joint statement constituted the report of the sub-committee and that the other two statements were attached, not as part of the report, but for reference purposes only. He would like to have that confirmed. There was general agreement on both sides of the table that Mr. Chiba's understanding was correct.

[ Reported exchange between Dr. Yang and Mr. Chiba highlighted here to facilitate reading. ]

  Dr. Yang, with reference to the sub-committee's report, stated that he would like once again to make clear the Korean position with reference to Korean residents in Japan. It was his Government's stand that there were two categories of Korean resident in Japan (1) those who were in Japan prior to August 9, 1945 and (2) those who arrived in Japan after that date. He felt it proper to consider those in the second category as aliens but desired to point out that those in the first category had been given the same treatment and assumed the same obligations and duties as Japanese during all their years of residence. He felt it would be improper to treat both these categories in the same manner.

  Mr. Chiba stated that he was not prepared to enter into a discussion of the report as yet, since he had not had an opportunity to study it but he felt that Dr. Yang had touched upon some matters of principle with which the Japanese Government could not agree. Particularly, the Japanese Government was not in accord with the Korean contention that August 9, 1945 was a significant date in connection with Korean nationality. The Japanese position was that Koreans in Japan were still Japanese until the effective date of the Peace Treaty, at which time they would become Koreans.

  Dr. Yang asked if these Koreans had enjoyed suffrage and Mr. Chiba said [?] no. Then Dr. Yang stated that they are not Japanese nationals and have never become Japanese nationals in the true sense of the word. Mr. Chiba stated that he felt it was indisputable that they had become Japanese nationals as of 1910. But Dr. Yang replied that the fact that they had never been allowed to vote in Japan was a contradiction of the notion that these Koreans had become Japanese nationals. Mr. Chiba pointed out that the question of universal suffrage was a rather recent innovation and could not be accepted as a proper criterion for nationality.

But since 1925, all qualified Japanese male residents in the Interior, including Chosenese and Taiwanese, were able to vote, and to be elected to local assembly and House of Representatives seats. In 1945, provisions were made for election districts to be established in Chōsen and Taiwan. And again the qualifications were based on Japanese nationality and place of residence -- not on the location of one's territorial domicile -- whether in the prefectural Interior, or in Chōsen or Taiwan.

Yang and Chiba are talking about suffrage in Chōsen, not the Interior.

In a 3-page memorandum to the Diplomatic Section of SCAP, archived between memoranda dated 10 August and 13 August 1951, the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan strongly argued that there was no foundation for regarding Koreans in Occupied Japan as Japanese. Its 3rd of 6 reasons by Koreans had never actually been Japanese nationals states as follows (KRN 78: 54, NKBK 78: 16).

  C. The Koreans were never given franchise. The belated promulgation of the Law of April 1, 1945, claiming to give them franchise was never brought into effect.

1925 revisions in the House of Representatives Members Election Law established universal male suffrage in the Interior, which meant that all male subject nationals who resided in an Interior election district were able to vote and run for local and national offices if they satisfied a common set of conditions. No national of the Empire of Japan had rights of suffrage in Chōsen or Taiwan at the time, because there were no election districts in these parts of Japan.

Several Koreans were elected to local assemblies and one was elected to the Imperial Diet. Japanese nationals who resided in a part of Japan that had no election district -- including Taiwan and Chōsen, but also some remote parts of the Interior -- could vote or run for office. The war ended before plans to establish election districts in Taiwan and Chōsen could be implemented.

Pak Ch'un'gŭm (朴春琴 박춘금 Bokushunkin 1891-1973) was twice elected to the House of Representatives. See Diet member Pak Ch'un'gum (Boku Shunkin) for a detailed overview of the development of rights of suffrage in Japan under the 1890 Meiji Constitution.

1 April 1945 Chōsen and Taiwan suffrage edict and related laws

On 1 April 1945, an imperial edict was promulgated in an extra edition of the National Gazette (官報 Kanpō). The Emperor "I" recognized that years had passed since Chōsen and Taiwan had come under "our" rule. Enlightenment had spread in the territories, they were showing the fruits of assimilation to customs and manners, and were making no small contribution to the war, the emperor was happy to observe. It was time to have their residents contribute to the governing of the country by being members of the Imperial Diet.

On the same day, the House of Representatives Members Election Law (衆議院議員選挙法) and the House of Peers Order (貴族院令) were accordingly revised. The House of Representatives law recognized Chōsen and and Taiwan residents (住民) as "imperial subjects" for the purpose of House of Representatives elections, and designated 23 seats for Chōsen and 5 seats for Taiwan. The House of Peers Order established 10 seats for Chōsen and Taiwan peers.

The course of the war made it impossible to hold House of Representatives elections. The 21st general election had been on 30 April 1942, and it would be the last wartime election before Japan surrendered on 2 September 1945. However, 7 Chosenese and 3 Taiwanese were imperially appointed to to House of Peers on 3 April 1945 -- among them the following two men.

Pak Yung Yang

One of the Chosenese peers elected in April 1945 was Pak Yung Yang (朴重陽 SJ Boku Jūyō 1874-1959), but a lot of good his esteem in the eyes of his peers did him. From 1949 until his death, ROK tried to convict him on charges of betraying the Korean race, and confine him to a mental hospital, but failed. Half a century after his death, under a revitalized racial traitor law, ROK confiscated assets which had been inherited by his descendants.

Lin Hsien-t'ang

Lin Hsien-t'ang (林献堂 PY Lin Xiantang, SJ Rin Kendō 1881-1956) was elected as a Taiwanese peer in April 1945. After the Republic of China accepted Japan's surrender of Taiwan in October 1945, it quickly nationalized the territory as an ROC province, and Lin was elected to Taiwan's first provincial assembly. In 1949, for health (and apparently also political) reasons, he moved to Occupied Japan. Chiang Kai-shek urged him to return to Taiwan, but he remained in Japan, where he died of pneumonia.

The imperially appointed Chosenese and Taiwanese members of the House of Peers were to have held their seats for 7 years, but those that survived resigned on 4 July 1946. Long before 1945, however, some members of the former Korean Imperial Family had become permanent members of the House of Peers by right of their title.

See Status and Citizenship: Japan and the United States for full particulars on the suffrage rights of Chosenese and Taiwanese as subjects and nationals of the sovereign Empire of Japan.

  Dr. Yang then asked if it were not true that Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration and its implications with regard to Korea. Mr. Chiba replied that although the Potsdam Declaration had been accepted, its terms were not to be implemented until a Treaty of Peace could come into effect. Dr. Yang stated that he felt that he felt this was somewhat at variance with reality since Korea had become sovereign and had been recognized by the United Nations and had established a Nationality Act of its own. Mr. Chiba replied that he did not dispute the sovereignty of Korea or the effectiveness of its Nationality Act. But he pointed out that it had not been formally recognized as yet by Japan and that even it it were, it would only result in the establishment of dual nationality for the individual Koreans involved. He went on to point out that Japan could not make an adaptation in its ultimate treatment of one category of Korean residents with respect to any other aliens in Japan and they would all have to receive the same treatment and privileges. However, he indicated that his Government was prepared to "facilitate the change-over" for those Koreans who had been in Japan for some time. For example, his Government might consider special exceptions from the payment of the thousand yen registration fee and would otherwise make it easy for those people to assume their new alien status. However, he desired to make it clear that once the change-over had been made there could be no distinction in ultimate treatment and that Koreans would enjoy the same privileges as all other aliens in Japan.

ROK was but Japan was not a sovereign state

This the clearest dramatization I have seen of what I am calling the "legal rock and political hard place" between which Japan found itself at the time. Chiba acknowledged that Yang is correct -- politically. ROK was a sovereign state. And ROK's laws were effective -- at least in ROK, and to some extent in countries that recognized ROK and permitted its legations to operate in their territories.

However, Chiba also knew that Japan was not a sovereign state -- and that, as yet, there were no bilateral agreements as to whether and how ROK's laws could or would affect the status of Koreans in Japan.

Since its surrender to the Allied Powers, Japan's sovereignty had been in SCAP's hands. Japan and the Allied Powers had signed a peace treaty, but Japan would not regain its sovereignty until the terms of the treaty came into force. In the meantime, it was SCAP's position -- in concert with its own laws and Japan's laws -- that Koreans in Japan were still Japanese, and would remain so until which time bilateral agreements determined otherwise. Japan and ROK had not yet agreed to recognize each other or otherwise establish the parameters of a legal relationship, including the extent to which ROK's laws would apply to Koreans in Japan.

See Separation and choice: Between a legal rock and a political hard place for fuller details.

  Mr. Chiba then proposed that the nationality sub-committee report be referred to the two Governments to see if any new proposals would be possible.

  If such proposals could be made he felt the matter could be turned back to the sub-committee for discussion of those proposals. Dr. Yang asked if . . .

[ Received report ends with page 10 of at at least 11 pages.

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26-27 November 1951 MOFA-SCAP on nationality and treatment

Hand written in the top margin of English version is "別紙乙" (Attachment A).

Attachment A
26 November 1951

The following text is a transcription of Attachment A (別紙甲) (JPN 4-561: 6) to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo related to communications with SCAP's Diplomatic Section officers circa 26-27 November 1951, concerning the nationality and treatment of Chosenese in Japan (JPN 4-561: 1-3). The transcription and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Hand written in the top margin of the English version is "別紙甲" (Attachment A). The Japanese version is typed on a single page of bordered Ministry of Foreign Affairs stationery.

Attachment A Nov. 26, 1951 Point I No disagreement. II 1. Koreans shall be considered as having permanent residence status, without payment of Yen 2,000. [sic] or application of "screening". 2. Those Koreans who have entered Japan by permission of SCAP should be subject to all provisions of Immigration Control Ordinance. III 1. As permanent residents, Koreans enjoy equal-status with all other aliens resident in Japan. 2. However, Koreans for the time being can automatically retain ownership of all property currently held in Japan. 3. The ownership of property not normally permitted to aliens in Japan shall be the subject of negotiation in a treaty of commerce and navigation. IV No disagreement. V Koreans in Japan, enjoying equal status with all other aliens in Japan, shall also incur the same responsibilities and liabilities. However, in the instance of deportation, the Japanese Government will consult with the Korean Mission prior to deporting any Korean who was resident in Japan prior to the date of Japan's surrender in the Pacific.War.

Hand written in the top margin of the English version is "別紙甲" (Attachment A). The Japanese version is typed on two pages of bordered Ministry of Foreign Affairs stationery.

Attachment B 27 November 1951

The following texts are transcriptions of the Japanese (JPN 4-561: 5) and English (JPN 4-561: 4) versions of Attachment B (別紙乙) to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo related to communications with SCAP's Diplomatic Section officers circa 26-27 November 1951, concerning nationality and treatment of Chosenese in Japan (JPN 4-561: 1-3). The transcriptions and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

    The Japanese Government will treat Koreans in Japan as alians in all respects as from the date of the coming into force of the peace Treaty.

    However, in regard to bona-fida Korean residents who have been continuously in Japan from before September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government will consider special measures with respect to the following matters:

  1. The alleviation of the conditions and procedures relating to the granting of permanent resident status.
  2. The authorizing of a definite period of grace during which certain properties the ownership of which is prohibited to aliens may be retained.
  3. The granting of special treatment during a definite period with respect to the taking out [of Japan] of personal property in case of repatriation.

    日本政府は在日朝鮮人を平和条約の発効の時以降総ての点において外国人として取扱う

    但し一九四五年九月二日以前から引続き正当に本邦に在留する朝鮮人につては次の特別装置を考慮する。

1、永住資格を付與する条件及び手続等の緩和について更に考慮する。

2、外国人に対し禁止されている特定の財産の保有については一定の猶予期間を認めることを考慮する。 3、引揚者の携行荷物に対し一定期間を限り特別の取扱をすることについて更に考慮する。

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30 November 1951 ROK says Koreans in Japan not immigrants

At the 12th session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, held on the morning of Friday, 30 November 1951, the Korea side pressed the Japan side to clarify Japan's position on Korea's demand for special treatment of "Koreans in Japan" as they would be defined in the agreement.The Japan side stated that it had made its position clear, that upon effectuation of the Peace treaty, Koreans in Japan would be aliens, and in principle they would be treated the same as other aliens.

The Japan side went on to say this, according to minutes of the meeting written by the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo and transmitted to ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pusan (KRN 81: 156-157, NKBK 81:59, Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation, my English translation).

・・・韓国側の主張する韓国人を特殊外国人と認め、日本内に二種の外国人、又は入国時期によって相違な二種の韓国人を認めることは、世界どこの国にも見られない例である。

. . . recognizing as special aliens the Koreans [in Japan] [as] the Korea side advocates, recogining two kinds of aliens in Japan, and according to when they entered the country two different different kinds of Koreans, would be an example not seen in any country in the world.


"an example not seen in any country in the world"

Today the most obvious example of a caste of aliens that are treated entirely differently from general aliens is in Japan. Special Permanent Residents (SPRs), representing the postwar residual population of Taiwanese and Chosenese in Occupied Japan who lost Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, and their Japan-born descendants, are mostly ROK nationals but come in about 50 other nationalities -- all of which, as a result, are differentiated from general aliens of the same nationality.

The Japan side pointed out that it had said it would study whether it could legally accommodate the needs of the Koreans the agreement would apply to, then said that first the two parties must determine whether they are going to agree to principles, or deliberate only concrete treatment issues.

Tanaka Mitsuo, representing the Japan's delegation, suggested, not for the first time, that "even if both sides reiterated [their different] basic principles, agreeing to a conclusion [coming to an agreement] would be difficult, so from now on, why not talk about concrete treatment issues without debating principles?" (双方が根本的原則論を反覆(反復)しても結論に合意するのが困難なので、今後は原則論を討議せずに具体的取扱問題を話すか).

The Korea side agreed to this, but Hiraga Kenta, a Ministry of Justice bureaucrat who specialized in nationality and related status laws, and rarely lost an opportunity to make a legal point, objected that Japan's Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Order was [tantamount to] Japan's immigrant law (移民法 iminhō). As such it was a domestic statute to address domestic issues, and applied across the board to all aliens. So long as it didn't violate general principles of inernational law, all aliens -- no matter what kind -- had to obey this law. In principle, therefore, Koreans in Japan would also have to be subject to its application.

"immigrant law"

Japan has no such law. Hiraga was saying that the alien status of residence and other provisions for alien control, including deportation, are comparable to an "immigrant law" within what is broadly a border control law that applies to everyone leaving and entering the country, regardless of nationality -- whether aliens or Japanese.

"imin"

The term "imin" (移民) actually means only "a person who moves" as in "migrant". It does not specify "in" or "out" or "away from" or "to" a country -- hence its use in terms like "domestic migrant" (国内移民 kokunai imin) and "domestic migration" (国内移動 kokunai idō). The term "migrant laborer" (移民労働者 imin rōdōsha) includes both foreign and domestic laborers.

Invoking the "immigrant" metaphor gave ROK the perfect peg on which to hook a perfect rebuttal. The Korea side -- probably Yu Chin O, its chief delegate on the Legal Status Subcommittee, a legalist in his own right and Hiraga's arch opponent in legal debates -- made the following rebuttal (KRN 81: 158-159, NKBK 81: 60, Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation, my English translation).

・・・今後渡日する韓人が出入国管理令の対象になるのは当然なことである。P159 一九四五年八月九日以前からの在日韓僑は「移民」として渡日したのでもなく、現在一般外国人とは異なる法的地位を持っているのが厳然たる事実なので、出入国管理令を原則的にこれに適用できないものだ・・・。

. . . that Koreans who cross to Japan after this become subjects of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] control law is appropriate. [However,] as it is a fact that Overseas Koreans in Japan from on or before 9 August 1945 did not cross to Japan as 'immigrants', and have a different legal status from [those of] present general aliens, is a solemn fact, and so the Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Order cannot in principle apply to them . . . .


"did not cross to Japan as 'immigrants'"

This round went to ROK but the fight had barely begun. By the end of the match, it was a draw by this writer's score card. The signable agreement the two sides reached by April 1952 was a reasonable compromise of their different original "principles".

"a solemn fact"

It is also a solemn fact that, not only did "Koreans" not cross as "immigrants", but they didn't cross to "Japan" or cross as "Koreans". They crossed as Japanese by nationality, and Chosenese by territoriality, from Chōsen (朝鮮) -- formerly Korea, then part of Japan -- to the prefectural Interior (内地 Naichi) of Japan.

Chosenese were migrants within their own country -- albeit migrants between territories within Japan's larger sovereign dominion. Hiraga was not about to point this out. As a legal bureaucrat, and later a judge, he would not have called Ch!sen "Korea" (韓国) or referred to the Interior (内地 Naichi) as "Japan" (日本) -- if writing a legal brief about a legacy issue between 1910 when Japan annexed Korea as "Chōsen", and 1945 when it lost control and jurisdiction over Chōsen as "Korea". He would have used the contemporary legal terminology.

But to insist on historical accuracy in negotiations with the Republic of Korea is to risk an ROK walkout. The same is true in the academic world today. There is practically no tolerance for historical accuracy.

The Korea side reiterated its demand that Japan recognize a unconditional special status of aliens for Koreans in Japan. Since Japan had said it would study the possibility, ROK demanded that Japan to make the first concrete proposal.

ROK's plans to issue registration certificates
and Japan's plans to fingerprint aliens in Japan

The following exchange between the Japan side (JS) and Korea side (KS) then took place, according to KDMJ's minutes (KRN 81: 163-165, NKBK 81: 61).

JS -- "We've heard talk of plans for the government of Korea to issue registration certificates to Koreans in Japan, but is that true?" (「韓国政府は在日韓人に登録証のようなものを発給する計画という話を聞いたが事実なのか」)

KS -- "If the Korean Mission (ROK Embassy or a consulate in Japan) were to register [Koreans in Japan] and issue [them] a certificate, wouldn't it be good if [Japan] were to recognize rights of permanent residence based on these [certificates]? (「駐日代表部(駐日大使館又は領事館)で登録をして証明書を発給したら、これに基づいて永住権を認めれば良いではないか」)"

JS -- (a) What measures are [we] to take toward communist-related Koreans who refuse to register [with ROK]? ( a) 登録を拒否する共産系韓人に対する措置はどうすればよいのか )
     (b) The [government of Japan] is revising the [1947] Alien Registration Order, and it appears that it will adopt fingerprinting in Alien Registration by request (demand) of the American side, but how [do you feel about this]? ( b) 外国人登録令を改正し、米国側の要請で外国人登録には指紋を採ることになりそうだが、どうか )

KS -- (a) As for measures toward [ROK] registration refusers, [this] would be something in accordance with a determination concerning right of residence and expulsion, but we agree to the expulsion of heinous communist elements. ( a. 登録拒否者に対する措置は、居住権と追放に関する決定によるものだが、悪質共産分子追放には賛同する。)
     (b) As for fingerprinting, even though you say it is a system enforced by America, because it is something that will stimulate (spur, exite, irritate) [Korean] residents (alien settlers, stayers), we'll reply after we study [the new law]. ( b. 指紋は例え米国では施行されている制度だといっても、居留民を刺激するものなので、研究してみた後に答える。)

"fingerprinting"

The United States had adopted fingerprinting as a means of dealing with subversive aliens under its own alien registration act, and GHQ/SCAP introduced these measures to Japan. The National Police Agency was also contemplating universal figerprinting of everyone in Japan, and it was provisionally introduced in a few local communities, but was so strongly opposed that the plan was abandoned. Aliens, though, began to be fingerprinted 3 years after the 1952 Alien Registration Law came into effect.

ROK would adopt a universal fingerprinting system in which everyone residing in the country were fingerprinted -- except ROK nationals recognized as categorial "Koreans in Japan", whose special status in Japan also exempted them from ROK's military service laws.

See articles in the Fingerprinting in Japan feature of this website

"[alien] residents"

The term "kyoryūmin" (居留民) is occasionally used by the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan to refer to Koreans in Japan, which it generally calls "Koreans in Japan" (在日韓国人 Zainichi Kankokujin) or "Overseas Koreans in Japan" (在日韓僑 Zainichi Kankyō).

File 81 shows considerable use of the term in ROK's references to numerous treaties regarding territorial transfers involving other countries, in which the the term is used to describe people who are essentially displaced persons. Most such treaties gave such people choices of nationality, and some required -- at the discretion of the country in which they resided -- that those who chose the nationality of another state had to leave.

"Kyoryū" (居留) refers to "residing" and "staying" -- and is the working part of the term "foreign settlement" (居留地 kyoryūchi). The 5th (1998) edition of Kōjien (広辞苑) defines the term as "A foreigner living in an [extraterritorial foreign] settlement. Or, aliens residing in the country." (居留地に住む外国人。また、その国に滞在する外国人。) Some dictionaries include "temporarily staying (remaining)" as part of their definition -- implying that aliens generally "sojourn" rather than permanently settle in a country.

"-min" (‐民) is a suffix for a "person" (or collectively "persons") usually conceived as an affiliate or member (affiliates or members) of a political entity. With "kyoryū" it implies someone affiliated with a foreign country.

ROK's usage defintely implies that "Koreans in Japan" are not considered "indigenous" but "alien" people who came to Japan and are "residing" (居 kyo) and "remaining" (留 ryū) in Japan -- at least at the moment. Since they are regarded as having turned down voluntary opportunities to "repatriate" to Korea -- i.e., "withdraw" from Japan -- ROK considers them to have "settled" in Japan and is therefore pushing for special treatment, beginning with rights of special permanent residence.

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4 December 1951 Sullivan's report on last preliminary session

The Korean community needed assurances there would be no mass deportation

Nationality sub-committee, not Immigration Bureau, should issue a statement


Yang said if there were times he lost his temper he meant well

Chiba said the beginnings, though small, were very significant

At this 10th and final session of the first, preliminary round of plenary talks between Japan and ROK, it was confirmed that everything was on schedule. The delegations to the nationality sub-committee had agreed to general principles regarding nationality and treatment. They should be able to resolve remaining problems by the start of the main plenary talks in February.

Yang would be returning to his duties as ROK ambassador to the United States but planned to be back in Tokyo in time to participate in the main talks. He hoped the two countries would be able to quickly resolve all their problems -- but insinuated that the burden would be on Japan to compromise in ROK's favor. Japan continued to highlight the importance of the small but sigificant steps that had been talken.

Deporting felons and subversive elements

Yang, as he had in his opening statement at the 1st session on 20 October 1951 (above), reiterated that the problems under discussion by the two countries were minor compared to the large problem of communism in Asia. He openly encouraged the government of Japan to identify "elements within the Korean community in Japan which have caused trouble" and said his government would cooperate with Japanese law enforcement agencies in both the apprehension and physical deportation of communist leaders.

Most so-called "communists" not really so

Yang reported said that the majority of Koreans in Japan who were then being classified as communists were "merely uninformed people who had been misled by Communist ideas" -- most of whom had come "from the lower strata of economic life and were susceptible to the propaganda which Communist leaders had inspired" -- in the worlds SCAP Diplomatic Section's 1st secretary William H. Sullivan.

Source and markup

The following text of William H. Sullivan's report is a reformatted transcription of scans of the original English document (JPN 3-63: 147-151). See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

December 4, 1951

    The delegates assembled at the conference table at 10/18 A.M. Dr. Yang asked Mr. Chiba if the Japanese delegation had any business and Mr. Chiba replied in the negative. Dr. Yang then went on to discuss the work currently being undertaken by the nationality sub-committee. He indicated his understanding that certain progress had been made and expressed his hope that meetings would continue regularly until agreement had been reached.

    He stated that he personally felt very much encouraged with respect to the recent trend of the discussions and believed that an area of agreement had been reached, particularly on the problem of deportation. He presented once again his Government's views on that issue, emphasizing that the Republic of Korea had no objection to the deportation to Korea of certain elements within the Korean community in Japan which have caused trouble. He expressed the opinion that once a few leaders had been eliminated, most of the disturbances would die out. He illustrated this belief by the example of what had been done in the Korean community in the United States with the outbreak of fighting in Korea. He thought perhaps that the Japanese Government and the Korean Mission could jointly discuss the names of certain leaders in the Korean community who had been prominent in causing disturbances in Japan.

    He then went on to state that although there were no objections to this type of deportation, he felt that some assurance was needed to counteract the propaganda which currently misled the Korean community into believing that there would be a mass deportation from Japan upon "trumped-up charges". He felt that the sub-committee on nationality should work out some statement which would assure the residents of Japan's intentions on this subject.

    Mr. Chiba asked if Dr. Yang felt that some sort of declaration by the immigration authorities would be adequate for this purpose. Dr. Yang replied that he felt the matter had best be left with the sub-committee to decide. He thought that a statement could be issued indicating that those persons guilty of felonies or subversive political activities would be subject to deportation, but that the majority of the Korean residents could feel secure in Japan. He stressed that the majority of the people currently classified as Communists were not really so but merely uninformed people who had been misled by Communist ideas. Most of them came from the lower strata of economic life and were susceptible to the propaganda which Communist leaders had inspired.

    Mr. Chiba asked if the Korean delegation had any suggestions about methods for apprehending Communist leaders prior to deportation. Dr. Yang felt that this would be entirely up to the law enforcement agencies of the Japanese Government who would follow the usual procedure. He suggested, however, that the Japanese Government might communicate with the Korean Mission for assistance not only in apprehending these people but also in making arrangements for their physical deportation to Korea.

    Dr. Yang announced that he was leaving for Washington on Thursday [6 December 1951] and that he hoped these talks would continue until the basic problem had been straightened out. He suggested that there was general agreement on the principles and that only the wording of the [nationality and treatment] understanding needed to be worked out. He hoped that there would be no actual termination of these talks and that they would if necessary continue at irregular intervals between now and next February. Consul-General Kim [Yong Shik] would assume charge of the Korean delegation until that time, although Ambassador Yang hoped to return in February.

    He expressed his sincere hope that a bilateral treaty could be accomplished in February. He pointed out that Japan and Korea are the closest neighbors and that it was a known fact that bad feeling [sic=feelings] had colored their relations in the past. He felt there was no need to hide this fact since the whole world knew it, but he thought it was more imperative that this be relegated to the past and that the two countries find a way to bring about a new relationship. He stated that both countries had a much bigger problem than those which were being discussed at this conference. He thought that Japan, next to Korea, was exposed to the threat of Communist aggression. He felt that both countries should join together to fight this threat and to solve their smaller problems in generous terms. Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Philippines were watching the results of this conference and would be in a position to join Japan and Korea in forming a new Asia. Dr. Yang felt certain that this new continent could survive only if the nations were united. To become united now, it was obvious that some compromises would have to be made on particular national interests, but he felt that those compromises at this time would pay off a thousand-fold in the future.

    Dr. Yang then referred to the informal indications which he had received concerning the despatch of a goodwill mission to Korea. He counseled against that mission leaving within the immediate future and particularly suggested that they wait until some announcement can be made concerning the accomplishments of this conference reassuring the Government and the people of Korea of Japan's willingness to conclude a basic agreement of broad scope.

    Dr. Yang then expressed his farewells for the present time, stated that he had enjoyed very much working with Mr. Chiba and his delegation and assured them that if there were any instances when he had lost his temper he had meant well and hoped that no grievance was felt.

    Mr. Chiba replied by an expression of the Japanese delegation's sorrow that Ambassador Yang was going so soon. He said that he knew the Ambassador was anxious to return to his duties in Washington and he was grateful for the patience and cooperative spirit which Dr. Yang had shown throughout the discussions. He felt that perhaps the Korean delegation was disappointed that the beginnings were so small but that he felt that it was a very significant beginning and that greater things should soon follow. Now that the Japanese Peace Treaty had been ratified by the Diet and the Foreign Office had been internally reorganized, he assured the Korean delegation that more adequate attention would be paid to the problems of this conference. He also assured the Korean delegation that certain preparatory work would be undertaken between his Government and the Government of Korea prior to the principal conference in February.

    Dr. Yang thanked Mr. Chiba for his assurances and expressed the further hope that the Japanese Government would be able to discuss and to settle all outstanding problems between Korea and Japan in February. Again he pointed out that what concessions were made to Korea at this time would return in much greater degree from other Asian countries which were interested in these talks.

    It was then agreed that the plenary session would adjourn subject to recall by the nationality sub-committee. The nationality sub-committee was scheduled to meet on Thursday and Friday [6 and 7 December 1951] and would report to the plenary session upon the achievement of agreement or whenever they felt a need of further discussion in this group. The delegates rose from the table at 10:48 A.M.

W. H. Sullivan
  Observer

""
11月18日に平和条約を批准し、28日に批准書を米国に寄託しました

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6 December 1951 Nationality loss effects clarified

7 December 1951 Economic rights can be facilitated

The 6 and 7 December 1951 (14th and 15th) sessions of the Legal Status Subcommittee were unique in that, in addition to the regular delgates from the Japan and Korea sides, the Japan side included representatives of the Japanese government organs -- ministries, agencies, and bureaus -- which supervised laws related to occupational and economic activities in Japan, some of which requried Japanese nationality.

The 6 December 1951 meeting was attended by officials from the Ministry of Transportation, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Foreign Investment Committee [FIC], and the Patent Office. The 7 December 1951 meeting included officials from the Ministry of Fianance Customs Bureau, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fisheries Agency, and the Radio Regulatory Bureau.

The object of these meetings was to clarify the effects that nationality loss would have on the lives of Koreans in Japan -- especially those who, when losing Japanese nationality, stood to lose their jobs, professional licenses or permits, and other qualifications which required possession of Japanese nationality. The Japanese bureaucrats took turns methodically explaining the workings of the relevant laws.

For the most part, the Japan side assured the Korea side that the livelihoods of Koreans in Japan would not be effected that much by nationality loss. In most cases where it seemed that Koreans would be effected, the Japanese bureaucrats indicated that statute and other measures could be taken to allow Koreans to continue to engage in the activities they now engaged in as Japanese.


6 December 1951 meeting

The following topics headings are mind, but the numbers are as received in the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (KDMJ) minutes.

1. Japanese flag ships

The Transport Ministry official was the secretary of the ministry's Documents Section. He explained the significance of a "Japanese ship" (日本船舶 Nihon senpaku) under Japan's "Ship Law" (船舶法 Senpakuhō), as Koreans in Japan -- who as Japanese had the right to operate vessels that were authorized to fly a Japanese flag -- would lose that right when they lost Japan's nationality.

In reply to a question from the Korea side as to whether any Koreans presently operated Japanese flag ships, the ministry official said no.

As for marine pilot licenses, the Pilotage Law (水先法 Mizusakihō)listed a person who is not a Japanese subject (日本臣民でない者) as the first disqualifying criteria, so foreigners were unable to receive licenses. In other marine related work, there was no discrimination between "inside and outside nationals" (内外国人 nai-gai-kokujin).

As for aviation, a Far Eastern Commission directive prohibitted Japanese from owning or flying aircraft, and a Potsdam cabinet order provided that only one Japanese company was permitted to operate an airlines within Japan.

"Potsdam cabinet order"

The relevant Potsdam cabinet order the 1950 "Domestic aviation transport operations order" (国内航空運送事業令 Kokunai kūkō unsō jigyō rei), known as Cabinet order (政令 seirei "government order") No. 327 of 1 November 1950. The order was abrogated by Law No. 81 on 11 April 1952, or "Law concerning abrogation of matters concerning orders issued in association with acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration" (ポツダム宣言の受諾に伴い発する命令に関する件の廃止に関する法律 Potsudamu Sengen no judaku ni tomonai hassuru meiri ni kan suru ken no haishi ni kan suru hōritsu). The 1952 Aeronautics Law (航空法 Kōkūhō), Law No. 231 of 15 July 1952, also prohibitted foreign-flag carriers and foreigners from operating passenger or cargo services between points within Japan, unless specifically permitted to do so by the Japanese government.

2. Japanese mines

The Ministry of Trade and Industry official, from the ministry's Mining Bureau, explained that, under the Mining Law (鉱業法 Kōgyōhō), only "an imperial subject or a corporate person (法人 hōjin) established in accordance with Japanese law" (帝國臣民又は日本法に依って設立された法人) could operate a mine. But this was in accordance with international convention, and so long as the company was a Japanese corporate person, a foreigner could manage or even own the mine. He said some Koreans (韓人 Kanjin) with Japanese names (日本氏名 Nihon shimei) are probably operating mines, but the number was under investigation.

"Japanese subject" . . . "imperial subject"

Yi Yangsu's translation accurately refects the use of 日本臣民 (Nihon shinmin) or "subject of Japan" and 帝国臣民 (teikoku shinmin) or "subject of the Empire" in the Korean minutes. However, these terms do not accurately reflect usage in contemporary laws.

Pilotage Law

The original Pilotage Law (Law No. 63 of 1899), which uses "Japanese subject", was replaced by an entirely new law (Law No. 121 of 30 May 1949), which uses "Japanese national" for good reason. The 1890 Constitution used "subject" (臣民 shinmin), and imperial laws generally spoke of "imperial subject". The Allied Powers outlawed the use of "subject" -- though it took time for the word to be replaced in Japanese laws. And the 1947 Constitution uses "national" (国民 kokumin) and "Japanese national" (日本国民 Nihon kokumin).

The current version of the 1949 Pilotage Law reads "Person who is not a national of Japan" (日本国民でない者 Nihon kokumin de nai mono) (Article 6.1).

When established in September 1901, the Licensed Inland Sea Pilots Association (内海水先区水先人組合) had 16 foreign and 5 Japanese members. The last foreign pilot in the association retired in March 1925, since which all members have been Japanese. Presumably other pilotage districts with foreign vessel traffic had similarly large numbers of foreign pilots at the time the 1899 law came into effect.

How many Chosenese qualified as Japanese pilots in Interior pilotage districts -- as more Chosenese migrated to the Interior after the annexation of Korea as Chōsen in 1910 -- is not clear. They would have needed experience in Interior ports to qualify, and my impression is that not many Koreans who settled in the Interior were engaged in the captaining or piotling of ships.

Mining Law

Ditto for the use of "imperial subject" in the Mining Law. The original law -- Law No. 45 of 8 March 1905 -- was abrogated by the Law No. 289 of 20 December 1950. The original 1950 law -- and the present version of the law -- stipulate that "If not a Japanese national or a Japanese corporate person, [one] cannot become a person with mining [mineral] rights" (日本国民又は日本国法人でなければ、鉱業権者となることができない Nihon-koku-min mata wa Nihon-koku-hōjin de nakereba, Kōgyōkensha to naru koto ga dekinai) (Article 17).


Why do the KDMJ minutes say "subject"?

I have not been able to verify the language in pre-postwar versions of either of the above laws, which underwent revisions over the decades. The KDMJ minutes cite Article 5.1 of the Pilotage Law, but the nationality clause is Article 6.1 in the postwar law. The minutes cite Article 5 in the Mining Law, but the somewhat differently worded nationality clause is Article 7 in the postwar law.

It is possible that, at the 6 December 1951 meeting, the Japanese government officials were intentionally citing the older laws -- which had been in effect when Chosenese (Koreans), as (imperial) Japanese subjects, would have qualified for pilot licenses and mineral rights. If so, then this would be an example of "legacy law" where the "origin" of a legal act -- such the issuing of a license or a formal recognition of rights -- would have been the law in force at the time of the act.

It is also possible that the KDMJ minutes reflect the ingrained usage in the minds of the Korea-side delegates, some of whom were educated -- a few in law -- in imperial Japanese universities and had even worked as civil servants. The minutes -- or rather "reports" -- for the 6 and 7 December 1951 meetings include several errors in the naming of Japanese government organs. See the Chronology elsewhere on this page for details.

3. Public notaries

Section 3 in the minutes is titled 法務部関係 (Hōmu-bu kankei) or "Legal affairs deparment related). This title reflects an interesting example of the kind of errors which appear in KDMJ's minutes.

法務部 (Hōmu-bu) was the name of ROK's Ministry of Justice. Hiraga Kenta, the Japan-side delegate who addressed "Ministry of Justice related" laws, was a legalist in Japan's Attorney General's Office, which was then called 法務府 (Hōmu-fu) -- though before that it had been 法務庁 (Hōmu-chō), and before that it had been -- and later again became -- 法務省 (Hōmu-shō) as it is today, the "Ministry of Justice".

In any event, Hiraga Kenta -- representing the Attorney General's Office (AGO) -- said that AGO-related laws had a "shall be a national of Japan and a person of full age" (日本国民ニシテ成年者タルコト Nihon kokumin ni shite seinensha taru koto) provision only in the case of public notories (公証人 kōshōnin). To his knowledge, there were no Korean public notaries in Japan at the time.

"public notaries"

"Public notaries" are not are nothing like the likes of "notory publics" in most of the United States and Canada, who are "lay" notaries with limited powers. Notaries in Japan are appointed by the Ministry of Justice from the ranks of court justices, prosecutors, attorneys, and Ministry of Affairs bureau chiefs, and others, who have passed state judicial exams, completed state judicial training, and amassed many years of actual legal experience. There are about 50 public notary offices in Japan, and about 500 notaries, who work under district Legal Affairs Bureaus. Their work includes legal document authentication, but also the creation of various court recognized legal instruments, including deeds and wills.

The public notary in Japan who wrote my will was the sole notary, with two secretaries, in a small office with a catchment of a few small towns including mine. The catchment population is several times the population of the entire county in Californai where I last lived, which has dozens of "notary publics" who require only a few hours of training and generally oinly witness signatures and oaths.

4. Foreign investments

The Foreign Investment Committee official's overview of nationality limitations on financial activities in Japan proved to be the most controversial and time-consuming, as loss of Japanese nationality would hamper the vocational activities of Korean entrepreneurs. The Japan side said it was prepared to consider separate treatment for Koreans in Japan through government orders or revisions of laws.

5. Civil servants

KDMJ's minutes gave the least space to public officials, but the entire section is worth translating in full (KRN 81: 189-190, NKBK 81:66-67, Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation, my English translation).

5. 公務員法関係

公務員法は日本国籍を要件にしていない。法務府としては解釈と意見がまちまちだが、大体「公権力の行使を随伴する職場を内容とする官職の公務員は、外国人が就業できないという意見が有力でというもので、現在在日韓国人で日本国家公務員の者は一名もなく、ただ地方公務員として二百名ほど韓人がいるが、ほとんど教員という説明があった。

韓国側から、韓国国籍法上、入夫婚姻等を認めないので、韓国籍を離脱できず日本籍を取った者がいるはずだが、どうなのかと質問したが、日本側からは、二重国籍者でも日本国籍があれば全然問題がなく、現在は旧国籍法第二十四条のような規定もないので、法的制限は全くないという答弁があった。

5. Related to civil servant laws

There was an explanation that "Civil [public] servant laws [1947 National Civil Servant Law (国家公務員法 Kokka kōmuin hō) and 1951 (1950) Local Civil Servant Law (地方公務員法 Chihō kōmuin hō)] do not make Japan nationality a condition [for exmployment]. As for the Attorney General's Office, interpretations and opinions vary, but generally the opinion that "as for public officials in government service the content of which is a workplace [post] associated with the exercise of public authority, aliens cannot be in [such] jobs [be assigned to such posts], and presently there is not a single person who is a Korean and a national public official [civil servant]; but there are about 200 Koreans [who are employed] as civil servants, though most are teachers."

From the Korea side, [a delegate] asked -- [ROK] does not recognize incoming husband marriages, under ROK's Nationality Law, so there will be persons who took Japan [register] affiliation [Japan nationality] [and are] unable to separate from [renounce] Korean [register] affiliation [Korean nationality] -- what about them? -- [and] from the Japan side, there was a reply that even if [they] are persons with two nationalitys [dual nationals], if they have Japan nationality there is absolutely no problem; and because [in Japan's 1950 Nationality Law] there is no provision like Article 24 in the [1899] old Nationality law, there are absolutely no legal restrictions.

The above account is at variance with statements on a document the Japan side circulated with its own proposal at the 18 December 1951 (18th) session. See 18 and 22 December 1951 Japan's status agreement drafts for details.

6. Patent attorneys

The Patent Law (特許法 Tokkyohō) provided that aliens who did not have domiciles or places of business in Japan did not have patent rights in Japan. So Koreans in Japan would not be effected.

The Patent Attorney Law (弁理士法 Benrishihō) held that, with the permission of the Minister of Trade and industry, aliens of full age could become patent attorneys, but the minister had not yet designated any foreign countries whose mationals might be permitted to practice patent law in Japan. Presently, there was only 1 alien patent attorney in Japan -- and Indian who had been a patent attorney in Japan before the [1921] Patent Law came into force. A transitional provision had permitted him to continue.

The Japan side said that at present, 3 Koreans were registered as patent attorneys, and that statute or other measures could be taken to allow them to continue to practice.


7 December 1951 meeting

At this session, a follow-up the 6 December 1951 session, Japanese officials representing other Japanese government organs reported how the status of Koreans in Japan would be affected by laws under their supervision. Much of the meeting focused on financial, property, and tax matters.

Time to get down to business

From the KDMJ reports on both the 6 and 7 December meetings, I get the impression that the Japan side was attempting to convince the Korea side that the livelihoods of most Koreans in Japan would not be greatly if at all affected by their loss of nationality -- that life would on as usual for the vast majority, who were not engaged in activities that required Japanese nationality. The minites report a number of remarks by the Japan-side to the effect that the most of the restrictions could be eliminated for Koreans in Japan through statute or other measures.

The 7 December 1951 report ends on the note that, in order to speed up the agreement, it was time for "both sides to submit concrete written proposals on based on deliberations up to now." And that is what they did -- beginning with the very next meeting. Within the next two weeks, the two sides had hammered out what would become the foundation for what -- by April the following year -- became a very workable, essentially ready-to-sign agreement.

Top  


12 December 1951 ROK's 1st status agreement proposal

At this 16th session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, Tanaka Mitsuo, who headed Japan's delegation on the committee, explained that the Japan side's final proposal draft (最終案) would be completed in a few days.

Yu Chin 0, the head of Korea's delegation on the committee, reported that the Korea side, broadly considering the Japan side's opinions and endeavoring to approach them as closely as possible, but without deviating from the home country government's basic line, had produced its final proposal draft. And the Korea side distributed its draft with the understanding that it had not yet been cleared with the home country government.

The Japan side asked the Korea side whether it had considered when an agreement of the kind it was proposing should come into effect. The Korea side replied that it could come into effect on the day the Peace Treaty came into effect.

The two sides then began discussing on-going issues related to status and treatment, making reference to the Korea-side draft. I have integrated some of the discussion into the comments following relevant parts of the draft, which is as follows.

12 December 1951 ROK's 1st status agreement proposal
ROK and Japan would recognize effects of past status acts
but both would prevent dual nationality and statelessness

Permanent residence for qualified Koreans who register with ROK
Deportation of convicts and persons ROK asks Japan to expel

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 233-236, NKBK 81: 74-75). The structural English translation is mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

The format is based on images of the Korean text, and I have restored Sinific numbers where Yi swapped in Arabic numbers for the date of the draft.

Comments

Comments on phrasing highlighted in cyan are based on discussions at the meeting. Comments on phrasing highlighted in rose are my own comments on the highlighted topics

在日韓人の法的地位に関する韓日両国の協定基本要綱
         (韓国側提案)          一九五一年十二月十二日

Basic outline of agreement between Korea and Japan concerning the legal status of Koreans in Japan
         (Korea-side proposal)          12 December 1951

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

一、目的 1. Purpose

本協定は一九四五年八月九日以前から継続して日本に居住する韓国人(以下在日韓国と称する)の特殊な地位に鑑み、韓日両国政府の友誼的協力により、彼らの安全と利益を適切に保護することで韓日両国の将来においての友好関係樹立の基礎を建てることを目的とする。

This agreement takes as its its purpose the building of a foundation for the establishment of friendly relations in the future of the two countries of Korea and Japan, by considering the special status of Koreans residing in Japan continuously from on or before 9 Autust 1945 (hereafter called Koreans in Japan), and through the amicable cooperation of the governments of the two countries of Korea and Japan, suitably protecting their safety and interests.

二、国籍 2. Nationality

一九四五年八月九日以後、韓日両国の身分上の行為に基づいて、各政府が既に取った処置に関しては互いに、その効力を承認することにする。ただしこれに基づいて両国政府は二重国籍者、又は無国籍者が生じることを防ぐために必要な法的手続きを完備することとする。

On or after 9 August 1945, on the basis of acts of status [pursuant to the domestic laws] of the two countries of Japan and Korea, concerning dispositions either government has already taken, [the two governments] mutually acknowledge their effects. However, on the basis of the governments of the two countries will make provisions for necessary legal measures in order to prevent two-nationality persons and no-nationality persons from originating.

"However"

At the 12 December 1951 meeting, in reference to nationality, the Japan side stated that "nationality issues were issues that could not be stipulated [dealt with] with only domestic laws, [while] treatment issues were issues that could be could be [stipulated] with domestic laws" (国籍問題は国内法だけでは規定できない問題で、処遇問題は国内法でできる問題だ). Accordingly, "[an agreement] would be meaningless if there were no nationality issue solutions (in other words, determing that this [person] is Korean, this [person] is Japanese)" (国籍問題解決(即ちこれは韓人で、これは日本人だと定めること)がなければ無意味だ).

Concerning this, the Japan side wondered if Korea would be making laws related to the proviso (但し項 tadashi kō) [proviso clause] in item 2 of the Korea-side proposal. Korea-side representative Yu Chin O replied that of course Korea would have to make a law.

In line with my criteria for structural translation -- an intentionally unpolished provisional rendering that preserves surface forms -- I am translating ただし (tadashi) in Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of 但 (taman) in the Korean text as "however". Clauses marked "tadashi" (但、但し) are called a "tadashigaki" (但し書) in Japanese. In English, such clauses are marked "provided" and called "provisos". In the Korean text of the Korea-side proposal, the nationality proviso is written in line with the main clause. In other instances, it is broken off as a second line.

"acts of status"

Status acts (身分行為 mibun kōi) are acts such as birth, death, marriage, divorced, and adoption and the like, which establish or change an indivdual's legal status. The two governments are agreeing that, in principle, they will recognize the legal effects of any measures the two countries have already made before the date on which Japan signaled its intent to accept the Potsdam Declaration. This includes the territorial laws Japan used to determine status changes in private matters -- such as marriage and adoption -- between Japanese affiliated with different territories -- the prefectural Interior, Taiwan (Formosa), and Chōsen (Korea).

"two-nationality persons and no-nationality persons"

Both states agreed -- as did most states did then and still do now -- to take measures to minimize the occurrence of dual nationality and statelessness. Under Japan's domestic laws, all Koreans in Japan -- at least those as defined in the agreement -- were still Japanese, on account of possessing Japan's nationality. Under ROK's domestic laws, however, they had already become ROK nationals. ROK did not recognize that they were dual nationals, and Japan did not recognize that they had become ROK nationals, but for the purpose of the agreement, the two states are accepting the effects of their respective domestic laws.

When the Peace Treaty comes into force, most -- but not all -- "Koreans in Japan" as defined by ROK would lose Japan's nationality, under Japan's domestic laws. In Japan's eyes, former Chosenese (Koreans) in prefectural (Interior) registers -- the result of inter-territorial status acts, in particular marriage and/or adoption -- would not lose Japan's nationality. These people -- mostly men -- would continue to be "Japanese" under Japan's laws, and "Koreans" under ROK's laws. And they would continue to be dual nationals unless the two governments establish measures to the contrary.

Under the ROK proposal, the two governments would have agreed to establish measures to ensure that such dual nationals have only one nationality. Whether the measures would have given the concerned individuals a choice of nationality, or simply decreed that they would be nationals of the country in which they resided, will never be known. Most (if not all) probably lived in Japan, and I would guess that ROK would simply have agreed that they were Japanese and not Koreans.

Why "Koreans in Japan" would have been or become stateless is not clear here. There are two possible origins of statelessness or "having no nationality" (無国籍 mukokuseki).

  1. A "Korean in Japan" who had lost Japan's nationality, but who ROK might refuse to recognize as its national (see "3. Residence rights" section of ROK's proposal)
  2. A "Korean in Japan" who, after losing Japan's nationality, refused to register as a national of the Republic of Korea, would have no nationality.

"Stateless persons" in KDMJ's minutes of the ROK-Japan talks is usually associated with "unregistered persons" meaning "Koreans in Japan" who would "refuse to" register as ROK nationals -- most likely because they were politically opposed to the ROK government, but for other reasons as well.

三、居住権 3. Residence rights

(1) 在日韓国人に関しては、一定の期間内に韓国政府の駐日外交機関で登録を施行して、善良で法律を遵守する者に対しては登録証明書を発給することとする。

(2) 登録実施に際しては必要に沿って、日本政府の中央・地方の各機関の協力を得ることができる。

(3) 韓国政府の駐日外交機関から登録証明書の発給を受けた者に対しては、その申請によって日本政府は個別的審査を行うことなく、また何らの手数料を徴収せずに永住権を授与することにする。
    ただし場合によっては韓国政府の駐日外交機関と協議して、永住権ではない居住権を授与できる。

(1) Concerning Koreans in Japan, [the government of Korea] will within a specific period carry out registration [of Koreans in Japan] through diplomatic agencies in Japan of the government of Korea, and shall issue registration certificates to persons who are good and observe the law.

(2) As for implementing registration, in line with necessity [as necessary], [Korean agencies] will be able to obtain the cooperation of central and regional organs of the government of Japan.

(3) Toward persons who have received an issuance of a registration certificate from a diplomatic agency in Japan of the government of Korea, in accordance with their application, the government of Japan, without conducting separate [additional individual personal] examinations, and with collecting [imposing] any [kind of] [procedural, administrative] fees, confer the right of permanent residence.
    However, in some cases, in deliberation with a diplomatic agency in Japan of the government of Korea, [the government of Japan] may confer a right of residence that is not a right of permanent residence.

"the cooperation of central and regional organs of the government of Japan"

Japan-side representative (Tanaka) made this remark (KRN 81: 211, NKBK 81:70).

日本側代表から、在日韓国人の登録を日本中央或いは地方公共団体で協力することを要請しているが、前は中央官庁で命令することで地方公共団体でその命令を遵行したが、今は地方公共団体の自治権が強いので、命令を聞かない。したがって協力できないだろう」と言ったが、
韓国側からは「登録申請の受付すらできないのか」と反問すると
日本側では「警察がやればできる。やむを得ない時は警察に依頼する考えはある。登録証は韓国の駐日代表機関の証明に基づいて日本が処理するのがよいようだ」という答弁があった。

The Japan side said, "[You] are requesting [calling on] Japan's central [government] or regional public bodies [local governments] to cooperate [with your (future) embassy and consulates in Japan regarding the] registration [by your country of Koreans in Japan for the purpose of confirming those who, under the agreement, would qualify for rights of permanent residence] -- and in the past [when our] central agencies [issued] orders, regional public bodies obeyed the orders -- but because now the autonomous rights of regional public bodies are strong, they don't listen to orders. Therefore, [they] probably can't [won't] cooperate";
and [when] the Korea side asked, "[You] couldn't even receive registration applications?"
the Japan side replied, "If the police do it we could. As for when [we] cannot but give up [doing otherwise], there is the thought of relying on the police [to do it] [In the event it's unavoidable, we have in mind asking the police to do it]. As for registration certificates, it would probably be okay for Japan to process [applications for permanent residence] based on certificates [issued by] [your] representative organs in Japan."

"regional public bodies . . . don't listen to orders"

Koreans in Japan, though still Japanese, were presumably registered as "aliens" for the purpose of alien registration. The easiest way for the ROK legation in Japan to reach such such Koreans would be to distribute and collect nationality registration forms through the governments of the municipalities in which they resided.

The Japan side is advising the Korea side that such "cooperation" may not be possible. Local governments, under postwar laws inspired by SCAP directives, had considerable autonomy, and were likely to refuse to do work that made them in effect agents of the ROK government. Some municipalities may have cooperated, but those with large numbers of Koreans in Japan who supported the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would have faced massive and disruptive protests.

Whether the Japan side is seriously suggesting that the police could facilitate registration is difficult to say on the surface of the Korea-side minutes of the meeting. I would guess that, in a more sober discussion of possibilities, the police would not have been seen as even a last resort. To involve the police would have been a sure way of inciting mass protests from radical DPRK elements.

The last thing the central Japanese government wanted were mini "Korean wars" in towns and cities with substantial numbers of Korean residents. I view the comments by the Japan side as diplomatic maneuvering away from "cooperation" of the kind ROK was demanding. The Japan had baite the Korea side with suggestions that it would like to cooperate. But I get the impression it had no intention of getting involved in nationality registration. That would be ROK's responsibility. Japan would take it from there.

"regional public bodies . . . don't listen to orders"

The acknowledgment by the Japan side that the central government has less authority than the ROK side may think is hightly interesting -- and prophetic. Many local governments simply refused to go along National Police Agency initiatives to institute universal fingerprinting of everyone in Japan. It was okay to fingerprint registered aliens, but not Japanese.

Many national laws had to be administrated by local governments. Depending on the kind of authority delegated to the local governments regarding a specific law, the local government could resist central government "interference" with its administration of the law.

Until late 1980 and early 1990 revisions in the national Alien Registration Law, local governments had exclusive control and jurisdiction over alien registration matters. Alien registration required fingerprinting, which was done by local governments. During the 1980s, many aliens -- most of them Koreans -- refused to give their fingerprints. However, police could not arrest a fingerprint refuser unless the government of the municipality in which the refuser resided filed a complaint.

During the anti-fingerprint movement, in response to a Ministry of Justice order to report aliens who refused to be fingerprinted, about 700 of the roughly 3000 municipal governments that existed at the time refused to comply with the Ministry of Justice order. The town in which I refused to be fingerprinted was one such municipality.

In 2003, when the central government launched a national registry database system called "Juki Net" (basic residence registration network), a few municipal governments refused to participate, claiming that it was their governmental duty to protect the privacy of their residents. The database included a unique ID number to facilitate nationwide sharing of residence registration data, which included name, address, sex, and date of birth. A 2008 Supreme Court decision overruled (quashed to dismissed) lower court decisions or appeals, to the effect that the national network did not violate Article 13 of the Constitution, which holds that all the people (すべて国民 subete kokumin "all nationals") were to be respected as individuals, et cetera.

"persons who are good and observe the law"

This would have given ROK the option to not recognize as its nationals -- hence not accept responsibility for -- any "Korean in Japan" it deemed was a "good and law-abiding person" -- which would have left all criminals and delinquents, and communist agitators and other rabble rousers, stateless.

四、処遇 4. Treatment

居住権を認定受けた在日韓国人は、参政権を除いては現在享受している権益、又は資格を継続して保障されることとする。
    ただし日本国の重大な利害に影響すると認められる特殊な権益に関しては、両国政府間の協議により一定の期間を定めて、この享有を許可できるようにする。

Koreans in Japan who have received an approval of right of residence, excepting rights of political participation, will continue to be guaranteed the interests [rights and benefits] and qualifications they presently possess [have, enjoy].
    However, concerning special interests [rights and benefits] that are recognized as affecting important interests [gains and losses] of Japan, through deliberation between the two countries [the two countries], determining a specific period], will endeavor to enable approval of the possession [enjoyment] of these [special] interests [rights and benefits].

"interests [rights and benefits] and qualifications"

Regarding treatment, the Japan side said this (KRN 81: 211-213, NKBK 70-71).

韓国側から「処遇問題に関する韓国側案は、わが側で大幅に譲歩して立案したものだと発言したところ日本側から「日本の公務員法に該当する韓人の公務員は教員だけで、韓人で沿岸貿易に従事する人は実際にいないのであり、在日韓人の漁業問題は、韓人が所有している船舶は韓国国旗を掲揚しなければならないのだが、韓国国旗を掲げた船舶が日本領海で漁業操事するのは問題になる点がある。しかし実際問題として現在在日韓人で漁業に従事している人は船舶を賃借しており、漁業組合の組合員にもなっているので別に支障がないだろう。鉱業権は韓国で外国人に許容されていれば相互主義で日本でも許容するだろうと言ったが、
韓国側から「鉱業権は本国で外国人に許容するように草案ができていて、現在審議中である」という答弁があった。

When the Korea side stated that "The Korea-side proposal concerning treatment issues [we] made making broad concessions [compromises] on our side";
the Japan side said, "As for Korean civil servants who fall under Japan's Civil Servant Law, [they are] only [all] teachers; as for people who are Koreans and are engaged in coastal trade, actually there are none; as for fishing industry issues of Koreans in Japan, ships that Koreans own must fly Korea's flag, but there will be the problem of ships that fly Korea's flag conducting fishing industries in Japan's territorial seas. However, as an actual problem, as for people who are Koreans in Japan and are occupied in fishing industries, because [they] are leasing ships, or are members of fishing industry associations, there will probably not be no [legal] obstacles in particular [to their continuing to engage in such work]. As for mining rights, if in Korea [they] are allowed for foreigners, then through reciprociity Japan would also probably allow [such rights to Koreans in Japan]";
and from the Korea side there was a reply that "As for mining rights, a draft [bill] to allow [them] in the home country [ROK] to foreigners is presently under consideration."

Tanaka on the Japan side said Japan's Land Law (土地法 Tochihō) was based on reciprocity. Some of the problems they had been discussing could be resolved through reciprocal guarantees [mutual security] (相互保障) in the Commerce and Navigation Treaty. Stock trading was another example.

Yu on the Korea side replied that the problems being dealt with at the present conference were those which had originated in the past, and those were the problems they were trying to dispose of at the conference. The Commerce and Navigation Treaty and such involved problems that may arise in the future, but they were not, at the conference, trying to dispose of future problems, so "the Japan side must not give thought to only reciprocity (相互主義だけを日本側で考慮してはならない)."

Tanaka explained that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had explained such this opinion of the Korea side to the Ministry of Finance and other related agencies.

"the Japan side must not give thought to only reciprocity"

In other words -- "reciprocity" was a fine principle for resolving problems arising between Japan and ROK negotiating as sovereign states. But the problems they were talking about -- which originated from Japan's annexation and rule of Korea -- were not the sort which were to be solved through reciprocity. Japan had an obligation, in ROK's view, of accommodating the rights and interests of Koreans in Japan regardless of whether ROK's domestic laws made provisions similar to those in Japan's domestic laws -- much less whether bilateral treaties between Japan and ROK had recipical assurances.

"special interests [rights and benefits]"

"Special interests" refers to, for example, the rights and benefits of nationals to hold government and other posts reserved for nationals, and to own ships that operate under Japan's national flag. The Japan side short listed all such "qualifications" in the course of presenting its own draft on 18 December 1951. See 18 and 22 December 1951 Japan's status agreement drafts for details.

五、撤退する時の財産の処分及び搬出 5. Disposal and carying out of property when leaving

(1) 本協定発効後、一定の期間内に在日韓国人が本国に撤退する場合には、居住期間中に日本国政府又は地方公共団体から賦課された一切の税金を納付した後には、何らの税も賦課されず、その所有した財産を処分し、一定の動産を携行できる。

(2) 前項によって携行を許す動産の種類と数量は、[1]商品の密輸出入及び[2]麻薬、爆発物等公案(治安)を害する憂慮がある物品の運搬を防止する目的に符号するように韓日両国政府の協議によって定められるようにする。

(3) 撤退者が所有する現金に対しては金額に制限なく、適当な送金の方途を講究するようにする。

(1) After effectuation of this agreement, in the event that within a specific period a Korean in Japan would leave this country [Japan], after paying all taxes levied by the government in Japan and regional public bodies [local governments] during their period of residence, without being levied any [additional] taxes, will be able to dispose of [such] property [assets] [as] they possess, and carry [with them] specific movable property.

(2) As for the kinds and quantities of movable property [Koreans who leave Japan will be] permitted to carry in accordance with the preceding paragraph, [they] will be determined through deliberation between the governments of the two countries, by coding [identifying kinds and quantities of property] with the object of preventing [1] commodity smuggling out of and into [the countries] and [2] the conveyance [trans-portation] of goods about which there are apprehensions [worries, concerns] they would harm public safety, [such as] narcotics and explosives et cetera.

(3) Toward [regarding] cash that leavers possess, [the two governments] will study appropriate means of sending money, without restrictions in amounts.

"public safety"

The Korean text has 公案 (kōan) for 公安 (kōan), which means "public peace/safety". Translator Yi Yangsu glosses this as 治安 (chian), which is metaphorically closer to "keeping peace/safety" generally, for the sake of the state as much as of the public.

六、退去強制 6. Leave compulsion [Deportation, Expulsion]

居住権が授与された在日韓国人に対しては、日本政府は本協定発効日から一定な期間、左の一に該当する者以外は退去強制をしないこととする。

(a) 日本の裁判所によって無期、又は一年を越える懲役、又は禁錮に処した者
    (ただし執行猶予の言渡しを受けた者を除く)

(b) 韓国政府から退去強制を命じるように要求がある者

Toward [regarding] Koreans in Japan for whom rights of residence have been conferred, the government of Japan, [during] a specific period from the effectuation of this agreement, other than those who fall under one of the items to the left [below], [Japan] will not do leave compulsion [deport, expel] [will not deport them].

(a) Persons who have been sentenced to an indefinite term, or to penal servitude or to confinement exceeding 1 year
    (however, excepting those who have received a decision of stay of execution).

(b) Those for whom, from the government of Korea, there is a request [to the government of Japan] to order [their] leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion].

"Those for whom . . . there is a request"

The Korea-side minutes reveal that the Japan side expressed alarm at paragraph (b) of part 6, which would have given ROK the authority to demand the deportation of any Korean in Japan it wanted in its custody. Japan also expressed concern -- as it repeatedly did -- about the deportation of Koreans who refused to register as ROK nationals.

The Korean minutes of the discussion of the deportation issue at the 12 December 1951 read like this (KRN 81: 216-218, NKBK 81: 71-72).

日本側から「この問題は日本としては強硬にしようと思う。特に(b)項はとても困だ。」と発言したが、
わが側から「この案はわが側の最後の線なので、この線に立脚して具体的条件を設置するのは構わない」としたが、
日本側平賀代表は「登録を拒否する者に対するしない退去強制はどうなのか」を質問し、
わが側から「そんな者を強制退去するのは、わが側で関与しないものだ」と答弁し、「本案を極秘にしてくれるように望む」と要請したが、
日本側から「日本側でも勿論そういうつもりだし、日本側案も韓国側で極秘で取扱ってくれるように」という同意があった。

The Japan side stated "As for this problem, for Japan, [we] think [we'll] be firm. Paragraph (b) is especially very difficult [for us]";
and our [the Korea] side held that "This draft is our side's final line, so as for establishing concrete conditions based on this line, [that's] not a problem [we wouldn't mind]";
and the Japan-side representative Hiraga asked, "What about the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] toward or not toward those [the deporation or not of those] who refuse registration?";
our side replied, "As for doing leave compulsion [As for deporting (expelling)] such persons, our side will not participate [be involved], and requested "[We] desire that [you] keep this draft secret";
and from the Japan side there was consent that, "The Japan side of course intends to do that, and regarding the Japan-side draft [we ask that] it be kept secret by the Korea side."

Top  


15 December 1951 "Consent" vs "liaison and deliberation"

At this 17th meeting of the Legal Status Subcommittee, Japan-side chief delegate Tanaka Mitsuko led off with a report that the Japanese government was presently spending 660,000,000 yen annually on livelihood assistance (生活扶助 seikatsu fujo). Such assistance was being received by 24 in 1,000 Japanese (日本人 Nihonjin), and by 110 in 1,000 Koreans (韓国人 Kankokujin. Among an estimated 550,000 Koreans in Japan, the number of Koreans receiving [livelihood] protection ([生活] 保護 [seikatsu] hogo) had reached 15,000 households and 60,000 individuals.

Korea-side chief delegate Yu Chin O asked if the amount was just livelihood assistance, and Tanaka replied that it also included medical and other kinds of assistance. It was technically difficult to separate the different kinds of livelihood protection he said, then added that most people who receive livelihood assistance also receive other forms of assistance.

Tanaka then reported that about 30 Koreans had mining rights, but they are using Japanese names (姓名 seimei) and so it isn't clear.

Japan's nationality proposal

Tanaka then explained that "relevant [Japanese] ministries had coordinated their opinions, and while they hadn't yet been able to produce final conclusions, [the Japan side] had made a general draft". The Japan side distrubted the nationality part of the proposal at this meeting, and the full proposal at the 18 December 1951 (18th) meeting (see next).

Hiraga Kenta, the Japan-side representative most family with nationality and related status issues, made this observtion about nationality (KRN 81: 222; NKBK 81: 72).

在日韓人が日本国籍離脱をするにおいては日本法を適用し韓国国籍を取得するにおいては韓国法を適用するという原則で、国籍法に関する案を作成したもので、表現方法はもっと研究してもよい

[We] produced [this] draft concerning nationality law, on the principle that, in [with respect fo] Koreans in Japan separating from the nationality of Japan, [we] will apply Japan's laws, and in [with respect to] [them] acquiring ROK nationality, [ROK] will apply ROK's laws, [but] as for how to express this, it would be good to study [this] more.

Note that Japan's proposal concerns neither Japan's nor Korea's "Nationality Law" specifically, but "nationality law" generally. The loss of Japan's nationality by Chosenese and Taiwanese would in fact be in accordance with Japan's customary nationality law, not with its Nationality Law, which has no provisions for aquisition or loss of nationality concomitant with territory changes.

ROK had taken the position that Koreans in Japan (and for that matter everywhere) had already acquired its nationality, pursuant to its Nationality Law. Hence Japan's proposal stops short of linking the loss of Japan's nationality to the acquisition of ROK's nationality. This would not have been case had the two states agreed to a third criterion, such as one involving nationality choice, in the acquisition of one nationality would imply the loss of another.

Later in the session, Yu returned to the nationality problem like this (KRN 81: 224-225; NKBK 81: 73)

わが側代表が「国籍問題に関して韓国側では、大韓民国国籍取得時期に関する日本側解釈を受諾したこともないし合意したこともないので、可能な限り抽象的に表現して韓国側提案のように、二重国籍と無国籍をなくすための積極的な規定をするのはどうか」と言ったのに対して、
日本側平賀代表は「それも構わないだろうが、日本側提案は必ずこうしなければならないという絶対的なものではなく、この提案に表れた意によって要綱を作成しようというものだ」という説明があった。

Our side's representative said, "Concerning the nationality problem, since on the Korea side, [we] have neither accepted nor agreed to the Japan-side interpretation concerning the time of acquisition of Republic of Korea nationality, how about -- as in the Korea-side proposal expressing [it] as abstractly as possible -- positively stipulating in order to for the sake of eliminating in order to do away with [eliminate] dual nationality and statelessness?";
toward which there was an explanation [from] Japan-side representative Hiraga that, "That's probably not a problem [we wouldn't mind], but [keep in mind that] the Japan-side proposal is not an absolute thing [such] that [we] must do [everything] this way, [but] is something that trys to create an outline in accordance with the meanings [intentions, feelings] that appear in this proposal."

Nationality clause in Livelihood Protection Law

Yu Chin O returns to the problem of livelihood assistance for indigent Koreans in Japan. He insists that they such assistance must continue. The Korea side had recognized that the "right of political participation" (参政権 sanseiken) was a "right and duty intrinsic [inherent] to nationals" (国民固有の権利義務) [under Japan's Constitution], but that in its view, the term "national" (国民 kokumin) in Japan's Livelihood Protection Law (生活保護法 Seikatsu hōgo hō) could not be interepreted as a "right and duty intrinsic [inherent] to nationals" -- and hence the law must apply to aliens as well. Yu also asserted that seen from the purport of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in examples in other countries, Japan's Livelhood Protection Law had to apply [to Koreans in Japan even after they lost Japan's nationality].

In response to Yu's statement, Tanaka said this (KRN 81: 223-225, NKBK 81: 72-73).

日本側田中代表は「その点はよく知らないが生活保護法が最初にできた時には『国民』という文字がなかったのに、その後昨年に改正する時『国民』という文字を挿入したのだから、その点から見て『国民固有』の権利ではないかと思う」と説明したのに
わが側兪鎮午代表は「『国民』という文字だけでは到底『国民固有』と解釈できない。外国の例を調査したが、どのような生活扶助を施行している国でも外国人に必ず適用している」と主張すると同時に、「現在、在日外国人でこの法の適用を受けている人は韓国人だけなのか」と質問したのに対して
日本側田中代表は「韓国人と台湾人だけだ」と答弁すると同時に、「韓国人はこれを悪用している者がいる。したがってこの際にこうやって悪用している者がいないようにしなければならない」と話した。
わが側兪鎮午代表は「悪用する者を摘発して数字を減少させるのは当然な方策だろうが、本当に生活が困難で扶助が必要な者への扶助を中止するのは人道上重大な問題ではないか」と反駁した。

Japan-side representative Tanaka explained that "I'm not very knowledgable about that point [as to whether other states provide livelihood protection for aliens], but when [Japan's] Livelihood Protection Law was first created the term 'national' was not in [the law], and when it was revised after that last year the term 'national' was inserted, and so seen from that point I think is it not a right "instrinsic [inherent] to nationals?";
and representative Yu Chin O on our [Korea] side asserted that "As for the just the term 'national', [you] cannot at all [possibly] interpret [it] as [meaning] 'intrinsic [inherent] to nationals'. [I've] investigated examples in other countries, any country that enforces [a] livelihood assistance [law], [they] invariably apply [it] to aliens" -- and at the same time asked the question, "Presently, as for people who are foreigners in Japan and are reciving livelihood assistance, is [it] just Koreans?"; toward which Japan-side representative Tanaka replied, "[it] is just Koreans and Taiwanese" -- and at the same time said, "As for Koreanse, there are persons who abuse this. Therefore at this time, like this [we] have to do so as there are no persons who abuse [livelihood protection].;
Our [Korea's] side's representative Yu Chin O rebutted, "As for exposing and reducing the number of those who abuse [livelihood protection], [that] is a rightful [mater-of-course] policy, but is not stopping assistance to those whose for whom livelihood [life] is really difficult and assistance is necessary a great [serious] humanitarian problem?"


If Japan wants to promote the return to Korea of all Koreans . . .

The Korea side agreed to hear an explanation about the taxation of people leaving the country from a representative of the Ministry of Finance. Koreans were already paying taxes on personal income, so of course they would pay such taxes when leaving Japan, even if between periods tax payment times. They wouldn't have to pay taxes on the disposal of person property, but proceeds from the sale of business-related property would be taxed as business income, and sales of land and homes would be treated as income from transfer of assets, and the difference in the actual sales price and the assessment value would be taxable.

In response to this, Yu Chin O stated made the following statement (KRN 81: 227-228, NKBK 91: 73-74).

これに対してわが側兪鎮午代表は「一九四五年八月九日以後に日本に来た韓国人が帰国する時には、そういう課税、為替管理等を一般外国人と同様に適用受けるのは当然なことだが、一九四五年八月九日以前から日本に居住している韓国人は一般外国人と違う取扱を受けなければならない。また帰国に随伴する特別取扱は何回もあるものではなく、たった一度しかないものだ」と説明すると同時に、「日本側としては韓人が可能な限り撤退することを希望しているのであって、したがって撤退を奨励する意味でも特別取扱をしなければならないのではないか」と言った。

Toward this our side's representative Yu Chin O explained, "As for when Koreans who came to Japan after 9 August 1945 return to [their] country, to receive [be subject to] application of such taxation, [currency] exchange controls, et cetera the same as with general aliens is rightful [a matter of course], but as for Koreans who have been residing in Japan from on or before 9 August 1951, [they] must receive treatment that is different from [that of] general aliens. And as for special treatment concommitant with return to [their] country [it] is not something that is [exists, occurs] many times, [but] is something that is not [does not exist, does not occur] but only once," and at the same time said "For the Japan side, [you] are hoping that Koreans as far as possible withdraw [retreat, pull back] [from Japan], therefore in the sense even of encouraging withdrawal should you not do [accord them] special treatment?"

The Finance Ministry official made further comments and left.

Deportation of people receiving livelihood assistance

The discussion then turned to the problem of deportation, especially of indigent Koreans. The Japan side was especially concerned about the request by the Korea side that Japan not deport anyone without ROK's "consent" (同意 dōi), as that could be seen as infringing on Japan's sovereignty. The minutes for the 17th meeting end like this (KRN 81: 230-232, NKBK 81: 74).

日本側田中代表から退去強制問題に関して「韓国側が駐日代表機関で在日韓人に対して監督をよくして、日本の出入国管理令運営に対して協力して欲しい。そうしないと後日、この問題が外交問題を起こして韓日友好関係に影響を与えるだろうから、この点を深く考慮して協力してくれるように望む」と要請した後、「退去強制に関しては日本側から韓国側と[連絡] [sic = 「連絡」] するようにしたらどうか。追放該当者がいる時には、事前に韓国代表部と連絡して、具体的にどうするかを定めるのだ。韓国代表部が保護できればよいし、帰国させろとか意見を聞いてから決定しようというもので、[1]これで出入国管理令を韓人に対してだけ適用しないという日本主権の制限になる結果が発生せず、[2]韓国側でも知らない内に追放されたという事態を将来において避けられるという意図だ。関係者の意見を充分に聞き同意を得て、来週火曜日か水曜日まで日本側の案を提出する」と言ったが、
韓国側からは「一定期限を制定して、最小限度その期限内には韓国側提案通りにしてくれることを望む。万一退去強制には韓国側の『同意』を得ようとするなら、即応じる。『連絡』というのは問題にならない」と答弁した。
日本側平賀代表が「結局、生活保護を受ける人の退去強制に関しては一番問題になるだろうが、外国人だからといって扶助をせずに退去を強制できない。兪先生もお話しされたように『国民』としたと、外国人を突然除外することにはならない。人道上からも、世界人権宣言の趣旨から見て、日本が追放しないので、『連絡』とか『協議』と言って追放されないという印象を与えると、悪用又は濫用者を防禦できないので考慮して欲しい」と追加説明があった。

Japan-side representative Tanaka, concerning the leave compulsion [deporation, explusion] issue -- after requesting that "[We] would like the Korea side to well [closely] supervise with regard to Koreans in Japan with [through] the [future] Korean representative [diplomatic] organs in Japan, and cooperate with regard to the operation of Japan's Japan's Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order. If [Korea] does not do that, later this problem will probably ocassion diplomatic problems and impart a [negative] effect on Korea-Japan amicable relations, [we] desire [that you deeply consider this point and cooperate" -- said "Concerning leave compulsion [deporation, explusion], what about making [the provision in the agreement] 'liaison' from the Japan side with the Korea side? When there is an explusion qualfier, [we] liaison with the Korea mission before hand, concretely determine what to do. It would be good if the Korea mission could protect [take protective custody of the concerned person], and [order the concerned person to] return to [your] country [Korea] -- something [we] decide after hearing [everyone's opinions] -- the intention being that [1] this way results are not engendered where [it] becomes a restriction of Japan's sovereignty, in which [if we were to accept your present demand we] would not apply [our] Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control Order only toward Koreans, and [2] the situation in which [someone] is expelled without the even the Korea side knowing would in the future be avoided. [We] will sufficiently hear the opinions of related persons [competent Japanese government agency officials], and by Tuesday or Wednesday next week submit [to you] the Japan-side proposal";
The Korea side replied, "[We] desire that you do as [proposed] in the Korea-side proposition -- that [we] set a specific time limit, and that during that time period [you keep deporations to] a minimum. If perchance, in a [case of] leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion], you seek to obtain the 'consent' of the Korea side, [we] will quickly respond [meet your request]. [The expression] 'liaison' will not become [be] a problem."

[From] Japan-side representative Hiraga there was the additional explanation that, "Ultimately, concerning the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] of people receiving livelihood protection, [it seems it] will probably become [be] the number-one issue, but [we] cannot compell [their] leave, not assisting them saying because they are aliens. As Yu-sensei has said, [we] have regarded [them] as 'nationals', [and so] it will not become a matter of [our] suddenly excluding [them as] aliens. Since from a humanitarian [standpoint] too, seen from the purport of the Unviversal Declaration of Human Rights, Japan will not expel [them] -- and since, if [we] saying 'liaison' or 'deliberation' impart the impression they can't be expelled, [we] can't protect [ourselves against] misuse or abusers -- [we would] like [you] to consider [what we are saying]."

From "consent" to "liaison" and "deliberation"

Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation encloses the first instance of "liaison" (連絡 renraku) in [ square brackets ]. The Korean minutes enclose it in 「single corner brackets 」and enclose other instances, and instances of the other two terms -- "consent" (同意 dōi) and "deliberation" (協議 kyōgi) -- in 『 double corner brackets 』 as does Yi.

Deportation and sovereignty

More important than such mechanics are the implications of the Japan-side appeal to the Korea side to adopt a "liaison and deliberation" procedure rather than a "consent" approach. "Liaison and deliberation" implied bilaterality. "Consent" gave the impression that ROK would have the right to refuse to accept responsibility for ROK nationals in Japan that Japan had reason to want to deport.

Japan is willing to accommodate the special needs of categorical "Koreans in Japan" but it wants to do so on an equal footing with the Republic of Korea. Japan does not want to exceptionalize such Koreans in a way that creates the impression that ROK has superior legal rights over its nationals while they are in Japan.

Japan is presently subject to the extraterritorial authority of the Allied Powers, as exercised through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). However, the moment the San Fransico Peace Treaty comes into effect, Japan will regain is full sovereignty. Moreover, SCAP has permitted Japan to negotiate with ROK on an equal footing, without SCAP interferrence -- even though, legally, SCAP still has the authority to mediate all of Japan's foreign affairs.

When Japan regains its sovereignty, all aliens in Japan -- except U.S. Forces -- will in principle be fully subject to Japanese laws. ROK nationals in Japan -- even those who to some extent will be exceptionalized under the status agreement as "Koreans in Japan" -- will be subject to Japan's laws, not ROK's laws, so long as they are in Japan.

It was one thing for Japan to agree to exempt "Koreans in Japan" from certain forms of alien treatment through a bilateral treaty enforced by special provisions in its domestic laws. It was quite another thing to surrender to another state part of its sovereignty in the form of what amounts to a "veto power" over its right to determine who it permits to live in Japan.

ROK's delegation was not unaware of this. It was merely stressing that "Koreans in Japan" as defined by the agreement constitute a special cohort that deserves to be treated more like Japanese nationals than like general aliens -- given the historical reasons they came to reside in Japan. ROK readily concedes that ROK nationals other than categorical "Koreans in Japan" would rightfully be treated as "general aliens" under Japanese laws.

The ROK delegation was also aware that, in principle, the Republic of Korea -- not Japan -- was responsible for the welfare of its own nationals, including those who resided in other countries. However, ROK had no money. It was not able to compensate Japan for the costs of livelihood assistance, and it would have been hard pressed to accept a sudden influx of indigents. Nor would it have welcomed "Koreans in Japan" who preferred the nationality of the state that was trying to destroy ROK in the on-going Korean War.

What we are seeing here is "negotiation" red in tooth and claw. The two parties are firmly defending separate lines, but are working toward a give-and-take compromise.

"Korea-Japan amicable relations"

I would guess that Japan's delegates actually said -- as they would have written -- "Japan-Korea" (日韓 Nik-Kan) rather than "Korea-Japan" (韓日 Kan-Nichi).

"As Yu-sensei has said"

It is not clear from the Korean minutes how the delegates in the 1951-1952 ROK-Japan talk addressed each other during their deliberations. But the Korean minutes cite Hiraga Kenta as having said "Yu-sensei mo o-hanashi sareta yō ni" (兪先生もお話しされたように). This phrasing represents a fairly normal level of respect for, I would argue, the usual reasons.

Hiraga and Yu

The Greater East Asia War had ended in Japan's defeat barely 6 years before the start of the ROK-Japan talks. But during the war, and for 30 years before the war, Korea had been Chōsen -- a part of Japan.

Hiraga and Yu, as compatriots of Imperial Japan, whether or not they personally agreed to the war, waved the same flag in hopes that Japan would win it. I have no evidence that they ever crossed paths before the start of the bilateral talks, but had they met each other before the end of the war, they might have found they had something in common other than their legal backgrounds. They might have become friends. They might even have married each other's sisters.

Hiraga most likely regarded Yu as a "friendly adversary" -- two professional legalists representing their respective countries in tense negotiations over difficult status and treatment issues. Hiraga probably also looked up to Yu as his elder by several years. And during the war, Yu had studied and then taught law at Keijō University, and during the war had been the head of the law department at Posung College, also in Keijō (Seoul) -- another reason Hiraga would have been inclined to address him as "sensei".

Attorney's are also generally addressed as "sensei" but Yu does not appear to have been an attorney -- unlike Hiraga, who was a trained and experienced judiciary officer, as were many career Attorney General's Office legal bureaucrats. However, neither man's qualifications mattered on the Legal Status Committee, where formally they would have been addressed as "representatives" (代表 daihyō) or "members" (委員 iin).

Is is, however, possible that Yu -- even though older -- also addressed Hiraga as "Hiraga sensei" or just "Sensei" in situations which required addressing him either by a name with a suffix -- or by a title like "daihyō" or "sensei", which can be suffixed to a name or used as a personal pronoun.

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18 December 1951 Japan's 1st status agreement proposal

At this 18 December 1951 (18th) session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, Japan distributed it's 1st proposal of provisions it considered essential in a bilateral status agreement. Japan distributed the first part of this proposal, concerning nationality, at the 15 December (17th) meeting (see above).

The 18 December meeting was dedicated to discussions of differences in ROK's and Japan's views of issues related to their respective proposals. I have integrated parts of their discussions as comments under related sections of the proposal.

Based on discussions and agreements at the 18 December and 19 December meetings, the Japan side partly revised its 18 December proposal in a 2nd proposal, which it distributed at the 21 December 1951 (20th) meeting (see next). The following day, at the 22 December (21st) meeting, which would be the last of the year, the Japan side issued a 3rd proposal (see next).

18 December 1951 Japan's 1st status agreement proposal
Domestic laws will determine loss of Japan's and acquisiton of ROK's nationality
Residentially qualified Koreans in Japan, who are legally registered as aliens,
will be given permanent residence if they submit an ROK registration certificate

Koreans who meet any criterion for deportation of aliens will be deported

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the Japanese text of the original Japanese document (KRN 81: 258-261, NKBK 81: 81-84). The transcription and the structural English translation are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側提案
    (昭和二十六年十二月十八日)

Japan-side proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Showa 26-12-18) [18 December 1951]

  終戦前から引続き合法的に日本に在住する韓国人の国籍及び待遇は左記によることとする。

  The nationality and treatment of Koreans who have legally resided in Japan continuously from before the end of the war will be in accordance with the [provisions] to the left [the following provisions].

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

在日韓国人の日本国籍喪失及び大韓民国国籍取得については、それぞれ当該国の国内法によつて決定する。

Regarding the loss of Japan's nationality and the acquisition of the Republic of Korea's nationality, [they] will be determined in accordance with the domestic laws of the concerned countries.

"in accordance with the domestic laws of the concerned countries"

The Japan and Korea sides resorted to this phrasing in order to get around their essentially incompatible understandings of nationality principles. As a generalization it includes the effects of "on the basis of acts of status [pursuant to the domestic laws] of the two countries" in the 12 December 1951 Korea-side proposal.

The "domestic laws" phrasing essentially means that each state will determine who possesses its nationality unililaterally on the basis of its own domestic laws, without regard to the laws of the other country. The nationality status of concerned persons could have been bilaterally determined only if the two states agreed to a common principle of nationality.

Japan's nationality principle was fully in accord with the nationality principle of the Allied Powers, which deemed that Koreans -- at least those who had stayed in Occupied Japan -- were Japanese and would remain Japanese until determined by a treaty between Japan and a competent Korean state. However, Japan's and Korea's agreement to determine nationality unilaterally, according to their respective domestic laws was bilateral -- hence the unilateral actions each state would take were not arbitrary but mutual.

In other words, Japan's "unilateral" actions were "bilateral".

二、居住権 2. Residence rights

1、永住許可を得ようとする者は、韓国側の発給する証明書を [←判明しにくい]して、日本側当局にその申請をするものとする。

1. as for a person who would obtain permanent residence permission, [the person] will effect its application to Japan-side authorities, submitting [attaching] a certificate [of nationality] issued by the Korea side.

2、前項により永住許可の申請があつた場合、日本側当局は外国人登録令により正式に登録をしている者に限り永住許可を認める。

2. In the event there is an application for permanent residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph, Japan-side authorities will recognize permanent residence permission limited to a person who is properly registered in accordance with the Alien Registration Order.

Treaty provided permanent residence

The window of opportunity was short -- only one year. And Chosenese who aligned themselves with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would not qualify -- unless they bit the ideological bullet and become nationals of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

An applicant also had to be legally registered as an alien, and application would expose the applicant to the sort of scrutiny that might result in the applicant's deportation if authorities found the applicant met any of the conditions for deportation stipulated in the Exit-entry-country (Immigration) control order.

1965 Status Agreement

The 1965 Status Agreement provided for an essentially identical "Permanent residence based on [Status] Agreement" (協定に基づく永住) as it was called in a special exit-enter-country control law to faciliate the agreement -- "Agreement permanent residence" (協定永住) as the status was dubbed in Alien Registration and other government statistics.

The special status of residence was available to qualified ROK nationals who applied within 5 years of the the date the status agreement came into effect in 1966. That gave plenty of time for Chosenese to gain recognition as an ROK national from a an ROK agency in Japan. It also gave the many Chosenese of still supported DPRK time to weigh the advantages of permanent residence as an ROK national against the disadvantages of remaining in the legacy "Chōsen-seki" status -- a de jure alien status as a national of a stateless entity, hence a de facto "stateless" alien. They, of course, were classified along with ROK natiionals in alien statistics.

Permanent residence eased for qualified ROC nationals and others

What Japan -- in its 18 December 1951 proposal to ROK -- was offering Chosenese who had remained in the prefectures, if they became ROK nationals -- would be offered to "Continental Chinese" and a few other aliens who had been residing in Japan from before the end of the war, and offspring born in Japan after the war. Within the first 6 months after Japan regained its sovereignty and control of its borders and foreign affairs on 28 April 1952, nearly 15,000 ROC nationals -- most of them "Continental Chinese" -- had applied for and been granted permission to permanently reside in Japan under extremely relaxed application conditions that recognized their historical ties to Japan.

Potsdam 126-2-6

ROK and Japan would not sign a status agreement until 1965, and qualified ROK nationals in Japan would not acquire a special treaty-accorded permanent residence status until 1966. However, on 28 April 1932, qualified Chosenese and Taiwanese who had lost their Japanese nationality on that day, acquired a special status provided under 126-2-6 of Japan's Potsdam Law, promulgated and enforced the same day. This would be the prototype -- the forerunner, the progenitor -- of the Special Permanent Resident status created in 1991 to replace all special treaty-based and equivalent alien statuses.

See Legacy aliens get permanent residence: How Japan treated nationality losers and long-term residents elsewhere on the website for details on the grants of permanent residence to "Continental Chinese" and others, and on Potsdam 126-2-6 for Chosenese and Taiwanese nationality losers.

3、前項の場合、出入国管理令第二十二条の永住許可の手続き及び条件並びに第六十七条の手数料 (一件につき二千円) の規定を適用しない。

3. In the event of the preceding paragraph, [Japan] will not apply the provisions for procedures and conditions for (of) permanent residence permission in Article 22 or the fee (2000 yen per case) of Article 67 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.

4、第一項により永住許可の申請を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一年とする。

4. The period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize an application of permanent residence permission in accordance with Paragraph 1, will be [within] one year after Peace Treaty effectuation.

5、前各項んいより永住許可を認めた者といえども、出入国管理令第二十四条に規定する退去強制事由に該当する場合は、退去を強制する。

5. Though a person for whom [Japan-side authorities] have recognized permanent residence permission in accordance the all of the foregoing paragraphs, in the event [the person] meets (falls under) [one of the] the causes for leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] provided in Article 24 of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order, [the person] will be compelled to leave [remove oneself from] [Japan].

Article 24 of 1951 Exit-entry-country [Immigration] Control order

Article 24 of the 1951 Immigration Control Order concerned the "compulsory leaving" (退去強制 taikyo kyōsei) better known in English as "deportation". Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of the article provided that the Minister of Foreign Affairs could compel any alien who fell under one of 15 categories of persons to leave the country.

Paragraph 2 of Article 24 obliged the Minister of Foreign Affairs, when making an acknowledgement stipulated in "yo" in Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1, concerning a person engaged in subversive activities, to consult with the Attorney General (法務総裁 Hōmu Sōsai). At the time, border control and alien affairs were under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

See 1951 Immigration Control Order, Article 24, Deportation for details.

三、退去強制 3. Leave compulsion [Deportation, Expulsion]

1、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項四号ハ、(癩予防法の適用を受けている癩患者) ニ、 (精神衞生法に定める精神障害者で同法に定める精神病院又は指定病院に收容されているもの) 及びホ、(貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上国又は地方公共団体の負担になつているもの) に該当する者がある場合には、日本当局は韓国側に事前に連絡する。

1. In the event there is a person who meets (falls under) Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Law Article 24 Paragraph 1 Item 4 c. [ha], (Leprosy patient receiving application of Leprosy Prevention Law) -- [Item 4] d. [ni], (person who is a person with a mental disorder as determined by Mental Hygiene (Health) Law and is interned in (confined to) a mental hospital or designated hospital as determined by the same law) -- and [Item 4] e. [ho], (a person who is a poor person, or vagrant person with a physical disorder and for [in terms of] [one's] living (livelihood) has become a burden of the country (state) or a regional public body (local government) -- Japan-side authorities will liaison with [contact] the Korea side in advance.

2、暴力革命分子及び日韓両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をなす者の退去強制については、韓国側は積極的に日本側当局に協力する。

2. Regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] of violent revolutionary elements, and persons who do (effect, perform) extreme words and actions which harm the friendly and good relations of the two countries Japan and Korea, the Korea side will cooperate with the Japan-side authorities.

四、処遇問題 4. Treatment issues

1、国民固有の権利又は国家に重大な利害関係を有するものとして一般国際慣例上認められている権利又は資格である参政権、公務員となる資格、日本船舶を所有 (沿岸貿易を含む。)する資格等は、日本国籍を喪失するとともに当然これを失う。(なお法人の日本船舶を所有する資格については、関係在日韓国人が日本国籍を喪失することにより船舶法第一条の[条] [←手で訂正しているが判明しにくい] を欠くに至つた場合を含み。)

1. As for intrinsic [inherent] rights of nationals -- as for rights recognized under general international conventions, as those which possess [hold] an important interest [gain and loss] relationship to the state, and the right to participate in government, the qualification to become (be) a public (civil) servant, the qualification to possess (own) a Japan ship (vessel) (including coastal trade.) et cetera -- [Koreans in Japan] concomitant with the loss of Japan's nationality will naturally lose [these]. (Moreover, regarding the qualification of a corporate person to possess (own) a Japan ship (vessel), including the event (case) in which the related (concerned) Korean in Japan, in accordance with losing Japanese nationality, has come to lack [ (fulfilling any of) the conditions ] of Article 1 of the Ship Law.)

Ship Law

Japan's "Ship Law" (船舶法 Senpakuhō), promulgated on 8 March 1899 as Law No. 46 of that year, remains one of the country's oldest standing laws, an excellent example of the simplicity and clarity of early laws, and a well-preserved fossil of contemporary legalese. Article 1 lists 4 classes of vessels other than which Article 2 states cannot fly Japan's national flag (my translation).

第一条   左ノ船舶ヲ以テ日本船舶トス
一 日本ノ官庁又ハ公署ノ所有ニ属スル船舶
二 日本国民ノ所有ニ属スル船舶
三 日本ノ法令ニ依リ設立シタル会社ニシテ其代表者ノ全員及ビ業務ヲ執行スル役員ノ三分ノ二以上ガ日本国民ナルモノノ所有ニ属スル船舶
四 前号ニ掲ゲタル法人以外ノ法人ニシテ日本ノ法令ニ依リ設立シ其代表者ノ全員ガ日本国民ナルモノノ所有ニ属スル船舶
Article 1   The ships to the left (following ships) are regarded as Japanese ships
1. A ship belonging to (in) the possession (ownership) of (belonging to, in the possession of , owned by) government agencies and public offices of Japan
2. A ship belonging to a Japan (Japanese) national
3. A ship belonging to a company which has been established in accordance with the laws of Japan, all of whose representatives and two-thirds or more of the officers who execute its operation are persons who are Japanese nationals
4. A ship belonging to a legal person other than a legal person listed in the preceding item, which has been established in accordance with the laws of Japan, and all of whose representatives are Japanese nationals
第二条   日本船舶ニ非サレハ日本ノ国旗ヲ掲クルコトヲ得ス Article 2   [A ship] when not a Japanese ship cannot hoist the flag of Japan

2、現に正当に享有しているその他の権利又は資格で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されているものについては、日本に居住する限り引続きこれを認める。但し、相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、法令により特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。

2. As for other rights and qualifications [a Korean in Japan] at present rightfully possesses, regarding those which are prohibited or restricted for general aliens, except instances (cases) in which they are specially recognized in accordance with laws and orders, [Japan] will not recognize these. However, as for succession, and transfer to other than a Japanese, excepting instances especially recognized by laws and orders, [Japan] will not recognize these.

Qualifications that required Japanese nationality and
estimates of numbers of Koreans who would be effected

Following the 18 December 1951 proposal is a 2-page document headed "Reference materials" (参考資料), titled "Rights and qualifications prohibited of or restricted for aliens (外国人に禁止又は制限している権利及び資格), and dated 15 December 1951, suggesting that it was prepared especially to accompany the proposal (KRN 81: 262-263, NKBK 81: 85-86).

Each of 13 rights and qualifications is parenthetically followed by the prohibiting or restricting law and article therein. Some qualifications include an estimate of the number of Koreans who would be affected by losing Japanese nationality.

Item (1) reads "Right of participation in government (Constitution, Article 15) Prohibited [of aliens]" (参政権 (拳法第十五条) 禁止). At the time, all Chosenese in Occupied Japan -- meaning all people in Japan who were members of Chōsen registers, hence people not subject to the Interior Family Register Law, were in effect already alienated from suffrage.

Item (2) reads "Civil servant (National Civil Servant Law Article 1 Paragraph 7) Prohibited, Concerned persons / National civil servants several persons / Local civil servants about 200 persons" (国家公務員法第二条第七項) 禁止、該当者 / 国家公務員数名 / 地方公務員約二百名).

I cannot verify a "Paragraph 7 in Article 2" that prohibits aliens. KDMJ's minutes for 6 December 1951 (14th session) of the Legal Status Subcommittee reported that the Japan side said (1) there were no nationality restrictions as such, (2) the general consensus in the Attorney General's Office was that posts which involved exercise of authority were not to be held by aliens, (3) there were no Korean national civil servants but around 200 local civil servants, and (4) most were teachers. See Chronology for details.

The number of Koreans who currently owned a ship qualified to fly a Japanese flag, on account of their being Japanese, who would no longer be able to fly a Japanese flag on their ship, unknown. About 30 Koreans with mining rights would lose their rights. No Koreans were known to be operating radio stations. None were known to be qualified under the Migrant Protection Law (移民保護法 Imin Hogo Hō), the Marine Pilot Law (水先法 Mizusakihō), or the Public Notary Law (公証人法 Kōshōninhō). But Item (10) reads "Attorney (Attorney Law Article 2) Restriction, Concerned [Korean] persons [number] about 5 people (弁護士 (弁護士法第二条) 制限、該当者約5名).

Civil servants

Of interest here is that, before the date of Peace Treaty Effectuation -- i.e., before Chosenese had lost their nationality -- the Cabinet induced the Attorney General's Office to obtain and expedite the processing of considerably simplified applications for permission to natural from a number of Chosenese and Taiwanese civil servants so that their naturalization could be announced in the Official Gazette on the day the Peace Treaty came into effect and they lost their Japanese nationality.

Formally, Chosenese and Taiwanese in Japan, as Japanese, would not have been allowed apply for naturalization until they lost their Japanese nationality and became aliens. The Cabinet requested that the Attorney General's Office disregard some of enforcement guidelines established for the 1950 Nationality Law, which replaced the 1899 Nationality Law from 1 July 1950.

See Expedited naturalizations: How Japan helped Chosenese and Taiwanese civil servants remain Japanese in the "Separation and choice" article on this website for details.

3、生活保護法の適用については、出入国管理法二十四条第一項第四号ホの規定との関係上、生活保護を受ける資格は認めない。

3. Regarding the application of the Living (Life, Livelihood) Protection (Assistance) Law, related to the provision of Item 4 e. [ho] of Paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order, the qualification to receive living assistance will not be recognized.

引揚荷物の持出及び引揚者の送金 5. Taking out withdrawal baggage and sending money

1、引揚荷物の持出は、現行特別取扱による。

1. As for the taking out of withdrawal baggage, [it] will be in accordance with current special treatment.

2、引揚者の送金については、現行の為替管理の下に特別の取扱を認める。但し、送金その他の具体的方法については別途協議する。

2. Regarding sending money by evacuees, [Japan] will recognize special treatment under current exchange-rate control. However, regarding concrete methods of sending money and so forth, [we] will separately deliberate [these].

3、前項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一年とする。

3. The period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize the special treatment of the preceding paragraph, will be [within] one year after Peace Treaty effectuation.

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21 December 1951 Japan's 2nd status agreement proposal

At this 21 December 1951 (20th) session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, the Japan side distributed its 2nd proposal, in which it integrated changes it and the Korea side had agreed to at the 18 December (18th) and 19 December (19th) meetings.

This 2nd proposal was immediately revised in a 3rd Japan-side proposal distributed the following day at the 22 December (21st) meeting, which would be the last of the year (see next).

21 December 1951 Japan's 2nd status agreement proposal
Domestic laws will determine loss and acquisiton of Japan's and ROK's nationalities
Persons receiving livelihood protection will be permitted to stay for up to 3 years,
renewable once if by the end of the term they no longer need liveliohood protection

Koreans who meet any criterion for deportation of aliens will be deported

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the Japanese text of the original Japanese document (KRN 81: 299-303, NKBK 81: 101-105). The transcription and the structural English translation are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

The received tif files show relatively small images of the 5-page document, which was typed or printed on bordered Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper, probably B5 in size. My impression is that the original document shows considerable bleeding of the ink, hence definition is generally poor.

A number of graphs appear as little more than black squares. In some cases there are sufficient traces of detail to read them in their context with a reasonable degree of certainty. I have highlighted in red the few graphs about which I am less certain, and I have transcribed those which I cannot decipher as red ellipses, e.g., ☐☐ for an unreadable 2-graph compound.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側新提案
    (昭和二十六年十二月二十一日)

Japan-side new proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Showa 26-12-21) [21 December 1951]

  終戦前から引続き合法的に日本に在住する韓国人の国籍及び待遇は左記によることとする。

  The nationality and treatment of Koreans who have legally resided in Japan continuously from before the end of the war will be in accordance with the [provisions] to the left [the following provisions].

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

  在日韓国人の国籍の取得、喪失については、両国はそれぞれ他の一方の国内法による決定を尊重する

  Regarding the acquisition and loss of the nationality of Koreans in Japan, both states will respect determinations in accordance with their respective domestic laws.

"the acquisition and loss of the nationality of Koreans in Japan"

Japan's 18 December 1951 proposal provided that domestic laws would apply to the loss of Japanese nationality and the acquisition of Korean nationality. At the 19 December 1951 (19th) session of the Legal Status Subcommittee, the Korea side made the following proposal, which Japan accepted, and integrated into the 21 December 1951 and subsequent drafts of its proposal.

The minutes for the 19 December 1951 minutes read as follows (KRN 81: 266, NKBK 81: 88, my English translation of Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of Korean text of minutes).

日本側田中代表は「語句だけ修正すれば、すぐ案を作成できるが、内容が変われば関係者と合議しなければならない」と説明した。兪鎮午代表は「国籍問題は日本案で『在日韓国人の国籍取得喪失には各その当該国籍国の国内法によって決定する』とするのはどうか」と、日本側案を日本側が修正することを提議したのに対して、日本側からは「よい」と同意した。

Representative Yu Chin O -- saying "As for the nationality problem, in the Japan proposal, what about making [the provision read] 'The acquisition and loss of nationality of Koreans in Japan is to be determined in accordance with the domestic laws of the respective concerned countries'? -- suggested that the Japan side revise the Japan-side proposal, toward which the Japan side, saying "Yes", consented.

二、居住権 2. Residence rights

1、後記5に該当する者を除き、永住許可を得ようとする者は、韓国側の発給する証明書を附して、日本側当局にその申請をするものとする。

1. Except for a person who falls under Later Note 5, as for a person who would obtain permanent residence permission, [the person] will effect its application to Japan-side authorities, submitting [attaching] a certificate [of nationality] issued by the Korea side.

"Later Note 5"

This refers to Paragraph 5 in this section, which in the 18 December 1951 draft excluded all people who Japan regarded as deportable under the provisions of the 1951 Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order, which would apply to Chosenese (Koreans) and Taiwanese (Foromosas) when they became aliens in 1952.

2、前項により永住許可の申請があつた場合、日本側当局は外国人登録令により正式に登録をしている者に限り永住許可を認める。

2. In the event there is an application for permanent residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph, Japan-side authorities will recognize permanent residence permission limited to a person who is properly registered in accordance with the Alien Registration Order.

3、前項の場合、出入国管理令第二十二条の永住許可の手続き及び条件並びに第六十七条の手数料 (一件につき二千円) の規定を適用しない。

3. In the event of the preceding paragraph, [Japan] will not apply the provisions for procedures and conditions for (of) permanent residence permission in Article 22 or the fee (2000 yen per case) of Article 67 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.

4、第一項により永住許可の申請を認める期間は、韓国側の証明書発給に必要な誌備を考慮し、平和条約発効後二年以内の期間につき別途協議決定する。

4. Regarding the period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize an application for permanent residence permission in accordance with Paragraph 1, considering the necessary preparations for certificate issuance of [by] the Korea side, [Japan and ROK] will separately deliberate and determine [it] within a period of 2 years after Peace Treaty effectuation.

"the period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize an application"

The 18 December 1951 Japan-side proposal stipulated 1 year.

At the 19 December (19th) meeting discussion the 18 December proposal, Korea-side representative Yu Chin O stated that 1 year was too short, and asked the Japan side to extend it. Japan-side representative Tanaka Mitsuo asked how much. Yu said he wasn't certain and would study it, but added that 3 years would be good. Tanaka said the 1 year stipulation wasn't fixed, and so the Japan side would consider the Korea-side request for 3 years. (KRN 81: 266-267, NKBK 81: 88)

At the 21 December (20th) meeting at which it distributed its 2nd proposal, the Japan side stated that, "consdering the time limit for Korea-side registration administration [business, work], [we] extended the 1-year permanent-resident-right-application time limit to 2 years" (韓国側登録事務の期限を考慮して、永住権申請期限一年を二年に延長した). (KRN 81: 274, NKBK 81: 89)

The 22 December 1951 Japan-side draft, and the 24 January 1952 Korea-side draft, and subsequent Japan-side drafts, similarly stipluated a "specific period" that would be deliberated separately (see next).

From the 18 March 1952 agreement draft, the period was fixed at 2 years.

The 1965 ROK-Japan Status Agreement, effective from 1966, did not specify a time limit for those who qualified as of the date the agreement came into effect. Applications for lineal descendants born after this date, though, had to be made within 60 days of their birth. A 5-year limit was imposed on applications for lineal descendants, but the limit was extended several times until 1991, when the Special Permanent Resident status (as it has been called since then) became perpetual for lineal descendants.

5、後記待遇問題4により生活保護を受ける者は、出入国管理令第四条第一項第十六号及び同条第二項の規定により三年以内の期限付居住許可を申請することができる。
    、前項により期限付居住許可を認められた者が、期限満了に生活保護法による生活保護を受ける必要がなくなった場合には、一回を限り出入国管理令第二十一条の規定により在留期間の更新を申請することができる。

5. As for a person who receives livelihood protection in accordance with Later Note, Treatment problems 4, [the person] will be able to apply for time-limited [fixed-term] residence permission of within 3 years in accordance with the provisions of Subparagraph 16 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4, and of Paragraph 2 of the same article, of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.
    Moreover, a person for whom [Japanese authorites] have recognized a time-limited residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph -- in the event that after the terminiation of the time limit there is no need to receive livelihood protection in accordance with the Livelihood Protection Law -- [the person], limited to 1 time, will be able to apply for renewal [extension] of the period of stay in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.

"Later Note, . . . Treatment problems 4"

Since the present 5th paragraph in the present "Residence rights" section is the referent for "Later Note 5" in the 1st paragraph in the present "Residence rights" section, Paragraph 4 in the later "Treatment problems" section is a "Later Note" within a "Later Note". These nested "later notes" qualify the "exception" in Paragraph 1 of the present "Residence rights" concerning a person who receives livelihood protection.

This is a very convoluted way of writing a law -- and here the convolution is a sure sign that the draft is in a very primitive stage of development. The next (22 December 1952) version would be considerably less tangled and simpler -- and clarity and conciseness would generally improve with each subsequent version.

"a person who receives livelihood protection"

The 18 December 1951 proposal made no exceptions for anyone who Japan considered subject to deportation under the 1951 Exit-enter-country {Immigration] Order, which would apply to Koreans in Japan when they became aliens in 1952. None would be given permanent residence, and all would have to leave Japan.

At the 19 December (19th) meeting, the Japan side explained that, "As for persons receiving assistance under the Livelihood Protection Law, [we] decided not to give [them] permanent residence but make them apply for permission to reside within 3 years" (生活保護法による扶助を受ける者は、永住許可を付与せず三年以内の居住権を申請さ せるようにした). (KRN 81: 274, NKBK 81: 89)

"time-limited [fixed-term] residence permission of within 3 years"

Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 1951 Immigration Control Order defined 16 statuses of residences in list of 16 subparagraphs. Each status was named after the number of the article, paragraph, and subparagraph. Hence 4-1-14 referred to "a person who would permanently reside in this country" (本邦で永住しようとする者 Honō de eijū shiyō to suru momo).

4-1-16, the last status, was a catch-all miscellaneous status defined as "a person who the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specially determines, other than a person stipulated in the foregoing subparagraphs" (前各号に規定する者を除く外、外務省令で特に定める者 Zen kaku gō ni kitei suru momo o nozoku hoka, Gaimushō de toku ni sadameru mono). A nummber of subcategories of this status of residence would be defined for the descendants of categorial "Koreans in Japan" and "Chinese in Japan" who qualified for Potsdam treatment on account of losing Japan's nationality when the Peace Treaty came into effect.

Paragraph 2 of Article 4, immediately following subparagraph 16, provided as follows (my structural translation).

2 前項各号(第一号、第二号及び第十四号を除く。)に規定する者の在留期間は、三年をこえない範囲内で外務省令で定める。

2. As for the periods of stay of persons stipulated in each subparagraph of the prececeding paragraph (Excepting Subparagraph 2 and Subparagraph 14.), [they] will be determined by Foreign Ministry orders [to be] within a range that does not [not to] exceed 3 years.


"Moreover . . . in accordance with the preceding paragraph"

Hand notations on the received copy number this as paragraph "6" and renumber the following paragraph as paragraph "7".

6、日本側当局は前項により期限付居住許可を認める場合、出入国管理令第六十七条の手数料(一件につき一千円)の規定を通用しない。

6. In the event Japan-side authorities recognize a time-limited residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph, [Japan] will not apply the provision of [for] the [application, administration] fee (1,000 yen per case) of Article 67 of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order.

"1,000 yen per case"

The original (1951) fee for a residence permission application was 1,000 yen.
Today (2014) an Application for Extension of Period of Stay (在留期間更新許可申請) costs 4,000 yen.

The original (1951) fee for permanent residence permission applications was 2,000 yen.
Today (2014) an application for Permanent Residence (永住許可申請) (2014) costs 8,000 yen.

The consumer price index today (2014) is roughly 7 times higher than it was in 1951.

A typical weekly magazine cost 30 yen in 1951.
Today most weeklies run between 350 and 400 yen -- roughtly half the nationwide average minimum hourly wage.

1951 versus 2014 price indices, salaries, and commodity prices

(Compiled from various sources by William Wetherall)

                                    Monthly       Weekly
                 CGPI     CPI       salary        magazine

Start of 20th century

 Meiji 34  1901    0.469

End of World War I

Taisho  6  1917    0.951
        7  1918    1.246

Allied Occpuation of Japan, 1945-1952

Showa  20  1945    3.503
       21  1946   16.27
       22  1947   48.15    109.1
       23  1948  127.9     189.0
       24  1949  208.8     236.9
       25  1950  246.8     219.9     13,238 yen     30 yen
       26  1951  342.5     255.5
       27  1952  349.2     266.1

Start of 21st century and today

Heisei  1  2001  658.0    1802.1
       25  2013  711.1    1734.8    500,000 yen    350 yen

CGPI Corporate goods price index (Prewar base index)
     企業物価指数 (戦前基準指数)
     Source: Bank of Japan (日本銀行)

CPI  Consumer price index (excluding imputed rent of owned home)
     消費者物価指数 (持家の帰属家賃を除く)
     Source: Bank of Japan (日本銀行)
三、退去強制 3. Leave compulsion [Deportation, Expulsion]
Deletion of "Deportation" section

I have transcribed the entire part of the "Deportation" section as written in the received copy of the 21 December 1951 draft. On the copy, the "Deportation" title is manually struck out by a single line. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are renumbered 5 and 6, and are edited as reflected in the following transcriptions.

The 22 December 1951 draft reflects most of these modifications, which suggests that the received copy of the 21 December 1951 draft was used at the 21 December 1951 meeting by one of the Korean delegates to jot down changes that were discussed and agreed to at that meeting -- changes which the Japan side later integrated into the 22 December 1951 draft.

See 22 December 1951 Japan's 3rd status agreement proposal for details

1、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項四号ホ、(貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上国又は地方公共団体の負担になつているもの)に該当する者がある場合には、[Del →] 後記、待遇問題4による☐☐者の☐☐とも☐☐し、平和条約発効後一年間を限り、日本側当局は韓国側に事前に協議しこれを決定する。[Ins →] なお,一定期間については別途協議する。

1. In the event there is a person who meets (falls under) Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Law Article 24 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 4 ho [e] (One who is an indigent person, a vagrant, a person with a physical disorder, or other [person], and for purposes of living are dependent on the state or a regional public body [local government]), [Del →] [Japan authorities] will ☐☐ also with the ☐☐ of the ☐☐ person in accordance with Later Note, Treatment problems 4, [and] limited to 1 year after Peace Treaty effection, Japan-side authorities will deliberate in advance with the Korea side and determine this [whether and how to deport the person]. [Ins →] Moreover, regarding the specific period [Japan and Korea] will separately deliberate [it].

"limited to 1 year"

The received copy shows editorial markup to change 年 to 定期, thus turning 一年間 (ichi-nen-kan) or "one year") into 一定期間 (ittei kikan) or "specific period" -- which comports with the phrasing of corresponding parts in later parts of the draft.

2、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項四号オ、ワ、カ及びヨに規定する暴力革命分子及び日韓両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をなす者の退去強制については、韓国側は積極的に日本側当局に協力する。

2. Regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] of violent revolutionary elements, and persons who inter alia do (effect, perform) extreme words and actions which harm the friendly and good relations of the two countries Japan and Korea stipulated in items o, wa, ka and yo [l, m, n and o] of Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order, the Korea side will cooperate with Japan-side authorities.

四、処遇問題 4. Treatment issues

1、国民固有の権利又は国家に重大な利害関係を有するものとして一般国際慣例上認められている権利又は資格である参政権、公務員となる資格、日本船舶を所有 (沿岸貿易を含む。)する資格等は、当然これを失う。
(なお法人の日本船舶を所有する資格については、船舶法第一条の規定による。)

1. As for intrinsic [inherent] rights of nationals -- as for rights recognized under general international conventions, as those which possess [hold] an important interest [gain and loss] relationship to the state, and the right to participate in government, the qualification to become (be) a public (civil) servant, the qualification to possess (own) a Japan ship (vessel) (including coastal trade.) et cetera, [Koreans in Japan] will naturally lose these.
(Moreover, regarding the qualification of a corporate person to possess (own) a Japan ship, [this] will be in accordance with Article 1 of the Ship Law.)

"(Moroever . . . )"

The received copy shows editing markup to merge the parenthetic "(Moreover . . . )" clause into the main text of the paragraph.

2、既得の鉱業権鉱権を含む。)については、平和条約発効後一定期間を限り、引続きその享有を認める。但し他の外国人への譲渡はこれを認めない。

2. Regarding already-acquired [vested] mining rights (Including lease-mine rights.), limited to a specific period after Peace Treaty effectuation, [Japan] will continuously recognize their possession. However, as for their transfer to another alien, [Japan] will not recognize this.

"mining rights . . . lease-mine rights"

The "so" (租) of "sokō" (租鉱) or "lease mine" means "to borrow". The graph for "so" in on the recevied text is very obscure and could be 祖 -- which, if so, would have been an error.

The original Mining Law (Law No. 45 of 8 March 1905) was abrogated by postwar Mining Law (Law No. 289 of 20 December 1950). The present law is a contining revision of the 1950 law.

Article 17, of both the original 1950 law and the present version of the law, stipulates that "If not a Japanese national or a Japanese corporate person, [one] cannot become a person with mining [mineral] rights" (日本国民又は日本国法人でなければ、鉱業権者となることができない Nihon-koku-min mata wa Nihon-koku-hōjin de nakereba, Kōgyōkensha to naru koto ga dekinai).

Article 87, pertaining to lease-mine rights, states that Article 17 applies mutatis mutandis (準用する junyō) to lease-mine rights and to the mining operations of lease-mine right holders.

"another alien"

The preceding 18 December 1951 Japan-side draft (1st), and the following 22 December 1951 Japan-side draft (3rd), had "other than a Japanese" (日本人以外 Nihonjin igai). The 24 January 1952 Korea-side draft (2nd), and the 26 and 29 January 1952 Japan-side drafts (4th and 5th), likewise had "other than a Japanese" rather than "another alien" (他の外国人 hoka no gaikokujin).

The 1 February 1952 Japan-side draft (6th) stipulates that right property rights will continue to be recognized so long as the person remains domiciled in Japan, which implies the right of a categorical "Korean in Japan" to receive a transfer of rights from another categorial "Korean in Japan", since both would be covered by the same provision.

The preference for "other than a Japanese" over "another alien" may have been to avoid equating categorical "Koreans in Japan" with aliens in general.

Both mining rights and lease-mine rights "become objects of inheritance and other general succession" (相続その他の一般承継の目的となる) but "cannot become the object of rights" (権利の目的となることができない).

3、[Ins →] 現に正当に享有しているその他の権利又は職業で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されている[Del →] その他の権利又は資格で、既得ものについては、既得権者が日本に居住する限り引続きこれを認める。但し、[Ins →] 原則として、相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、法令により特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。[Ins →] なお細目については別途協議する。

3. [Ins →] As for other rights and employment [a Korean in Japan] at present rightfully possesses, [Del →] As for other rights and qualifications → @ A which are prohibited or restricted for general aliens, → B @ regarding those → A [Del →] which are already acquired, B in so far as [so long as] the person [with] the already-aquired [vested] rights resides in Japan, [Japan] will continually recognize these. However, [Ins →] in principle, as for succession, and transfer to other than a Japanese, excepting instances especially recognized by laws and orders, [Japan] will not recognize these. [Ins →] Moreover, regarding details, [Japan and Korea] will separately deliberate [them].

Deletions and insertions

This is an especially heavily edited part of the received text. Keep in mind that the deligions and insertions are not part of the 21 December 1951 draft, but reflect the process by which the 21 December 1951 draft was reworked into the 22 December 1951 draft.

The

4、貧窮者に対する生活保護については、生活保護法による生活保護を受ける資格は認めないが、人道的見地から、平和条約発効後一年間を限り、必要に応じて☐☐として☐☐☐☐を行う。

4. Regarding livelihood protection toward indigents, as for the qualification of receiving livelihood protection in accordance with the Livelihood Protection Law, [Japan] will not recognize [it], but from a humanitarian viewpoint, limited to a one-year interval after Peace Treaty effectuation, [Japan] will, in response to need [as needed], carry out ☐☐ of ☐☐ as ☐☐.

引揚荷物の持出及び引揚者の送金 5. Taking out withdrawal baggage and sending money

1、引揚荷物の持出はIns →] については、原則として現行特別取扱による。

1. [Del →] As for [Ins →] Regarding

2、引揚荷物の国外搬出に対しては、輸出税、輸入税又はその他の税金を賦課しない。

2. [Ins →] Toward the taking out of the country of withdrawal baggage, [Japan] will not levy [impose] export tax, import tax or other charges.

Insertion

The above paragraph was inserted between paragraphs 1 and 2 of the received typescript. The handwriting is difficult to read, but the context, and the number of graphs and the placement of commas in the tentatively transcribed segment, suggests the above wording, which appears in related drafts.

2、引揚者の送金については、現行の為替管理の下に特別の取扱を認める。但し、送金その他の具体的方法については別途協議する。

2. Regarding sending money by withdrawers [leavers], [Japan] will recognize special treatment under current exchange-rate controls. However, regarding concrete methods of sending money and so forth, [Japan] will separately deliberate [these].

Paragraph numbers

The above Paragraph 2, and the following Paragraph 3, are numbered as they were originally numbered in the received text. In the received text, they are manually changed to 3 and 4 to accommodate the insertion of the new Paragraph 2 shown above.

3、前項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一年とする。

3. The period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize the special treatment of the preceding paragraph, will be [within] one year after Peace Treaty effectuation.

Top  


22 December 1951 Japan's 3rd status agreement proposal

The 18 December 1951 Japan-side draft was first revised in Japan's 2nd status agreement proposal on 21 December 1951 (see above), and the 2nd proposal was immediately revised as the following 3rd proposal, which would be the last draft of the year.

Both the 18 December and 21 December 1951 proposals had 5 sections. The 22 December 1951 proposal had 4 sections, reflecting the incorporation of a simplified version of the "Deportation" section in the earlier drafts into the "Residence rights" section. The simplifications reflected Japan's acceptance of many of ROK's demands regarding the application of deportation rules in Japan's Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order to the categorical "Koreans in Japan" to whom the status agreement would apply.

In the following presentation of the 22 December 1951 draft of the legal status proposal, I am showing two versions of the draft -- the Japanese version of the Japan-side draft in the ROK archives, and Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of the Korean translation of the Japan-side draft, also from the ROK archives.

In ROK's archives, the Korean version comes first, followed by the Japanese version. Here I am showing the Japanese version first.

See Status agreement drafts for descriptions of the copies of the 22 December 1951 proposal and related proposals in ROK archives.

22 December 1951 Japan's 3rd status agreement proposal
Domestic laws will determine loss and acquisiton of both Japan's and ROK's nationality
Even poor, vagrant, and physically disabled persons may receive permanent residence
if they have lived in Japan from before the war ended and are certified ROK nationals

Japan will deliberate in advance with ROK before deporting an indigent or sick Korean

Source and markup

The following Japanese texts represent (1) my transcription of the text of the Japanese version of the 22 December 1951 Japan-side status agreement draft (KRN 81: 291-294, NKBK 81: 93-96). (2) a cut-and-paste of Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of a Korean translation of the Japan-side draft (KRN 81: 286-290, NKBK 81: 92), and (3) my structural English translation of the Japanese version with reference to both Yi's Japanese translation of the Korean translation and the Korean translation. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Text of Japanese version of 22 December 1951
Japan-side status agreement proposal

Text of Yi Yansu's Japanese translation of
Korean translation of Japanese proposal

Structural English translation of Japanese draft with reference to
Yi's Japanese translation of the Korean translation and to Korean translation

在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側新提案
    (昭和二十六年十二月二十二日)

在日韓国 [←脱字] の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側新提案
    (檀紀4284年 [1951年] [←翻訳者の説明] 12月22日)

Japan-side new proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Dangi 4284-12-22) [22 December 1951]

  終戦前から引続き合法的に日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び待遇は左記によることとする。

  終戦前から継続して合法的に日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び処遇は左記によるものとする。

  The nationality and treatment of Koreans who have legally stayed in Japan continuously from before the end of the war will be in accordance with the [provisions] to the left [the following provisions].

Text

"stayed in Japan"

The phrase "stay in Japan" (日本に在留する Nihon ni zairyū suru) is possibly only for aliens. The term "zairyū (在留) is used to refer to a person who "stops in" or "remains in" -- i.e., "sojourns" or "stays" -- in a country other than that of their nationality. Being in Japan as a matter of living in Japan would be "reside in Japan" (日本に居住する Nihon ni kyojū suru) regardless of nationality.

The term "kyojū" (居住) is therefore use in the expression "kyojūken" (居住権) or "right of residence". For Japanese, the right to reside in Japan is an unconditional "intrinsic [inherent] right of nationals" (国民固有の権利 kokumin koyū no kenri), but for aliens it is a permitted and conditional right.

The final drafts of the the Korea-Japan status agreement use legally more concise expression "possess a [domicile] address in the country of Japan" (日本国に住所を持つ Nihonkoku ni jūsho o motsu), which also applies Japanese and aliens alike. The implication of "jūsho" (住所) is not merely "address" as of the place where one resides, but is "domicile" as the address of the place where one lives for the purpose of pursuing a livelihood.

一、国籍 一、国籍
I. Nationality

  在日韓国人の国籍の取得喪失について、両国はそれぞれ他の一方の国内法による決定を尊重する

  在日韓国人の国籍の取得喪失に関しては、両国は他の一方の国内法による決定を尊重する

  Regarding the acquisition and loss of the nationality of Koreans in Japan, both states will respect determinations in accordance with their respective domestic laws.

二、居住権 二、居住権
II. Residence rights

1、永住許可を得ようとする者は、韓国側の発給する証明書を附して、日本側当局にその申請をするものとする。

1. 永住許可を得ようとする者は韓国側が発給する証明書を添付して、日本側当局にその申請をすることにする。

1. A person who would try to obtain permanent residence permission, attaching a certificate [of nationality] issued by the Korea side, will effect an application to Japan-side authorities.

2、前項により永住許可の申請があつた場合、日本側当局は外国人登録令により正式に登録をしている者に限り永住許可を認める。

2. 前項によって永住許可の申請があった場合、日本側当局は外国人登録令によって正式に登録をしている者に限って永住許可を認める。

2. In the event there has been an application for permanent residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph, Japan-side authorities will recognize permanent residence permission limited to a person who is properly registered in accordance with the Alien Registration Order.

3、前項の場合、出入国管理令第二十二条の永住許可の手続き及び条件並びに第六十七条の手数料 (一件につき二千円) の規定を適用しない。

3. 前項の場合、出入国管理令第二十二条の永住許可の手続き及び条件、また第六十七条の手数料(一件当り二千円)の規定を適用しない。

3. In the event of the preceding paragraph, [Japan] will not apply the provisions for procedures and conditions for (of) permanent residence permission in Article 22 or the fee (2000 yen per case) of Article 67 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.

4、第一項により永住許可の申請を認める期間は、別途協議する

4. 第一項によって永住許可の申請を認める期間は、別途に協議する

4. The period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize an application of permanent residence permission in accordance with Paragraph 1, will be deliberated separately.

5、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項(貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上国又は地方公共団体の負担になっているもの)に該当する者がいる場合には、平和条約発効後一定期間 [←原文の挿入] 日本側当局は韓国側と事前に協議する。尚右期間については、別途協議する。

5. 出入国管理令第二十四条第一項 [←韓訳は原文の「ホ」を「마」にしてから、「ホ」に書き直した]、(貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上) [←韓訳のない、和訳の誤字] 国家又は地方公共団体の負担になっていること)に該当する者がいる場合には、平和条約発効後一定期間日本側当局は韓国側と事前に協議する。また右期間に関しては別途協議する。

5. In the event there is a person who meets (falls under) Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Law Article 24 Paragraph 1 [Item 4] e. [ho], (a person who is a poor person, or vagrant person, or person with a physical disorder et cetera, and for [purposes of] living [livelihood] has become a burden of the country [state] or a regional public body [local government]) -- within a specific period after peace treaty effecuation, Japan-side authorities will deliberate in advance with the Korea side. Regarding the period to the right [above] [Japan and Korea] will separately deliberate.

6、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項第四号オ、ワ、カ、及びヨに規定する暴力革命分子及び日韓両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をなる者等の退去強制については、韓国側も協力する。

6. 出入国管理令第二十四条第一項第四号オワカ [ ←韓訳は原文の「オ、ワ、カ」を「라파하」にしてから、「オワカ」に書き直した] 及びヨに規定する暴力革命分子、及び韓日両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をする者等の退去強制については、韓国側も協力する。

6. Regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] of violent revolutionary elements stipulated in [items] l., m., n., and o. of Article 24 of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order, and persons who do (effect, perform) extreme words and actions which harm the friendly and good relations of the two countries Japan and Korea, et cetera, the Korea side will also cooperate.

Major change from earlier drafts

The 22 December 1951

  1. The independent section "Leave compulsion [Deporation, Explusion]" (Section 3 of 18 and 21 December 1951 proposals) was deleted, and was simplied within the "Residence rights" section (Section 2 of earlier drafts).
  2. Where the previous draft gave indigent persons a time-limited right-of-residence, the new draft gives them permanent residence.
"ho . . . o, wa, ka, yo"

These are part of the ordered list of causes for deportation. The ordering follows the kana in the "Iroha poem" (いろは歌 Iroha uta), which uses each of 47 kana once in two (almost) standard stanzas of two 7/5 mora couplets each (7/5 6/5 // 7/5 7/5).

いろはにほへと ちりぬるを わかよたれそ つねならむ うゐのおくやま けふこえて あさきゆめみし ゑひもせす
Iro ha nihoeto / chirinuru wo / wakayo tareso / tsune naramu // uwi no okuyama / kefu koete / asaki yume mishi / wihi mo sesu

When used in lists, they correspond to the ordering in alphanumeric lists.

いろはにへと ちりぬるを わかよたれそ・・・
イロハニエト チリヌルヲ ワカヨタレソ . . .
a-b-c-d-e-f-g  h-i-j-k-l  m-n-o-p-q-r . . .
1-2-3-4-5-6-7  8-9-10-11-12  13-14-15-16-17-18 . . .

The translator of the Japanese text rendered katakana ホ (ho) as hangŭ 마 (ma) -- then rendered オ、ワ、カ as 라파하 (ra p'a ha) -- then reaching ヨ, wrote ヨ in the Korean text and changed earlier hangŭ renditions of katakana back to katakana -- probably to be faithful to the notations in the relevant Japanese law.

The string of hangŭl used in the Korean translation is similar to, but not quite the same, as the present-day ordering of hangŭl-indexed Korean dictionaries.

가 나 다 라 마 바 사 아 자 차 카 타 파 하
ka na ta ra ma pa sa a cha ch'a k'a t'a p'a ha

This is comparable to the kana-ordering of Japanese dictionaries.

あ か さ た な は ま や ら わ ん
a ka sa ta na ha ma ya ra wa n

三、処遇問題 三、処遇問題
III. Treatment problem

1、国民固有の権利又は国家に重大な利害関係を有するものとして一般国際慣例上認められている権利又は資格である参政権、公務員となる資格、日本船舶を所有(沿岸貿易を含む)する資格等は、当然これを失う。(なお法人の日本船舶を所有する資格については、船舶法第一条の規定による)

1. 国民固有の権利又は国家に重大な利害関係を持つものとして、一般国際慣例上認められている権利、又は資格である参政権、公務員になる資格、日本船舶を所有(沿岸貿易を含む)する資格等は、当然これを喪失する。(また法人の日本船舶を所有する資格に関しては船舶法第一条の規定による)

1. As for intrinsic [inherent] rights of nationals -- as for rights recognized under general international conventions, as those which possess [hold] an important interest [gain and loss] relationship to the state, and the right to participate in government, the qualification to become (be) a public (civil) servant, the qualification to own a Japan ship (including coastal trade.) et cetera -- [Koreans in Japan] will naturally lose these. (Moreover, regarding the qualification of a corporate person to possess (own) a Japan ship (vessel), [this] will be in accordance with the stipulations of Article 1 of the Ship Law.)

2、現に正当に享有しているその他の権利又は職業で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されているものについては、日本に居住する限り引続きこれを認める。但し原則として相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、法令により特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。
  細目については別途協議する

2. 現在正当に享有しているその他の権利又は職業で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されているものに関しては、日本に在留する限り継続してこれを認める。ただし原則として [←脱落・韓訳は「原則으로서」となる] 相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、法令によって特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。
なお細目に関しては、別途に協議する

2. As for other rights and employment [a Korean in Japan] at present rightfully possesses, regarding things [rights and work] prohibited or restricted for general aliens, in so far as [only if, as long as] [a Korean in Japan] stays [resides] in Japan, [Japan] will continuously recognize them. However, as for inheritance, and transfer to other than a Japanese, excepting instances (cases) specially recognized in accordance with laws and orders, [Japan] will not recognize these.
  Concerning details, [the two states] will separately deliberate [these].

"employment . . . prohibited or restricted for general aliens"

Such work included most national and many local civil service positions. Most Koreans who as Japanese had held such posts, and would otherwise have lost them when losing Japanese nationality, were teachers in local public schools.

四、引揚者に対する措置 四、撤退者に対する措置
4. Measures toward withdrawers [leavers]

1、引揚荷物の国外搬出については、原則として現行輸出貿易管理令に規定する特別取扱によ る。但し、例外的取扱については別途協議する。

1. 撤退荷物の国外搬出については、原則として現行輸出貿易管理令に規定する特別取扱による。ただし例外的取扱に関しては別途協議する。

1. Regarding the taking out of the country of withdrawal baggage, in principle [this] will be in accordance with special treatment stipulated in the operating Export Trade Control Order. However, concerning exceptional treatment, [the two countries] will separately deliberate [this].

"withdrawers [leavers]"

The term "hikiage" (引揚) was most commonly used to refer to pulling out of, or withdrawing or evacuating from, a settled or occupied area. A person who "withdraws" or "pulls out" is a "hikiagemono" (引揚者).

The term "tekkyo" (撤去) means to "leave" or "evacuate" in the sense of "removal (from)" and "departure" and similarly means "evacuation". A "tekkyosha" (撤去者) is person who "leaver" or "evacuee".

The term "hikiage" is commonly translated in English as "repatriation" and "hikiagemono" is similarly translated "repatriate", as is the verb "hikiage suru" (引揚する). While such expressions imply returning to one's place of origin, the place need not be the country of one's nationality.

In later drafts, the term "kikan" (帰還) -- meaning "return" as to one's home or country or other place where one in some sense belongs -- was used. The person thus returning is called a "kikansha" (帰還者) or "returnee".

Export and Trade Control Order

The Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令 Yushutsu bōeki kanri rei) was promulgaged on 1 December 1949 as Cabinet Norder No. 378).

2、引揚荷物の国外搬出に対しては、輸出税、輸入税又はその他の課金を賦課しない。

2. 撤退荷物の国外搬出に対しては、輸出税、輸入税又はその他の課税 [←韓訳は「課金」となる]を賦課しない。

2. Toward the taking out of the country of withdrawal baggage, [Japan] will not levy [impose] export tax, import tax or other charges.

3、引揚者の送金については、現行の為替管理 [←1951-12-23の活字版は「替管理」となる] の下に特別取扱を認める。但し、送金その他の具体的方法については別途協議する。

3. 撤退者の送金については、現行の換管理下に特別取扱を認める。ただし送金その他の具体的方法に関しては別途に協議する。

3. Regarding a withdrawer's sending of money, [Japan] recognizes special treatment under operating exchange controls. However, regarding concrete methods of sending money and so forth, [we] will separately deliberate [these].

4、 前各項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一定期間とし、右期間については別途協議する。

4. 前各項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一定期間とし、右期間に関しては別途協議する。

4. As for the period during which [Japan] recognizes the special treatment of the preceeding paragraphs, [we] will make [it] a specific period [beginning] after Peace Treaty effectuation, and regarding the period to the right [above, i.e., this specific period], [we] will separately deliberate [this].

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23 December 1951 Japan's 4th status agreement proposal

23 December 1951 Japan-side status agreement draft

The 18 December 1951 Japan-side draft was first revised in Japan's 2nd status agreement proposal on 21 December 1951 (see above), and the 2nd proposal was immediately revised as the following 3rd proposal, which would be the last draft of the year.

Both the 18 December and 21 December 1951 proposals had 5 sections. The 22 December 1951 proposal had 4 sections, reflecting the incorporation of a simplified version of the "Deportation" section in the earlier drafts into the "Residence rights" section. The simplifications reflected Japan's acceptance of many of ROK's demands regarding the application of deportation rules in Japan's Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order to the categorical "Koreans in Japan" to whom the status agreement would apply.

In the following presentation of the 22 December 1951 draft of the legal status proposal, I am showing two versions of the draft -- the Japanese version of the Japan-side draft in the ROK archives, and Yi Yangsu's Japanese translation of the Korean translation of the Japan-side draft, also from the ROK archives.

In ROK's archives, the Korean version comes first, followed by the Japanese version. Here I am showing the Japanese version first.

See Status agreement drafts for descriptions of the copies of the 22 December 1951 proposal and related proposals in ROK archives.

23 December 1951 Japan's 4th status agreement proposal
Domestic laws will determine loss and acquisiton of both Japan's and ROK's nationality
Even poor, vagrant, and physically disabled persons may receive permanent residence
if they have lived in Japan from before the war ended and are certified ROK nationals

Japan will deliberate in advance with ROK before deporting an indigent or sick Korean

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted transcription of scans of the Japanese text of the original Japanese document (KRN 81: 295-298, NKBK 81: 97-100). The transcription and the structural English translation are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側新提案
    (昭和二十六年十二月二十三日)

Japan-side new proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Shōwa 26-12-23) [23 December 1951]

  終戦前から引き続き合法的に日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び処偶は在記によることとする。

  The nationality and treatment of Koreans who have legally stayed in Japan continuously from before the end of the war will be in accordance with the [provisions] to the left [the following provisions].

Text

一、国籍 I. Nationality

  在日韓国人の国籍の取得喪失については、両国はそれぞれ国の一方の国内法による決定を尊重する。

  Regarding the acquisition and loss of the nationality of Koreans in Japan, both states will respect determinations in accordance with their respective domestic laws.

二、居住権 II. Residence rights

1、1,永住許可を得ようとする者は、韓国側の発給する証明書を附して、日本側当局にその申請をするものとする。

1. A person who would try to obtain permanent residence permission, attaching a certificate [of nationality] issued by the Korea side, will effect an application to Japan-side authorities.

2、前項により永住許可の申請があった場合、日本側当局は外国人登録令により正式に登録をしている者に限り永住許可を認める。

2. In the event there has been an application for permanent residence permission in accordance with the preceding paragraph, Japan-side authorities will recognize permanent residence permission limited to a person who is properly registered in accordance with the Alien Registration Order.

3、前項の場合、出入国管理令第二十二条の永住許可の手続及び条件並びに第六十七条の手数料(一件につき二千円)の規定を適用しない。

3. In the event of the preceding paragraph, [Japan] will not apply the provisions for procedures and conditions for (of) permanent residence permission in Article 22 or the fee (2000 yen per case) of Article 67 of the Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order.

4、第一項により永住許可の申請を認める期間は、別途協議する。

4. The period [during] which [Japanese authorities] will recognize an application of permanent residence permission in accordance with Paragraph 1, will be deliberated separately.

5、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項ホ、(貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上国又は地方公共団体の負担になっているもの)に該当する者がある場合には、日本側当局は韓国側に事前に連絡する。平和条約発効後一年間日本側当局は韓国側と事前に協議する。 22 DEC 出入国管理令第二十四条第一項ホ (貧困者、放浪者、身体障害者等で生活上国又は地方公共団体の負担になっているもの) に該当する者がいる場合には、平和条約発効後一定期間 日本側当局は韓国側と事前に協議する。尚右期間については途協議する。

RETRANSLATE 5. In the event there is a person who meets (falls under) Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Law Article 24 Paragraph 1 [Item 4] e. [ho], (a person who is a poor person, or vagrant person, or person with a physical disorder et cetera, and for [purposes of] living [livelihood] has become a burden of the country [state] or a regional public body [local government]) -- within a specific period after peace treaty effecuation, Japan-side authorities will deliberate in advance with the Korea side. Regarding the period to the right [above] [Japan and Korea] will separately deliberate.

6、出入国管理令第二十四条第一項第四号オ、ワ、カ、及びヨに発足する。暴力革命分子及び日韓両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をなす者の退去強制については、韓国側は積極的に日本側当局に協力する。 22 DEC 出入国管理令第二十四条第一項第四号オ、ワ、カ、及びヨに規定する暴力革命分子及び日韓両国の友好親善関係を阻害する極端な言動をなる者等の退去強制については、韓国側も協力する。

RETRANSLATE

6. Regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] of violent revolutionary elements stipulated in [items] l., m., n., and o. of Article 24 of the Exit-enter-country (Immigration) Control Order, and persons who do (effect, perform) extreme words and actions which harm the friendly and good relations of the two countries Japan and Korea, et cetera, the Korea side will also cooperate.

三、処遇問題 III. Treatment problem

1、国民固有の権利又は国家に重大な利害関係を有するものとして一般国際慣例上認められている権利又は資格である参政権、公務員となる資格、日本船舶を所有(沿岸貿易を含む。)する資格等は、当然これを失う。(なお法人の日本船舶を所有する資格については、船舶法第一条の規定による。)

1. As for intrinsic [inherent] rights of nationals -- as for rights recognized under general international conventions, as those which possess [hold] an important interest [gain and loss] relationship to the state, and the right to participate in government, the qualification to become (be) a public (civil) servant, the qualification to own a Japan ship (including coastal trade.) et cetera -- [Koreans in Japan] will naturally lose these. (Moreover, regarding the qualification of a corporate person to possess (own) a Japan ship (vessel), [this] will be in accordance with the stipulations of Article 1 of the Ship Law.)

2、現に正当に享有しているその他の権利又は職業で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されているものについては、日本に居住する限り引続きこれを認める。但し、相続又は日本人以外への讓渡は、法令により特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。 OLD 現に正当に享有しているその他の権利又は職業で、一般外国人に禁止又は制限されているものについては、日本に居住する限り引続きこれを認める。但し原則として相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、法令により特に認められる場合を除き、これを認めない。
  細目については別途協議する

RETRANSLATE

2. As for other rights and employment [a Korean in Japan] at present rightfully possesses, regarding things [rights and work] prohibited or restricted for general aliens, in so far as [only if, as long as] [a Korean in Japan] stays [resides] in Japan, [Japan] will continuously recognize them. However, as for inheritance, and transfer to other than a Japanese, excepting instances (cases) specially recognized in accordance with laws and orders, [Japan] will not recognize these.
  Concerning details, [the two states] will separately deliberate [these].

四、引揚者に対する措置 四、撤退者に対する措置
4. Measures toward withdrawers [leavers]

1、引揚荷物の国外持出については、原則として現行輸出貿易管理令に規定する特別取扱による。但し例外的取扱については別途協議する。

1. Regarding the taking out of the country of withdrawal baggage, in principle [this] will be in accordance with special treatment stipulated in the operating Export Trade Control Order. However, concerning exceptional treatment, [the two countries] will separately deliberate [this].

2、引揚荷物の国外持出に対しては、輸出税、輸入税又はその他の料金を賦課しない。 OLD 引揚荷物の国外搬出に対しては、輸出税、輸入税又はその他の課金を賦課しない。

RETRANSLATE

2. Toward the taking out of the country of withdrawal baggage, [Japan] will not levy [impose] export tax, import tax or other charges.

3、引揚者の送金については、現行の為替管理の下に特別の取扱を認める。但し、送金その他の具体的方法については別途協議する。

3. Regarding a withdrawer's sending of money, [Japan] recognizes special treatment under operating exchange controls. However, regarding sending money and other concrete methods, [we] will separately deliberate [these].

4、全各項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一定期間とし、在期間については別途協議する。 OLD 前各項の特別取扱を認める期間は、平和条約発効後一定期間とし、右期間については別途協議する。

RETRANSLATE

4. As for the period during which [Japan] recognizes the special treatment of the preceeding paragraphs, [we] will make [it] a specific period [beginning] after Peace Treaty effectuation, and regarding the period to the right [above, i.e., this specific period], [we] will separately deliberate [this].

Top  


24 January 1952 ROK's 2nd status agreement proposal

After ROK submitted its 1st status agreement proposal on 12 December 1951, Japan took the lead in revising ROK's proposal in accordance with agreements the two states made in Legal Status Subcommittee negotiations. In this, its 2nd (24 January 1952) agreement proposal, ROK has kept the 4-section format of Japan's 3rd (22 December 1951) and most recent proposal, but reworded and changed a number of provisions.

Two days later, on 26 January 1952, Japan would again follow ROK, and as it did in December, with its 4th proposal, which is also quickly revised in accordance with the outcomes of negotiations in the continuing talks. By 1 February 1952, Japan had produced its 6th proposal, which would be the last until 18 March 1952, when the first fully fleshed out bilateral working draft was produced.

Here, as before, I have integrated comments with the presentation of the proposal, including comments based on the Korea-side minutes of related meetings.

24 January 1952 ROK's 2nd status agreement proposal

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 336-339, NKBK 81: 112-113). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する韓国側新提案
    (一九五二年一月二四24日)

Korea-side new proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (1952-1-24) [24 January 1951]

太平洋戦争終結前から継続して日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関しては、左記によるものとする。

Concerning the nationality and treatment of Koreans who have stayed [resided] in Japan continously from before before the end of the Pacific War, will be in accordance with the [provisions] to the left [the following provisions].

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

一九四五年八月九日以後、韓日両国民間の婚姻、養子縁組、認知等、身分法上の行為によって、各政府が既に行った処置に関しては、相互その効力を承認することにする。

[The Republic of Korea and Japan] -- Regarding dispositions the respective governments have already carried out, due to acts under [their respective] status laws -- marriages, adoption alliances, [paternal or maternal] acknowledgements, et cetera between the nationals of Korea and Japan, on or before 9 August 1945 -- mutually acknowledge their effects.

Nationality in accordance with domestic laws

ROK has replaced the general "domestic laws" principle of nationality determination in the nationality section of earlier drafts, with a more concrete "legacy effects of status laws" principle. Though worded very differently, the underlying principle is the same in that "domestic laws" will govern the "effects of status acts" the ultimate status of which is "nationality".

Not alluded to in the wording of either principle was the fact that the "effects" of ROK's and Japan's laws, in the domestic eyes of the two states, were in conflict -- in such a way that resulted in de jure dual nationality and de facto statelessness.

"status laws"

A "status law" is any law or order which determines an individual's civil status and changes in civil status, including personal statuses (such as nationality, sex, or legal competency), and interpersonal statuses (such as whether one is a husband or wife, or a legitimate or illegitimate child, or a son or daughter, or older or younger brother or sister). In Japan and the Republic of Korea, such laws would include civil codes, which include family laws -- family registration laws, which document the effects of family laws -- and nationality laws, which in Japan at least are inseparably related to family registers and share some features of family laws.

Relevant Japanese status laws would include all statute and customary laws, and government orders, that affected status and changes of status for imperial subjects with family registers in the prefectural Interior or in Chōsen (Korea), both as parts of Japan, from the time Japan annexed Korea as Chōsen on 29 August 1910, and all such laws which Japan continued to apply after 2 September 1945 during the Allied Occupation of Japan to the status actions of Japanese in Occupied Japan, including Chosenese (Koreans), who did not lose Japan's nationality until 28 April 1952.

Relevant ROK status laws would be statutes it enacted and enforced, and customary laws it applied, since its emergence as a polity after 2 September 1945, but especially since its formal establishment as a sovereign state on 15 August 1948.

二、居住権 2. Residence rights

1. 永住許可を得ようとする者は、韓国側が発給する証明書を添付して一定の期間内に日本側当局にその申請をすることにする。

1. A person who would try to obtain permanent residence permission, attaching a certificate [of nationality] issued by the Korea side, will effect an application to Japan-side authorities within a specific period of time.

"attaching"

The Japanese equivalent of term used is the Korean draft -- "tenpu" shite" (添付して) -- is the same as that of the Japanese translation of the Korean translation of the 22 December 1951 Japanese draft, which used "fu shite" (附して).

"within a specific period of time"

The 18 December 1951 1st proposal provided 1 year. The 21 December 1951 2nd proposal stated that the period would be determined in separate deliberations within 2 years after the Peace Treaty came into effect. The final round of drafts (18 March through 1 April) provided 2 years.

2. 前項によって永住許可申請がある時は、日本側当局は終戦前から継続して居住する者に対しては永住を許可することとする。

2. When there is permanent residence permission application in accordance with the preceding paragraph, Japan-side authorities will permit permanent residence toward persons [Koreans in Japan] who have continuously resided [in Japan] from before the end of the war.

"persons who have continuously resided in Japan"

This proposal cut the phrase "limited to a person who is properly registered in accordance with the Alien Registration Order" from the the 22 December 1951 draft. The phrase was not really necessary, since in order apply for permission for permanent residence, an alien would have to have registered.

3. 前項の場合、日本の国内法が規定する永住許可の手続き条件及び手数料の規定は、これを適用させない。

3. In the event of the preceeding paragraph, as for provisions of application conditions and fees for permanent residence permission sipulated in domestic laws of Japan, [Japan] will not apply these.

""

Simplification and generalization

This article has simplified and generalized the article in the 22 December 1951 draft, which specified relevant articles in the Exit-enter-country {Immigration] Control Order and cited the 2,000 yen fee per application.

4. 永住許可の効力は、その許可を受けた者の現在日本に居住している直系卑属に及ぶものとする。

4. As for the effect of premanent residence permission, [Japan will regard it] as something which extends to direct lineal descendants of the person who receives the permission, who presently reside in Japan.

"extends to direct lineal descendants"

As a legal statement, this clause anything but concise. Common sensically, it embraces lineal descendants who were born -- presumably in Japan -- after the end of the war. Common sensically, it embraces such descendants who are residing in Japan -- presumably having continously resided in Japan -- "at present" -- whenever that is.

5. 永住許可を認可受けた在日韓国人に対して退去強制を行おうとする時には、平和条約発効後一定期間日本側当局は韓国側と事前に協議する。
    右期間及び協議の方法に関しては別途協議する。

At which time [Japan] would carry out the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] toward a Korean in Japan who has received an approval of permanent residence permission, concerned authorities of Japan will deliberate with the Korea side [during] a specific period after Peace Treaty effectuation.
    Concerning right [above] period and methods of deliberation, [Japan and Korea] will separately deliberate [these].

"specific period"

ROK insisted on Japan providing a period of "grace" during which it would not apply all the deportation criteria specified in Article 24 of its Exit-enter-country [Immigration] Control Order. The initial period of time -- and later provisions for deliberating an extension of the initial period depending on circumstances on the peninsula as well as in Japan -- would remain points of contention in the 29 March and 1 April drafts that were otherwise ready to sign.

三、処遇 3. Treatment

1. 在日韓国人は一般国際慣例上、国民固有の権利と認められている権利、又は資格である参政権、公務員になる資格及び日本船舶を所有する資格等は、これを喪失する。

1. As for Koreans in Japan, as for rights recognized under general international conventions as rights intrinsic [inherent] to nationals, and the right to participate in government which is a qualification, the qualification to become (be) a public (civil) servant, and the qualification to own a Japan ship, et cetera -- [Koreans in Japan] will lose these.

"the right to participate in government which is a qualification"

The 22 December 1951 draft does not characterize "the right to participate in government" -- the right to elect and to be elected, or "suffrage" -- as "being a qualification".

Come to think of it, though, suffrage is a qualification. It usually comes with nationality -- if one satisfies other conditions, such as age, sex (in Japan before December 1945), and legal capacity, et cetera.

Until December 1945, Chosenese and Taiwanese, as Japanese, had equal rights of suffrage if they resided in an election district, which at the time were limited to the prefectural Interior, except for a few remote, sparsely populated localities. In 1945, laws were promulgated to establish some election districts in both Chōsen and Taiwan, but the war ended, and Japan lost its right to govern both territories.

December 1945 revisions in Japan's election extended suffrage to woman, but limited suffrage to Japanese who resided in Occupied Japan and were subject to the Interior family register law, Chosenese and Taiwanese who resided in Occupied Japan were Japanese, but under the terms of the surrender, Korea (Chōsen) and Formosa (Taiwan) -- and their household registers -- were no longer within Japan's legal control and jursidiction.

2. 現在、所有しているその他の権益又は職系 [sic = 業 (韓国版の原文)] は、日本に居住する限りこれを認める。ただし一定な期間を経過した後には、一般外国人に対して禁止しているものに対しては、相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、原則的にこれを認めない。細目に関しては別途協議する。

2. As for other interests [rights and benefits] and employmen [a Korean in Japan] at present possesses, [Japan] will recognize them in so far as [as long as] [the person] resides in Japan. However, after the passage of a specific period, regarding something [interests and employment] prohibited toward [of] general aliens, as for inheritance, and transfer to other than a Japanese, in principle [Japan] will not recognize these. Concerning details, [the two states] will separately deliberate [these].

四、帰還 4. Return

1. 在日韓国人が一定な期間内に本国へ帰還する場合には、居住期間中日本国政府又は地方公共団体から負課された一切の税金を納付した後には、その所有した財産を日本国民と同一な条件で処分し、また何らの税金を負課させず、動産を携行できることとする。

""

2. 前項によって携行が許諾される動産の種類及び数量に関しては、密貿易及び麻薬、爆発物等禁輸品の運搬を防止する目的に符合するように別途協議する。

""

3. 帰還者はその所有する現金を、本国に送金できる。
送金の具体的方法に関しては別途協議する。

4. 日本国政府から現在生活扶助金の支給を受けている者が一定な期間内に本国へ帰還する場合には、日本国政府は別途の協議で定めるところにより、帰還に必要な費用その他の便宜を供与することとする。

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26 January 1952 Japan's 5th status agreement proposal

26 January 1952 Japan's 5th status agreement proposal

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 347-350, NKBK 81: 114-115). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

(韓訳)
在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日本側提案
    (昭和二七年一月二六日)

Japan-side proposal concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Showa 27-1-26) [26 January 1952]

終戦前から継続日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び処遇は、左記によるものとする。

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

1. 日韓両国は、在日韓国人が大韓民国国民であり、日本国民でないことを承認する。

2. 日韓両国は、この協定の効力発生する時までの間に、日本人及び韓国人相互間に取ることになった身分関係に関して、両国の国内法の適用によって、既に発生した効力を承認する。

""

二、居住権 2. Residence rights

1.永住許可を得ようとする在日韓国人は、韓国政府の発給する証明書を添付して、一定期間内に日本国政府に申請することとする。

2. 前項によって永住許可申請がある場合に、日本国政府が終戦前から継続居住すると認める者に対しては永住を許可することとする。そういう場合に、出入国に関する現行の日本国法令に規定する永住許可の手続き及び条件、手数料の規定は適用しない。

""

3. 永住許可を受けた者で、一定期間内に退去強制の事由に該当する者がいる時は、両国政府は退去強制の実施上必要な事項に関して協議又は連絡することとする。

""

三、処遇 3. Treatment

1. 在日韓国人は一般国際慣例上、国民固有の権利、又は国家に重大な利害関係がある権利、又は資格と認められている参政権、公務員になる資格、日本船舶を所有する資格等を喪失する。

2. 前項に規定されていること以外に、在日韓国人が本協定発効時享有している権利又は資格で、日本国法令によって一般外国人に禁止又は制限されていることに関しては、本人が日本国に居住する限り、原則として継続これを認める。ただし相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、原則としてこれを認めない。細目に関しては別途協議する。

四、帰還 4. Return

1. 在日韓国人が一定期間内に韓国へ帰還する時に携帯する動産に関しては、居住期間中日本国政府又は地方公共団体から賦課された全ての税金を納付した以上は、締約国政府によって何らの税金を賦課しないこととする。

""

2. 在日韓国人が帰還に際して携行する動産の種類及び数量に関しては、貿易管理の目的に符合するよう別途協議する。

3. 帰還者の所有する現金の本国送金方法に関しては、為替管理の目的に符合するよう別途協 議する。

4. 日本国又は地方公共団体から現在生活上救済を受けている者が、本協定発効後三年以内に 韓国へ帰還する場合には、日韓両国政府は、別途に定めるところにより、帰還に必要な諸 便宜を供与することとする。

""

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29 January 1952 Japan's 6th status agreement proposal

29 January 1952 Japan's 6th status agreement proposal

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 359-363, NKBK 81: 117-118). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

(韓訳)
在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇等に関する新提案
    (世紀一九五二年一月二九日)

New proposal concerning inter alia nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    (Seiki 1952-1-29) [Western Era 29 January 1951]

終戦前から継続して日本に在留する韓国人の国籍及び処遇等は、左記によるものとする。

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

1. 韓日両国は、在日韓国人が大韓民国国民であり、日本国民でないことを承認する。

2. 韓日両国は、この協定の効力発生日に至る間に、日本人及び韓国人相互間の身分関係に関する両国の国内法の適用によって、既に発生した効果を承認する。

""

二、居住 2. Residence

1. 永住許可を得ようとする在日韓国人は、韓国政府が発給する証明書を添付して、一定期間内に日本国政府に申請することとする。

2. 前項によって永住許可申請がある場合には、日本国政府は終戦前から継続して居住すると認める者に対して永住許可をすることとする。この場合、出入国に関する日本国法令に規定する永住許可の手続き条件及び手数料の規定を適用しない。

""

3. 永住許可を受けた者に対する退去強制に関しては、韓日両国の関係当局は一定期間、その運用上必要な事項に関して協議又は連絡することとする。右協議又は連絡の方法に関しては、別途協議する。

""

三、処遇 3. Treatment

1. 在日韓国人は一般国際慣例上、国民固有の権利、又は国家に重大な利害関係を持っている権利、又は資格として認められている参政権、公務員になる資格、日本船舶の所有者になる資格等は喪失する。

""

2. 前項に規定する以外に、在日韓国人が本協定発効時に享有している権利、又は現在従事している職業に対して、日本国法令によって一般外国人に禁止又は制限されていることに関しては、本人が日本国に居住する限り、原則で継続してこれを認める。ただし相続又は日本人以外への譲渡は、原則としてこれは認めない。細目に関しては別途協議する。

""

四、帰還 4. Return

1. 在日韓国人が一定期間内に韓国へ帰還する場合は、彼が所有している動産の携帯に関しては、何らの税金を賦課しないこととする。

2. 在日韓国人が帰還する時、携行する動産の種類及び数量に関しては、日韓両国は貿易管理の目的に合うように別途協議する。

3. 帰還者が所有する資金の本国送金方法に関しては、日韓両国はその為替管理の目的に合うように別途協議する。

4. 日本国又は地方公共団体から現在生活上救済を受けている者が、本協定発効後一定期間内P363 に韓国へ帰還する場合には、日韓両国は別途定めるところによって、帰還に必要な諸便宜を供与することとする。

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1 February 1952 7th proposal 1st status agreement draft

1 February 1952 7th proposal 1st status agreement draft
(1st proposal

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 379-382, NKBK 81: 121-122). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

(韓訳)
在日韓人の国籍及び処遇に関する韓日協定(案)
    (一九五二年二月一日)

ROK-Japan agreement concerning inter alia nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan (draft)
    (1952-2-1) [1 February 1952]

太平洋戦争終結前から継続日本に在留する韓人の国籍及び処遇に関しては、左記によるものとする。

Text

一、国籍 1. Nationality

1. 韓日両国は、在日韓人が大韓民国国民であり、日本国民でないことを確認する。

2. 韓日両国は、この協定の効力発生日に至る間に、日本人及び韓人相互間の身分関係に関して、両国の国内法の適用によって、既に発生した効果を承認する。

""

二、居住 2. Residence

1. 永住許可を得ようとする在日韓人は、韓国関係当局の発給する証明書を添付して、本協定発効後二年以内に、日本国関係当局に申請することとする。

2. 前項によって永住許可の申請がある場合には、日本国関係当局は終戦前から継続居住すると認められる者に対して、永住を許可することとする。そのような場合に、出入国に関する日本国法令に規定する、永住許可の手続き条件及び手数料の規定は適用しない。

""

3. 永住許可を得た者に対する退去強制に関しては、韓日両国の関係当局は本協定発効後二年間、その運用上必要な事項に関して協議することとする。右協議の方法に関しては別途協議する。

三、処遇 3. Treatment

1. 在日韓人は一般国際慣例上、国民固有の権利、又は国家に重大な利害関係がある権利、又は資格と認められている参政権、公務員になる資格、日本船舶の所有者になる資格等は喪失する。

""

2. 前項に規定したもの以外に、在日韓人が本協定発効時現在所有している財産上の権利、又は現在従事している職系で、日本法令によって一般外国人に禁止されていることに関しては、当該人が日本国に居住する限り継続これを認める。右権利、及び職系に関しては別途協議する。

四、帰還 4. Return

1. 在日韓人が本協定発効後二年以内に、韓国へ帰還する場合には、その所有する動産の携行に関しては、税金を賦課しないこととする。携帯する動産の種類及び数量に関しては、別途協議する。

2.前項の帰還者は、その所有する資金を、別途協議によって定める具体的方法によって、本国に送金できる。

3. 第一項の帰還者中の生活困窮者に関しては、日韓両国の関係当局は相互協力して、帰還に必要な諸便宜を供与することとする。

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6 February 1952 Chosenese will have no nationality choice

The 1 February 1952 proposal draft -- the first to use the term "agreement" -- marked the achievement of a prototype agreement that would sleep for few weeks before it underwent further editing and finalization. At this point, on the eve of the start of the formal plenary session on 15 February, for the purpose of hammering out a normalization treaty, Japan began to make concrete preparations for enforcing the provisions of the agreement.

The following document is preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Finance, formerly OŪkurashō (大蔵省), since 2001 Zaimushō (財務省).

6 February 1952 Chosenese will have no nationality choice

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted transcription of a scan of the original Korean document (JPN 17: 1-2). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓人の国籍及び処遇等に関する日韓取極要綱

(一九五二年二月六日)

Outline of the Japan-ROK settlement concerning inter alia nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan

(1952-2-6) [6 February 1952]

  平和条約の発効により日本は朝鮮の独立を承認することとなるが、これに関連し日本に在留する韓人の国籍及び処遇等については、国際法の原則及び国際慣例等 に基づき、左記要綱によることとする。

  In accordance with the effecuation of the Peace Treaty Japan will acknowledge the independence of Chōsen [Korea], but in relation to this, regarding the nationality and treatment of Koreans [Chosenese] staying in Japan,based on principles of international law, international conventions, et cetera, [they] will be accordance with the outline to the left (following outline).

Text

"In accordance with . . . based on . . ."

These are very different expressions. The former implies, and is more formally translated, "pursuant to" specific provisions in a law, treaty, or agreement. The later implies the operation of a non-specific principle which may be related to such a provision but is not itself stipulated in a law or treaty.

If C is "based on" B which is "pursuant to" A, then A directly causes B but not C, which is merely an effect of B in accordance with other causes -- in this case, Japan's domestic legal principles and practices, which Japan considered commensurate with international law and conventions.

"principles of international law, international conventions, et cetera"

The Special Permanent Resident (特別永住者 Tokubetsu eijūsha) qualification today -- a direct descendant of the special measures referred to in this 6 February 1952 document -- is defind for persons who separated from Japan's nationality "based on" the effectuation of the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952.

Japan abandoned (and thereby lost) all claims and rights to "Korea" (Chōsen) and "Formosa" (Taiwan) pursuant to Article 2 of the Peace Treaty. but the separation from [loss of] nationality was based on Japan's application of its domestic laws and practices, which it regarded as being generally consistent with international law and conventions. In general, nationality is linked with territory, hence is gained and lost with gain and loss of territory, barring multilateral arrangements to the contrary.

一、国籍については、平和条約の発効とともに日本国籍を離脱せしむるものとする。この場合、国籍選択は認めない。

1. Regarding nationality, together with the effectuation of the Peace Treaty [Japan will] regard [Koreans staying in Japan] as persons who [effectuation] causes to separate from Japan's nationality [based on international law and conventions]. In this case, as for nationality choice, [Japan] will not recognize [choice].

"causes to separate from Japan's nationality"

Since Korea (Chōsen) and Formosa (Taiwan) were separated from Japan's sovereign territory, and since possession of Japan's nationality is based on possession of a household register within Japan's sovereign dominion, Chosenese (Koreans) and Taiwanese (Formosans) separated -- or were caused y the territoriial separation to separate from -- Japan's nationality.

"nationality choice"

Japan's laws and legal policies cannot Japan cannot directly represent the laws and policies of other countries, hence here it is just "Japan" which does not recognize nationality choice. However, the negataion of recognition of "choice" implies similar negation on the part of at least one other state. Since states have exclusive right to determine who qualifies for their nationality, Japan could not have unilaterally recognized a choice of its or ROK's nationality without reciprocation by ROK in some kind of bilateral or multilateral agreement.

二、日本国籍離脱後の法的地位は、すべての点において一般外国人と同一とする。但し、終戦前から引続き本邦に在留する韓人に対しては、次の如き国籍切替の際の特別装置を講ずるものとする。

  1. 1、居住については、出入国管理令(昭和二十六年政令第三百十九号)に規定する退去強制事由に該当する者を除き、原則として引き続きこれを認めること。
      但し貧困者の退去強制については当分の間特別の考慮を加えること。
  2. 2、処遇については参政権、公務員たる資格、日本船舶の所有者たる資格等の如き一般国際慣例上国民固有の権利又は国家に重大なる利害関係を有する権利又は資格として認められているものを除き、日本国法令により一般外国人に禁止されている権利または職業については原則として引続きこれを認めること。
  3. 3、日本国籍喪失のため本国に引揚げる韓人の携帯荷物及び送金については、一定期間を限り特別の取扱を認めること。

2. As for the legal status [of Koreans saying in Japan] following [their] separation from Japan's nationality, in all points, [Japan] will regard [it] as the same as [that] of general aliens. However, toward Koreans who have continuously stayed in this country from before the end of the war [the end of hostilities], [Japan] will regard [it] as something for which [Japan] will contrive special provisions at the time of nationality switch [from Japan to ROK nationality], as follows.

  1. 1. Regarding residence, except persons who fall under the causes for leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] stipulated in the Exit-enter-country [Imigration] Control Order (Government [Cabinet] order No. 319 of 1951), [Japan] will in principle continuously recognize this.
      However, regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, explusion] of indigent persons, [Japan] will for the present give special consideration.
  2. 2. Regarding treatment -- except for those [rights and qualifications] which are recognized under general international conventions as intrinsic [inherent] rights of nationals or as rights or qualifications which possess [hold] an important interest [gain and loss] relationship to the state, such as the right to participate in government, the qualification of being a public [civil] [public-administration-person], and the qualification of being an owner of a Japan [flag] ship -- regarding rights and work which in accordance with Japan's laws and orders are prohibited for general aliens, [Japan] will in principle continously recognize these.
  3. 3. Regarding the carried baggage and the sending of money [remittance] [from Japan to ROK] of Koreans who withdraw [from Japan] to [their] home country on account of losing Japan's nationality, [Japan] will limited to a specific period recognize special treatment.
"special provisions at the time of nationality switch"

Although at the last minute ROK called off its talks with Japan -- refusing even to sign agreements that were ready to sign, including a status agreement -- Japan followed through with provisional special measures tantamount to the kind that would have been taken had the agreement been signed. Latterday revisions of these measures -- which became effective the moment the Peace Treaty came into force -- define today's Special Permanent Resident (SPR) status for all residentially qualified nationality losers and their qualified lineal descendants.

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7 March 1952 Early English version of status agreement

The Japanese government apparently prepared the following 7 March 1952 translation of the working draft of the status agreement. The translation appears to have been based on the 1 February 1952 version of the agreement (see above).

Whether there were earlier English versions is not clear. This may be the first. The language in this version substantially survived in the 3 and 5 April 1952 Korea-side and Japan-side translations (see below).

7 March 1952 1952 Early English version of status agreement
Full mock-up lacking only signature blocks for government representatives

Source and markup

The following text is a reformatted transcription of a scan of the original English document (JPN 4-557: 4-8). The transcription and the markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Draft of Agreement between Japan and Republic of
Korea concerning Nationality and Treatment of
Korean Nationals Resident in Japan.

March 7, 1952.

    Whereas Japan and the Republic of Korea recognize, as a result of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco, September 8, 1951, the necessity to establish the nationality of Korean Nationals residing continuously in Japan since the termination of the Pacific War or since prior thereto; and

    Whereas Japan and the Republic of Korea recognize the fact that it is desirable to adopt provisional measure as regards the treatment of those Korean Nationals [sic] after the establishment of nationality mentioned above;

    Japan and the Republic of Korea accordingly have concluded the present agreement.

Article 1

    For the purpose of the present Agreement, the term "Korean nationals resident in Japan" shall mean Korean nationals residing continuously in Japan since the termination of the Pacific War or since prior thereto until the coming into form of the present Agreement.

Article 2

(1) Japan and the Republic of Korea will recognise the fact that a Korean national resident in Japan holds the nationality of the Republic of Korea and is not a Japanese national.

(2) Japan and the Republic of Korea will recognise the validity of such acts affecting personal status of a Japanese or a Korean national is relation to each other under the internal laws of either of the contracting parties as has been performed before the coming into force of the present Agreement.

Article 3

(1) In case a Korean national resident in Japan submits, within two years after the coming into force of this Agreement, to the Japanese Government for [sic = an application for permission of]permanent residence together with a certificate issued by the government of the Republic of Korea in lieu of a passport, the Japanese government shall grant permission thereto. In this case, the provisions of the Japanese laws applicable to aliens in general in relation to qualifications, procedure and fees for permanent residence shall not be applicable.

(2) Within three years after the coming into force of the present Agreement the authorities concerned of Japan and the Republic of Korea will consult with each other, in reference to the compulsory deportation of a Korean national resident in Japan granted permission for permanent residence under the preciding [sic = preceding] paragraph on such matters as are require fear the implementation thereof.

(3) In case the government of the Republic of Korea considers at any time after the elapsing of two years and nine months and prior to the expiration of the period under the preceding paragraph, as desirable in view of the internal or external circumstances at the time an extension of the period under the said paragraph with respect to the compulsory deportation from Japan of destitute Korean nationals resident in Japan who are constituting a burden upon Japan or its municipalities, the former may propose to the Japanese government an extension thereof not exceeding two years.

Article 4

(l) A Korean national resident in Japan will he entitled to the property rights actually enjoyed by him at the time of the coming into force of the present Agreement which are prohibited to aliens in general under the provisions of the Japanese laws, provided that he resides continuously in Japan.

(2) In the event a Korean national resident in Japan enjoying the rights provided for by the preceding paragraph deceases, his heir shall assign the rights to a person Japanese or to a Japanese juridical person with a year after the decease of the succeeded person.

Article 5

    A Korean national resident in Japan is entitled to follow the occupation followed by him at the time of the coming into force of the present Agreement which aliens in general are prohibited to follow under the provisions of Japanese laws, provided that he resides in Japan continuously.

Article 6

(1) Any movables owned by a Korean national resident in Japan, which he takes with him when returning to Korea with three years after the coming into force of the present Agreement, will be exempt from taxes. The types and quantity of movables to he taken will be negotiated separately.

(2) The repatriator provided for under the preceding paragraph may remit to the Republic of Korea the funds he owns through the procedures to he negotiated separately.

(3) In case the government of the Republic of Korea considers, at any time between the expiracy of two years and nine months after the coming into force of the present Agreement and the expiration of an [sic = the] period mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, as desirable, in view of the internal or external circumstances, an extension of the period under the said paragraph, the former may propose an extension thereof not exceeding two years.

Article 7

    The present Agreement shall come into force at the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco, September 8, 1951.

    In witness whereof, the representatives of the two governments, being duly authorised by their respective governments, have signed the present Agreement.

    Done in duplicate at Tokyo this        day of       , 1952, in the Japanese, Korean and English languages, all being equally authentic.

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18 March 1952 Advanced working status agreement draft

18 March 1952 Advanced working status agreement draft

Source and markup

The Japanese text is a reformatted cut-and-paste of the entire translation by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean document (KRN 81: 415-421, NKBK 81: 128-129). The structural English translation and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars and guide to markup.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

(仮訳)
在日韓人の国籍及び処遇に関する日韓協定
    (三月十八日)

(Provisional translation)
Draft of Japan-Korea agreement concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan
    [1952] (3-18) [18 March (1952)]

  日本国及び大韓民国は、一九五一年九月八日にサンフランシスコ市で署名された日本国との平和条約の効力発生に随伴し、太平洋戦争の戦闘が終止した日以前から継続して、日本国に在留する韓人の国籍を確定する必要があることを認めるので、
  また、前記の国籍の確定に随伴するこのような韓人の処遇に関して経過措置を講究することが必要と認めるので、
  因って、日本国及び大韓民国は、この協定を締結した。

  Japan and the Republic of Korea, concomitant with day of the the start of effectuation of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed in San Francisco on 8 August 1951, recognizing [ < because (we) recognize] that it is necessary [ < there is need] to determine the nationality (国籍 kokuseki) of Koreans (韓人 Kanjin) who have been residing] in Japan, continuously from on or before the day the hostilities of the Pacific,
  and, recognizing that, concerning the treatment of such Koreans concomittant with the aforementioned determination of nationality, it is necessary to consider transitory mearues,
  accordingly, Japan and the Republic of Korea, conclude this agreement.

"Japan-Korea agreement"

This is the only Korean-language status agreement draft in File 81 in the ROK archives which shows Japan first. All other show "Korea-Japan" and write "the Republic of Korea" before "Japan" in all instances, including the signature section, which conforms with protocol.

Of interest here is that, in the Korean draft, the writer first wrote 韓協定 (Kan kyōtei) -- then later inserted 日 (Nichi) before 韓. Whether this was done immediately after writing 韓協定, or when proofreading the entire agreement, is not clear.

If the former, the translator would have had an opportunity to insert 日 after 韓, and cast the order of states throughout the agreement in the order appropriate for a Korean version of the agreement. If the latter, the translator would have inserted 日 before 韓国 to conform to the order we see in this draft, which is appropriate for a Japanese version of the agreement.

第一条
  この協定において在日韓人というのは、太平洋戦争の戦闘が終止した日以前から、この 協定の効力が発生する日まで継続して日本国に住所を持つ韓人をいう。

Article 1
  In this agreement Koreans in Japan (在日韓人 Zainichi Kanjin) shall refer to Koreans who, from on or before the day the hostilities of the Pacific War ended, until the day the effectuation of this agreement starts, have continuously had a domicile in Japan.

""

第二条
  1. 日本国及び大韓民国は、在日韓人が大韓民国国民であり、日本国民でないことを確認する。
  2. 日本国及び大韓民国は、この協定の効力発生日に至るまでのある時期において、日本人及び韓人相互に亘る身分関係に関して、ある一方の当時国の法令を適用することで、既に発生した効果を承認する。

Article 2
  1. Japan and the Republic of Korea confirm that Koreans in Japan are nationals of the Republic of Korea, and are not nationals of Japan.
  2. Japan and the Republic of Korea reconize the effects which have already engendered, through the application of the laws of one of the countries at the time, concerning the [personal] status relations that mutually span [involve both] Japanese and Koreans, in the time up to the start of effectuation of this treaty.

""

第三条
  1. 日本国政府は、在日韓人がこの協定の効力発生日から二年以内に大韓民国政府の発給する証明書として旅券に代わるだけのものを添付して、日本国政府に永住許可を申請する時には、これを許可する。この場合において、一般外国人に適用される永住許可の条件、手続き及び手数料に関する日本国法令の規定は、適用しない。
  2. 前項の規定によって永住許可を受けた在日韓人の日本国からの退去強制に関しては、この協定の効力発生日からに三年間、日本国政府及び大韓民国政府の当該機関が、その実施のために必要な事項に関して協議して行う。
  3. 大韓民国政府は、この協定の効力発生日から二年九ヶ月を経過した後、前項の期間が満了する時までの期間において、その時の内外の状況によって、貧困者で日本国又はその公共団体の負担になっている在日韓人の日本国からの退去強制に関して同項の期間を延長することが必要と思料する時には、日本国政府に対して二年を越えない範囲内でその延長を提議できる。

Article 3
  1. The Government of Japan -- when a Korean in Japan applies for permanent residence permission to the Government of Japan, attaching someone in lieu of a passport a certificate of registration [nationality] the Government of the Republic of Korea has issued within 2 years of the day of the start of the effectuation of this Agreement -- will approve this [the application]. In this event, as for the provisions of Japan's national laws concerning conditions for permanent residence permission, [application] procedures and [application] fees, [Japan] will not apply [them].
  2. Regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] from Japan of a Korean in Japan who has received permanent residence permission pursuant to the provision of the preceding paragraph -- during 3 years from the day of the start of effectuation of this Agreement, concerned agencies of the Government of the Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea will deliberate and act with regard to matters [particulars] necessary for its implementation.
  3. The Government of the Republic of Korea -- after the passing of 2 years and 9 months from the day of the start of effectuation of this Agreement, in the period up to the time the period of the preceding paragraph ends -- at the time [the government of the Republic of Korea] considers that, due to domestic or foreign conditions at the time, regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] from Japan of a Korean in Japan who is an indigent person [pauper] and has become a burden on Japan or its public bodies, an extension of the term of the preceding paragraph is necessary, within not exceeding 2 years of deliberation, can propose an its extension.

""

第四条
  1. 在日韓人がこの協定の効力発生日に現在持っている財産上の権利として、日本国法令が一般外国人による享有が認められていないものに関しては、その人が継続して日本国に住所を持つ限り、これを享有できる。
2. 前項の権利を享有する在日韓人が死亡した時には、その相続人は、被相人の死亡後一年以内に、その権利を日本国民又は日本国法人に譲渡しなければならない。

Article 4
  1. Koreans in Japan -- as a right with respect to property [a person] presently have in Japan on the day of the start of the effectuation of this agreement -- concerning something for which possession by general aliens is not recognized -- in so far as [only if] the person has continuously had a domicile in Japan -- can possess it.
  2. At the time [When] a Korean in Japan who possesses the right of the previous paragraph dies, the [person's] successors [heirs], within one year of the death of the successee (inheritee), must transfer the right to a national of Japan or a corporate person of Japan.

""

第五条
  在日韓人がこの協定の効力発生時に現在従事している職業で、日本国法令が一般外国人に当該職業に従事する資格を認めていないものに関しては、その人が継続して日本国に住所を持つ場合に限り、これに従事できる。

Article 5
  A Korean in Japan -- regarding the occupation [the person] is engaged in, at the time of the start of the effectuation of this Agreement, [even if] Japan's laws do not recognize in general aliens the qualification to be engaged in the said occupation -- in so far as [only] in the event the person has continuously had a domicile in Japan, can engage in this [the occupation].

""

第六条
  1. 在日韓人で、この協定の効力発生日から三年以内に、大韓民国へ帰還する者に対しては、その所有する動産の携行に関して、関税その他の課徴金を賦課しない。携帯できる動産の種類及び数量に関しては、別途に協議して定める。
  2. 前項の帰還者は、その所有する資金を、別途に協議して定める方法によって、大韓民国に送金できる。
  3. 大韓民国政府は、この協定の効力発生日から二年九ヶ月を経過した後、第一項の期間が満了する時までの間において、その時の内外の状況によって、同項の期間を延長することが必要だと思料する時には、日本国政府に対して二年を越えない範囲内で、その延長を提議できる。

Article 6
  1. Toward a person who is a Korean in Japan, who returns to the Republic of Korea within three years from the day of the start of the effectuation of this Agreement, regarding the taking of movable property they possess, [the Government of Japan] will not levy tariffs or other charges. Regarding the kind and quantity of movable property that can be carried, [they] will be separately determined by deliberation.
  2. The returnees of the previous paragraph, in accordance with laws separately determined by deliberation, can send funds which they possess to the Republic of Korea,
  3. The government of the Republic of Korea, after the passing of 2 years and 9 months from the day of effectuation of this agreement, in the interval up to the time the term of the preceding paragraph ends -- when [at which time] [it] considers that, due to domestic or foreign conditions at the time, an extension of the term of the preceding paragraph is necessary, toward the government of Japan, within not exceeding 2 years of deliberation, can propose its extension.

""

第七条
  この協定は、一九五一年九月八日にサンフランシスコ市で署名された日本国との平和条約の最初の効力発生日に効力を発生する。

Article 7
  This agreement will start effectuation on the day of start of the first [earliest] day of the start of effecutation of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed on 8 September 1951.

  以上の証拠として、両政府の代表者は、このために正当な責任を受けて、この協定に署名した。

  一九五二年 月 日に東京で、共に正文である日本語、韓国語及び英語で本書二通を作成する。

  日本国政府のために

  大韓民国政府のために

  As testimony to the above, the representatives of the two Governments, having received proper responsibility for this purpose, have signed this agreement.

  On __ day __ month 1952 in Tokyo, [the signatory states] will produce two copies of this document in Tokyo, in the Japanese language, the Korean language, and the English language, which together [all of which] are authentic texts.

  For the Government of Japan

  For the Government of the Republic of Korea

""

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29 March and 1 April 1952 Nearly final status agreement drafts

The 29 March 1952 draft of the status agreement was tweaked a bit over the weekend into the 1 April 1952 draft, which is shown below with traces of the changes. The drafts included provisions for continuing to negotiate issues that had not been entirely settled on account of uncertainties about "domestic and foreign conditions" -- namely the Korean War and its implications for agreements concerning the disposition of indigent Koreans and Korean violators of Japanese laws.

These nearly final drafts would probably have been signed had Japan and ROK been able to agree on other issues. They could still have been signed had the two countries agreed that full normalization could wait -- but in the meantime, the nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan needed to be determined.

As it was, Japan went ahead and implemented its determination that Taiwanese and Chosenese would lose their Japanese nationality when Taiwan and Chōsen were formally separated from Japan's sovereign dominion under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It also implemented a special Potsdam status called 126-2-6 for Chosenese and Taiwanese who continuously been in the prefectures since Japan formally surrendered on 2 September 1945. This was the prototype of the Special Permanent Resident status created in 1991 to replace all special treat-based and equivalent alien statuses.

29 March and 1 April 1951 drafts of Korea-Japan status agreement
Why Koreans in Japan lost Japanese nationality
and became 126-2-6 aliens on 28 April 1952

Sources

The Japanese text is a merger of cuts and pastes of the entire translations by Yi Yangsu (李洋秀) of the original Korean texts of 29 March 1952 (KRN 81: 446-453, NKBK 81: 134-135) and 1 April 1952 (KRN 81: 461-468, NKBK 81: 136-138) drafts of the ROK-Japan status agreement. The structural English translations and markup are mine. See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars.

Korean texts

The original Korean texts are written on Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (大韓民國駐日代表部) folio manuscript paper. Both copies are fairly clean but show some corrections. Yi Yangsu's Japanese translations reflect the corrected Korean exts. I will comment only only a couple of the corrections.

Translations and markup

I have embedded the translation of the 29 March 1952 draft in the translation of the 1 April 1952 draft. I have noted where they differ, and their similarities with the text of the 1966 (signed 1965) status agreement, using the following markup scheme.

Black text same in both 29 March and 1 April 1952 drafts
Blue text underscored for commentary
Red text deleted from 29 March draft
Green text added to 1 April draft
Purple text added to 1966 status agreement.

Received Japanese text

Structural English translation

在日韓人韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する韓日協定案

Draft of Korea-Japan agreement concerning nationality and treatment of Koreans in Japan

  大韓民国及び日本国は、千九百五十一年九月八日にサンフランシスコ市で署名された日本国との平和条約の効力発生に随伴し、太平洋戦争の戦闘が終止した日以前から継続して、日本国に在留する韓人の国籍を確定する必要があることを認めるので、
  また、前記の国籍の確定に随伴して、このような韓人の処遇に対して特別な措置を講究することが必要と認めるので、
  因って、大韓民国及び日本国は、この協定を締結した。

  The Republic of Korea (大韓民国 Dai-Kan-Min-Koku "Great Korea People Country") and Japan (日本国 Nihon-koku "Country of Japan"), concomitant with the start of effectuation of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed in San Francisco on 8 August 1951, recognizing [ < because (we) recognize] that it is necessary [ < there is need] to determine the nationality (国籍 kokuseki) of Koreans (韓人 Kanjin) who have been residing] in Japan, continuously from on or before the day the hostilities of the Pacific,
  and, recognizing that, concomitant with determination of the aforementioned nationality, it is necessary to consider special measures toward the treatment of such Koreans,
  accordingly, the Republic of Korea and Japan, conclude this agreement.

The Repblic of Korea and Japan

In the original Korean manuscript of the 29 March 1952 draft, 日本国및大韓民国 has been revised to read 大韓民国및日本国. The former (original) order would be appropriate for the copy of the treaty Japan gives ROK, while the latter would appropriate for the copy ROK gives Japan, when they sign and exchange copies.

Possibly the Korean draft originated as a translation of a Japanese version, which would have listed Japan first -- and the translator later realized that ROK should come first.

"Kanjin" versus "Kankokujin"

The name of the Korean entity in the 29 March 1952 draft is modified in the 1 April 1952 version.

"Kanjin" (韓人 K. Hanin) -- meaning a "Kan" or "Han" person or "Korean -- was frequently used in the past, especially from 1897 to 1910, when the country on the peninsula was called the "Empire of Korea" (大韓帝国) or "Great Han Empire" -- in the same vein that Japan was "Great Nippon Empire" (大日本帝国) and the Great Britain was "Great English Empire" (大英帝国). In the formal name of the Republic of Korea -- "Great Han Republic" (大韓民国) -- "empire" (帝国) has been replaced by "republic" (民国), as in the name of the Republic of China or "China Republic" (中華民国), where 中華 is an elegant term for 中国 and 民国 is an older Sinification of "republic". The names of the People's Republic of China (中華人民共和国) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (朝鮮民主主義人民共和国) use 共和国 for "republic".

"Kankokujin" (韓国人 K. Hangugin), refering to a "person" of "Kankoku" or the "Republic of Korea" -- implies more than Kanjin (韓人) that the "person" is a national of "Kankoku" -- i.e., an ROK national on account of possessing ROK nationality.

I get the impression -- not statistically verified -- that, during the course of the talks, there was a gradual shift from Kanjin (韓人) -- and also Kankō (韓僑 K. Hankyo), meaning "Overseas Korean" -- toward "Kankokujin" (韓国人).

Japan itself continued -- and continues today -- to refer to the entity that was formally part of its sovereign territory from 1910 to 1952 as "Chōsen" (朝鮮), though Chōsen was legally under Japan's control and jurisdiction from 1910 to only 1945. Japan officially used Ch!sen and Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人), meaning "Chosenese", until finally normalizing its relations with ROK in 1965, since which it has referred to "Koreans in Japan" as affiliated with "Kankoku·Chōsen" (韓国・朝鮮), a conflation of "Republic of Korea" and the former Japanese territory of "Chōsen". Some statistics use "Kita Chōsen" (北朝鮮) instead of "Chōsen" -- which at best is confusing, for the term referred to the "northern part of Chōsen" long before it referred to "North Korea" in reference ot the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Many people, however, infer "North Korea" from simply "Chōsen" -- which poses problems for people in Japan who are "Chōsenjin" but not necessarily oriented toward DPRK, which in any even Japan does not yet recognize.

In all treaties and agreements related to postwar settlements, including the San Francisco Peace Treaty it signed in 1951, and the normalization treaty and status agreement it signed with ROK in 1965, where the English version has spoken of "Korea" and the "Korean" (ROK) version has 韓国, the Japnese version has 朝鮮.

During their the Japan-ROK talks, Japanese delegates faced considerable criticism from ROK delegates concerning Japan's position that, under its laws, the people ROK wanted to call "Kanjin" or "Kankokujin" were "Chōsenjin" -- and could not be called "Kankokujin" until they acquired ROK nationality. ROK delegates, of course, insisted that, under ROK's laws, they were already ROK nationals.

The status agreement with ROK, however, was written in such way that there was no need to refer to what people in Japan, who stood to become ROK nationals, were in the eyes of domestic Japanese law before they came to be recognized as ROK nationals in Japan's eyes. The avoidance scheme worked equally well for ROK, which seems to have proposed the idea that the conflicts in their views toward nationality and appelation could easily be avoided by simply not talking about them -- i.e., by regarding them as domestic matters that didn't qualify as subjects for bilateral negotiation.

This approach worked for nationality and appelation, but not for the issue as to whether the annexation treaty and related laws were null and void as a natural effect of Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers and the Peace Treaty it signed with the Allied Powers -- or whether, as ROK contended, the annexation treaty and related laws should be recognized as null and void from the very beginning as they, in ROK's opinion, had been illegal.

第一条
  この協定において在日韓人というのは、太平洋戦争の戦闘が終止した日以前から、継続して日本国に住所を持つ韓人をいう。

Article 1
  In this agreement Koreans in Japan (在日韓人 Zainichi Kanjin) shall refer to Koreans who, from on or before the day the hostilities of the Pacific War ended, have continuously had a domicile in Japan.

The function of this article is included in Article 1 of the 1966 Japan-ROK status agreement (signed in 1965 but effective from 1966), and in article 2 of Japan's 1991 domestic law defining Special Permanent Residents.

"the day the hostilities of the Pacific War ended"

I can hear Hiraga and other legalists among Japan's delegation object to the vagueness of "the day the hostilities of the Pacific War ended". Possibly it was left vague in order to allow Japan to determine its meaning under its domestic laws, rather than stipulate a date favorable to ROK but not Japan -- or vice versa.

ROK had generally stipulated 9 August 1945 as the date from which it considered all "Koreans" to have been "liberated" from Japan's control and jurisdiction. However, this date did not mark the end of hostilities. Hirohito ordered his commanders to cease fire on 15 August 1945, but not all hostilities ended on this day. Japan would have preferred 2 September 1945, the day it formally surrendered to the Allied Powers.

The date formally adopted in the 1966 ROK-Japan status agreement was 15 August 1945. The date Japan adopted in its 1991 domestic law defining Special Permanent Residents, following deliberation with ROK, was 2 September 1945.

1966 status agreement

Article 1 of the 1966 Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the legal status and treatment of nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan qualifies 2 categories of aliens of ROK nationality as follows (my translation).

(a) a person who has been residing continuously in Japan from on or before 15 August 1945 until the time of application

(b) a person who, as a lineal descendant of a person who falls under (a), was born in Japan on or after 16 August 1945 and within five years of the day of enforcement of this agreement, and has since then continuously resided in Japan until the time of application

1991 Special Permanent Resident law

Article 2 of the 1991 Special law concerning, inter alia, the exit-entry-country [immigration] control of persons who based on the Treaty of Peace with Japan separated from the nationality of Japan similar qualifies 2 categories of aliens of any nationality as follows (my translation).

(1) A person who has been residing continuously in this country (本邦 honp?) from on or before 2 September 1945.

(2) A person who was born in this country between 3 September 1945 and the day the Treaty of Peace came into force, and has since then been continuously residing in this country, and whose father or mother who is a biological parent had been continuously residing in this country from on or before 2 September 1945 until the time of the said birth (when [the parent] died prior to the said birth, then the time of the said death), and, is a person who falls under the following (a) or (b).

(a) A person who pursuant to provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan seceded [separated] from the nationality of Japan on the day of effectuation of the Peace Treaty.

(b) A person who died by the day of enforcement of the Treaty of Peace or who has lost the nationality of Japan by the day of enforcement of the Treaty of Peace, and if there had not been the said death or the said loss would have pursuant to provisions in the Treaty of Peace with Japan would have seceded [separated] from the nationality of Japan on the day of enforcement of the Treaty of Peace.

第二条
  1. 日本国は、在日韓人が日本国民でないことを認定し、また、大韓民国は、在日韓人が大韓民国国民であることを確認する。
  2. 大韓民国及び日本国は、この協定の効力発生日に至るまでのある時期において、韓人及び日本人相互に亘る身分関係に関して、ある一方の当時国の法令を適用することで、既に発生した効果を承認する。

Article 2
  1. Japan acknowledges that Koreans in Japan are not Japan nationals, and, tThe Republic of Korea confirms that Koreans in Japan are nationals (国民 kokumin) of the Republic of Korea.
  2. The Republic of Korea and Japan recognize the effects which have already engendered, through the application of the laws of one of the countries at the time, concerning the [personal] status relations that mutually span [involve both] Koreans and Japanese, in the time up to the day of the start of effectuation of this treaty.

There are no such provisions in the 1966 status agreement.

This article would have worked in 1952, but by 1965, when the status agreement was finalized, signed, and ratified, both paragraphs were either inappropriate or politically impossible.

"not Japan nationals"

This is a good example of how ROK and Japan avoided any phrasing that stipulated or suggested that "Koreans in Japan" were at the time or had ever been Japanese.

The deleted statement was "acceptable" from Japan's perspective, in that the people who were soon to lose its nationality has been its nationals until that point -- and by the time the status agreement came into effect, they would not be its nationals. However, it was "unacceptable" from ROK's point of view, for it suggested that Japan had right to recognize "Koreans" having been or not having been its nationals.

ROK's ambivalency on "Japanese nationality"

ROK's position on whether people in peninsular registers were Japanese at the time of the ROK-Japann talks was crystal clear. It's position on those it considered to be Koreans had ever been Japanese was ambivalent.

ROK argued -- in many of the documents introduced here -- that Japan had lost whatever right it might have had to regard "Koreans in Japan" as "Japanese" as soon as Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 9 August 1945. It also argued that "Koreans in Japan" became "ROK nationals" when ROK, shortly after it became a state on 15 August 1948, promulgated and enforced its Nationality Law, which recognized them as its nationals. Moreover, the United Nations, and a number of member states, including the United States, had recognized ROK as the only legitimate government on the peninsula. Hence "Koreans in Japan" could not possibly be Japanese.

This argument seemed to acknowledge that people in peninsular registers had been Japanese at least until "Korea" was "liberated" from Japan -- presumably on 9 August 1945. However, ROK also viewed the annexation as illegal, which implied that Korea did not legally become Chōsen or otherwise part of Japan's sovereign territory, and so Koreans did not legally become Chosense much less Japanese.

Not a simple matter of "side-ism"

The inclusion of the "not Japanese nationals" phrase in the 29 March 1952 draft suggests that, at that point, the phrase was accepted by both sides. Which side was responsible for the inclusion of the phrase -- and which side was responsible for its deletion from the 1 April 1952 draft -- are not clear.

Some ROK delegates had grown up in the Empire of Japan, and gone to school and worked in the Interior. At least one had been a civil servant. Such Koreans generally did not have the reflexive anti-Japanese attitude of Koreans who had lived overseas, and were capable of thinking of themselves as having been Japanese nationals. Japan's delegation, for its part, was not short of people who were sensitive to ROK's position.

So an ROK delegate might have originated the phrase, and a Japanese delegate might have later suggested that it be deleted. While not incorrect from Japan's point of view, it was (1) potentially offensive to ROK's position, and (2) unnecessary.

By this time, ROK and Japan had agreed that interpretations of the effects of the annexation on the legal status of people in peninsular registars were domestic rather than international matters. Diplomatically, then, it was not difficult for Japan to accede to ROK's senstitivies regarding such matters.

Hence any phrasing that alleged or even hinted that "Koreans" had been Japanese was easily deletable from any agreement between the two countries. Their domestic laws, and how their courts regarded legacy status issues, was another matter -- a matter for each state to regard within the privacy, as it were, of its sovereignty.

"effects which have already engendered"

This implies that ROK was accepting the annexation and everything that followed as a matter of legal fact, apart from how it felt about the legality of it all. No such phrase appears in the 1965 (effective from 1966) agreement. Article 2 of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea declares in the English version -- "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." Japan and ROK continue to disagree over what they thought they were agreeing to.

Japan has argued that early treaties and agreements were "already null and void" because of the effects of the terms of surrender, which were agreed to on 2 September 1945, and which were finalized by the effecutation of the San Francisco Peace treaty on 28 April 1945. ROK insists it meant "null and void" retroactive to the earlier treaties and agreements -- which, if accepted in a court of law, could have been grounds to nullify all effects of such treaties and agreements. Japan is in the stronger position both legally and linguistically.

第三条
  1. 日本国政府は、在日韓人がこの協定の効力発生日から二年以内に大韓民国政府の発給する登録証明書を添付して、日本国政府に永住許可を申請する時には、これを許可する。この場合において、一般外国人に適用される永住許可の条件、手続き及び手数料に関する日本国法令の規定は、適用しない。
  2. 前項の規定によって永住許可を受けた在日韓人の日本国からの退去強制に関しては、この協定の効力発生日から三年間(日本主張)五年間(韓国主張)、大韓民国政府及び日本国政府の当該機関が、その実施のために必要な事項に関して協議して行う。
  3. 大韓民国政府及び日本国政府は、この協定の効力発生日から二年九ヶ月を経過した後、前項の期が満了する時までの間において、その時の内外の状況によって、貧困者で日本国又はその公共団体の負担になっている在日韓人の日本国からの退去強制に関して、同項の期間を延長することが必要と思料する時には、協議して二年を越えない範囲内で、これを延長できる。

Article 3
  1. The Government of Japan -- when a Korean in Japan applies for permanent residence permission to the Government of Japan, attaching a certificate of [nationality] registration the Government of the Republic of Korea has issued within 2 years of the day of the start of the effectuation of this agreement -- will approve this [the application]. In this event, as for the provisions of Japan's national laws concerning conditions for permanent residence permission, [application] procedures, and [application] fees, [Japan] will not apply [them].
  2. Regarding the compulsion of leaving [expulsion, deportation] from Japan of a Korean in Japan who has received permanent residence permission pursuant to the provision of the preceding paragraph -- during 3 years (Japan's assertion) 5 years (ROK's assertion) from the day of the start of effectuation of this agreement, concerned agencies of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan will deliberate and act with regard to matters [particulars] necessary for its implementation.
  3. The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan -- after the passing of 2 years and 9 months from the day of the start of effectuation of this agreement, in the interval up to the time the term of the preceding paragraph ends -- at the time [either government] considers that, due to domestic or foreign conditions at the time, regarding the leave compulsion [deportation, expulsion] from Japan of a Korean in Japan who is an indigent person [pauper] and has become a burden on Japan or its public bodies, an extension of the term of the preceding paragraph is necessary, within not exceeding 2 years of deliberation, can extend this [term].

This article has two very different functions.

Paragraph 1 would have allowed residentially qualified ROK nationals -- but not Chosenese -- to become permanent residents without satisfying any of the conditions for permanent residence stipulated in the Immigration Control Order. In effect, it was was theirs for the asking.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 concern deportation.

These two very different matters are treated under Article 1 (permanent residence) and Article 3 (deporation) in the 1966 Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning the legal status and treatment of nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan.

Permanent residence and certificate of [nationality] registration

The 1966 status agreement similarly allowed residentially qualified ROK nationals to acquire what was called "Agreement permanent residence" (協定永住 Kyōtei eijū). The status was differentiated from general permanent residence (一般永住 Ippan eijū) in Alien Registration statistics and other data which broke down aliens by status of residence.

The "certificate of registration" referred to in the 1952 drafts would be evidence that the the Republic of Korea recognized the person applying for permanent residence as a national. In other words, an alien of legacy Chōsen-seki (朝鮮籍) status -- i.e., an alien with a register in the former Japanese territory of Chōsen -- would have submitted to procedures at an ROK consulate, or other ROK agency, which would have vetted the person's Chōsen register, required that the person declare that he or she wished to be regarded as an ROK national, and then issued a certificate which acknowledged that the person was an ROK national. Armed with such a certificate, the person would then be recognized by Japan as an ROK national -- a "Kankokujin" (韓国人) rather than a "Chōsenjin" (朝鮮人).

Deportation -- "Japan's assertion, ROK's assertion"

By early 1952, the only truely contentious issue in the status agreement was deportation. Here we see clear signs that the two states -- while apparently ready to sign the agreement -- had not yet resolved differences in opinion regarding the grounds and procedures for deportation, hence the cautious wait-and-see provisions for future deliberations with a view toward amending the particulars of the agreement.

第四条
  1. 在日韓人は、この協定の効力発生時に日本国において持っている財産上の権利として、一般外国人による享有が認められていないものを、日本国に継続して住所を持つ限り、享有できる。
  2. 前項の権利を享有する在日韓人が死亡した時には、日本国の法令でその権利の相続が認められている場合を除いて、その権利は、一年以内に、日本国国民又は日本国法人に日本国法令によって当該権利の享有を認められている者に対して譲渡されなければならない。

Article 4
  1. A Koreans in Japan -- as a right with respect to property [one] has in Japan at the time of the start of the effectuation of this agreement -- in as far as [only if] [one] has continuously had a domicile in Japan -- can possess something for which possession by general aliens is not recognized.
  2. At the time [When] a Korean in Japan who possesses the right of the previous paragraph dies, except in instances when the succession of that right is recognized by the laws of Japan, that right, within one year, must be transferred to a national of Japan or a corporate person of Japan toward [to] the person who pursuant to Japan's laws the possession of the said right is recognized.

There are no such provisions in the 1966 status agreement.

"national or corporate person of Japan"

This provision in effect recognized "national treatment" for at least the 1st generation of "Koreans in Japan" as defined by this agreement. This generation would include all Koreans in Japan who qualified as subjects of the agreement as of the day the agreement came into effect. The cohort would have included 1st generation migrants (who came to the Interior from Chōsen) and their 2nd generation (Japan-born) children, and a few (I would imagine) 3rd generation descendants.

Paragraph 1 recognizes that Koreans subject to the agreement, as aliens, would continue to have the property rights they had as Japanese. The original wording of paragraph 2 stipulating that in some cases, when the original owner of the right died, the right would be transferred to a national of Japan or a corporate person of Japan.

The rewording leaves nationality restrictions that might limit a Korean's Korean heir's succession rights to assets a general alien is not allowed to possess -- as opposed to the succession rights of a Korean's non-Korean alien or Japanese heir's succession rights -- to relevant laws, which could change.

第五条
  在日韓人がこの協定の効力発生時に現在従事している職業(公務員の職を除く)で、日本国法令が一般外国人に当該職業に従事する資格を認めていないものに関しては、その人が継続して日本国に住所を持つ限り、これに従事できる。

Article 5
  A Korean in Japan -- regarding the occupation (other than the work of a public servant) [the person] is engaged in, at the time of the start of the effectuation of this Agreement, [even if] Japan's laws do not recognize in general aliens the qualification to be engaged in the said occupation -- in so far as [only if] the person has continuously had a domicile in Japan, can engage in this [the occupation].

There are no such provisions in the 1966 status agreement.

"occupations other than public servants"

This provision in effect accorded "national treatment" to all Koreans in Japan -- except those who working as civil servants, who stood to lose their jobs when they lost Japanese nationality. In a document dated 15 December 1951 attached to its 18 December 1951 status agreement proposal, the Japanese government informed ROK that around 200 Koreans were then employed by national or local government agencies as public servants. In March 1952, the Attorney General's Office, at the request of the Cabinet, initiated actions to prevent their disemployment by expediently naturalizing them. Some Koreans -- presumably all civil servants, reportedly most of them teachers employed as local civil servants -- were expediently permitted to naturalize on 28 April 1952, the day they lost Japanese nationality.

See Expedited naturalizations: How Japan helped Chosenese and Taiwanese civil servants remain Japanese below for details.

第六条
  1. 在日韓人で、この協定の効力発生日から三年以内に、大韓民国へ帰還する者に対しては、その所有する動産の携行に関して、関税その他の課徴金を賦課しない。携帯できる動産の種類及び数量に関しては、別途に協議して定める。
  2. 前項の帰還者は、その所有する資金を、別途に協議して定める方法によって、大韓民国に送金できる。
  3. 大韓民国政府及び日本国政府は、この協定の効力発生日から二年九ヶ月を経過した後、第一項の期間が満了する時までの間において、その時の内外の状況によって、同項の期間を延長することが必要と思料する時には、協議して二年を越えない範囲内で、これを延長できる。(日本はこの項を保留中)

Article 6
  1. Toward a person who is a Korean in Japan, who returns to the Republic of Korea within three years from the day of the start of the effectuation of this Agreement, regarding the taking of movable property they possess, [the government of Japan] will not levy tariffs or other charges. Regarding the kind and quantity of movable property that can be carried, [they] will be separately determined by deliberation.
  2. The returnees of the previous paragraph, in accordance with laws separately determined by deliberation, can send funds which they possess to the Republic of Korea,
  3. The government of the Republic of Korea and the government of Japan, After the passing of 2 years and 9 months from the day of effectuation of this Agreement, in the interval up to the time the term of the preceding paragraph ends -- when [at which time] [either government] considers that, due to domestic or foreign conditions at the time, an extension of the term of the preceding paragraph is necessary, within not exceeding 2 years of deliberation, [the government] can extend this [term]. (Japan places reservations on this paragraph)

There are no such provisions in the 1966 status agreement.

"domestic or foreign conditions"

By 1965, domestic and foreign conditions were such that there was no need make special provisions for Koreans in Japan who might decide to leave Japan.

第七条
  この協定は、当事国によって各自の憲法上の手続きに従って、批准されなければならない。批准書は、東京○○で交換することとする。
  この協定の効力は批准書の交換日に発生する。ただし第四条及び第五条の規定は、千九百五十一年九月八日サンフランシスコ市で署名した日本国との平和条約の最初の効力発生日に遡及して適用される。

Article 7
  This agreement must be ratified by the party states in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. [They] will exchange ratifications in Tokyo ○○ [place].
  The effectuation of this agreement will start on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification. However, the provisions of Article 4 and Article 5, shall be applied retroactively to the day of the start of the first [earliest] effectuation of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951.

The functions of this article are incorporated in Article 6 of the 1966 status agreement. Provided that, because by 1965 there was no need for provisions like those in Articles 4 and 5 in the 1952 drafts, there was no longer any cause for the proviso added to the 1 April 1952 revision of the 29 March 1952 draft.

"applied retroactively"

The reason for including the proviso for retroactive application of Article 4 (succession of property rights) and Article 5 (occupation) was probably to insure that all provisions related to the loss of Japanese nationality would be tied to the date of loss of Japanese nationality. While this would seem to serve the gods of legal neatness, I would think the gods of administrative convenience would have been better served by setting the date of applicability of both articles to the date the agreement came into effect. It wouldn't have mattered much if the lag between the two dates was short -- on the order of a few weeks or months -- but it would have been a major headache to reverse the effects of actions taken after the loss of nationality, and before the effecutation of the agreement, which did not satisfy the conditions stipulated in Articles 4 or 5.

  以上の証拠として、両政府の代表者は、このために正当な委任を受け、この協定に署名した。

  千九百五十二年 月 日に東京で、共に同じ正文である韓国語、日本語及び英語で本書二通を作成した。

  日本国政府のために大韓民国政府のために

  大韓民国政府のために日本国政府のために

  As testimony to the above, the representatives of the two governments, have received proper commissions for this purpose, have signed this Agreement.

  [The signatory states] have produced two copies of this document in Tokyo on __ day __ month 1952, in the Korean language, the Japanese language, and the English language, which together [all of which] are the same authentic text.

  For the government of the Republic of Korea

  For the government of Japan

There are many ways to close treaties and agreements. What is remarkable about the closing of the 1952 draft agreement is that it survived in the 1966 Japan-ROK Status Agreement, signed in Tokyo in 1965, with no structural changes. A couple of clarifying phrases were added, an adjective became an adverb, and an instrumental marker became more formal. And English vanished as one of the languages -- though an English version of the 1966 agreement exists.

The Japanese and English texts of the closing of the 1966 agreement is shown below with changes marked in red. Note that the order of the country names, languages, and country signature blocks are different in the two national versions of the agreement.

以上の証拠として,下名は,各自の政府からこのために正当な委任を受け,この協定に署名した。

千九百六十五年六月二十二日に東京で,ひとしく正文である日本語及び韓国語により本書二通を作成した。

日本国のために

    椎名悦三郎

    高杉晋一

大韓民国のために

    李 東 元

    金 東 祚

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese and Korean languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR JAPAN

    Etsusaburo Shiina

    Shinichi Takasugi

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

    Tong Won Lee

    Dong Jo Kim

Top  


Korean draft of nationality agreement image ROK-Japan nationality and treatment agreement
1st page of 8-page 1 April 1952 Korean draft
Image converted from KRN 81: 461 (00810461.tif)
Click on image to enlarge
Japanese draft of nationality agreement image Japn-ROK nationality and treatment agreement
1st page of 2-page 3 April 1952 Japanese draft
Image composited from JPN 4-557-9 (2006-00588-0557-01-01.xdw)
Click on image to enlarge

Ready-to-sign Nationality and Treatment Agreement

"in the Japanese, Korean and English languages,
each text being equally authentic" (X day 1952)

In late March and early April 1952 -- even as the heads of the Korean and Japanese delegations to the main Korean-Japan Conference were exchanging blows that by the end of April would knock out the talks -- other delegates continued to polish the Japanese, Korean, and English drafts of the status agreement they had been working on since late October 1951.

The early April Japanese, Korean, and English drafts of the Nationality and Treatment Agreement -- which I have transcribed below -- are all within a couple of days of editorial deliberations of being final copies.

Japanese and Korean versions

The Japanese and Korean texts are very similar in their mixture of Chinese graphs, kana, and hanŭ.

Graphically, there is nearly 100 percent correspondence in their Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean elements. The Korean text tends to be more "Sinific" than the Japanese text, which is apt -- where Korean is not -- to use Chinese graphs with Japanese readings. The Korean text preserves more Sinific "fossils" than the Japanese text.

Structurally, too, the languages are extremely close, and so there is nearly 100 percent correspondence in their grammatical elements as well. The structural logic of their topic, subject, and object markers is essentially the same. Attributive and adverbial markers in one langauge generally predict equivalent markers in the other.

Accessibility of texts

One huge difference in the Japanese and Korean texts is that -- while both were accessible to contemporary readers of the two languages -- the Korean text is no longer accessible to most readers of Korean today. Readers of Japanese with just a smattering of Korean can easily read the Korean text, but most readers of Korean today lack sufficient literacy in Sino-Korean graphs to make sense of the Korean version.

Kana and hangul orthography

Contemporary Korean documents are typically posted on Republic of Korea websites in hangul-only versions. Not only are Sino-Korean graphs represented in hangul, but contemporary hangul expressions which reflect older or idiosyncratic orthographic standards may be recast in orthography more familiar to present-day readers.

The Japanese documents contain relatively few examples of older kana orthography. Present-day kana standards, which had been developed before the end of the Pacific War, were introduced in print media and schools in the early years of the Allied Occupation. Habits, though, are hard to break, and inevitably some older usage slipped into memos and drafts.

On a personal note, my first Japanese language teachers, a Manchurian-born man employed by the medical laboratory of an U.S. Army hospital in Yokohama were I was a technician, and the local woman in charge of the hosptial's medical library, which was part of the laboratory, reflexively wrote in the older orthography. Even today, the newer orthography has not entirely eclipsed the older orthography in the writing of some elderly people.

When transcribing the received documents in alphabetic script, I have made every effort to represent the original texts as they were written.

Ready-to-sign Nationality and Treatment Agreements
3 April 1952 Japanese text of status agreement
1 April 1952 Korean text of status agreement
5 April 1952 Japan-side draft of English translation
5 April 1952 Korea-side draft of English translation

Sources

All of the following representations are my transcriptions of texts in Japan's and ROK's archives.

3 April 1952 Japanese version

The Japanese text is a perfectly clean of the 3 April 1952 Japanese draft of the status agreement in MOFA's archieves (JPN 4-557: 9-10). The received copy fills two sheets of what appear to be ordinary paper. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 is missing from the draft pending a decision made about Japan's reservations concerning the paragraph.

1 April 1952 Korean version

The Korean text is a complete but not as clean copy of the 1 April 1952 Korean draft (KRN 81: 461-468). The received copy fills 8 pages (4 sheets) of Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan (大韓民國駐日代表部) folio manuscript paper. It has a few corrections, and the last 3 pages appear to be in a different hand. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 parentheticallly notes Japan's pending reservation.

See Nearly final status agreement drafts for Yi Yangu's Japanese translation of the 1 April 1952 Korean draft (NKBK 81: 136-138).

5 April 1952 Japan-side English translation

There are 2 copies of the 5 April 1952 Japan-side English translation draft in MOFA's archives (Copy 1 JPN 3-123: 1-6, Copy 2 JPN 4-557; 11-16).

The 2 copies are line for line, page for page, typographically identical. Both are identified as 日本側英訳 (Nihon-gawa Eiyaku) or "Japan-side English translation" though in slightly different hands in upper right corner. Stamped in the left upper margin is 秘密指定解除 / 情報公開室 (Himitsu shitei kaijo / Jōhō Kōkai Shitsu) or "Secrecy designation removed [Declassified] / [Government] Information Public Access Office".

Copy 1 is absolutely clean -- no typographical or manual corrections whatever. Copy 2 has quite a bit of manual underlining and some words are circled.

5 April 1952 Korea-side English translation

There are also 2 copies of the 5 April 1952 Korea-side English translation draft in MOFA's archives (Copy 1 JPN 3-123: 7-11, Copy 2 JPN 4-557; 17-21)

Copy 1 shows no date but a notation in the upper right margin of the 1st page identifies the document as a "Korea-side English translation" (韓国側英訳). Another notation immediately below this reads "* Red lines [underscoring] indicate places ammended toward [in] Japan-side draft" (※赤線は日本側案に対する修正個所を示す).

Copy 2 has a "APR-5.1952" date stamp in lower left corner margin of the 1st page, immediately below the parenthetic notation "(兪代表から入手)" or "Received from representative Yu" with an oval 島 (Shima) seal. In the upper right margin is written ". . . ☐の箇所日本案を修正した由" or " . . . ☐ places due to having corrected Japan draft".

In the right upper margin of both copies is stamped "秘密指定解除 / 情報公開室" (Himitsu shitei kaijo / Jōhō Kōkai Shitsu) or "Secrecy designation removed [Declassified] / [Government] Information Public Access Office".

The two copies are typographically different. Copy 1 has 1 less line per page, which means that the words in the lower right corner, signifying the first word of the following page, are different. These "continuation words" are also different styled. Copy 1 shows "word" but Copy 2 shows "word/".

Copy 1 is a very clean copy. Only 3 words on the 1st page (affirm, affirmation, confirms), and 2 expressions on the 3rd page (not exceeding two years, such rights) are underlined. On the 2nd page, there is a check mark (✓) above the "*five / three" choice of the number of years within which the parties will consult with each other regarding the compulsory deportation of a Korean resident granted permannent residence permission under the agreement.

Copy 2 has more marking, and a 3-line paragraph which appears to have been accidentally repeated has been blacked out.

See ROK and Japan archives for source particulars.

Markup

I have used the following scheme to mark phrases of interest in the four received texts.

Differences in representation based on protocol
Other differences discussed in comments
Parts of a text missing in another text
Paragraphs retranslated in comments
Object of correction or commentary
[sic = Correction] [← Commentary ]

3 April 1952 Japanese text

1 April 1952 Korean text

Japan's 5 April 1952 English translation

ROK's 5 April 1952 English translation

極秘

    在日韓国人の国籍及び処遇に関する日韓協定案(四月三日)

  日本国及び大韓民国は、千九百五十一年九月八日にサン・フランシスコ市で署名された日本国との平和条約の効力発生に伴い、太平洋戦争の戦闘の終止の日以前から引き続き日本国に在留する韓人の国籍を確定する必要があることを認めるので、
  また、前記の国籍の確定に伴うこれら韓人の処遇について特別の措置を講ずること望ましいと認めるので、
  よつて、日本国及びは大韓民国は、この協定を締結した。

    在日韓国人의国籍及処遇에関한韓日協定案(四月一日)

  大韓民国및日本国은千九百五十一年九月八日에桑港市에서署名된日本国과의平和条約의効力発生에随伴하여太平洋戦争의戦闘가終止된날以前부터継続하여日本国에在留하는韓人의国籍을確定할必要가있음을認定하므로、
  또、前記의国籍의確定에随伴하여이러한韓人의処遇에対하여特別한、措置를講究함必要하다고認定함으로、
  因하여大韓民国및日本国은、이協定을締結하였다

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Agreement between
Japan and Republic of Korea
concerning Nationality and Treatment of
Koreans Resident in Japan.
[ (Draft translation.) ]

April 5, 1952.

    Whereas Japan and the Republic of Korea recognize, as a result of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed at the city of San Francisco, September 8, 1951, the necessity to establish the nationality of Koreans residing continuously in Japan since the date of the termination of hostilities of the Pacific War or since prior thereto; and

    Whereas the two countries recognize that it is desirable to adopt a special measure as regards the treatment of those Koreans after the establishment of nationality mentioned above;

    Japan and the Republic of Korea have accordingly concluded the present. Agreement.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Joint Draft Agreement between
the Republic of Korea and Japan
concerning Nationality and Treatment of
Korean Residents in Japan
(Tentative Translation)

[ April 5, 1952 ]

    Whereas the Republic of Korea and Japan recognize, as a result of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed at the city of San Francisco, September 8, 1951, the necessity to affirm the nationality of Koreans residing continuously in Japan since the date of the termination of hostilities of the Pacific War or since prior thereto; and

    Whereas the two countries recognize that it is desirable to take a special measure as regards the treatment of those Koreans after the affirmation of nationality mentioned above;

    The Republic of Korea and Japan have accordingly concluded the present Agreement.

"3 April 1952"
"1 April 1952"

The 3 April 1952 Japanese version reflects Japan's reservations concerning particulars that are more completely spelled out in the 1 April 1952 Korean version, which presumably reflects the 1 April 1952 revision of the 29 March 1952 version worked out in the 29 March and 1 April sessions of the Legal Status Subcommittee. These were the last sessions of the committee, but of course its delegates continued to work. Final revisions would have been made by the formal plenary talks had they continued.

"Japan and the Republic of Korea"
"The Republic of Korea and Japan"

Following conventional treaty protocol, a state will write its name first followed by the names of other party states. Ditto for references to their nationals and their languages. We see examples of all three situations in the Japanese and Korean versions of the treaties, and in their respective English translations.

"San Francisco"

The Japanese version uses the by then conventional kana transliteration サン・フランシスコ (San Furanshisuko). The Korean version uses an older Sino-Japanese term, 桑港 (Sōkō), which is based on 桑 (sang), the first graph of a Chinese transliteration (桑方西斯哥), and 港 or "harbor" as the city was a port town.

"it is desirable"

Both translations have "it is desirable", which follows "nozamashii" (望ましい) in the Japanese version. The Korean version has "piryo hada" (必要하다), which means "it is necessary".

第一条
  この協定において在日韓人とは、太平洋戦争の戦闘の終止の日以前から引き続き日本国に住所を有する韓人をいう。

第一条
  이協定에있어서在日韓人이라함은、太平洋戦争의戦闘가終止된날以前부터継続하여日本国에住所를가진韓人을말한다