Kanda v. State, 1961

Interior woman who married Chosen man lost nationality

By William Wetherall

First posted 18 July 2008
Last updated 21 June 2014


Overview Origins | Ruling | Chronology | Quality of opinions | Quality of translations | Sources, presentation, commentary
Main judgment Particulars | Findings | Summary | Relevant laws | Main text | Justices
Other opinions Supplementary (Fujita) | Supplementary (Irie) | Supplementary (Okuno) | Dissenting (Shimoiizaka)
Importance of case 0. In eyes of Japanese law | 1. Entity transfers | 2. Register migrations | 3. Race and ethnicity
Glossary of misusage States, countries | Empire of Japan, Japan | Empire of Korea, Chosen, Korea, ROK, DPRK | Laws and legal status


Overview of Kanda v. State, 1961

In calling this case "Kanda v. State" I am following Chang Hyo Sang (Chang 1990), who identifies the case as "Atsuko Kanda v. The State". The received Japanese and English texts do not name the appellant, as public versions of such court rulings sometimes cloak personal names. I am calling the appellant Kanda only for the convenience of having a name, though her actual name might have been something else.

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Origins of Kanda case

In 1935, Kanda, an Interior subject, married a Chōsen subject and migrated to his family register, thus becoming a Chōsen subject. The couple separated in 1941, and Kanda obtained an adjudicated divorce in October 1952. However, a Tokyo ward did not accept her notification of divorce, citing a Ministry of Justice circular, according to which Kanda had lost her Japanese nationality in April 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. Consequently, she no longer had a family register in Japan, hence the ward could not facilitate a change in her marital status.

Register migration

The legal action of moving from one family register to another is something I call "register migration". Register migrations occur for several reasons, but most commonly because of marriage.

Since a marriage exists only when a man and a woman file a notification of marriage, and are registered as husband and wife in the same family register, marriage mandates one spouse migrate to the register of the other spouse. This has been a principle of Japanese family law since the codification of civil laws during the Meiji period.

By the time Kanda married, most provisions of Japanese family law, originally coded in statutes that applied only to the prefectures (Interior), had been extended to Chōsen (an Exterior territory) by Imperial Diet actions and Government-General of Chosen decrees. GGC decrees, sanctioned by the emperor before promulgation, were equivalent to laws in the Interior.

The most important GGC decree, for the purpose of understanding the register migration that affected Kanda's legal status, was the Chōsen Family Registration Decree (朝鮮戸籍令 Chōsen koseki rei) proclaimed in 1922. One aim of this decree was to facilitate marriages between Chōsen subjects and other Japanese subjects, including Interior and Taiwan subjects.

The decree provided that status actions like marriage and adoption, between persons and families in different subnations (my term), would cause movements between family registers. Such register migrations (my term) would cause changes in subnationality (my term) -- just as, under the contemporary laws related to changes in nationality, marriages and adoptions between Japanese and aliens could result in gain or loss of status in a Japanese (Interior, Taiwan, Chōsen, Karafuto) register and hence gain or loss of Japanese nationality.

In fact, such migrations occurred between registers -- since registers, as sub-entities of local (municipal) entities, were themselves mini entities. The subnational affiliation of a register derived from the nesting of its local (municipal) affiliation, within a prefecture or province, within a subnational territory, within the national (sovereign) territory of the Empire of Japan.

In other words, a family register was a part of the local polity with which it was primarily affiliated, and higher level (prefectural/provincial, subnational, national) affiliations derived from the territorial affiliation of the local polity. Japanese nationality has always been based on territorial affiliation.

For an overview of the development of population registration in Korea as a Japanese protectorate, and in Chōsen as a subnation of Japan -- including all the Korea/Chōsen laws and decrees referred to only by name in Kanda v. State, 1961 -- see Korean household registers in article on "Soshi kaimei myths: Confusion then, misunderstanding now" and Chosen laws: Family registration in article on "Chosen: The legal cornerstones of imperialism".

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Majority ruling and other opinions

The ruling in Kanda v. State was handed down by the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court on 5 April 1961. The bench consisted of thirteen justices.

See "Quality of opinions" for details.

Majority ruling

Nine of the justices on the bench shared in the majority opinion that the measures taken by the Japanese government, which resulted in Kanda losing the nationality of Japan on 28 April 1952, did not violate the 1947 Constitution.

The majority opinion pointed out that Kanda could easily restore the Japanese nationality she lost by naturalizing in accordance with provisions of the Nationality Law -- "easily" (簡易に) being an allusion to an article that considerably relaxed conditions for several categories of persons, including those who had lost Japanese nationality.

Supplementary opinions

Three justices submitted supplementary opinions that accepted the majority opinion while differently arguing certain points of law.

Dissenting opinion

Only one justice dissented -- arguing that, while the government's nationality measures were appropriate for persons who had always been in Chōsen registers, allowances should have been made for people like Kanda, who had migrated to a Chōsen register from an Interior register through marriage -- but, when finally obtaining a divorce, found herself the victim of circumstances beyond her countrol.

Unanimity

While the ruling was not unanimous, all thirteen judges agreed that the population of Chōsen reverted to Korea with the territory of Chōsen. They also agreed that, in principle, migrations between Interior and Chōsen registers were legal. They disagreed about finer points of law -- some relevant, some not -- and only one chose to insist that special provisions should have been made for people like Kanda.

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Chronology of case

It is worth examining a more detailed chronology of events in the saga of Kanda's journeys from marriage to divorce. The main entries in the following table were translated or paraphrased from the dissenting opinion of Justice Shimoiizaka (see below). The romanizations of Chōsen place names are mine, and all comments, are mine.

The comments have been added to clarify the geopolitical background against which Kanda's saga unfolded. This background is not depicted in any of the opinions, which are mostly concerned with legal events -- status actions and their consequences.

Chronology of events leading up to Kanda v. State, 1961

4 February 1915

Born the older daughter of a father C and a mother B, but went by the family name D which her mother used. Her father and mother, and she, were "Japanese" (日本人 Nihonjin) -- by which Shimoiizaka means their family register/registers was/were in the Interior.

"Japanese"   Shimoiizaka, like the writers of the other opinions in this case, habitually reserve the term "Japanese" for people in Interior registers. This problem is discussed below in the section on "Quality of judgment".

16 July 1935

Married A, whose principle register (本籍 honseki) was in Chōsen Kōkaidō Hōsangun A-ri B-banchi (朝鮮黄海道鳳山郡a里b番地 Chosŏn Hwanghae-do Pongsan-kun A-ri B-pŏnchi), and entered A's principle register.

Kōkaidō Hōsangun   Hwanghae province, on the western side of the peninsula just north of the 38th parallel, is now divided into northeastern and southwestern halves called Hwanghaepuk-to and Hwanghaenam-do. Pongsan-kun is in the northern half, which is immediately south of Pyŏngyang.

[ 1935-1941 ]

After marriage, cohabited (同棲していた) with A in Tokyo.

Tokyo   Apparently the couple married in the Interior, possibly in Tokyo.

November 1941

Moved to Keijō-fu Eitōho (京城府永登浦 Kyŏngsŏng-bu Yŏngdŭngpo) [Seoul] in Chōsen with A.

September 1942

Abandoned with malicious intent by A, who had started living separately with a certain Chosenese woman (朝鮮人女性某) then claimed he was going to north China (北支) but concealed his whereabouts.

February 1943

"Returned to Tokyo" (東京に帰り), resided in Itabashi, worked in a printing factory.

June 1945

Proceeded again to Keijo on the advice of A's parent(s) that she evacuate. Because A has not severed his relationship with his mistress (妾), firmly resolved that she should "return to Japan" (日本に帰る), but it was not easy at the time to do what one wanted, and before she could return the war ended.

[ August 1945 ]

At the time the war ended, she was living with A's father in Sariin (沙里院 Sariwŏn) in Kōhai (黄海 Hwanghae) province, just north of the 38th parallel in what had become the "North Korea sector" (北鮮地域) in the Soviet occupation zone, and so she could not be repatriated

Sariin   Sariwŏn is now the capital of Hwanghaepuk-to, the northern half of former Hwanghae-do.

December 1950

Finally reached Fusan (釜山 Pusan), where she was held in a detention facility for Japanese (日本人収容所).

Fusan   Pusan, on the south coast of the peninsula, is the main port for crossing the Eastern Sea / Sea of Japan for Fukuoka. Given the dates, it appears that Kanda was finally able to move south across the 38th parallel from about the middle of October 1950, after the Eighth U.S. Army and ROK forces had swept through Hwanghae (which had not yet been divided) on their way to Pyongyang, which was captured on 19 October, and the Yalu river. UN forces quickly lost all the ground they had they had gained in the north after Chinese troops entered the war in early November.

January 1951

Finally able to return to Japan (日本に帰還する).

[ 1952 ]

Filed for divorce at Tokyo District Court -- Showa 27 (ta) No. 136 Divorce request case (昭和二七年(タ)第一三六号離婚請求事件).

21 October 1952

Ruling of divorce.

5 November 1952

Ruling confirmed.

14 November 1952

Submitted notification of divorce based on court ruling to Chuo ward in Tokyo, but head of ward did not accept the notification, on the grounds that appellant had lost the nationality of Japan pursuant to a Attorney General's Office circular and the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

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Quality of opinions

I personally feel that, while the Japanese government was under no legal obligation to do so, it should have given all former Exterior subjects residing in the prefectures at the end of the war, and their postwar descendants, the option of remaining Japanese. Those who chose to remain Japanese would have had to give up their Taiwan or Chōsen register and establish a municipal register in a prefecture, in accordance with Japan's domestic family laws.

Majority ruling legally correct . . .

With this qualification I would argue that the majority opinion is essentially correct in its understanding of what was possible under Japanese law: (1) former exterior subjects naturally lost their Japanese nationality when the San Francisco Peace Treaty entered into force on 28 April 1952, and (2) Notification No. 438, as an interpretation of the natural effects of the Peace Treaty, was not a violation of Article 10 of the Constitution.

. . . but morally deficient . . .

That loss of nationality in 1952 should be a natural effect of the Peace Treaty in the case of former Chōsen subjects -- given the natural origins of their Japanese nationality when Korea ceded itself to Japan in 1910 -- did not, however, prevent Japan from exercising its discretionary power to offer subjects who had been residing in the prefectures since the end of the war, and their postwar descendants, the option of remaining Japanese.

. . . and in any event perverse as a legal text

Quite apart from its legal position, and its failure to provide an option to remain Japanese, I find the majority ruling perverse in the manner in which it describes the legal order under which Interior and Exterior subjects shared the status of being nationals of Japan, and therefore Japanese. To put it bluntly -- I find the majority opinion astonishingly poor, even sloppy, as a description of the status of subjects of the territories that made up the sovereign dominion of the Empire of Japan. The single dissenting opinion, which comes closer to what the ruling should have been, happens to be the most accurate description (see below).

Here I will cite only the most salient problems. See the "Glossary of errors" below for details.

Majority ruling

The most serious shortcomings of the text of the majority ruling is its pervasive misuse of the following terms.

"Chosen" (朝鮮 Chōsen) is usually confused for "Korea" (韓国 Kankoku). However, these two terms are clearly differentiated in all laws and treaties -- "Korea" being the entity that ceded itself to Japan in 1910, "Chosen" the entity under Japanese rule, and "Korea" the entity that Chōsen became when Japan abandoned its rights over Chōsen.

"Japanese" (日本人 Nihonjin) is used to mean "Interiorites" (内地人 Naichijin) -- in contrast with "Chosenese" (朝鮮人). However, if Chōsen subjects were deemed to have lost the nationality of Japan on 28 April 1952, when Chōsen reverted to being Korea, then Chosenese were Japanese until they lost their putative Japanese nationality.

Supplementary opinions

Three justices, in separate and very different supplementary opinions, nonetheless endorsed the majority ruling.

Fujita Hachiro's opinion more conservative

Fujita Hachiro argued that Kanda lost the nationality of Japan -- not when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952 -- but from 15 August 1945, when Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. In his view, the Peace Treaty merely made de jure the de facto independence of Chōsen that Japan recognized when it formally accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration reiterated in the surrender agreement.

However, Fujita errs in holding that "Chosen" regards 15 August 1945 its day of independence. While true that many Chosenese celebrated the public announcement of Hirohito's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August 1945 -- and that both the Republic of Korea (founded on 15 August 1948) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (founded on 9 September 1948) regard 15 August 1945 as their "National Liberation Day" -- in terms of international law, there was no Korean state at the time -- much less one known as "Chosen".

Significantly, though, the agreement signed by Japan and ROK in 1965 and effective from 1966 -- four years after Kanda v. State -- stipulated 15 August 1945 as the date from which an ROK national would have to trace his or her continuous residence in postwar Japan to qualify for permanent residence under the agreement -- and 16 August 1945 for the postwar-born descendants of such nationals. However, Japan's original understanding -- as reflected in domestic laws based on its consent to the Potsdam Declaration upon signing the Instruments of Surrender on 2 September 1945 -- was 2/3 September 1945, the standard of qualification for the Special Permanent Residence status introduced from 1991 to replace the 1966 status and a few other treaty-related alien statuses of residence.

Fujita's digression into the rise and demise of the "family" (家 ie) as a corporate entity in Japanese civil law, however, really has no bearing on the issue -- since long before 1898 and long after 1947 -- the period during which families were formally defined as "corporate" entities -- the same principles of register migration have applied to marriage and adoption. Moreover, customary family law in Taiwan and Korea, before and after their tenures under Japanese rule, also generally regarded marriage and adoption as causes of migration from one family to another.

Irie Toshiro's opinion the best framed

Irie Toshiro believes that the intent of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is to undo the conditions that emerged as a result of the annexation treaty -- in other words, to restore the state of territorial and personal sovereignty Korea had before it became Chōsen. Naturally, people affiliated with Chōsen would be regarded as affiliated with Korea, hence would lose the nationality of Japan, since before the annexation they would have had the nationality of Korea.

What, though, about Interiorites who became Chosenese, and Chosenese who became Interiorites? Irie argues that, had the annexation never taken place, and had the same individuals married, the laws of Korea and Japan would have conspired to cause the same register migrations -- i.e., a Japanese woman who married a Korean would have gained Korean nationality and lost Japanese nationality, and vice versa.

This is hardly surprising -- since Japan's Nationality Law evolved as a codification of family law and family registration law -- and "national registration" (affiliation with the nation, i.e., "nationality") was equated with "family registration" (affiliation with a household register that was part of the nation). And while comparable practices in Taiwan and Korea were somewhat different, Japan introduced similar concepts of registration to these entities when they became parts of Japan.

Irie's opinion is best, though, as a comparatively careful description of how Japanese laws actually operated within the sovereign empire. Unlike the authors of the majority ruling, he very carefully differentiates "Korea" from "Chosen" -- and he speaks of both Interiorites and Chosenese as "Japanese".

Okuno Ken'ichi's opinion was the most perverse

Okuno Ken'ichi's opinion is a hybrid of arguments in the opinions of Fujita and Irie. He argues that the 1950 Japanese Nationality Law, in effect at the time the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force in 1952, would not have caused a Japanese woman who had married a Chosenese to lose her nationality "even had, hypothetically, her husband acquired the nationality of Chōsen simultaneously with the effectuation of the Peace Treaty" (仮りに平和条約発効と同時に夫が朝鮮の国籍を取得したものとしても-- whereas the 1899 Nationality Law in effect at the time Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration would have caused her to lose her Japanese nationality, since the older law incorporated the principle of same nationality of spouses.

Like Fujita, Okuno argues that the San Francisco Peace Treaty merely restated what Japan had already done when it accepted the Potsdam Declaration -- i.e., recognize the independence of Chōsen, thereby abandoning its claims to territorial sovereignty over Chōsen and personal sovereignty over Chosenese. The appellant, he claims, lost her Japanese nationality because her husband in effect "gained a foreign country's nationality and lost Japan's nationality at the time our country accepted the Potsdam Declaration" -- and claims that Article 18 of the the 1899 Nationality Law then in effect caused her, also, to lose her Japanese nationality.

Well, not exactly. Article 18 of the 1899 law provided that (my translation) "When a Japanese (日本人 Nihonjin) has become the wife of an alien and has gained the husband's nationality she will lose the nationality of Japan." The article clearly applies to the case of a Japanese woman who marries an alien. But Kanda did not marry an alien. She married a Japanese. And there are no contingencies in the 1899 law for the Japanese wife of a Japanese man to lose her nationality simply because he loses his -- unless he were to naturalize in a state that required one spouse to naturalize with the other. And even if Kanda's spouse had been an alien at the time she married him, she would have lost her Japanese nationality only in the event she were to gain his.

In any event, Kanda could not possibly have gained the "Chosen" nationality her husband supposedly gained the moment Japan recognized "the independence of Chōsen" -- since there was no Chōsen state, hence no Chōsen nationality, much less a Chōsen nationality law that could possibly have caused anyone -- not even her husband -- to acquire Chōsen nationality.

Dissenting opinion

Only one justice dissented -- arguing that, while the government's nationality measures were appropriate for persons who had always been in Chōsen registers, allowances should have been made for people like Kanda, who had migrated to a Chōsen register from an Interior register through marriage -- but, when finally obtaining a divorce, found herself the victim of circumstances beyond her countrol.

Shimoiizaka Yoshi's opinion

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Quality of translations

There are at least two published English versions of the final judgment in Kanda v. State, 1961.

Like most received English versions of court decisions in Japan, they capture the general drift of the decision but misrepresent some of the key terms and phrases as metaphors in Japanese law.

The first appeared in Japanese Annual of International Law (JAIL), Number 8, 1964, page 153 et sequens

The English version is shown in black as extracted from the html file. The English version, while a replica of the Japanese summary, is not an especially close or complete translation, and contains phrasing not reflected in the Japanese version.

Though not my purpose here to present a closer translation of the judgment, I have sometimes modified the received English version to better reflect certain details in the Japanese version, and in places I have entirely retranslated a statement.

All modifications are highlighted as explained under "Presentations" in the next section.

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Sources, presentation, and commentary


Sources


Received Japanese text of ruling

The Japanese text was extracted from a pdf file downloaded from the database accessible through the Japanese government's 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. Most case particulars and a summary were retrieved by a query using minimum case particulars. These particulars and the summary are also shown.

Received English translation

SESCOJL English version   The first of two English versions was extracted from an html file obtained in response to an English query on the same Courts in Japan website. This version, though undated, is attributed to the Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law (SESCOJL), established at the University College of London in 1989. It is shown first only because it appears to have been endorsed by the Courts in Japan website -- although it is the most seriously flawed.

JAIL English version   The second English version -- though the first to be published, and the better of the two published versions -- is at present incomplete, as I have not yet seen the original publication. The parts shown here have been transcribed as cited by Hosokawa Kiyoshi (Hosokawa 1990, in Kim 1990, see details in Bibliography). Hosokawa -- and Chang Hyo Sang (Chang 1990, also in Kim 1990), who cites portions of the same parts -- attribute this translation to Japanese Annual of International Law (JAIL), Number 8, 1964, page 153 et sequens.

Though the earlier JAIL English version is generally superior to the later SESCOJL version, both reflect fatal flaws in how they have chosen to represent Japanese phrasing and terminology in English.

Structural English translation

Because parts of the received translation do not accurately reflect the finer details and texture of the language of the Japanese ruling, I have occasionally shown structural translations of parts that are of special interest to me.

Formatting, commentary, and markup

I have divided the judgment into sections, and have somewhat reformatted the received texts and highlighted some words and phrases to facilitate analysis and commentary.

Underscoring

All underscoring in the text of the judgment is as received. Unless otherwise noted, the underscoring of corresponding parts of the received translation is mine. All underscoring in my own commentary is, of course, also mine.

Parentheses

Unless otherwise noted, all (parentheses) in the received text and translation are as received.

Square and angle brackets

All in-line [square brackets] and <angle brackets> -- and everything enclosed in such brackets -- are mine.

Structural translations and commentary

My own closer (structural) translations are generally shown in blue in cells below the received judgment and received translation. At times I have shown closer translations of words or short phrases in-line, between right and left → arrows ← following the amended text.

Editorial [clarifications] are shown in-line. Brief comments are sometimes boxed in the cells of the texts they relate to. Extended comments are generally shown in cells below the relevant texts.

Color highlighting

The received texts of the judgment and translation, and my own commentary, are shown in black. However, to facilitate commentary on the language of the ruling and/or its translation, I have highlighted specific words and phrases in various colors according to the following scheme, which includes in-line editorial clarifications and corrections.

Color Original Translation
Background highlighting
Blue Corresponding parts of two or more texts selected for comparison
Yellow Content added to received text to reconstruct a missing part
Pink Transcription or scanning errors parenthetically corrected in-line (sic = in-line)
Graphic highlighting
Blue [ Clarification ] (in-line) [ Clarification ] (in-line)
→ My closer translation ← (in-line)
My closer translation (boxed)
Green Presumed true and correct copy of the language of the original text May be too free and a bit off key but represents all elements or original
国籍法


韓国
Nationality Law
Nationality Act (unconventional)
Law / Act of Nationality (unconventional)
Korea (if "Empire of Korea" 1897-1910)
Purple Problematic phrasing or usage in the language of the original text Imprecise or awkward, incomplete or embellished, or otherwise inadequate
国籍
韓国
朝鮮
内地
Citizenship → Nationality (as legal status)
Korea → Republic of Korea (since 1948)
Korea → Chōsen (as territory 1910-1952)
Japan Proper → Interior (as territory)
Red Incorrect phrasing or usage ※ Misleading or incorrect
放棄する
離脱する
朝鮮
renounce → abandon, relinquish
renounce, separate from
Korea → Chōsen (as territory)
Cyan ※ When original is incorrect Mistranslation is more correct than original
日本と朝鮮との併合
the annexation of Korea by Japan
→ the union of Japan and Chōsen

※   The example of incorrect 朝鮮 (Chōsen) being mistranslated Korea (韓国 Kankoku), thus "accidentally" correcting the usage in the judgement, can be seen in Kanda v. State 1961.

1. While 朝鮮 (Chōsen) in the judgment is factually incorrect, the correct translation is "Chōsen" because that is what the original text says. Because the translators conflate "Chōsen" (朝鮮) with "Korea" (韓国 Kankoku), they habitually translate "Chōsen" as "Korea" -- which constitutes a "mistranslation" that in effect accidentally "corrects" the factual error in the original -- i.e., a double negative becomes a positive. But two wrongs don't make a right. Translators are not supposed to "edit" the content of legal briefs. They might flag a problematic expression for comment in a footnote, but the translation itself should be faithful to the original.

2. Note that where the judgment precisely paraphrases the phrasal logic of the expression "Nik-Kan heigō" (日韓併合) [Japan-Korea union] as "X to Y to no heigō" (XとYとの併合) [the union between X and Y], the received translation incorrectly represents the syntactic logic of the paraphrase as "the annexation of Y by X" -- which constitutes an interpretation of the effects of the union, not its formal description in Japanese law -- which I underscore, because the court is making a legal, not political, argument. Historiographic "opinion" external to received text of the original judgment, and its attempt to deal with the letter and operation of Japanese law is irrelevant. A translator might say that the past is past. Treaties, laws, and ordinances of the past -- though no longer enforced -- may continue to have effect in court reviews of what I call "legacy" cases, which involve status actions in the past.

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1961 Supreme Court judgment in Kanda v. State
Japanese text, English version, and commentary
Tokyo District Court

原審裁判所名:東京高等裁判所

原審事件番号:

原審裁判年月日:

Court of original instance: Tokyo High Court

Original instance case number:

Date of original decision:

Supreme Court

事件番号:昭和30(オ)890

事件名:国籍存在確認請求

裁判年月日:昭和36年04月05日

法廷名:最高裁判所大法廷

裁判種別:判決

結果:棄却

判例集巻・号・頁:第15巻4号657頁

Case number: Showa 30 [1955] (O) 890

Case name: Nationality existence confirmation request

Date of judgment: 5 April 1961 [Showa 36]

Court name: Supreme Court, Grand Bench

Type of judgment: Ruling

Results: Dismissed

Hanreishū [Court Reports] Volume, Number, Page:
Volume 15, Number 4, Page 657

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判示事項 Findings
朝鮮人男子と婚姻した内地人女子の平和条約発効後の国籍。

Nationality after peace treaty effectuation of an Interior woman who had married a Chosenese man.

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裁判要旨 Summary of the judgment

朝鮮人男子と婚姻した内地人女子で日本の国内法上朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつていた者は、平和条約発効とともに日本国籍を失う。

A Japanese woman who married a Korean man and had the legal status of a Korean under Japanese Law lost Japanese nationality after the entering into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (there are supplementary and dissenting opinions).

Structural translation

A person who, as an Interior woman who had married a Chosenese man and under the domestic laws of Japan held the legal status of a Chosenese, shall lose Japan's nationality [concomitant] with Peace Treaty effectuation.

Key terms misrendered in English version of summary

The highlighted phrases are among several that are misrendered in the English version.

The Japanese text accurately reflects the fact that, under the domestic laws of the Empire of Japan and of non-imperial Japan after the 1947 Constitution came into effect -- as well as under international law in the eyes of states that recognized Chōsen as part of Japan -- all subjects of the Interior (naichi, i.e., the prefectures), and all subjects of Chōsen and other exterior territories of the sovereign empire, were nationals of Japan, hence were Japanese.

"Chosen/Chosenese" -- not "Korea/Korean" -- properly refer to the entity of Chōsen as part of Japan and the status of subjects affiliated with Chōsen -- as distinct from entities and affiliates before annexation in 1910 and after retrocession in 1952.

"Interior/Interiorite" properly refers to the prefectures as an entity, and to persons whose family registers were affiliated with the prefectures.

Fatal flaws in wording of Japanese text of main judgment

Note that, while the terminology of the Japanese summary is accurate, the main text habitually and fatally errs in referring to Interior people as 日本人 (Japanese) -- even when referring to status actions that took place before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, when 朝鮮人 (Chosenese) were both subjects (臣民 shinmin) and nationals (国民 kokumin), and as such were Japanese (日本人 Nihon) under domestic law.

The discriminatory language of the English translation of the above summary, and the discriminatory language of the Japanese text of the main judgment (and of its English version), give the impression that the plaintiff was a woman who had been "Japanese" but became "Korean" when she married a "Korean" man. If so, then she lost her "Japanese nationality" when she married the man -- not in 1952.

In fact, a Japanese woman of Interior subnationality married a Japanese man of Chōsen subnationality. Family law, as facilitated by family register law, recognized that a man and a woman were married only when they were registered as husband and wife in the same family register. So either the bride or the groom had migrate to the other's family register.

Except in cases of husband adoption, a bride migrated to the grooms register. As the plaintiff had been in an Interior register, and the man to whom she wished to be married was in a Chōsen register, she migrated from her Interior register to his Chōsen register, at which point she became a Chōsen rather than Interior subject.

However, both the plaintiff and her husband were Japanese at the time of their marriage, and they remained Japanese until 1952 -- when, as a consequence of the peace treaty and Ministry of Justice Civil Affairs A No. 438 notification, sovereignty over Chōsen, including its population registers, reverted to "Korea" and they lost their Japanese nationality.

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参照法条 Relevant laws

憲法10条,日本国との平和条約2条(a)項

Constitution Article 10, Article 2 paragraph (a) of Peace Treaty with Japan

Articles cited in above references but not included with received judgment

憲法10条

日本国民たる要件は、法律でこれを定める。

Article 10 of the Constitution

[ official version ]  The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

Structural translation

As for the conditions to be a national of Japan, [the state shall] determine these by law.

日本国民 is better represented by "Japan national" or "national of Japan". Japanese texts differentiate 日本国民 ("Japan national") and 日本の国民 ("national of Japan") -- but the latter essentially defines the former, hence "national of Japan" can be used for "Japan national" in most contexts. Rendering 日本 as "Japanese" when used attributively is a problem especially in contexts where "Japanese" could be taken to mean 日本人. It is a problem here because the 1899 Nationality Law uses 日本人 where the 1950 Nationality Law uses 日本国民. Neither the 1890 nor 1947 constitutions use 日本人.

法律 is broadly any law, act, code, statute, treaty, or other legal measure approved by the National Diet.

日本国との平和条約2条(a)項

日本国は,朝鮮の独立を承認して,済州島,巨文島及び欝陵島を含む朝鮮に対するすべての権利,権原及び請求権を放棄する。

Article 2 paragraph (a) of the Peace Treaty with Japan

[ official English version ]  Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

Structural translation

(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Chōsen, abandons all rights, titles and demand rights [right to make demands, claims] toward Chōsen including the Saishū islands [K. Cheju-do, aka D. Quelpart] , Kyūbun islands [K. Kŏmun-do, aka E. Port Hamilton] and Utsuryō islands [K. Ullŭng-do, aka F. Dagelet].

Note that the Japanese version clearly and consistently refers to the entity being ceded away from Japan as 朝鮮 (Chōsen) or Chōsen, not "Korea". Even today, Japan refers to the entity that became part of Japan in 1910, and remained part of Japan until 1952, as Chōsen, and to its affiliates as 朝鮮人 (Chōsenjin) or Chosenese.

In Japanese law, the "Korea" in the English version of the treaty refers to "Chosen" as the entity Japan is in effect ceding to an unnamed state -- which is neither the "Korea" of the defunct "Empire of Korea" (韓国), nor the "Korea" of either the "Republic of Korea" (韓国) or the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (朝鮮 Chosŏn) -- all of which are different entities. A proper understanding in English of Japanese laws and court decisions is possible only if their English versions clearly reflect entity distinctions made in Japanese.

Articles not cited in above references but cited in judgment

共通法三条一項

一ノ地域ノ法令ニ依リ其ノ地域ノニ入ル者ハ他ノ地域ノヲ去ル

Article 3, Paragraph 1 of Common Law

[ structural translation ]  A person who on account of [pursuant to] the laws of a territory enters a [corporate] family of that territory will leave the [corporate] family of another territory.

Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Common Law (Law No. 39 of 1918) -- though not listed in the references of the received text of the Kanda v. State judgment -- was instrumental in facilitating register migration (my term) between territorial registers in cases of marriage and adoption alliances between subjects of different territories. Exceptionally, Article 3 did not come into force until 1921.

For further details about the origin and application of the Common Law, including the Japanese text and my translations of relevant parts, see 1918 Common Law.

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Japanese SESCOJL translation JAIL translation
主文 Main text of the judgment

本件上告を棄却する。
上告費用は上告人らの負担とする。

The jokoku appeal shall be dismissed.
The cost of the jokoku appeal shall be borne by the jokoku appellant.

理由 Reasons

一、上告代理人鹿野琢見の上告理由第一及び第二について

1 上告人は、原判決が憲法一〇条、一一条、一二条、一三条及び国籍法に違反した裁判であるとする。なるほど、憲法一〇条は、日本国民の要件を法律で定めることを規定している。しかし、これを定めた国籍法は、領土の変更に伴う国籍の変更について規定していない。しかも、領土の変更に伴つて国籍の変更を生ずることは、疑いをいれないところである。この変更に関しては、国際法上で確定した原則がなく、各場合に条約によつて明示的または黙示的に定められるのを通例とする。したがつて、憲法は、領土の変更に伴う国籍の変更について条約で定めることを認めた趣旨と解するのが相当である。それ故に憲法一〇条に違反するといら主張は理由がなく、国籍法も本件に関しては適用がない。また、憲法一一条、一二条、一三条についても、上告人の日本国籍の喪失は、つぎに述べるように、平和条約の規定に基くものであつて、憲法のこれらの規定に違反する点は認められない。

2 日本国との平和条約は、第二条(a)項で、「日本国は、朝鮮の独立を承認して、済州島、巨文島及び欝陵島を含む朝鮮に対するすべての権利、権原及び請求権を放棄する」と規定している。簡単にいえば、朝鮮の独立を承認して、朝鮮に属すべき領土に対する主権を放棄することを規定している。この規定は、朝鮮に属すべき領土に対する主権(いわゆる領土主権)を放棄すると同時に、朝鮮に属すべき人に対する主権(いわゆる対人主権)も放棄することは疑いをいれない。国家は、人、領土及び政府を存立の要素とするもので、これらの一つを缺いても国家として存立しない。朝鮮の独立を承認するということは、朝鮮を独立の国家として承認することで、朝鮮がそれに属する人、領土及び政府をもつことを承認することにほかならない。したがつて、平和条約によつて、日本は朝鮮に属すべき人に対する主権を放棄したことになる。

このことは、朝鮮に属すべき人について、日本の国籍を喪失させることを意味する。あるに属する人は、その国の国籍をもつ人であり、その国の主権に服する。逆にいえば、ある国の国籍をもつ人は、その国の主権に服する。したがつて、日本が朝鮮に属すべき人に対する主権を放棄することは、このような人について日本の国籍を喪失させることになる。

3 朝鮮に属すべき人というのは、日本と朝鮮との併合後において、日本の国内法上で、朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつた人と解するのが相当である。朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつた人というのは、朝鮮戸籍令の適用を受け、朝鮮戸籍に登載された人である。日本と朝鮮の併合の前に、韓国には民籍法があり、韓国の国籍をもつた人は、民籍に登載されていた。併合の後に、民籍法に代つて朝鮮戸籍令が施行され、民籍に登載されていた人は、朝鮮戸籍に登載されることになつた。これと異つて、元来の日本人は、戸籍法の適用を受け、戸籍に登載される。朝鮮戸籍からはつきり区別するために、これを内地戸籍ということがある。このように、朝鮮人と日本人は、はつきりと戸籍を異にするばかりでなく、それと同時に、適用される法律を異にした。

朝鮮人との婚姻又は養子縁組によつて朝鮮人の家に入つた日本人は、共通法三条一項の「一ノ地域ノ法令ニ依リ其ノ地域ノニ入ル者ハ、他ノ地域ノヲ去ル」という規定に従つて、朝鮮戸籍に登載され、他方で内地戸籍から除籍された。このような人は、法律上で朝鮮人として取扱われ、朝鮮人に関する法令が適用され、日本人に関する法令は適用されなかつた。法律上から見るかぎり、まつたく朝鮮人と同じであり、朝鮮人にほかならなつた。このことは、あたかも日本人の女が外国人と婚姻し、夫の国籍を取得した場合と同じである。改正前の国籍法によれば、このような場合に、日本人の女は、日本の国籍を喪失する。そのために、法律上から見れば、日本の法令は適用されず、もつぱら外国の法令が適用されることになり、法律的には外国人にほかならないことになる。日本人の女が朝鮮人と婚姻し、朝鮮戸籍に入籍し、内地戸籍から除籍された場合も、右と同じであり、法律上では日本人でなく、朝鮮人になつたものと見るほかない。

連合国による日本占領の時代にも、朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつ者は、日本人としての法的地位をもつ者から、法律上で区別されていた。連合国総司令部の覚書は、あるいは朝鮮人を外国人と同様に取扱い、あるいは「非日本人」という言葉のうちに朝鮮人を含ませ、あるいは「外国人」という言葉のうちに朝鮮人を含ませていた。連合国総司令部の覚書に基いて発せられた日本政府の「外国人登録令」は、朝鮮人を当分の間外国人とみなし、これに入国の制限と登録を強制した。そのさいに、朝鮮人というのは、法律上で朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつ人のことである。そのうちに、婚姻又は養子縁組によつて朝鮮戸籍に登載されるに至つた人も含まれていたことは、いうまでもない。これらの人は、右に述べたように、法律上では、朝鮮人に関する法令が適用され、朝鮮人に異らないものであり、実際において、「非日本人」または「外国人」として取扱われ、外国人として登録もしたのであつた。

これを要するに、朝鮮人 としての法的地位をもつ人は、日本人としての法的地位をもつ人から、日本の国内法上で、はつきり区別されていた。この区別は、日本と韓国の併合のときから一貫して維持され、占領時代にも変らなかなつた。このような法律的状態の下に、平和条約が結ばれ、日本は朝鮮の独立を承認して、朝鮮に属すべき人に対する主権を放棄し、その人の日本国籍を喪失させることになつた。そうしてみれば、日本国籍を喪失させられる人は、日本の法律上で朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつていた人と見るのが相当である。

4 本件の上告人は、元来は日本人であるが、昭和一〇年七月一六日に朝鮮人であるAと婚姻入籍したことは、原判決の適法に確定したところである。それによつて、上告人は、法律上で朝鮮人としての法的地位を取得し、日本人としてのそれを喪失したことになる。

平和条約によつて、日本は、朝鮮の独立を承認し、朝鮮に属すべき人の日本国籍を喪失させることになつた。朝鮮に属すべき人というのは、さきに述べたように、日本の法律上で、朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつていた人である。本件の上告人は、この法的地位をもつていたから、平和条約によつて、日本の国籍を喪失したことになる。

5 上告人は、上告理由第一のうちで、日本と韓国の合併がなかつたならば、朝鮮人Aと婚姻しなかつたであろうということも主張している。しかし、法律上の問題としては、朝鮮人と婚姻したという場合において、朝鮮人としての法的地位を取得するか、その結果として平和条約によつて日本の国籍を喪失するかということが問題であつて、上告人が昭和一〇年七月一六日に朝鮮人Aと婚姻入籍したことは、原判決の適法に確定したところであり、このように確定した事実に基いて、原判決が日本の国籍を上告人が喪失すると判断したのは正当である。

二、同第三について上告人は、平和条約が効力を発生した当時に、実質的に完全な離婚状態にあり、しかも住所をすでに日本国に固定していたとし、それ故に日本の国籍を喪失しないとする。しかし、上告人は、元来は日本人であつても、朝鮮人と婚姻入籍したものであつて、離婚は事実上の状態によつてただちに成立するもので (sic = はな)く、法律上では、上告人の住所のいかんを問わず、その婚姻はいぜんとして継続し、上告人は朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつていたのである。昭和二七年一〇月に、上告人は離婚の判決をえたけれども、これは平和条約が効力を発生した後のことであり、すでに平和条約によつて国籍を喪失していた状態を変更するもので (sic = はな)い。

三、以上の理由によつて、上告人が日本の国籍を有することの確認を求めるのは失当である。上告人が日本の国籍を希望するならば、国籍法に定める帰化の手続によるべきであり、これによつて国籍を簡易に回復することができる。原判決が国籍存在の確認を求める上告人の請求を排斥したのは相当である。

よつて、民訴四〇一条、九五条、八九条に従い、主文のとおり判決する。

この判決は、裁判官藤田八郎、同入江俊郎、同奥野健一の補足意見及び裁判官下飯坂潤夫の少数意見があるほか、裁判官全員一致の意見によるものである。

I. On the grounds item 1 and 2 of jokoku appeal by the representative for the jokoku appellant TK:

1. The jokoku appellant argues that the judgment of the original instance court is in breach of articles 10,11,12, and 13 of the Constitution and the Law on Nationality. Article 10 of the Constitution provides that the requirements for Japanese nationality are to be determined by law. However, the Law on Nationality which determines them do not provide for a change of nationality as the result of a change of territory. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that a change of territory results in a change of nationality. Concerning these changes, there is no established rule of international law, and usually it is determined explicitly or tacitly by treaties on each occasion. Therefore, it is reasonable to understand that the Constitution allows treaties to provide for a change of nationality resulting from a change of territory. Thus, the argument that it is in breach of Article 10 of the Constitution is without grounds and the Law on Nationality is not applicable to the present case. Concerning articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Constitution, the loss of Japanese nationality by the jokoku appellant is a result of the provision of the Peace Treaty as explained below, and there is no breach of these provisions of the Constitution.

2. The Peace Treaty with Japan on Article 2 (a) provides that 'Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet'. To put it simply, it provides that Japan recognises the independence of Korea and renounces sovereign rights to the territory which belongs to Korea. There is no doubt that this provision renounces the sovereign rights over the territory (territorial sovereignty) as well as the sovereignty over the people who belong to Korea (personal sovereignty). A state comprises people, territory and government, and even one of them lacking, the state cannot exist. The recognition of the independence of Korea means that Korea is recognised as an independent state and Korea is recognised to have people who belong to Korea, the territory and the government. Therefore, through the Peace Treaty, Japan is understood to have renounced sovereignty vis a vis all people who belong to Korea.

This means that in relation to those who belong to Korea, Japanese nationality would be lost. A person who belongs to a country has the nationality of that country and is subject to the sovereignty of that country. On the other hand, a person who has the nationality of a country is subject to its sovereignty. Therefore, the renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the people who belong to Korea will cause those people to lose Japanese nationality.

3. It should be understood that 'people who belong to Korea' means people who obtained legal status as Koreans under Japanese law after the annexation of Korea by Japan. People who have legal status of Koreans are those to whom the Korean Civil Status Decree is applicable and those who are registered in the Korean Civil Status Register. Before the Annexation by Japan, there was a Law on Civil Status in Korea and those who had the nationality of Korea were registered in the Civil Status Register. After the annexation, in place of the Law on Civil Status, the Korean Civil Status Decree was enforced, and those who had been registered in the Civil Status Register were registered in the Korean Civil Status Register. In contrast, those who are Japanese by birth are those to whom the Law on Nationality is applicable and are registered in the Civil Status Register. In order to distinguish this from Korean Civil Status Register, this Register was sometimes called the Japanese (home land) Civil Status Register. Thus, the Japanese and Koreans not only had a clearly distinct civil status, but the applicable law was also different.

Those Japanese who joined a Korean ie (a traditional Japanese household) by marriage with a Korean or by adoption, by virtue of the Common Law Article 3, para. 1 which states that 'a person who joined a family in a territory in accordance with its law shall leave the ie of another territory', was registered in the Korean Civil Status Register and at the same time, removed from the Japanese (home land) Civil Status Register. These people were treated as Koreans by law and the laws concerning Koreans were applied while laws concerning the Japanese were not applied. Thus, from a purely legal point of view, these people were treated in the same way as Koreans and they were simply Koreans. This is identical to the situation where a Japanese woman married a foreign person and obtained the same nationality as the husband. According to the Law on Nationality before the amendment, in such cases, the Japanese woman loses her Japanese nationality. For this reason, from a legal point of view, Japanese law is not applicable and foreign law is exclusively applied, and legally, she is a foreigner. In cases where a Japanese woman marries a Korean man, is registered in the Korean Civil Status Register and has been removed from the Japanese (home land) Civil Status Register, it is the same, and legally, she is not a Japanese and cannot but be regarded as having become a Korean.

Under the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces, those who had legal status of a Korean were distinguished by law from those who had legal status of a Japanese. The memorandum of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers treated Koreans in the same way as foreigners, included Koreans in the category of 'non-Japanese', or included them in the term 'foreigners'. The Ordinance on the Registration of Foreigners issued on the basis of the above memorandum deemed, for the time being, Koreans to be foreigners and imposed restrictions on entry into the country and registration. In this context, Koreans meant those who had legal status of a Korean by law. It goes without saying that these included people who came to be registered in the Korean Civil Status Register by marriage or adoption. To these people, as mentioned above, legally, laws concerning Koreans are applied and they (sic = they are) no different from Koreans, and in practice, were treated as 'non-Japanese' or 'foreigners' and were registered as foreigners.

Thus, those who had legal status of Koreans were clearly distinguished under Japanese law from those who had legal status of a Japanese. This distinction has been maintained consistently ever since the annexation of Korea by Japan and did not change under the Allied occupation. Under such a state of law, the Peace Treaty was concluded and Japan has recognised the independence of Korea, renounced the sovereignty over the people who belong to Korea and thus removed Japanese nationality of those people. Therefore, those who are to lose Japanese nationality should be understood as those who had legal status of a Korean national under Japanese law.

4. As has been lawfully established by the judgment of the original instance court, the jokoku appellant in the present case was a Japanese by birth, but on July 16, 1935, married with a Korean man, A, and registered. In this way, the jokoku appellant has legally obtained legal status of a Korean national and lost legal status of a Japanese national.

Under the Peace Treaty, Japan has recognised the independence of Korea and as a result, those who belong to Korea lost Japanese nationality. Those who belong to Korea are, as mentioned above, those who had legal status of a Korean national under Japanese law. The jokoku appellant in the present case had this legal status, and therefore, she should be regarded to have lost Japanese nationality under the Peace Treaty.

5. The jokoku appellant argued in the ground of the jokoku appeal item 1 that had it not been for the annexation of Korea by Japan, she would not have married the Korean man, A. However, from a legal point of view, the problem is whether in the case of her marriage with a Korean, she acquired legal status of a Korean national or not, and as a result, whether she lost Japanese nationality under the Peace Treaty or not. It has been lawfully established by the judgment of the original instance court that the jokoku appellant married a Korean A on July 16, 1935, and the conclusion of the judgment of the original instance court which ruled that the jokoku appellant loses the [lost] Japanese nationality based upon these facts is justifiable.

II. On the ground of appeal item 3:

The jokoku appellant argues that at the time the Peace Treaty took effect, she was in substance divorced and furthermore, the address was already fixed in Japan and therefore, she does not lose Japanese nationality. However, although the jokoku appellant was originally a Japanese, she has married a Korean and registered. Divorce does not take effect merely through the actual state of marriage and legally, the marriage continues regardless of the address of the jokoku appellant, and she has maintained legal status of a Korean national. In October 1952, the jokoku appellant obtained a divorce judgment, but this was after the Peace Treaty had taken effect, and did not change the situation whereby she had lost Japanese nationality under the Peace Treaty.

III. Based upon the above reasons, there are no grounds for the jokoku appellant to claim for recognition of the existence of Japanese nationality. If the jokoku appellant desires to obtain Japanese nationality, she should apply for naturalisation in accordance with the Law on Nationality, and through this procedure, nationality can be easily restored. The judgment of the original instance court which dismissed the claim of the jokoku appellant to recognise the existence of Japanese nationality is justifiable.

Therefore, in accordance with articles 401, 95, and 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the justices rule as the main text of judgment.

This judgment is based upon an unanimous opinion of the justices except for supplementary opinions by justices FUJITA Hachiro, IRIE Toshio, and OKUNO Kenichi, and a dissenting opinion by SHIMOIIZAKA Masuo.


[ first parts omitted ]

1. . . .

[ omission ]

Indeed, it is clear Article 10 of the Constitution provides that the conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law. However, the Nationality Law, which made this determination, makes no provision for changes in nationality pursuant to transfers of territory. Nevertheless, changes in nationality undoubtedly follow transfers of territory. In international law there is no conclusive principle concerning such transfers; rather the normal practice is to settle the matter expressly or impliedly by treaty in each case. Consequently, it is proper to construe that the Constitution purports to recognize that changes in nationality pursuant to transfers of territory are prescribed by treaty. Therefore, the allegation that Article 10 of the Constitution has been violated is without reason and the Nationality Law does not apply to this case. . . .



[ omission ]


2. The Peace Treaty with Japan provides in Article 2(a) that 'Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.' Simply put, it provides that Japan recognizes the independence of Korea and renounces sovereignty over the territory belonging to Korea. Undeniably, this provision renounces sovereignty over the territory belonging to Korea (so-called 'territorial sovereignty') while at the same time also renouncing sovereignty over the people belonging to Korea (so-called 'personal sovereignty'). A State is composed of people, territory and a government as its essential requisites for existence, and if it lacks any one of these it cannot exist as a State. Recognition of the independence of Korea is recognition that Korea possesses the people, territory and government appertaining to it. Accordingly, by the Peace Treaty, Japan has renounced sovereignty over the people belonging to Korea.

This fact means that the people belonging to Korea have been divested of Japanese nationality. The people belonging to a country are the people who possess the nationality of that country and who are subject to the sovereignty of that country . . . [C]onversely, the persons who possess the nationality of a country are subject to its sovereignty. Thus, renunciation by Japan of sovereignty over the people belonging to Korea constitutes the divestment of these people of their Japanese nationality.

3. 'People belonging to Korea' is properly construed to mean persons who had legal status as Koreans under Japanese domestic law after the union of Japan and Korea. Persons who had legal status as Koreans were those who were subject to the application of the Chosen [Korean] Family Registration Order and those who were recorded in a Chosen Family Register. Prior to the union of Japan and Korea, a Civil Registration Law had existed in Korea and persons possessing Korean nationality were those who were recorded in the Civil Register. After the union, the Chosen Family Registration Order was enforced in place of the Civil Registration Law, and those persons who had been entered in the Civil Register came to be recorded in the Chosen Family Register. Quite differently proper Japanese were subject to the application of the Family Registration Law and were entered in the Family Register. In order clearly to distinguish it from the Chosen Family Register, there are those who call it the 'homeland Family Register'. In this way, not only did Koreans and Japanese clearly differ in family registration, but at the same time, they also differed in respect to the laws applicable to them.

A Japanese, who entered the house of a Korean by marriage or adoption, was entered in the Chosen Family Register and [struck] from the homeland Family Register in accordance with the provision in Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Common Affairs Law that '[a] person, who pursuant to the laws and orders of one area enters a family in that area, leaves a family in another area.' Such a person was treated by law as a Korean; laws and orders concerning Koreans were applied to him while laws and orders concerning Japanese were not applied. Viewed from the standpoint of the law alone, he was completely the same as a Korean -- he was none other than a Korean. . . .



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The upshot of these [considerations] is that persons who had legal status as Koreans were clearly differentiated under Japanese domestic law from persons who had legal status as Japanese. This distinction was consistently maintained following the union of Japan and Korea and remained unchanged during the occupation period. Under these legal circumstances the Peace Treaty was concluded and Japan recognized the independence of Korea, renounced sovereignty over the people belonging to Korea and divested them of their Japanese nationality. Viewed in this manner, it is proper to regard the persons deprived of Japanese nationality as those individuals who had held legal status under Japanese law as Koreans.



[ remaining parts omitted ]

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Supplementary opinion of Fujita Hachirō
Japanese SESCOJL translation

裁判官藤田八郎の補足意見は次のとおりである。

多数意見は平和条約第二条により、同条約の発効と同時に、当時朝鮮戸籍令によつて朝鮮戸籍に登録されていたものは、本来の朝鮮人のみならず、朝鮮人との婚姻等に因り、共通法三条一項の規定によつて内地における本籍を失い朝鮮の戸籍に入つた本来の日本人をもすべて朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつ人として、右条約の効力として、条約発効の時を時限として当然に日本の国籍を喪失するものとしている。

The supplementary opinion of Justice FUJITA Hachiro is as follows:

The majority opinion is of the view that by virtue of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, with the Treaty taking effect, all of those who, at that time, were registered in the Korean Civil Status Register by the Korean Decree on the Civil Status, (i.e. not only the original Koreans but also those who were originally Japanese but by marriage with a Korean or other reasons and by virtue of Article 3, para. 1 of the Common Law, lost the civil status in the home land and were registered in the Korean Register), automatically lost Japanese nationality as persons with legal status of a Korean national as a result of the Peace Treaty at the time the Treaty took effect.

Structural translation

The supplementary opinion of Justice Fujita Hachirō is as follow:

The majority opinion holds that, due to [pursuant to] Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, simultaneously with the effectuation of the same treaty, those who had been registered in a Chōsen family register in accordance with [pursuant to] the then Chōsen Family Register Decree -- not only [those who were] Chosenese from the beginning [= when they were first registered (usually shortly after their birth)], but also [those who were] Japanese from the beginning who, due to marriage et cetera with a Chosenese, in accordance with Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Common Law lost [their] principal register in the Interior and entered a family register of Chōsen -- all, as persons with the legal status of Chosenese, would naturally forfeit the nationality of Japan at the temporal limit of the time of treaty effectuation.

しかしながら、日本人としての国籍喪失の問題は、わが国の国内法上の問題であつて(憲法一〇条)、平和条約の国際法上の効力として、直接かかる効果を発生するものとすることはできない、平和条約の国内法上の効力の問題として理解されなければならないものである。しかるときに、多数意見は、平和条約発効のときに既に施行後数年を経ていた日本国憲法ならびにこの憲法の施行に伴つてその趣旨に沿うて改正された民法その他の国内法秩序と平和条約との関連をいかに理解せんとするものであろうか。

条約の国内法上の効力は、憲法の趣旨に背反して解釈することの許されないことは当然であろう。憲法の施行につれて民法は改正されいわゆる家は廃止された。平和条約発効当時において、共通法三条にいわゆる「家ニ入ル」「家ヲ去ル」の理念はその適用の根拠を失つているのである。そして民法の改正に伴つて、戸籍法も改正され、いわゆる本籍の概念は一変した。従来の「家」という抽象的、観念的の団体を基本単位として、これに属する人の身分関係を明らかにするという意義の本籍は廃罷されて、新に夫婦親子という通常の親族共同生活態をもつて戸籍の単位とすることとなつた。まさに戸籍法の劃期的な変革であつて、共通法が朝鮮人たる身分の得喪の基準としたところの在来の本籍なる観念はこのときをもつて全く消失したのである。一方、国籍に関しても昭和二五年五月新国籍法は制定され、旧国籍法に採用されていたいわゆる夫婦国籍同一主義は、もともとわが国在来の家族制度の趣意に沿うものであり、新憲法の個人の尊厳、夫婦の平等、国籍離脱の自由の原則等の理念とは相容れないものであつたがためこれを廃止し、現時世界の大勢に従つて、夫婦国籍独立主義を採用したのである(八条参照)。

これら新しい国内諸法規の趣意からみて、平和条約の国内法的効力を解釈するにあたつて、同条約発効当時に、尚かつ共通法三条の規定を肯定して国籍の得喪を論議することは、いかにしても不合理で (sic = はな)かろうか。

多数意見は、日本国憲法施行後、民法改正の後に、そして、平和条約発効までの間に朝鮮人と婚姻した日本婦人についても、共通法の規定によつて、その日本婦人は「内地ノ家ヲ去ル」ものとして、従つて日本における本籍を失つたものとして、平和条約発効と同時に日本の国籍を喪失したものと解して何の疑念をもさしはさまないのであろうか。とすればあまりにも憲法の趣旨とかけ (sic = はな)れた解釈と評せざるを得ないので (sic = はな)いか。日本国憲法に伴う諸改正法規の施行された以後においては、朝鮮人と婚姻したが故に、従つて日本の家を去るが故に日本の本籍を失うという観念は、新民法からいつても、新戸籍法からいつても、さらに新国籍法の理念からいつても是認し得ないところのもので (sic = はな)いか。しかもこれらの法律改正は日本国憲法の趣意に淵源するものであることを銘記しなければならない。

わが国は昭和二〇年八月ポツダム宣言を受諾して事実上朝鮮の独立を承認したのである。朝鮮は同月一五日をもつてその独立の記念日としていること、そしてその時以後独立国の実体をそなえていることは世界公知の事実である。少くとも朝鮮在住の朝鮮人はこの時以後日本国の国籍を喪失したものと解すべきは疑を容れないところであろう。(多数意見は朝鮮在住の朝鮮人についても、平和条約発効までは日本の国籍を失わなかつたとするのであろうか。)

昭和二七年四月締結された平和条約第二条は、法律上明確に朝鮮の独立を承認しているのであるが、これはさきになされた事実上の承認を法律上明認したものと解すべきであろう。従つて朝鮮の独立承認にもとづく朝鮮人の日本の国籍喪失の基準は、わが国がポツダム宣言の受諾によつて事実上朝鮮の独立を承認した時を基準としなければならないものであると思う。この時は、もとより日本国憲法の施行以前であり、いわゆる共通法秩序は厳として存在していた時期である。この時を基準とするかぎりにおいて、多数意見の説くところはすべて是認し得るのであつて、本件の上告人はその以前において朝鮮人と婚姻し、朝鮮の家に入り日本の本籍を失つていたものであることは原判決の確定するところであるから、上告人はこの時を基準として日本の国籍を喪失したものと解すべきである。

However, loss of nationality as a Japanese is a matter of Japanese domestic law (Article 10 of the Constitution) and cannot be regarded as a direct effect under international law of the Peace Treaty. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of the effect of the Peace Treaty under Japanese law. In such a case, how does the majority opinion explain the relationship between the domestic legal order at the time the Peace Treaty took effect, i.e. the Constitution which had already been in place for several years then, and the Civil Code which had been amended by the taking of effect of the Constitution and in accordance with the Constitution on the one hand, and the Peace Treaty on the other hand?

It is natural that the internal effect of an international treaty under national law cannot be interpreted in breach of the meaning of the Constitution. Through the taking of effect of the Constitution, the Civil Code was amended and the system of 'ie' was abolished. At the time the Peace Treaty took effect, the concept of 'joining the ie', and 'leaving the ie' as referred to in Article 3, para.1 of the Common Law had lost the basis for application. Through the amendment to the Civil Code, the Law on the Civil Status was also amended and the concept of the original civil status also changed significantly. The concept of the original civil status which had the meaning of determining the status of the people who belong to the basic component -- an abstract and conceptual entity such as ie -- was abolished, and instead, basic and normal forms of family such as spouses and parents and children were made the basic component of the civil status. This is a revolutionary reform of the civil status law and the previously existing concept of the original civil status which was used as a criterion for the acquisition and loss of legal status of a Korean national by the Common Law completely disappeared at this time. On the other hand, concerning nationality, a new Law on Nationality was enacted in May 1950 and the requirement of the previous Law on Nationality that the spouses should share the same nationality was abolished, since this was in line with the traditional family system and was not compatible with the ideas of the principles of respect for individuals, equality of spouses, and the freedom of the waiver of nationality, and in accordance with the present global trend, had adopted the principle of separate nationalities of spouses (see Art.8).

In the light of the meaning of those new domestic laws, is it not irrational, when interpreting the effect of the Peace Treaty under Japanese law, to acknowledge Article 3 of the Common Law and discuss the acquisition and loss of nationality at the time the Peace Treaty had taken effect?

Does not the majority opinion have any doubt that after the entering of force of the Constitution and the amendment of the Civil Code, and before the taking of effect of the Peace Treaty, a Japanese woman who married a Korean man should, by virtue of the Common Law, be regarded as having lost Japanese nationality through the Peace Treaty taking effect, since she has 'left the ie in the homeland' and had lost the original civil status in Japan? If this is so, should this not have to be seen as an interpretation extremely alien to the spirit of the Constitution? After the amended laws as a result of the new Constitution came into effect, the idea that the original Japanese civil status is lost since she had married a Korean and had left the Japanese ie cannot be supported in light of the new Civil Code, the new Law on Nationality, and the idea behind the new Law on Nationality. It should also be noted that the amendment to these laws originates from the Constitution.

Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945 and recognised the independence of Korea de facto. It is publicly known worldwide that Korea has made August 15 a national day of independence and since then has come to acquire the substance of an independent state. It goes without saying that at least Koreans who live in Korea have lost Japanese nationality since then (the majority opinion would be of the view that those Koreans who live in Korea did not lose Japanese nationality until the Peace Treaty came into force).

Article 2 of the Peace Treaty concluded in April 1952 explicitly recognises the independence of Korea legally, but this should be understood as a legal ratification of the already made de facto recognition. Therefore, the time for the loss of Japanese nationality by the Koreans based upon the independence of Korea has to be the time of the acceptance of Potsdam Declaration by Japan by which Japan de facto recognised the independence of Korea. This was before the entering into force of the Japanese Constitution and the legal order under the Common Law was firmly in place. Only when this moment is seen to be decisive in determining the loss of Japanese nationality, can the majority opinion be fully supported. The judgment of the original instance court has established that the jokoku appellant in the present case married a Korean before this, joined a Korean ie and lost the original Japanese civil status, and therefore, the jokoku appellant lost Japanese nationality at the time of the acceptance of Potsdam Declaration.

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Supplementary opinion of Irie Toshirō
Japanese SESCOJL translation

裁判官入江俊郎の補足意見は次のとおりである。

一、上告人の憲法および国籍法違反の主張の理由のないこと、および本件上告人の日本国籍の喪失は、日本国との平和条約の規定に基づくものであることについては、わたくしは多数意見と同様である。ところで、本件上告人の日本国籍喪失の根拠規定たる前記条約第二条(a)項は、「日本国は、朝鮮の独立を承認して、……朝鮮に対するすべての権利、権原及び請求権を放棄する。」と規定しており、朝鮮に対する領土主権を放棄するものであることは疑いないが、これに伴つていかなる限度において対人主権を放棄することになるかは必らずしも明瞭で (sic = はな)く、対人主権を放棄することとした朝鮮に属すべき人の範囲は、右条約の規定の成立するに至つた経緯を顧み、同規定の趣旨に従つて、解釈によつて定めるほか (sic = はな)いものと思う。

二、わたくしは、先ず、前記条約の朝鮮の独立を承認した規定は、明治四二年 (sic = 明治四三年)日本国と旧韓国との間に成立した韓国併合条約により発生した状態を除去し、終戦後独立した朝鮮国家に、併合なかりせば旧韓国が持つていたはずのものと認められる領土主権および対人主権を回復し、いわば、併合なかりせば、法律上かくのごとくであつたと認めうる法的状態を実現すること(原状回復)を主眼としたものであると考えるのである。そこで、これを前提として、朝鮮の独立を承認したことに伴つて対人主権を放棄することとした朝鮮に属すべき人の範囲につき考えてみると、併合前の韓国人またはその子孫で併合後その者の身分上に特段の変動のなかつた者(いわば生来の朝鮮人)は、朝鮮に属すべき人として、わが国がこれに対する対人主権を放棄したものであることは、前記平和条約の規定の解釈上問題 (sic = はな)いであろう。しかし、それ以外の者、例えば、生来の日本人である女子が、併合後前記のような生来の朝鮮人と婚姻入籍した本件上告人のごとき場合、その他昭和二七年四月一九日付民事局長通達の第一、朝鮮及台湾関係の(二)、(三)に掲げられたような者の場合等において、その者の日本国籍がどうなるかは、その個々の場合ごとに、併合なかりせばその者の国籍は法制上どうなつているであろうかということを考えて、それに合致する限度において、判断すべきであると思う。或いは、前記条約の規定は生来の朝鮮人以外の者の日本国籍の喪失についてまで定めたもので (sic = はな)く、それらの者については、専ら朝鮮国家独立の際におけるわが国の国内法の規定によるべきであるという者があるかもしれないが、わたくしは、前記条約の規定は、前述のごとく原状回復を趣旨とするものと考えるのであつて、その趣旨に合致する限度において、生来の朝鮮人以外の者の日本国籍の喪失についても規定していると解するのである。

そこで、これを本件に即して調べてみると、当時の旧韓国の法制によれば、旧韓国人男子に嫁した外国人女子は旧韓国の国籍を取得することとなつており、また当時のわが国の旧国籍法(明治三二年法律六六号)一八条によれば、日本人が外国人の妻となり、夫の国籍を取得したときは日本国籍を失うこととなつていたことが明らかであるから、もし韓国併合なかりせば、前記のように生来の朝鮮人と婚姻した生来の日本人である上告人は、その当時韓国の国籍を取得するとともに、日本国籍を失うべかりし者であつたことが明らかであり、そしてこのことは、併合なかりせば上告人が婚姻した時そのように確定して既成の事実となつてしまつたはずの事柄であつて、前記条約の規定はそのような事柄に着目し、そのような法的状態を、朝鮮国家独立の際実現せんとするものである。このことは、その後わが国に日本国憲法が施行され、また国籍法が改正されて夫婦同一国籍主義をやめたとしても、それによつて影響を受くべきもので (sic = はな)い。けだし、前記条約の規定をこのように解することは、日本国憲法に何ら違反するもので (sic = はな)く(夫婦同一国籍主義そのものが憲法に違反するものとは考えられない。そしてこの主義は、新憲法施行後たる昭和二五年に、同年法律一四五号国籍法が施行されるまで、旧国籍法一八条、二一条等によつて認められていたのである。)、また本件日本国籍喪失は、前記条約の規定に基づくものであつて、国籍法に基づくものでないこと冒頭に述べたとおりであるから、新国籍法の施行とは関係がないという号べきだからである。しからば、上告人は前記条約の規定の解釈上、朝鮮国家独立とともに日本国籍を喪失するに至つたものというほか (sic = はな)い。

以上は、原判決の理由説示と同趣旨であり、本件判決の理由としては、わたくしはこれをもつて足りるものと考える。

三、多数意見は、「右平和条約の規定の解釈上、朝鮮に属すべき人というのは、日本の国内法上で朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつた人と解するのが相当である。」と説示し、併合後において、わが国の国内法上朝鮮人とされる者についての法制を詳述しているが、併合後わが国の国内法制が、朝鮮人としての法的地位を持つ者としからざる者とを区別したのは、併合により日本人となつた従前の韓国人と生来の日本人との双方を含めた日本国籍を有する者についての区別であつて、それは立法政策の要請に応じ、適正妥当な範囲においていかようにも定め得たところのものである。或いは併合後のわが国の国内法制における朝鮮と内地との関係は、あだかも準国際私法的なものであつて、朝鮮戸籍が内地戸籍とは別個の独立性を認められていたことをもつて、朝鮮戸籍は旧韓国の国籍と実質を同じくするものであるとして、朝鮮戸籍令の適用をうけ朝鮮戸籍に登載された者は、すべて朝鮮国家の独立とともに、日本国籍を失うものであるという考え方があるかもしれない。多数意見は結局そのような立場に立つもののごとくであるが、わたくしは、併合後のわが国の国内法制が朝鮮戸籍に独立性を認めたからといつて、それを旧韓国の国籍と実質を同じくするとの考え方には、併合後のわが国の朝鮮に対する立法政策の動向に照らし、にわかに賛同することができない。従つて、たとえわが国内法制において朝鮮人との婚姻または養子縁組によつて朝鮮人の家に入つた日本人は、共通法三条一項により朝鮮戸籍に登載され、他方内地戸籍から除籍され、法律上で朝鮮人として取扱われたからといつて、もし上告人の婚姻当時の旧韓国の法制および当時における日本の旧国籍法が前記のような夫婦同一国籍主義を認めておらず、日本人たる女子が外国人の妻となつても依然日本国籍を失うものでないとされていたとするならば、併合がなかつたとしても、その日本人たる女子は日本国籍を失うこと (sic = はな)いのであるから、前記条約の規定の解釈からいつて、上告人は、朝鮮国家の独立とともに、日本国籍を失つた者であるとすることはできないわけである。すなわち、本件においては、併合後におけるわが国の国内法制上、上告人が朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつていたとの一事をもつて、日本国籍を失うに至つたというべきで (sic = はな)く、前記のような旧韓国の法制およびわが国の旧国籍法一八条の規定が当時存在していたことと相まつて、はじめて前記条約の規定の解釈上、上告人が朝鮮国家の独立とともに、日本国籍を失つたものとされるのである。なお、わたくしは、本件国籍の喪失は、前記条約発効の時に生じたものであるとの見解に立つものである。

わたくしは以上の趣旨において、多数意見に賛同する。

The supplementary opinion of Justice Toshiro IRIE is as follows:

I. I concur with the majority opinion that the arguments of the jokoku appellant concerning the breach of the Constitution and the Law on Nationality are groundless and that the loss of Japanese nationality by the jokoku appellant is based upon the provision of the Peace Treaty of Japan. Article 2 (a) of the above treaty which serves as a basis of the loss of Japanese nationality by the jokoku appellant provides that 'Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea'. There is no doubt that it renounces territorial sovereignty over Korea, but it is not necessarily clear to what extent personal sovereignty has been renounced. The scope of people who belong to Korea in relation to whom Japan's sovereignty has been renounced has to be determined by interpretation by considering the process of incorporating this provision of the Treaty and in accordance with the spirit of this provision.

II. First of all, I think that the above provision which recognises the independence of Korea is primarily intended to remove the state of affairs which emerged by the Annexation Treaty of Korea concluded between Japan and the former State of Korea in 1907 (sic = 1909) [sic = 1910]) and, restore to the State of Korea which became independent after the War, the territorial and personal sovereignty which the former State of Korea would have had, had there not been annexation and realise the legal state of affairs which should be acknowledged to have existed had there not been annexation (restoration of the status quo ante). Upon this presupposition, if we consider the scope of people who belong to Korea in relation to whom Japan's sovereignty has been renounced by the recognition of the independence of Korea, there is no problem as an interpretation of the above-mentioned Peace Treaty that Koreans from before the Annexation or their descendants whose status has not particularly changed after the Annexation (original Koreans) are those who should belong to Korea and that Japan has renounced its personal sovereignty over these people. However, in relation to people other than those, such as the jokoku appellant who is a Japanese woman by birth and married after the Annexation a man who is originally a Korean and registered, and others who are listed in the notice of the Director of the Civil Law Department of April 19, 1952, No.1, 'Matters related to Korean and Taiwan' (2) and (3), the fate of their Japanese nationality should be determined on a case by case basis by taking into consideration what his or her nationality would have been by law, had not there been annexation, and only to the extent that it coincides with this nationality. There may be a view that the provision of the above Treaty does not cover the loss of Japanese nationality by those other than original Koreans and for such people, Japanese law at the time of the independence of Korea should be exclusively applied, but I think the provision of the above Treaty is, as mentioned above, intended to restore the status quo ante, and within this framework, also provides for the loss of Japanese nationality by those other than the Koreans by birth.

If this is applied to the present case, according to the law of the former state of Korea, a foreign woman who married a Korean man from the former State of Korea was to acquire the nationality of the State of Korea, and on the other hand, according to Article 18 of the former Law on Nationality of Japan (Law No.66, 1899) applicable at that time, if a Japanese woman married a foreigner, she would lose Japanese nationality. Thus, if there was no Annexation, as explained above, it is evident that the jokoku appellant, who is a Japanese by birth and married a Korean by birth would have acquired Korean nationality and have lost Japanese nationality. Had there not been Annexation, this would have been established as a fait accompli at the time of jokoku appellant's marriage, and the provision of the above Treaty focuses on such a state of affairs and is intended to realise this at the time of the independence of the Korean State. This is not affected by the fact that later, the Constitution took effect in Japan, the Law on Nationality was amended and the principle of common nationality of spouses was abolished. This is because the interpretation of the provision of the above Treaty is not in contravention of the Constitution at all (it is incomprehensible that the principle of common nationality of spouses is itself against the Constitution. In fact, this principle was acknowledged by articles 18, 21 and others of the former Law on Nationality after the Constitution took effect and until 1950 when the new Law on Nationality (Law No.145, 1950) took effect). Furthermore, the loss of Japanese nationality in the present case is based upon the provision of the above Treaty and not upon the Law on Nationality. As explained at the beginning, it has nothing to do with the taking of effect of the new Law on Nationality. If this is the case, under the interpretation of the provision of the above Treaty, there is no alternative but to conclude that the jokoku appellant has lost Japanese nationality through the independence of the Korean State. This is in line with the reasons of the judgment of the original instance court, and as the reason of the present judgment, it is sufficient.

III. The majority opinion ruled that 'in interpreting the provision of the above Peace Treaty, it is reasonable to understand that those who are to lose Japanese nationality should be understood as those who had the status as a Korean national under Japanese law' and explains in detail the legal system concerning those who are regarded as Koreans under Japanese law after the Annexation. However, the distinction under the Japanese legal system after the Annexation between those who had the status of a Korean and others was a distinction among Japanese nationals who were Koreans by birth and became Japanese by Annexation and those who were Japanese by birth. This distinction could have been established almost freely within an appropriate and fair limit in accordance with the requirement of the legislative policy. There may be a view that the relationship between Korea and the Japanese homeland under Japanese law after the Annexation is like a quasi-private international law relation, and the fact that the Korean Civil Status Register was acknowledged as independent from the register in the Japanese homeland indicates that the Korean Civil Status Register is the same in substance as the civil status register of the former State of Korea, and therefore, all of those to whom the Decree on the Korean Civil Status Register was applicable and who were registered in the Korean Register lost Japanese nationality upon the independence of the Korean state. In the end, the majority opinion seems to take this view, but in light of the legislative policy of Japan vis a vis Korea, I cannot immediately agree to the view that because Japanese law after the Annexation acknowledged the independence of the Korean Civil Status Register, it is the same in substance as the Register of the former Korean State. Therefore, even if a Japanese who, by marriage or adoption with a Korean joined a Korean ie is registered in the Korean Civil Status Register, removed from the Japanese homeland Register under Japanese law by Virtue of Article 3, para.1 of the Common Law and treated as a Korean by law, if the law of the former Korean State and the former Law on Nationality at the time of the marriage had not acknowledged the above-mentioned principle of common nationality for spouses and if a Japanese woman became the wife of a foreign national, she still would not lose Japanese nationality, then, also through the interpretation of the provision of the above Treaty, the jokoku appellant cannot be regarded as a person who lost Japanese nationality through the independence of the Korean state, since had there not been an annexation, this Japanese woman would not have lost Japanese nationality. Thus, in the present case, the jokoku appellant did not lose Japanese nationality merely because she had the status as a Korean under Japanese law after the Annexation, but has lost it only because there existed the law of the former State of Korea as mentioned above and Article 18 of the former Law on Nationality of Japan at that time, as the interpretation of the provision of the above Treaty, the jokoku appellant lost Japanese nationality with the independence of the Korean State. Incidentally, my view is that the loss of nationality in the present case took effect at the time the above Treaty came into force.

In this sense, I concur with the majority opinion.

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Supplementary opinion of Okuno Takeo
Japanese SESCOJL translation

裁判官奥野健一の補足意見は次のとおりである。

多数意見は、平和条約第二条により、同条約の発効と同時に上告人は日本国籍を喪失したものという。

しかし、平和条約第二条(a)項で「日本国は朝鮮の独立を承認して、済州島、巨文島及び欝陵島を含む朝鮮に対するすべての権利、権原及び請求権を放棄する」と規定しているが、これは朝鮮の独立を承認し、領土主権を放棄すると共に朝鮮人に対する主権をも放棄する趣旨であり、国籍については日韓併合によつて韓国の国籍を喪失した本来の朝鮮人及びその子孫をして日本国籍を喪失させる趣旨であることは首肯できるけれども、それ以上にこれらの者と婚姻した本来の日本人女についてまで日本国籍を喪失させねばならないという要請まで包含しているものとは解し難い。また国際法上又は国際慣行上も夫婦同一国籍主義の原則は確立されていない。然らば、朝鮮人と婚姻した日本人女の国籍の問題はわが国の国内法令に従つてこれを決定しなければならない。そして平和条約発効当時施行されているわが国籍法によれば明白に夫婦独立国籍主義を採用しているのであつて、外国人と婚姻した日本人女は日本国籍離脱の措置を採らない限り、当然には日本国籍を失わないのである。従つて、仮りに平和条約発効と同時に夫が朝鮮の国籍を取得したものとしても、妻たる上告人が当然に夫に随い日本国籍を喪失するものと解することはできない。然らば平和条約二条によつても、国際法上からも、また国籍法上からも、多数意見のいう如く朝鮮人と婚姻した日本人女が平和条約発効と同時に当然に日本国籍を失うものということができない。もつとも、多数意見は朝鮮人と婚姻した日本人女は、共通法三条により夫の家に入り夫の朝鮮戸籍に登載され、他方で内地戸籍から除籍されていたのであるから、「法律上では日本人でなく、朝鮮人になつたものと見るほかない」というのであるが、多数意見に従つても平和条約発効まではかかる日本人女でも依然として日本国籍を保有していたのであつて、単に戸籍上形式的に内地戸籍から朝鮮戸籍に移されていたからといつて日本国籍を失う理由と (sic = はな)り得ない。殊に、新憲法の下いわゆる家の制度は廃止されているのであり、単に共通法、戸籍法の上で内地人と異別な取扱を受けていたという理由で日本国民の基礎である日本国籍が奪われるということは本末顛倒であるといわなければならない。この意味において私は平和条約発効のときに、上告人が日本国籍を喪失したものであるとの多数意見には同調できない。

私見によれば、わが国はポツダム宣言を受諾し、右宣言は朝鮮の独立を認めているのであるから、これにより、わが国は、すでに朝鮮の独立を認めたものと考える。もつとも、平和条約第二章第二条(a)は「日本国は朝鮮の独立を承認して、……」とあるけれども、すでにポツダム宣言の受諾によつて朝鮮の独立を承認しており、平和条約はただこれを確認した趣旨と解すべきものと思う。従つて、他の法律関係についてはとにかく、少くとも国籍の問題としては、上告人の夫はわが国が右ポツダム宣言を受諾した時に外国国籍を取得し、日本国籍を失つたものと解すべく、そして当時のわが国籍法一八条によれば、夫婦同一国籍主義をとり、日本人が外国人の妻となることによつて日本の国籍を失うものとされていたのであるから、妻たる上告人も外国人の妻として当時すでに日本の国籍を失つたものと解さなければならない。然らば、たとえ、上告人が朝鮮在住中夫と同棲しなかつた事実、その後日本に帰つて来た事実、その後離婚した事実があつたとしても、それによつて当然に日本国籍を回復することに (sic = はな)らず、現在上告人が日本国籍を有しないものといわねばならない。私は現在上告人が日本国籍を有しないという結論については多数意見と同意見であるが、上告人の日本国籍喪失の時期及び原因について意見を異にする。

The supplementary opinion of Justice OKUNO Takeo is as follows:

The majority opinion is of the view that by virtue of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, simultaneously with the Treaty taking effect, the jokoku appellant lost Japanese nationality.

Article 2 (a) of the Peace Treaty provides that 'Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet'. It can be acknowledged that this means the recognition of the independence of Korea, and the renunciation of territorial sovereignty as well as the sovereignty over Korean people, and that concerning nationality, it is meant to cause the loss of Japanese nationality for those Koreans by birth and their descendants who lost Korean nationality by the Annexation by Japan, but it is not possible to go beyond this and acknowledge that it includes the requirement that a woman who is Japanese by birth and married a Korean should lose Japanese nationality. Furthermore, under international law or customary international law, the principle of common nationality for spouses has not been established. If this is the case, the problem of nationality of a woman who married a Korean has to be determined by Japanese law. The Japanese Law on Nationality which was in force at the time the Peace Treaty took effect explicitly adopts the principle of separate nationality of the spouses. A Japanese woman who married a foreigner does not automatically lose Japanese nationality, unless she applies for the waiver of nationality. Therefore, even if the husband acquires Korean nationality by the taking of effect of the Peace Treaty, the wife -- jokoku appellant does not automatically lose Japanese nationality by this. Thus, neither by Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, international law, nor the Law on Nationality, can it be said as the majority opinion maintains that a Japanese woman who married a Korean man automatically loses Japanese nationality with the taking of effect of the Peace Treaty. The majority opinion is of the view that regarding a Japanese woman who married a Korean man joins the ie of the husband and is registered in the Korean Civil Status Register by virtue of Article 3 of the Common Law, 'legally, she should be regarded as nothing else than a Korean national'. However, even if one follows the majority opinion, she still had Japanese nationality until the Peace Treaty took effect, and the mere fact that she had been formally transferred from the homeland Civil Status Register to the Korean Register does not serve as a ground for the loss of Japanese nationality, Particularly, under the new Constitution, the system of ie has been abolished, and it is non sequiter if Japanese nationality which is the basis of a Japanese national is deprived merely because under the Common Law and the Law on Nationality, she was treated differently from the people in the homeland. In this sense, I cannot agree with the majority opinion which maintains that the jokoku appellant lost Japanese nationality at the time the Peace Treaty took effect.

In my view, Japan has accepted the Potsdam Declaration which recognises the independence of Korea, and Japan has recognised the independence of Korea by accepting the Declaration. Admittedly, Chapter 2, Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty provides that 'Japan recognises the independence of Korea...', but Japan had already recognised the independence of Korea by accepting the Potsdam Declaration and I think the Peace Treaty merely confirmed this. Therefore, without referring to other legal relations, at least in relation to the problem of nationality, it should be understood that the husband of the jokoku appellant acquired foreign nationality and lost Japanese nationality when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Article 18 of the Law on Nationality of Japan applicable at that time provided for the principle of common nationality of spouses and if a Japanese national married a foreigner, she would lose Japanese nationality, and therefore, the jokoku appellant who was a wife of a foreigner had already at that time lost Japanese nationality. If this is the case, even if the jokoku appellant did not live with the husband while she was in Korea and later returned to Japan and then divorced him, this does not automatically restore her Japanese nationality, and at present, she does not have Japanese nationality. I concur with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the jokoku appellant does not have Japanese nationality now, but differ concerning the time and the ground of the loss of Japanese nationality by the jokoku appellant.

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Dissenting opinion of Shimoiizaka Yoshio
Japanese SESCOJL translation

裁判官下飯坂潤夫の少数意見は次のとおりである。

多数意見を要約すれば、次のとおりである。すなわち、(一)、日本国が平和条約第二条から、いわゆる朝鮮領土に対する主権を抛棄したことは、取りも直さず、朝鮮に属すべき人に対する主権を抛棄したことであり、このことは朝鮮に属すべき人について日本国籍を喪失させることを意味する。(二)、右にいわゆる朝鮮に属すべき人というのは日本の国内法上で朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつた人と解すべきであり、ここに朝鮮人としての法的地位をもつた人というのは、元来朝鮮戸籍に登載された人ばかりでなく、朝鮮人と婚姻し、共通法の適用で、朝鮮戸籍に登載された結果、内地戸籍から除籍された日本人女性をも含むのである。(三)、上告人は元来日本人であるが、昭和一〇年七月一六日朝鮮人であるAと婚姻入籍したものであることは原判決の確定した事実であるから、以上により、日本国籍を喪失している。

というのである。

上叙によつて見れば、多数意見は本事案を純法律的にのみ受取り、平和条約と日本国内法に依つてのみこれを処理せんとしているのである。その立論の過程には疑点がないでもない。例えば(一)、日本国と韓国との間に日本人国籍の得喪に関して条約、協約は固より、何らの話合もされてはいないのである。(二)、前示Aはいわゆる北鮮人であり上告人は北鮮人の妻であるが、いわゆる朝鮮人民共和国は日本政府の承認している国家で (sic = はな)く、両者の間には何ら外交上の手段をもつていないのである。かような現段階において、多数意見のように一般的法理論のみに従つて本事案を解決点にもつてゆくことが果して可能、且つ妥当であろうか、この点に(多数意見はこの点に関して何ら探究をしていない)、私は疑問を挾むのであるが、それはそれとして、多数意見は、一般通常の場合における朝鮮人妻であつた日本人女性の日本国籍喪失に関する法理論としては一応首肯できるものであろう。しかしながら、上告人は本件においてそのような説法を聴かんと欲しているので (sic = はな)い。自分の場合はかくかくの異常な場合であるから、これを十分に賢察され、一般法理の例外の場合として、日本人たることを認められたいというのである。では、その異常、例外の事態とは何か、本件記録を通覧すれば明瞭に看取できるように、上告人は次のように主張するのである。すなわち、(一)、上告人は大正四年二月四日日本人たる父Cと日本人たる母Bとの間に長女として出生した日本人であり、母BがD姓を名乗るとともに同姓を称していたのであるが、昭和一〇年七月一六日、朝鮮黄海道鳳山郡a里b番地に本籍を有するAと婚姻しAの本籍に入籍した。(二)、そして右婚姻後、上告人はAとともに東京において同棲していたが、昭和一六年一一月朝鮮京城府永登浦に移転したところ、Aは間もなく朝鮮人女性某と関係し、上告人と別居するに至り、遂に翌一七年九月北支に行くと称して行方を晦まし、上告人を悪意を以て遺棄した。(三)、よつて、上告人は同一八年二月東京に帰り、板橋に住み、印刷工として働いていたが、昭和二〇年六月Aの親より朝鮮に疎開するよう勧められ、上告人は再び前記京城府永登浦に赴いたがAは妾との関係を断たなかつたので、上告人は日本に帰るべく決意を堅めたが、時、宛も終戦末期で容易に願望垂遂げられずしている中に、終戦となり、上告人は北鮮地域の沙里院にAの父親と疎開同居をしていたが、日本に引揚げることも出来ず、ようやく昭和二五年一二月釜山に辿りつき、同地の日本人収容所に入れられ、翌二六年一月頃日本に帰還することが出来た。(四)、そこで、上告人は上叙の理由に基きAに対する離婚の訴を東京地方裁判所に提起し、同裁判所昭和二七年(タ)第一三六号離婚請求事件として係属したが、同二七年一〇月二一日離婚の判決があり、同判決は同年一一月五日確定した。(五)、よつて、上告人は同年一一月一四日東京都中央区長に対し右離婚判決の確定に基く離婚の届出書を提出したところ、同区長は、昭和二七年四月一九日附法務府民事第四三八号法務府民事局長通達に従い、もと内地人であつても、日本国との平和条約発効前に朝鮮人との婚姻、養子縁組等の身分行為により内地の戸籍から除籍せらるべき事由の生じた者は平和条約の発効とともに日本の国籍を喪失したものとして上告人の届出を受理しない。

The dissenting opinion of Justice SHIMOIIZAKA Yoshio is as follows:

The majority opinion can be summarised as follows: (1) the fact that Japan, by virtue of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, renounced sovereignty over Korea directly means that Japan has also renounced sovereignty over the people who belong to Korea, and that this means that this causes the loss of Japanese nationality by those people, (2) the above-mentioned people who belong to Korea should be understood as those who, under Japanese law, have legal status of Korean nationals, and this includes not only those who had originally been registered in the Korean Civil Status Register, but Japanese women who married a Korean and by the application of the Common Law, registered in the Korean Civil Status Register, and as a result, were removed from the Civil Status Register of the homeland, (3) it has been established by the judgment of the original instance court that the jokoku appellant is a Japanese by birth, but married A, who is a Korean, on July 16, 1935 and was registered, and therefore, based upon the above, has lost Japanese nationality.

Thus, the majority opinion approaches the present case from a purely legalistic point of view and attempts to handle the case with the Peace Treaty and Japanese domestic law only. However, this approach is not without its doubts. For example, (1) there has been no treaty, agreement, or even negotiation between Korea and Japan concerning the acquisition and loss of Japanese nationality, (2) the above-mentioned A is a north Korean and the jokoku appellant is the wife of a North Korean, but the 'Peoples' Republic of North Korea' has not been recognised by Japan and there is no diplomatic relationship between them. Is it possible and appropriate at such a stage to solve the present case with merely a general doctrine of law as the majority opinion has? I have doubts about this (the majority opinion has not examined these points), but in any case, the majority opinion may be agreeable as a legal theory on the loss of Japanese nationality by a Japanese woman who was the wife of a Korean under normal circumstances. However, the jokoku appellant is not asking for such a theory in the present case. In her view, her case is extraordinary as explained, and therefore, she is asking that such circumstances be sufficiently taken into account and that it be acknowledged that she is a Japanese national as an exception to the general theory of law. Then what are the extraordinary circumstances? As can be seen from the record of the case, the jokoku appellant claims as follows: (1) the jokoku appellant is a Japanese born on February 4, 1915 as the eldest daughter of a Japanese father C and a Japanese mother B. The mother came to use the family name D, and she also used this family name. On July 16, 1935, she married A who was originally registered in Korea and was registered in the same register as A; (2) after the marriage, she lived with A in Tokyo, but moved to Seoul in November 1941. Soon A developed a relationship with a Korean woman and disappeared in September 1942, claiming that he was heading for North China. Thus, A abandoned the jokoku appellant in bad faith; (3) therefore, the jokoku appellant returned to Tokyo in February 1943, lived in Itabashi and worked as a printer, but was advised by the parents of A to evacuate Tokyo and go to Korea in June 1945 and she returned to Seoul. However, SS continued his relationship with his mistress and therefore, the jokoku appellant decided to return to Tokyo. But this was towards the end of the War, and her wishes could not easily be realised. When the War ended, she was living with the father of S in North Korea, but could not return to Japan, and not until December 1950, did she reach Pousan, where she was interned in the detention centre for the Japanese, and she finally returned to Japan around January 1951; (4) the jokoku appellant brought an action for divorce to the Tokyo District Court (Tokyo District Court, Claim for Divorce 1952 (ta) No.136) and a judgment of divorce was rendered on October 21, 1952, which came into effect on November 5 of the same year; (5) therefore, the jokoku appellant submitted a notification of divorce to the mayor of the Chuo Ward of Tokyo on November 14 of the same year based upon the taking of effect of the above judgment. However, the mayor of the ward refused to accept the notification in accordance with the circular of the Director of the Civil Law Division of the Justice Department of April 19, 1952 on the ground that even though jokoku appellant was a Japanese by birth, those who had been removed from the homeland Civil Status Register due to marriage or adoption with a Korean before the taking of effect of the Peace Treaty have lost Japanese nationality through the taking of effect of the Peace Treaty.

Attorney General's Office Notification No. 438

Shimoiizaka's description of the provision notification that applied to Kanda is practically identical to the text of the notification. See Civil Affairs A No. 438 notification for the original notification and my translation

Shimoiizaka attributes the notification to the Attorney General's Office (法務府 Hōmufu), which was true on 19 April 1952 when it was issued, and on 28 April 1952 when it came into effect. However, the agency's name reverted to 法務省 (Hōmushō), its former and present name, on 1 August 1952 -- three months before the appellant attempted to file her notification of divorce at Chuo ward.

Structural translation of highlighted text

5. Consequently, when the appellant on the 14th day of the 11th month of the same year submitted to the head of Chuo ward of Tokyo prefecture a notification of divorce based on the determination of the right [ = above] divorce ruling, the same ward head did not accept the notification of the appellant holding that, in accordance with Attorney General's Office Civil Affairs No. 438 Attorney General's Office Civil Affairs Bureau Director-General Notification dated the 19th day of the 4th month of the 27th year of Showa, though [one] is a former Interiorite, a person for whom cause occurred to be removed from a family register of the Interior due to a status act such as a marriage or an adoption alliance with a Chosenese before the effectuation of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, will forfeit the nationality of Japan [concomitant] with effectuation of the Peace Treaty.

というのである。

想うに、以上、上告人主張のような事態の推移であつたとすれば、上告人の場合は多数意見採用のような一般的純法理論のみを以て簡単に律するには、余りにも異常、例外の場合で (sic = はな)かろうか。裁判所としてはこのような事件の処理に当つては、すべからく上叙のような事態の推移を具さに取調べ、その中に解決の鍵となるべき具体的妥当性を発見すべく努力することこそ肝要な任務で (sic = はな)いかと私は考えるのである。言うまでもなく、法律は国民生活の種々相を余すことなく捉え得るもので (sic = はな)い。法律はただ太い一線を引いているだけである。その太い一線で律することのできない異常、例外の場合があり、右一線をのみ貫くときは、法律の予想しない幾多の禍根を生ずるであろうことはわれわれの経験するところである。そこに法律運用の妙味があり、その妙味の発揮こそは裁判官にのみ任されているのである。原審裁判所は本事案が右のような異常、例外の場合であるや否やについては一顧も与えず、ただ法理論のみに泥んで、上告人の請求を排斥し去つたのである。私見を以て言わしむれば、原審は全く法律運用の妙を忘れたものというを憚らないし、当事者の大事な主張にいささかも答えなかつたというかきんありと言わざるを得ない。遺憾ながら、多数意見もその非難を免れ得ないであろうと思う。上告人の言うところを信ずれば上告人は過ぐる大戦争において、日本が敗北した結果日本本土、南北朝鮮と数年悲惨な流浪を続けてきたのである。そして、その余りにも当然な欲望として祖国の国籍に執着し、ようやくにして日本本土の岸辺に辿り付いた生れながらの日本人女性であり、しかも戸籍上朝鮮人の妻であつても、平和条約発効時においてはすでにに妻たる実質を失つていたのである。裁判所は何故にこの同胞に対し救いの手を差し延べることを躊躇するのであろうか。この場合多数意見の帰化容易論などは上告人の問らところで (sic = はな)く、上告人が主張の核心とする問題の法律的解決としては論外である。

以上を要約すれば、私見は、原判決が上叙異常、例外の場合に思いを致さず、何らこれに言及しなかつた点において審理不尽、理由不備の粗漏があり、本件上告は理由あるに帰し、原判決は右の理由を以て破棄差戻し然るべきものと信ずるのである。

以上の次第で、私は多数意見には賛同し難い。

My view is that under such circumstances as the jokoku appellant claims, this is a case which is too extraordinary and exceptional to be handled simply by general and pure legal doctrines as adopted by the majority opinion. In handling such cases, an important task of the court is to examine the circumstances in detail and make efforts to find a specific and equitable solution. It goes without saying that law cannot grasp every aspects of peoples' life. The law, so to speak, merely draws a thick line. We know by experience that there are extraordinary and exceptional cases which cannot be regulated by this thick line, and if in such cases, this thick line is still applied, there may be undesirable outcome. This is the subtlety of the application of law which is left to no one else but judges. The original instance court never gave a thought as to whether the present case was such an extraordinary and exceptional case or not and dismissed the claim of the jokoku appellant merely on the basis of legal doctrines. I do not hesitate to say that the original instance court has completely forgotten the subtlety of the interpretation of law and is defective, since it totally failed to respond to important claims of the party. I regret to say that the majority opinion is not immune from such criticism either. If we believe what the jokoku appellant says, she has been wandering around Japan, South and North Korea for several years as a result of the defeat of Japan in the past War. She is a Japanese by birth who at a long end arrived back to homeland Japan and as an undisputedly natural desire, she insists on the nationality of her fatherland. Although she was registered as a Korean, there was no substance in her status as a wife at the time the Peace Treaty took effect. Why does the court hesitate to extend assistance to this compatriot? The argument of the majority opinion that naturalisation is easy is not what the jokoku appellant had asked for, and is out of the question as a legal solution to the problem which is at the core of the claim of the jokoku appellant.

To summarise, my view is that the judgment of the original instance court has failures of insufficiency of examination and lack of reasons since it failed to take into consideration the above-mentioned extraordinary and exceptional circumstances and did not even refer to them, and therefore, the jokoku appeal is with ground and the judgment of the original instance court should be quashed and reversed on these grounds.

Thus, I cannot agree to the majority opinion.

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Justices
Japanese SESCOJL translation

最高裁判所大法廷

裁判長裁判官 横田 喜三郎
   裁判官 島     保
   裁判官 斎藤   悠輔
   裁判官 藤田   八郎
   裁判官 河村   又介
   裁判官 入江   俊郎
   裁判官 池田    克
   裁判官 河村   大助
   裁判官 下飯坂 潤夫
   裁判官 奥野   健一
   裁判官 高橋    潔
   裁判官 高木   常七
   裁判官 石坂   修一

Supreme Court Grand Bench

Presiding Judge Justice  YOKOTA Kisaburo
     Justice  SHIMA Tamotsu
     Justice  SAITO Yuusuke
     Justice  FUJITA Hachiro
     Justice  KAWAMURA Matasuke
     Justice  IRIE Toshiro
     Justice  IKEDA Katsushi
     Justice  KAWAMURA Daisuke
     Justice  SHIMOIIZAKA Yoshio
     Justice  OKUNO Kenichi
     Justice  TAKAHASHI Kiyoshi
     Justice  TAKAGI Jyohichi
     Justice  SIHIZAKA (sic = ISHIZAKA) Shuichi

(*Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London)

The Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law (SESCOJL) was established at the University College, University of London in 1989, in honor of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929), who was an undergraduate at the University College London from 1859 to 1861. Five Chōshū men, including Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909), studied at UCL from 1863 to 1964.

Satow was known in Japanese as Satō Ainosuke (佐藤愛之助), though the "sa" in his name is pronounced as in "say" rather than "saw". A British scholar and diplomat, he witnessed much of the radical change in Japan during the late Edo and Meiji period. He was a prolific writer, as well as a translator and interpreter, and helped found the Asiatic Society of Japan in Yokohama in 1872. He served as British Minister to Japan from 1895 to 1900, in which post he saw the end of extraterritoriality in 1899.

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Importance of Kanda v. State in eyes of Japanese law

The ruling in Kanda v. State, handed down by the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court on 5 April 1961, is important for what it implies about three very fundamental issues.

1. Legal significance of entity transfers in Japanese law
2. Legal significance of register transfers in Japanese law
3. Legal significance of race and ethnicity in Japanese law

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1. Legal significance of entity transfers in Japanese law

All thirteen justices -- including the single dissenting justice -- agreed that, in principle, Chosenese -- meaning people whose legal status was tied to the Japanese territory of Chōsen -- naturally lost their Japanese nationality when Japan formally abandoned its sovereignty over Chōsen on 28 April 1952.

This ruling is predicated on the idea that, when an entity consisting of a geographical territory and an affiliated population is transferred to another entity, both the territory and population are transferred.

When Korea was transferred to Japan in 1910, Koreans were also transferred to Japan. Because Korea was incorporated into Japan's sovereign dominion as Chōsen, Koreans became Japanese -- though, as Japanese, their territorial affiliation within Japan (including Chōsen) was Chosenese.

In accepting the Potsdam Declaration and signing the Instruments of Surrender in 1945, Japan provisionally released its claims to Chōsen, which the Allied Powers were calling "Korea", and which the United States and the Soviet Union occupied as "Korea". However, "Korea" remained "Chosen" in Japanese law.

Japan did not formally abandon all claims to Chōsen until 1952, from the day the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. Only then was the territorial and demographic transfers affected in 1910 legally reversed. The same was true for Taiwan and Taiwanese. Hence Japan formally gave up Taiwan and Chōsen, and Taiwanese and Chosenese formally lost their Japanese nationality, on 28 April 1952.

Territorial affiliates of Chōsen who had settled in the prefectures -- who had not migrated to the nationality of another state that Japan recognized -- remained "Chosenese" in the eyes of Japanese law. While Japan informally recognized ROK nationality, and Chosenese who claimed to be ROK nationals were allowed to write as such on alien registration and other legal forms, their status as ROK nationals was not formalized until Japan and ROK signed a normalization treaty in 1965.

As of this writing, Japan has not established normal ties with DPRK. It recognizes DPRK nationality only in the cases of the few DPRK domiciled individuals it allows for various reasons to enter Japan, usually for short periods of time related to cultural activities. Japan-domiciled Chosenese -- meaning people with the status of "Chosenese" as a legacy of the Potsdam Declaration and postwar settlements -- are not considered DPRK nationals, even if they declare themselves to be so.

However, Japanese government reports on aliens in Japan commonly conflate ROK nationals and Chosenese, if not also DPRK nationals, in statistics broken down by "nationality".

Legal effects of territorial transfers of Korea and Chōsen
from the 1910 Annexation Treaty to the 1952 Peace Treaty

Until 29 August 1910

Empire of Korea (specific state entity)
Nationals of Korea (Koreans)

The Empire of Korea was founded in 1897 by pro-Japan Koreans with Japan's help, following Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, which began in Korea. Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905, following Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Korea ceded itself to the Empire of Japan on 22 August 1910, effective from 29 August, on which date the name of the entity, as a subnational territory of Japan's sovereign dominion, was formally changed from "Korea" to "Chosen".

Until 2 September 1945

Chōsen (territory of Empire of Japan)
Nationals of Japan (Japanese)
Affiliates of Chōsen (Chosenese)

Japanese laws during the period Chōsen was part of Japan, and later treaties and legacy laws, refer to the entity as "Chosen" (朝鮮 Chōsen)and to affiliated people as "Chosenese" (朝鮮人 Chōsenjin).

Until 28 April 1952

Korea (nonspecific entity)

Under the authority of GHQ/SCAP directives pursuant to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, as accepted in the Instruments of Surrender, Japan loses control and jurisdiction of "Korea" (Chōsen). However, Japan's sovereignty over the territory will continue until Japan cedes or abandons the territory in a treaty.


Chōsen (specific entity)

In the meantime, Chosenese ("Koreans") remain Japanese nationals under domestic Japanese laws that GHQ/SCAP allows to remain effective. These laws do not include new alien registration and immigration control laws which, pursuant to GHQ/SCAP directives, classify "Koreans" (Chosenese) as "aliens" within GHQ/SCAP's definitions of "Japan" and "Japanese".

From 28 April 1952

Korea (nonspecific state entity)
Nationals of Korea (Koreans)

Japan has recognized only the Republic of Korea (ROK). Hence Chosenese in Japan who migrate to ROK nationality, or to the nationality of another entity that Japan recognizes as a state, will cease being Chosenese, and instead will become aliens with a nationality. Their former Chosenese status figures only in legacy laws that facilitate the implementation of postwar treaties.

Chosenese who have not migrated to a recognized nationality are treated as stateless aliens, though in most alien statistics they are conflated with ROK nationals. This reflects Japan's position that, until ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) unite as a single Korean entity, or until Japan recognizes DPRK in addition to ROK, Chosenese will be treated, in Japan, as residuals of a defunct entity that is now part of at least ROK.

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2. Legal significance of register migrations in Japanese law

2. Twelve justices -- including the nine who joined in the majority opinion, and the three who submitted supplementary opinions -- agreed that the plaintiff (appellant), though formally an Interiorite (prefectural subject), had become Chosenese (Chōsen subject) when she married a Chosenese and migrated from her Interior register to his Chōsen register.

Women were generally more likely than men to migrate to their spouse's register when marrying. The principles and effects were the same, whether the registers were in the same municipality, or in municipalities in different prefectures or even different territories. But husbands sometimes migrated to their wife's register. And children and adults were adopted.

So just as some Interiorites became Chosenese or Taiwanese, some Chosenese and Taiwanese became Interiorites -- through marriage or adoption. Since register affiliation is the foundation of legal status in Japan, register migrations, especially across borders of different legal territories within the sovereign Empire -- Interior, Taiwan, Karafuto, Chōsen -- affected one's status from 1952.

Under the Common Law of 1918, which determined applicable laws in matters of private law within the empire, Karafuto was treated as part of the Interior. And was formally incorporated into the Interior as a prefecture in 1943, people affiliated with Karafuto did not lose their Japanese nationality.

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3. Legal significance of race and ethnicity in Japanese law

Neither race nor ethnicity have been causes for determination of an individuals legal status in Japan. Even during its imperial years, Japan's laws were raceless. Legal status within imperial territories was based only on register affiliation. Race and ethnicity, though foils for social discrimination and themes in political ideology, were not matters of law.

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Glossary of misusage of keywords in Kanda v. State, 1961
Japanese, received English translations, and structural translations

A number of terms and phrases used in Kanda v. State have been misrendered in the received translations. Some have even been misused in the Japanese text.

Classification

I have divided the selected expressions into the following categories.

1. States, countries
2. Empire of Japan, Japan
3. Empire of Korea, Chōsen, Korea, ROK, DPRK
4. Laws and legal status

Color coding

The degree of quality of translation of each word or phrase is marked according to the color highlighting scheme described in the Sources, presentation, and commentary section above, which see for details. Briefly the scheme is as follows.

Green = Best, or not best but unproblematic
Purple = Problematic
Red = Misleading or incorrect
Cyan = More correct than original hence incorrect

※ "Correct"

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1. States  /  countries
Japanese   Romanization SESCOJL translation JAIL translation
Structural translation   Definition and remarks.
国家  kokka state State

state   A "state" is a sovereign entity that consists of a sovereign territory, a sovereign "nation" consisting of people affiliated with the state by "nationality", and a sovereign government in effective control of both the territory and the people. A state is mononational if it does not define subnations within its state nationality (Japan), and multinational if it does define subnations within its state nationality.

Regardless of how a state defines the "nation" affiliated with its territory, the state is internationally recognized as a state, not as a nation. And regardless of whether a state equates its "nationality" with "citizenship" in its domestic laws, or of how a state regionally or racially subdivides its nation in domestic law, international law recognizes a state's nationality as an attribute of affiliation with the state, without regard for the bearer's citizenship, race, or ethnicity under the state's domestic law.

  kuni country country

country   This is a less formal version of "state" (国家 (kokka).

日本と朝鮮との併合
Nihon to Chōsen to no heigō
Annexation of Korea by Japan union of Japan and Korea
日本と朝鮮の併合
Nihon to Chōsen no heigō
Annexation by Japan union of Japan and Korea
日本と韓国の併合
Nihon to Kankoku to no heigō
Annexation of Korea by Japan

union of Japan and Korea   The JAIL translation corrected reflects the structure of Japanese text, which describes the "union" of two entities, one with the other. The SESCOJL translation imposes an active/passive relationship on Japan/Korea.

While I personally view Japan's actions in 1910 as an "annexation" of the kind the United States carried out in Hawaii in 1898, what it was legally, and how it is described, are two entirely different matters. Here it is clearly described as a "union" and structural fidelity requires that it be called a "union". This does not mean that the "union" was not an "annexation" -- since "annexation" is one of several means of unification. However, the reader is left to understand, or decide, the nature of the action that brought about a "union" of Japan and Korea.

"Korea" accidentally correct

Here we have a fine example of a correct translation resulting from a mistranslation. The correct translation of 朝鮮 (Chōsen) in the judgment is "Chosen". The problem is that the judgment itself errs in calling the entity that Japan annexed "Chosen" rather than "Korea" (韓国 Kankoku) -- as it does elsewhere in the same paragraph. In other words, the correct historical statements would be "before" or "after" the "union of Japan and Korea" (日本と韓国との併合 Nihon to Kankoku to no heigō).

The "union/annexation" agreement, signed on 22 August 1910, was promulgated and came into force on 29 August. The agreement concerns "Korea" and no where mentions "Chosen". In other words, the object of the "union/annexation" was Korea.

The name of the entity that "united with Japan / was annexed by Japan" was changed to "Chosen" by Imperial Ordinance No. 318 of 1910, which was also promulgated on, and effective from, 29 August 1910.

併合  heigō annexation union

union   Used pronominally for "union of Japan and Korea" (see above). See Korea becomes Chosen: The road to annexation and the first decade of nationalization for an overview of the "union / annexation" debate.

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2. Empire of Japan  /  Japan
Japanese   Romanization SESCOJL translation JAIL translation
Structural translation   Definition and remarks.
日本国  Nihonkoku Japan Japan

country of Japan   The formal name for "Japan" (日本 Nihon).

日本国民  Nihon kokumin Japanese nationality Japanese national
their Japanese nationality

affiliate of the country of Japan   I.e., "national (affiliate) of Japan" or "Japanese national"  While "Japanese national" is not incorrect, in formal contexts it should not be used to translate 日本国民 since "Japanese" is used to translate 日本人 (Nihonjin) -- which is a consequence, not a cause, of being a national of Japan. In other words, one is "Japanese" (日本人 Nihonjin) because one is a "national of Japan" (日本国民 Nihon kokumin), which is a consequence of being "a person who possesses the nationality of Japan" (日本国籍を有する者 Nihon kokuseki wo yū suru mono).

Not "their" nationality

Since a person is Japanese by reason of possessing the nationality of Japan, it is certainly possible to say "their Japanese nationality" in the sense that it is "theirs" so long as they possess it. However, there is no foundation for specifying (embellishing the translation with) "their" in this particular text. Moreover, Japan's nationality is not automatically acquired as a personal right, but is acquired and lost by actions of law -- including, at times, discretionary actions of nationalization and denationalization.

日本  Nihon Japan Japan

Japan

A less formal name for "the country of Japan" (日本国 Nihonkoku).
日本人   Nihonjin Japanese Japanese

Japanese

日本の国籍  Nihon no kokuseki Japanese nationality Japanese nationality

nationality of Japan   While generally synonymous with "Japanese nationality" (日本国籍 Nihon kokuseki) the two should be translated differently when used in the same text. Using "of" (の) attributes the nationality in question to the country ("nationality of Japan"), whereas using the country attributively qualifies the country of nationality ("Japanese nationality").

日本国籍  Nihon no kokuseki Japanese nationality

Japanese nationality   Generally synonymous with "Nationality of Japan" (日本の国籍 Nihon no kokuseki) but should be translated differently when the two are used in the same text.

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3. Empire of Korea  /  Chōsen  /  Korea  /  ROK  /  DPRK
Japanese   Romanization SESCOJL translation JAIL translation
Structural translation   Definition and remarks.
朝鮮  Chōsen Korea Korea
Chosen [Korea]
Chosen

Chōsen   The name the Empire of Japan gave the former Empire of Korea immediately after the union of the two entities. Japanese laws and treaties have consistently referred to the entity by this name, by way of differentiating what was formally part of Japan's sovereign dominion (Chōsen), and the independent state of Korea that actually existed before the union agreement came into effect in 1910, and the state of "Korea" that in principle existed when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952.

"Chosen" was also the official name of the entity in English. See the following reports for further details.

Korea becomes Chosen: The road to annexation and the first decade of nationalization

Korea, Chosen, and Tyosen reports: The scripting of protection and nationalization

Koreans Chosenese" section of The Japan Year Book: Forty years of rise, then fall

Chosen [Korea]

As the JAIL version was transcribed from Hosokawa 1990, I have not confirmed whether the bracketed "[Korea]" in the first instance of "Chosen" was in JAIL or was added by Hosokawa. Nor have I been able to confirm the use of italics in all instances.

JAIL translators render 朝鮮 (Chōsen) as "Chosen" only in the title of laws. Why they render it as "Korea" in other instances is not clear -- in as much as they render 韓国 (Kankoku) as "Korea" and "Chosen" and "Korea" are not the same entities.

In any event, the italics are odd, since they appear to exoticize "Chosen" as a "Japanese" expression assumed to be "unfamiliar" in English -- when in fact it is well established as the term for the territory in question.

朝鮮人  Chōsenjin Korean Korean

Chosenese   The official name for Japanese affiliated with the exterior territory of Chōsen. Japanese laws and treaties have consistently referred to such persons as 朝鮮人 (Chōsenjin), and this continues to be the way in which they are differentiated from "Koreans" as nationals of the Empire of Korea (past) or of the Republic of Korea (present). In some contexts 朝鮮人 (Chōsenjin) may also refer to persons affiliated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

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4. Laws and legal status
Japanese   Romanization SESCOJL translation JAIL translation
Structural translation   Definition and remarks.
国籍  kokuseki nationality nationality

nationality   This is the meaning of 国籍 (kokuseki) wherever it appears in Japanese domestic law. The SESCOJL and JAIL translators appear to have recognized -- as many, especially American or "Americanized" translators do not -- that there is no foundation for translating this term as "citizenship" -- which, in any case, is not specified in Japanese law. Even where "citizenship" is specified in a state's domestic law (as in the United States), it has no currency in international law, which recognizes only nationality.

国籍法  Kokusekihō Law on Nationality Nationality Law

Nationality Law   This is the standard name of the law in question, as well as being the structurally better name.

改正前の国籍法  kaiseizen no Kokusekihō Law on Nationality before the amendment

Nationality Law before revision   I.e., the 1899 [Old] Nationality Law.

朝鮮戸籍 Chōsen koseki Korean Civil Status Register Chosen Family Register

Chōsen family register

朝鮮戸籍令  Chōsen koseki rei Korean Civil Status Decree Chosen [Korean] Family Registration Order

Chosen family register decree   This is the first appearance of "Chosen" in the JAIL version apparently the translator or an editor bracketed "[Korean]" to explain the term for readers who are not familiar with the term "Chosen". The italics, of course, are odd, since "Chosen" was the official name of the entity that other states recognized to be part of the Empire of Japan.

This decree was issued by the Government-General of Chosen on 18 December 1922 (GGC Decree No. 154). Basically it added many elements of the Interior household register system to the Chōsen register system.

"Chōsen civil matters decree" (朝鮮民事令 Chōsen minji rei) (GGC Decree No. 7) of 1911 extended various aspects of Interior civil law to Chōsen. Another decree the same year, concerning the police, which oversaw population registration, included regulations concerning administration of population registers (minseki) and household surveys (koseki chōsa) [censuses].

日本の国内法上で、
朝鮮人としての法的地位
legal status as Koreans under Japanese law legal status as Koreans under Japanese domestic law

legal status as Chosenese under the domestic laws of Japan   Mindful that "Japan" included Chōsen and that laws extended to by the Diet and other Chōsen legal measures were part of Japan's domestic law -- and mindful that the status distinction in question was not between "Koreans" and "Japanese" but between "Chosen subjects/nationals" and "Interior subjects/nationals", both of which were Japanese -- the structure of this phrase is important.

民籍法  Minsekihō, Minjŏkpŏp Law on Civil Status Civil Registration Law

Population [census affiliation] Register Law   This law was promulgated in March 1909 by the Empire of Korea. Korea at the time was a protectorate of Japan -- meaning that Japan was responsible for Korea's defense and foreign affairs. As such, Korea's sovereignty was compromised. Today, this condition would disqualify an entity as a state.

As such, Korea was subjected to numerous controls imposed by Japan. The Population Register Law was in fact initiated and shaped by the Resident-General of Korea, who wished to increase the precision of demographic information for the purpose of collecting taxes and introducing other administrative reforms of the kind Japan had implemented during the early years of Meiji Period.

The term 民籍 had some currency in late Edo and early Meiji registration practices, where it signified a register of people affiliated with a country or province (国籍 kokuseki) or other territory, or a survey of households and members.

民籍  minseki, minjŏk Civil Status Register Civil Register

population register   This register was a census and affiliation register, which recorded information about an individual's social and family status.

韓国の国籍  Kankoku no kokuseki nationality of Korea  Korean nationality

nationality of Korea   Affiliation with the Empire of Korea.

元来の日本人 Japanese by birth proper Japanese

Japanese originally or "Japanese in origin"

Two other SESCOJL renderings have "by birth".

was a Japanese by birth (元来は日本人である)
is a Japanese by birth (元来日本人である)

But one has "originally".

was originally a Japanese (元来は日本人であつて)

And "originally" also figures in another rendering.

those who had originally been registered in the Korean Civil Status Register (元来朝鮮戸籍に登載された人)

The last two examples reflect what 元来 (genrai) means -- not "by birth" but "from the start" -- i.e., from the first instance of registration, which is usually at time of birth.

The last example is the most important because it associates the acquisition of status with registration. One does not automatically acquire status by being born. One acquires status only when one's birth is duly registered. Criterion for acquiring Japanese nationality included being born anywhere to any woman, and recognized by Japanese father (patrilineality), born anywhere to unmarried Japanese woman (matrilineality), born in Japan to stateless parents, born in Japan to known parents (foundling).

In any event, "by birth" is metaphorically wrong as a structural rendering of 元来 (genrai).

Phrase in question here should be rendered something like this.

元来の日本人は、戸籍法の適用を受け、戸籍に登載される。

Genrai no Nihonjin wa, Kosekihō no tekiyō o uke, koseki ni tōroku sareru.

SESCOJL   those who are Japanese by birth are those to whom the Law on Nationality is applicable and are registered in the Civil Status Register.

JAIL   proper Japanese were subject to the application of the Family Registration Law and were entered in the Family Register.

Structural   as for [those who are] Japanese from the beginning [= originally], [they] receive the application of [= are subject to, are covered by] the Family Register Law [that applies to prefectural / Interior registers], and are recorded [= entered] in a [prefectural, Interior] family register.

Notice that the SESCOJL translation is either (1) mistranslating "Family Register Law" as "Nationality Law", (2) correcting what the translators regards as an error in their received text, or (3) correctly translating another version of the text that has "Nationality Law". However, the phrase 戸籍法 is rendered "Law on Nationality" in several other instances where there is no doubt that "Family Register Law" is in fact intended -- as it is here. For the Family Register Law -- not the Nationality Law -- determines who is recorded in a family register.

The issue here is not which Nationality Law applied -- since the Interior Nationality Law was never extended to Chōsen. Customary law continued to determine qualifications for entry into a Chōsen family register at time of birth.

At issue in the Supreme Court decision is which family register law applied, and they they conspired to cause migration between registers. The registers, being territorial, could only be administered through ordinances that applied to the territory. Chōsen laws applied to Chōsen registers and people in Chōsen registers, and Interior (prefectural) laws determined status actions in registers affiliated with prefectural municipalities.

Of course, in the Interior, the Nationality Law -- meaning the 1899 law and its revisions -- determined eligibility for status as a member of an Interior register. But the Interior Family Register Law is the law that immediately determines actions in Interior registers.

The point of the Supreme Court ruling is that both the registers and the laws that governed them were territorially different -- and hence there was never a time when being affiliated with "Chosen" was tantamount to being affiliated with the prefectures.

戸籍法 Law on Nationality Family Registration Law

Family Register Law or "Family Registration Law"

戸籍 Civil Status Register / civil status Family Register / family registration

family register or "household register"

内地戸籍 Japanese (home land) Civil Status Register the 'homeland Family Register'

Interior family register or "Interior household register"

"Japanese" wrongly implies that Chōsen and Taiwan registers were not also "Japanese" registers.

"Homeland" is an emotional metaphor that could just as well describe Chōsen or Taiwan from the point of view of someone who regarded them as their home.

"Naichi" -- "interior land" -- is an objective geopolitical metaphor referring to the prefectural "Interior" of Japan as a legal jurisdiction distinct from the legal jurisdictions of "exterior" (外地 gaichi) territories such as Chōsen and Taiwan, which were formally parts of "Japan". Karafuto, originally an exterior territory of Japan, was integrated into the Interior as a prefecture in 1943.

"Naimuchō" -- "internal [domestic, home] affairs ministry" -- was often called "Ministry of Home Affairs" or "Home Ministry". So long as "home" is associated with "domestic" and not "homeland", no particular harm is done. However, in my own structural translations, I prefer "Ministry of Interior" or "Interior Ministry" because it is metaphorically closer to the meaning of "nai" (内) -- especially in the context of "Naichi" (内地), over which the ministry had jurisdiction. Formally, Naimushō did not have jurisdiction over exterior territories, though in the early 1940s control over exterior territors was partly transferred to the Interior Ministry, for the purpose of centralizing territorial administration and increasing the pace of assimilation and possibly prefecturization.

Naimushō, abolished in 1947. was reincarnated (rather than resurrected) in 1960 as Jichishō (自治省) -- autonomous [body] ministry -- called "Ministry of Home Affairs" in English. From the 2001, the minister was merged with other agencies as Sōmushō (総務省) -- general affairs ministry -- called "Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications" in English. The "internal affairs" refers mainly to the affairs of Japan prefectures and municipalities, which are formally called "regional [local] public bodies" (地方公共団体 chihō kōkyō dantai), also known as "autonomous bodies" (自治体 jichitai). Such bodies are provisioned by the 1947 Constitution, and their structures and operations are described by the Local Autonomy Law (地方自治法 Chihō jichi hō), which was promulgated on 17 April 1947 and enforced from 3 May 1947, the day the Constitution came into effect.

"Gaimushō" -- "external [foreign] affairs ministry" -- has generally been called "Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

朝鮮人の家 Korean ie (a traditional
Japanese household)
/ house of a Korean

family of a Chosenese or Chosenese family

Member of Chōsen family registers were Chosenese.

The term "family" (家 ie), under the Civil Code prior to 1948, referred to a so-called "corporate family" consisting of one or more related nuclear families, over which presided a head of household, usually the oldest male in the main line of the family. Chōsen families were structured somewhat differently from Interior or Taiwan families. Each territory had its own family laws. Though Chōsen and Taiwan laws were gradually Interiorized, they continued to retain certain features peculiar to the territory.

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