Estate distribution ruling, 1995-2000
Applicable law issues in inheritance dispute in Japan-ROK family
By William Wetherall
First posted 5 July 2014
Last updated 21 July 2014
Overview
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Origin
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Rulings
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Chronology
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Quality of opinion
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Sources, presentation, commentary
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Works cited
Rees v. State judgment
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Particulars
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Findings
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Summary
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Relevant laws
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Main text
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Reasons
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Justices
Overview of Rees v. State, 1992-1995
I am calling this case "Rees v. State" after the family name of William and Roberta Rees, the adult guardians of the child plaintiff Robert Rees Andrew (ロバート・リース・アンデレ), their adopted son. The case originated in 1992 when the Rees sued the Japanese government on behalf of Andrew in what is called a "nationality confirmation" case.
Origin of Rees v. State
Forthcoming.
Court rulings in Rees v. State
On 4 June 2008, the Supreme Court issued separate but substantially identical judgments in both Boy v. State and Children v. State.
The court held that the legitimacy condition in Article 3 of the Nationality Law was unconstitutional, by no later than 2003 in Boy v. State and by no later than 2005 in Children v. State.
The earlier date in Boy v. State became the criterion for the retroactive transitional measures that came into effect with a revision of Article 3 -- sans the legitimacy condition -- from 1 January 2009.
Rees v. State chronology
By the time the Supreme Court issued its rulings against the legitimacy requisite, there were numerous cases before various courts. Here I will present the chronologies of the two principle series of rulings which ended with the Supreme Court's rulings in 2008.
2003-2008 series of cases involving one boy
The series of cases involved the nationality of a boy. It followed and was entwined with a case involving a deportation order against the mother and the boy. The nationality confirmation case became the first in which a Japanese court, in 2005, ruled that part of the Nationality Law was unconstitutional.
Court: Tokyo District Court Case: Heisei 15 (Gyo-U) 110 Litigants: Boy v. State Judgment: 13 April 2005 Ruling: Boy is JapaneseSecond instance court (2005-2006)
Court: Tokyo High Court Case: Heisei 17 (Gyo-Ko) 134 Litigants: State v Boy (State appeals) Judgment: 28 February 2006 Ruling: Boy is not JapaneseFinal court of appeal (2006-2008)
Court: Supreme Court, Grand Bench Case: Heisei 18 (Gyo-Tsu) 135 Litigants: Boy v. State (Boy appeals) Judgment: 4 June 2008 Ruling: Boy is Japanese
Quality of Supreme Court opinion in Rees v. State
The judgment in this case is a wonderful example of the capacity of the Supreme Court to favor the spirit of a law over its literal interpretation. The judgment came down to the quality of what I would call the acknowledging father's MO.
Sources, presentation, and commentary
Sources
Received Japanese text of ruling
The Japanese text was extracted from a pdf file downloaded from the database accessible through the Japanese government's 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. Most case particulars and a summary were retrieved by a query using minimum case particulars. These particulars and the summary are also shown.
Received English translation
The English version was extracted from an html file retrieved by a query in the English section of the same 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. A note at the bottom states that the English version as "Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London" -- which would seem to be Hiroshi Oda (小田博 Oda Hiroshi), who has has been the Sir Ernest Satow Professor of Japanese Law at the University of London, University College, since 1990. Oda is the author of Japanese Law, first published by Butterworths in 1993. Oxford University Press brought out a revised 2nd edition in 1999 and further revised 3rd edition in 2009.
Structural English translation
Because parts of the received translation do not accurately reflect the finer details and texture of the language of the Japanese ruling, I have occasionally shown structural translations of parts that are of special interest to me.
Formatting, commentary, and markup
I have divided the judgment into sections, and have somewhat reformatted the received texts and highlighted some words and phrases to facilitate analysis and commentary.
Underscoring
All underscoring in the text of the judgment is as received. Unless otherwise noted, the underscoring of corresponding parts of the received translation is mine. All underscoring in my own commentary is, of course, also mine.
Parentheses
Unless otherwise noted, all (parentheses) in the received text and translation are as received.
Square and angle brackets
All in-line [square brackets] and <angle brackets> -- and everything enclosed in such brackets -- are mine.
Structural translations and commentary
My own closer (structural) translations are generally shown in blue in cells below the received judgment and received translation. At times I have shown closer translations of words or short phrases in-line, between right and left → arrows ← following the amended text.
Editorial [clarifications] are shown in-line. Brief comments are sometimes boxed in the cells of the texts they relate to. Extended comments are generally shown in cells below the relevant texts.
Color highlighting
The received texts of the judgment and translation, and my own commentary, are shown in black. However, to facilitate commentary on the language of the ruling and/or its translation, I have highlighted specific words and phrases in various colors according to the following scheme, which includes in-line editorial clarifications and corrections.
Color | Original | Translation |
Background highlighting | ||
Blue | Corresponding parts of two or more texts selected for comparison | |
Yellow | Content added to received text to reconstruct a missing part | |
Pink | Transcription or scanning errors parenthetically corrected in-line (sic = in-line) | |
Graphic highlighting | ||
Blue | [ Clarification ] (in-line) | [ Clarification ] (in-line) |
→ My closer translation ← (in-line) My closer translation (boxed) |
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Green | Presumed true and correct copy of the language of the original text | May be too free and a bit off key but represents all elements or original |
国籍法 韓国 |
Nationality Law Nationality Act (unconventional) Law / Act of Nationality (unconventional) Korea (if "Empire of Korea" 1897-1910) |
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Purple | Problematic phrasing or usage in the language of the original text | Imprecise or awkward, incomplete or embellished, or otherwise inadequate |
国籍 韓国 朝鮮 内地 |
Citizenship → Nationality (as legal status) Korea → Republic of Korea (since 1948) Korea → Chōsen (as territory 1910-1952) Japan Proper → Interior (as territory) |
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Red | Incorrect phrasing or usage ※ | Misleading or incorrect |
放棄する 離脱する 朝鮮 |
renounce → abandon, relinquish renounce, separate from Korea → Chōsen (as territory) |
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Cyan | ※ When original is incorrect | Mistranslation is more correct than original |
日本と朝鮮との併合 ※ |
the annexation of Korea by Japan → the union of Japan and Chōsen |
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※ The example of incorrect 朝鮮 (Chōsen) being mistranslated Korea (韓国 Kankoku), thus "accidentally" correcting the usage in the judgement, can be seen in Kanda v. State 1961. 1. While 朝鮮 (Chōsen) in the judgment is factually incorrect, the correct translation is "Chōsen" because that is what the original text says. Because the translators conflate "Chōsen" (朝鮮) with "Korea" (韓国 Kankoku), they habitually translate "Chōsen" as "Korea" -- which constitutes a "mistranslation" that in effect accidentally "corrects" the factual error in the original -- i.e., a double negative becomes a positive. But two wrongs don't make a right. Translators are not supposed to "edit" the content of legal briefs. They might flag a problematic expression for comment in a footnote, but the translation itself should be faithful to the original. 2. Note that where the judgment precisely paraphrases the phrasal logic of the expression "Nik-Kan heigō" (日韓併合) [Japan-Korea union] as "X to Y to no heigō" (XとYとの併合) [the union between X and Y], the received translation incorrectly represents the syntactic logic of the paraphrase as "the annexation of Y by X" -- which constitutes an interpretation of the effects of the union, not its formal description in Japanese law -- which I underscore, because the court is making a legal, not political, argument. Historiographic "opinion" external to received text of the original judgment, and its attempt to deal with the letter and operation of Japanese law is irrelevant. A translator might say that the past is past. Treaties, laws, and ordinances of the past -- though no longer enforced -- may continue to have effect in court reviews of what I call "legacy" cases, which involve status actions in the past. |
Works cited
The rulings in the three Rees v. State court cases understandably got quite a bit of play in newspapers in Japan, and the small but dedicated sector of the foreign press that covers social issues in Japan. The Supreme Court judgment has also gotten a lot of attention in academic journals and a number of books, mostly in Japanese, but also in English, and I would guess also a few other languages.
Higashizawa 1993
Higashizawa Yasushi (東沢靖) represented the Rees in the first round of litigation in the Tokyo District Court, which in April 1993 ruled in their favor, namely that Andrew qualified for birth-right jus soli Japanese nationality. The following book, published 3 months later, ends with a detailed overview of Andrew's case.
東沢靖
長い旅の重荷
(弁護士が描く事件のなかの外国人群像)
東京:海風書房、1993年7月1日 第1版発行
207、xxiiiページ、単行本
Higashizawa Yasushi
Nagai tabi no omoni
(Bengoshi ga egaku / jiken no naka no gaikokujin gunzō)
[ The heavy baggage of a long journey
(An attorney depicts / a group of foreigners in cases) ]
< A long journey with a burden: A lawyer's sketch of foreigners and their cases in Japan >
Tokyo: Kaifū Shobō, 1 July 1993, 1st edition
207, xxiii pages, softcover
The 23 pages numbered in roman numerals, at and from the back of the book, are devoted to solid chapter summaries in good English -- like the < provided English title > on the cover. In the English summary of the Epilogue (あとがき), dated Spring 1993 (1993年春), Higashizawa credits "Mr. Suzuki Akihiko for helping me with translation." The fuller Japanese version credits Suzuki Akihiko (鈴木昭彦) of the "Ōta citizen network for living together with foreigners" (外国人と共に生きる太田・市民ネットワーク Gaikokujin to tomo ni ikiru Ō shimin nettowaaku) for his considerable exertions in checking the English summaries. Who originally wrote them, if not Higashizawa himself, is not clear.
On its website, theŌta Citizens Network an NGO, dubs itself "OCNet (Ohta Citizens' Network for Peoples' Togetherness)" in English. This is a not uncommon example of "duplicity" in organizational naming, avoiding -- in this case -- a faithful English rendering of the notion that the "citizens" (市民 shimin) of Ōta ward, in Tokyo, are endeavoring to "live together" with "aliens" or "foreigners" or "outlanders" (外国人 gaikokujin).
The term "shimin" (市民) should imply anyone, regardless of nationality, who is registered as a resident of a 区民町村 (ku-min-chōson) -- a ward, city, town, or village -- of prefecture in Japan. "Japanese" and "foreigners" residing in Ōta are already "living together" as "citizens" of the same municipal polity -- and the only certain difference between "Japanese" and "foreigners" is their nationality -- not, as the Japanese (but not the English) version of OCNet's organization description would seem to imply.
The English expression "Peoples' Togetherness" has heavy overtones of "racioethnic peoples". The Japanese version of OCNet's blurb underscores the "ethnic" implications of the English version by speaking of exchanges among people whose languages, cultures, and customs variously differ. The English version speaks of the twain of "Japanese" and "non-Japanese" -- which hearkens of the "we Japanese" and "foreigners" refrain.
Andrew's case is the centerpiece of the 5th and final story (pages 161-202), which bears the following titles.
国籍を求める子どもたち:急増する無国籍児と国籍確認裁判
Kokuseki o motomeru kodomo-tachi: Kyūzō suru mukokuseki-ji to kokuseki kakunin saiban
[ Children seeking a nationality: Rapidly increasing stateless children and nationality confirmation court cases ]
Okuda 1996, 2003a
奥田安弘
家族と国籍:国際化の進むなかで
有斐閣選書
東京:有斐閣、1996年
206ページ、単行本
増補版、2003年、210ページ、単行本
Okuda Yasuhiro
Kazoku to kokuseki: Kokusaika no susumu naka de
[Family and nationality: In the midst of progressing internationalization]
Hūhikaku sensho [Yūhikaku library]
Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1996
206 pages, softcover
Expanded edition, 2003, 210 pages
Okuda 2003b
Yasuhiro Okuda
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Japan's International Family Law including Nationality Law
Zeitschrift fuer Japanisches Recht / Journal of Japanese Law
Volume 15, Number 8, 2003
Pages 88-110
This article is an edited reprint from Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū (北大法学論集) [The Hokkaido Law Review), Volume 54, Number 1, pages 456-429 [from higher to lower page numbers because article, in English, is published in a journal that features mostly Japanese articles on pages that run in the opposite direction].
Steele 2004
Stacey Steele
Comments on Okuda, Statelessness and the Nationality Act of Japan: Baby Andrew Becomes a Teenager and other Changes?
Zeitschrift fuer Japanisches Recht / Journal of Japanese Law
Number 18, February 2005 [2004]
Pages 178-192
This article is a critique of Okuda's article.
Main judgment in Supreme Court ruling in Rees v. State
Forthcoming.
2000 Supreme Court judgment X v. in Boy v. State Japanese text, English version, and commentary |
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Osaka District Court | |
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Osaka High Court | |
原審裁判所名:大阪高等裁判所
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Court of original instance: Osaka High Court
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The Osaka High Court was the second instance court. Here it is called the "original instance court" from the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, since the case the Supreme Court was asked to review originated in the Osaka High Court. |
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Supreme Court | |
所有権移転登記手続等請求事件 |
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事件番号:平成7(オ)1203
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Case number: Heisei 7 [1995] (O) 1203
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判示事項 | Findings |
Received Japanese text | Received English translation |
一 渉外的な法律関係においてある法律問題を解決するために不可欠の前提問題の準拠法を決定する方法 二 渉外親子関係の成立の判断方法 三 平成元年法律第二七号による改正前の法例の下における出生以外の事由により嫡出性を取得する場合の嫡出親子関係の成立の準拠法 四 平成元年法律第二七号による改正前の法例の下における血縁関係がない者の間における嫡出以外の親子関係の成立の準拠法 |
1. Meaning of "When the father and the mother are together unknown" in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Nationality Law 2. Proof of application of "When the father and the mother are together unknown" in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Nationality Law |
MOJ's English version of 父母がともに知れないとき (fubo ga tomo ni shirenai) is "When both parents are unknown". I am structurally translating the phrase as I have here because the main judgment interprets its meaning by paraphrasing it with different words, which I will also structurally render in order to facilitate their comparison (see below). While "unknown" is a good translation of "shirenai" (知れない), this expression -- as a negative potential -- means "could not be known" despite attempts to know -- i.e., is presently unknown but could be known in the future. The negative passive "not known" would be "shirarete inai" (知られていない), which also stops short of declaring that something is "unknowable" no matter how much one attempts to know. |
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Structural translationThe underscoring in the received text, and in corresponding parts of the translation, reflects the received text. All bold or otherwise highlighted emphasis is mine. |
裁判要旨 | Summary of the judgment |
Received Japanese text | Structural English translation |
一 渉外的な法律関係において、ある法律問題(本問題)を解決するために不可欠の前提問題が国際私法上本問題とは別個の法律関係を構成している場合、その前提問題の準拠法は、法廷地である我が国の国際私法により定めるべきである。 二 渉外親子関係の成立の判断は、まず嫡出親子関係の成立についてその準拠法を適用し、嫡出親子関係が否定された場合には、嫡出以外の親子関係の成立についてその準拠法を適用して行うべきである。 三 平成元年法律第二七号による改正前の法例の下において、出生以外の事由により嫡出性を取得する場合の嫡出親子関係の成立の準拠法は、嫡出性を取得する原因となるべき事実が完成した当時の母の夫の本国法である。 四 平成元年法律第二七号による改正前の法例の下において、血縁関係がない者の間における嫡出以外の親子関係の成立は、右親子関係を成立させる原因となるべき事実が完成した当時の親の本国法及び子の本国法の双方が右親子関係の成立を肯定する場合に認められる。 |
1. In cases where, in transnational legal relations, the preliminary issue which is indispensable to solve the primary issue constitutes a different legal relationship from the primary issue from the viewpoint of conflict of laws, the applicable law of the preliminary issue shall be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan. 2. In determining the emergence of a parent-child relationship in transnational relations, first, the existence of a parent-legitimate child relationship should be determined by applying its applicable law, and if this relation is denied, the existence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child should be determined by applying its applicable law. 3. Under the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989, the applicable law to the existence of a parent-legitimate child relationship, in cases where the child obtains the status of a legitimate child by reasons other than birth, is the law of the home country of the mother's husband at the time the fact which constitutes the ground for the acquisition of the status as a legitimate child emerged. 4. Under the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989, the emergence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child, between those who are not in blood relationship, is acknowledged when the parent-child relationship is confirmed by the law of the home country of the parent, as well as the child, at the time the fact which constitutes the ground for the acquisition of the status as a legitimate child emerged. |
参照法条 | Relevant laws |
Received Japanese text | Received English translation |
法例,法例(平成元年法律第27号による改正前のもの)17条,法例(平成元年法律第27号による改正前のもの)18条1項,法例(平成元年法律第27号による改正前のもの)22条 |
Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989 Article 17 Whether a child is legitimate or not shall be determined by the law of the country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth, and if the husband has died before the birth of the child, the law of the last country which he belonged to. Article 18 para.1 Requirements for the legitimisation of a child are determined by the law of the country of the father or mother at the time of the legitimisation in relation to the father or mother, and the law of the country of the child at the time of the legitimisation in relation to the child. Article 22 Family relationship and the rights and obligations emerging from family relationship other than those as provided by the preceding nine provisions shall be determined by the law of the home country of the parties. |
主文 | Main text of the judgment |
Received Japanese text | Received English translation |
一 原判決を次のとおり変更する。 第一審判決を次のとおり変更する。 1 被上告人B1の平成六年一〇月二〇日以降の賃料相当額の金員支払請求に係る訴えを却下する。 2 上告人は、被上告人B1に対し、平成四年三月三日から同六年一〇月一九日まで、一箇月二万三〇〇〇円の割合による金員を支払え。 3 被上告人B1のその余の請求を棄却する。 4 上告人に対し、被上告人B2は第一審判決別紙物件目録(一)及び(二)記載の土地の一〇八分の一四の持分について、同B3及び同B4は同土地の各一〇八分の八の持分について、同B1及び同B5は同土地の各一〇八分の三の持分について、昭和四五年五月一六日時効取得を原因とする持分一部移転登記手続をせよ。 5 上告人に対し、被上告人B2、同B3及び同B4は第一審判決別紙物件目録(三)記載の建物の各三六分の二の持分について、同B1及び同B5は同建物の各三六分の一の持分について、昭和四五年五月一六日時効取得を原因とする持分一部移転登記手続をせよ。 6 上告人のその余の請求を棄却する。 二 訴訟の総費用はこれを二分し、その一を上告人の、その余を被上告人らの負担とする。 |
1. The judgment of the first instance court shall be altered as follows: 1) The claim of the jokoku appellee B concerning the amount equivalent to the rent after October 20, 1994 shall be dismissed; 2) The jokoku appellant is ordered to pay 23,000 yen per month for the period between March 3, 1992 and October 19, 1994 to the jokoku appellee B; 3) The remaining claims of the jokoku appellee B shall be dismissed; 4) The jokoku appellee D is ordered to register the transfer of 14/108 of the piece of land as indicated in the lists (1) and (2) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court, jokoku appellees C and D, 8/108, and jokoku appellees B and F, 3/108 to the jokoku appellant on the ground of the acquisition of the property by prescription on May 16, 1970; 5) Jokoku appellees D, C, and E are ordered to register the transfer of 2/36 of the building as indicated in list (3) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court, and the jokoku appellees B and F for 1/36 of the property on the ground of the acquisition of the property by prescription on May 16, 1970; 6) The remaining claims by the jokoku appellant are dismissed. 2. The total cost of the litigation shall be divided in half. Half shall be borne by the jokoku appellant and the remaining half shall be shared by the jokoku appellees. |
理由 | Reasons |
Received Japanese text | Received English translation |
上告代理人山田由紀子、同中川明、同大島有紀子、同東澤靖、同錦織明、同村上典子、同小林幸也、同山下朝陽、同小野晶子の上告理由第一ないし第四について 一 本件は、被上告人B1が上告人に対し、第一審判決別紙物件目録(三)記載の建物(以下「本件建物」という。)の持分権に基づき、その明渡し及び賃料相当額の金員の支払を求める第一事件と、上告人が被上告人らに対し、本件建物及び同物件目録(一)及び(二)記載の土地(以下「本件土地」という。また、本件建物と併せて「本件土地建物」という。)について時効取得を原因とする持分全部移転登記手続を求める第二事件が併合された訴訟である。 原審の適法に確定した事実関係の概要は、次のとおりである。 1 韓国籍を有するD(後述のように後に日本に帰化した。)は、韓国籍を有する妻Eとの間に長男被上告人B2(昭和一五年一月一日生まれ)、長女被上告人B3(昭和一六年一二月二八日生まれ)及び二女被上告人B4(昭和一八年三月一四日生まれ)をもうけた。同被上告人らはいずれも韓国籍を有している。 Dは、Fとも男女関係があり、同人との間に、非嫡出子として被上告人B1(昭和二六年三月二〇日生まれ)及び同B5(昭和二八年八月三〇日生まれ)がある。同被上告人らはいずれも日本国籍を有している。 2 Dは、昭和三六年三月一〇日にEと離婚し、同年九月、韓国に在住し韓国籍を有するGと婚姻した。 3 Dは、昭和三八年二月二七日に日本に帰化し、氏名をDとする日本戸籍が編製されたが、その際同戸籍にGとの婚姻の事実が記載されなかった。 4 Dは、昭和三八年五月二日に上告人と婚姻した。 上告人は、右婚姻後、D、被上告人B1及び同B5と同居していた。 5 Dは、昭和四五年五月一六日に死亡した。 本件土地建物は、Dの相続財産である。上告人は、Dの死亡後、単独で本件土地建物を占有管理している 6 昭和四六年一月二三日に被上告人B1、同B3、上告人及びその親族らが集まり、Dの相続財産の処理についての話合いをしたが、何らの合意も成立しなかった。 上告人は、同日から数箇月を経過しないうちに、遺産分割交渉を依頼した弁護士を通じ、Dと上告人の婚姻が重婚であるとの事実を知るに至った。 7 Gは、昭和五二年九月四日に死亡した。 8 被上告人B1は、平成二年、上告人に対し、Dと上告人の婚姻は重婚であるとの理由で婚姻取消しの訴えを提起し、平成四年三月三日に婚姻を取り消す旨の判決が確定した。 9 上告人は、本件建物(店舗兼共同住宅)をH外一四名に賃貸し、賃料として一箇月計四一万四〇〇〇円を収受している。 10 上告人は、本訴において、本件土地建物(又はその持分)について、二〇年間占有したことを理由とする取得時効及び被上告人B1の相続回復請求権の消滅時効を援用した。 |
Concerning reasons (grounds) 1 through 4 for the appeal of [argued by] the appeal representatives Yamada Yuko, Nakagawa Akira, Ōshima Yūkiko, Higashizawa Yasushi, Murakami Noriko, Kobayashi Yukiya, Yamashita Asahi, and Ono Masako: I. The present case is the result of the consolidation of an action by the jokoku appellee B vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant, claiming the transfer of the building as indicated in list (3) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court (hereinafter, "the Building") (Case 1) and the payment of rent based upon the right to the share in the Building and a claim by the jokoku appellant vis-a-vis the jokoku appellees for the registration of the transfer of the share, on the ground of acquisition by prescription of the piece of land as indicated in lists (1) and (2) of the property attached to the judgment of the first instance court (hereinafter, "the Land" and together with the Building, "the Land and the Building")(Case 2). The facts lawfully established by the original instance court are as follows: 1. G, who is a Korean national (who, as indicated later, subsequently acquired Japanese nationality) has the eldest son, jokoku appellee D (born January 1, 1940), the eldest daughter, jokoku appellee C (born December 28, 1941) and the second daughter, jokoku appellee E (born March 14, 1943) between his wife H who has Korean nationality. G had an extra-marital relationship with I and has illegitimate children, jokoku appellees B (born March 20, 1951) and F (born August 30, 1953) with I. Both B and F have Japanese nationality. 2. In September the same year G divorced H on March 10, 1961 and married J, who is a Korean national and lived in Korea. 3. G acquired Japanese nationality on February 27, 1963 and was registered in the civil register in the name of K, but his marriage with J was not registered. 4. K married the jokoku appellant on May 2, 1963. The jokoku appellant lived together with K and the jokoku appellees B and F after the marriage. 5. K died on May 16, 1970. The Land and the Building are the inheritance estate of K. The jokoku appellant has occupied and administered the Land and the Building on her own since the death of K. 6. On January 23, 1971, the jokoku appellees B, C, the jokoku appellant, and the relatives met and discussed the inheritance of K's estate, but failed to reach an agreement. 7. J died on September 4, 1977. 8. The jokoku appellee B initiated an action vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant for the revocation of the marriage on the ground that her marriage with K was a dual marriage, and the judgment which revoked the marriage came into effect on March 3, 1992. 9. The jokoku appellant is letting the Building (shop and communal residence) to YAUCHI Sonoko and 14 others and is receiving 414,000 yen per month in total. 10. The jokoku appellant invoked acquisitive prescription for the Land and the Building (or its share) on the ground that she had occupied the property for 20 years, and also that the right of the jokoku appellee B to recover the inherited property had expired by extinctive prescription. |
二 原審は、次のように判断して、第一事件請求のうち本件建物明渡し及び右明渡し済みまで賃料相当額の金員として月額四万五一一五円の支払を求める部分を認容してその余を棄却し、第二事件請求をすべて棄却すべきものとした。 1 Dの死亡により、被上告人B1は非嫡出子として本件建物の一二分の一の持分を、Gは妻として三分の一の持分をそれぞれ相続した。 2 Gの死亡による相続人の範囲、順位、相続分については、平成元年法律第二七号による改正前の法例(以下「旧法例」という。)二五条により韓国法が準拠法となる。一九七七年改正前の韓国民法七七三条、七七四条、一〇〇〇条、一〇〇二条及び一〇〇九条により、Gの財産についての被上告人B1の相続分は一三分の一である。したがって、同被上告人は、Dからの相続とGからの相続を合わせて、本件建物の四六八分の五一の持分を有することになるから、上告人に対し、本件建物の賃料相当額の金員として月額四万五一一五円(四一万四〇〇〇円の四六八分の五一)を請求することができる。 3 上告人は、昭和四六年一月二三日から数箇月を経過するまでの間に、自己が相続人の地位になく、本件土地建物につき所有権はもとより相続による持分もないことを知り、その後は、所有の意思をもって本件土地建物を占有したものではないから、本件土地建物の所有権又は持分を時効取得することはできない。 4 上告人は、自ら相続人でないことを知りながら相続人であると称し、又は自己に相続権があると信ぜられるべき合理的な事由があるわけではないにもかかわらず相続人であると称し、相続財産を占有管理することによりこれを侵害している者に該当するから、相続回復請求権の消滅時効が適用される余地はない。 |
II. The original instance court ruled as follows and acknowledged the claim for the transfer of the Building and the payment of the equivalent of the monthly rent of 40,115 yen but dismissed the remaining claim in Case 1 and dismissed the claim in Case 2. 1. As a result of K's death, the jokoku appellee inherited one-twelfth of the Building as an illegitimate child and J, one-third of the Building as his wife. 2. Concerning the scope of the heirs, their rank, and their share of the inheritance on the death of J, by virtue of Article 25 of the Law on the Application of Laws before the amendment by Law No.27, 1989 (hereinafter, "the Previous Law"), Korean law is the applicable law. According to Articles 773, 774, 1000, 1002, and 1009 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment of 1977, the inheritance share of the jokoku appellee B is one-thirteenth. Therefore, the jokoku appellee B has a share of 51/468 of the Building if the inheritance from K and J is combined and is entitled to claim 40,115 yen per month which is an equivalent of 51/468 of 414,000 yen from the jokoku appellant. 3. The jokoku appellant became aware that she was not an heir and had no entitlement to the Land and the Building or inheritance share to them within several months of January 23, 1971, and since then she has not occupied the Land and the Building with the intention to own them. Therefore, the jokoku appellant cannot acquire the title to, or a share of the Land and the Building by acquisitive prescription. 4. The jokoku appellant, although being aware that she was not an heir, or without having a reasonable ground to believe that she had the right to inheritance, claimed that she was an heir, infringed the right to inheritance through administering or occupying the estate and therefore, there is no possibility of the application of extinctive prescription of the right to claim recovery of the inherited estate. |
三 上告代理人勝部征夫、同高橋司、同桑森章の上告理由第二について 原審の適法に確定した前記事実関係の下においては、上告人は、被上告人B1及び同B5と同居し、自分以外にもDの相続人がいることを知っていたことが明らかであり、上告人がDの相続人として本件土地建物について単独で占有を開始したからといって、上告人が本件土地建物を単独で所有する意思を表示したものとはいえない。したがって、上告人に本件土地建物全体の所有権について取得時効が成立しないとした原審の判断は、結論において是認することができる。論旨は、原審の認定に沿わない事実に基づいて原判決の違法をいうものにすぎず、採用することができない。 |
III. On the ground Item 2 for the jokoku appeal by the representatives for the jokoku appeal, KATSUBE Masao, TAKAHASHI Tsukasa, and KUWAMORI Akira: Under the above circumstances lawfully established by the original instance court, it is evident that the jokoku appellant lived together with the jokoku appellees B and F and was aware that there were heirs to K other than herself, even if the jokoku appellant commenced occupation of the Land and the Building on her own, it does not follow that she has demonstrated her intention to own the Land and the Building on her own. Therefore, in conclusion, the ruling of the original instance court that the jokoku appellant did not acquire the Land and the Building as a whole by acquisitive prescription can be upheld. The argument of the representatives for the jokoku appeal contests the unlawfulness of the judgment of the original instance court on facts not established by the original instance court and cannot be accepted. |
四 同上告理由第一について 上告人による本件土地建物の持分の時効取得を否定した原審の前記二3の判断は是認することができない。その理由は、次のとおりである。 民法一八六条一項の規定は、占有者は所有の意思で占有するものと推定しており、占有者の占有が自主占有に当たらないことを理由に取得時効の成立を争う者は右占有が所有の意思のない占有に当たることについての立証責任を負う(最高裁昭和五四年(オ)第一九号同年七月三一日第三小法廷判決・裁判集民事一二七号三一五頁)。そして、所有の意思は、占有者の内心の意思によってではなく、占有取得の原因である権原又は占有に関する事情により外形的客観的に定められるべきものである(最高裁昭和四五年(オ)第三一五号同年六月一八日第一小法廷判決・裁判集民事九九号三七五頁、最高裁昭和四五年(オ)第二六五号同四七年九月八日第二小法廷判決・民集二六巻七号一三四八頁、最高裁昭和五七年(オ)第五四八号同五八年三月二四日第一小法廷判決・民集三七巻二号一三一頁参照)。 これを本件について見ると、原審は、上告人がD死亡後単独で本件土地建物を占有している事実を確定しつつ、上告人が占有開始後に自己が所有者又は持分権者でないことを知ったという内心の意思の変化のみによって所有の意思の推定を覆しており、民法一八六条一項の所有の意思の推定が覆される場合について法令の解釈適用を誤った違法があるといわざるを得ず、その違法は原判決の結論に影響を及ぼすことが明らかである。論旨は理由がある。 そして、前記確定事実によれば、上告人は、Dの相続人として、Dが死亡した日である昭和四五年五月一六日に本件土地建物の占有を開始し、その後二〇年間その占有を継続しているところ、自己がDの唯一の配偶者で三分の一の法定相続分を有するものとして占有を開始したと見るべきであるから、被上告人らが他に上告人の占有が所有の意思のないものであることを基礎付ける事情を何ら主張していない本件においては、本件土地建物の各三分の一の持分を時効により取得したものというべきである。そうすると、上告人は、本件建物の共有者としてこれを占有していることになるが、被上告人B1は、本件建物の共有者である上告人に対して本件建物の明渡しを求めることができる理由を何ら主張していない。よって、原判決中、第一事件請求のうち本件建物の明渡請求を認容し、第二事件請求を全部棄却すべきものとした部分は、いずれも破棄を免れない。 |
IV. On the ground for the jokoku appeal Item 1: II-3 above of the judgment of the original instance court which denied the acquisitive prescription of the share in the Land and the Building by the jokoku appellant cannot be upheld. The reason is as follows: Article 186, para.1 provides for the presumption that the person who occupies a property has an intention to occupy the property with the intention to own it, and the person who claims that the occupier does not have such an intention and contests the acquisitive prescription by the occupier bears the burden of proof for the absence of the intention to own on the part of the occupier (Supreme Court 1979 (O) 19, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, July 31, 1979, Saibanshu, Civil Cases, No.127, p.315). The intention to own should be determined not by the internal intention of the occupier, but formally and objectively by the right which served as the ground for the commencement of the occupation or the circumstances concerning the occupation (Supreme Court, 1970 (O) 315, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, June 18, 1970, Saibanshu No.99, p.375; Supreme Court, 1970 (O) 265, Judgment of the Second Petit Bench, September 8, 1972, Minshu vol.26, No.7, p.1348; Supreme Court, 1982 (O) 548, Judgment of the First Petit Bench, March 24, 1983, Minshu vol.37, No.2, p.131). In the present case, the original instance court established the fact that the jokoku appellant had been occupying the Land and the Building on her own after the death of K, but has overturned the presumption of the existence of the intention to own the property merely with reference to the change of the internal intention of the jokoku appellant, that she had become aware after the commencement of the occupation that she was not an owner nor had a share in inheritance. This is an error in the interpretation and application of Article 186, para.1 of the Civil Code which provides for the overturning of the presumption of the intention to own, and it is evident that this error affects the conclusion of the original instance court. The argument is with grounds. According to the facts established above, the jokoku appellant, as an heir of J, commenced occupation of the Land and the Building on May 16, 1970 when K died, and has continued to occupy the property for 20 years. The jokoku appellant should be regarded to have commenced occupation as the sole spouse of K with the statutory inheritance share of one-third, and since the jokoku appellees failed to assert any circumstances which support the absence of the intention to own on the part of the jokoku appellant, the jokoku appellant should be regarded to have acquired one-third of the Land and the Building by acquisitive prescription. Thus, the jokoku appellant occupies the Building as a co-owner, but the jokoku appellee B has not put forward any reason to justify the claim vis-a-vis the jokoku appellant who is a co-owner to transfer the Building to B. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the original instance court in Case 1 which acknowledged the claim to transfer the Building and dismissed the entire claim in Case 2 cannot but be quashed. |
五 同上告理由第四について 1 準拠法の選択について (一) 【要旨第一】渉外的な法律関係において、ある一つの法律問題(本問題)を解決するためにまず決めなければならない不可欠の前提問題があり、その前提問題が国際私法上本問題とは別個の法律関係を構成している場合、その前提問題は、本問題の準拠法によるのでも、本問題の準拠法が所属する国の国際私法が指定する準拠法によるのでもなく、法廷地である我が国の国際私法により定まる準拠法によって解決すべきである。 これを本件について見ると、Gの相続に関する準拠法は、旧法例二五条により被相続人であるGの本国法である韓国法である。韓国民法一〇〇〇条一項一号によれば、Gの直系卑属が相続人となるが、相続とは別個の法律関係である被上告人らがGの直系卑属であるかどうか、すなわちGと被上告人らの間に親子関係が成立しているかどうかについての準拠法は、我が国の国際私法により決定することになる。 (二) 【要旨第二】親子関係の成立という法律関係のうち嫡出性取得の問題を一個の独立した法律関係として規定している旧法例一七条、一八条の構造上、親子関係の成立が問題になる場合には、まず嫡出親子関係の成立についての準拠法により嫡出親子関係が成立するかどうかを見た上、そこで嫡出親子関係が否定された場合には、右嫡出とされなかった子について嫡出以外の親子関係の成立の準拠法を別途見いだし、その準拠法を適用して親子関係の成立を判断すべきである。 【要旨第三】旧法例一七条によれば、子が嫡出かどうかはその出生当時の母の夫の本国法によって定めるとされており、同条はその文言上出生という事実により嫡出性を取得する嫡出親子関係の成立についてその準拠法を定める規定であると解される。そうすると、出生以外の事由により嫡出性を取得する場合の嫡出親子関係の成立については、旧法例は準拠法決定のための規定を欠いていることになるが、同条を類推適用し、嫡出性を取得する原因となるべき事実が完成した当時の母の夫の本国法によって定めるのが相当である。 したがって、被上告人B2、同B3及び同B4がDとGの婚姻によってD・G夫婦の嫡出子となるかどうかについては、右婚姻当時のGの夫Dの本国法である韓国法が準拠法となり、被上告人B1及び同B5がDによる同被上告人らの認知によってD・G夫婦の嫡出子となるかどうかについては、Dが同被上告人らを認知した当時(Dが同被上告人らを認知したのは、D(D)が日本に帰化した後の昭和三八年三月一四日であることが記録上明らかである。)のDの本国法である日本法が準拠法となるというべきである。 そうすると、被上告人B2、同B3及び同B4は、一九九〇年法律第四一九九号による改正前の韓国民法七七三条によりGとの間にいわゆる継母子関係が生じ、その嫡出子たる実子と同様に扱われ(なお、韓国においては、同条に規定する法定母子関係が成立するためには、母と子が同一の家籍(戸籍)内にあることを要しないと解されている。)、同被上告人らはGの相続人となる(同改正法附則一二条一項)。他方、被上告人B1及び同B5は、日本民法によりGの嫡出子であるとは認められないことになる。 (三) 右のようにGの嫡出子であるとは認められない被上告人B1及び同B5について、更にGとの間に嫡出以外の親子関係が成立するかどうかを検討する。 【要旨第四】旧法例一八条一項は、その文言上認知者と被認知者間の親子関係の成立についての準拠法を定めるための規定であると解すべきであるから、その他の事由による親子関係の成立については、旧法例は準拠法決定のための規定を欠いていることになる。その他の事由による親子関係の成立のうち、血縁関係がない者の間における出生以外の事由による親子関係の成立については、旧法例一八条一項、二二条の法意にかんがみ、親子関係を成立させる原因となるべき事実が完成した当時の親の本国法及び子の本国法の双方が親子関係の成立を肯定する場合にのみ、親子関係の成立を認めるのが相当である。 したがって、Dが被上告人B1及び同B5を認知することによってGと同被上告人らの間に親子関係が成立するかどうかについては、右認知当時のGの本国法である韓国法と同被上告人らの本国法である日本法の双方が親子関係の成立を肯定するかどうかを見るべきであり、日本法ではGと同被上告人らの間に親子関係が成立しないから、韓国法の内容を検討するまでもなく、Gと同被上告人らの間の親子関係は否定され、結局、同被上告人らは、Gの相続人にはならないというべきである。 (四) 右と異なり、Gと被上告人B1間の親子関係の成立について、韓国法を準拠法としてこれを肯定した原審の判断には、法令の解釈適用を誤った違法があり、その違法は原判決の結論に影響を及ぼすことが明らかである。論旨は、右の趣旨をいうものとして理由がある。原判決中、第一事件請求のうち本件建物の賃料相当額の金員支払請求につき、被上告人B1がGの相続人であることを前提に計算した額の支払を命じた部分は、破棄を免れない。 2 被上告人らの各相続分について (一) Gは、Dの相続財産につき、昭和五五年法律第五一号による改正前の民法九〇〇条の規定により三分の一の相続分をもって相続した。 Gの死亡による相続に関し、韓国法によれば、前記のようにGとの間に法定母子関係が存する被上告人B2、同B3及び同B4が直系卑属として同順位で相続人となるが、同一家籍内にない女子の相続分は男子の四分の一となる(一九七七年法律第三〇五一号による改正前の韓国民法一〇〇九条一項、前記一九九〇年改正前の同条二項、右一九七七年改正法附則五項、右一九九〇年改正法附則一二条一項)。被上告人B3及び同B4がGと同一家籍内にない女子であったことは記録上明らかである。 そうすると、Dの相続財産に関する被上告人らの各取得分は、次のとおりとなる。 (二) 被上告人B2について 被上告人B2は、Gが相続した本件土地建物の各三分の一の持分につき、その六分の四を相続するから、Gから本件土地建物の各一八分の四の持分を相続した。同被上告人は、Dの死亡により、その嫡出子として本件土地建物の各一二分の二の持分を既に相続しているから、合計で各一八分の七の持分を取得したことになる。 (三) 被上告人B3及び同B4について 被上告人B3及び同B4は、Gが相続した本件土地建物の各三分の一の持分につき、Gと同一家籍内にない女子としてそれぞれその六分の一を相続するから、Gから本件土地建物の各一八分の一の持分を相続した。同被上告人らは、Dの死亡により、その嫡出子として本件土地建物の各一二分の二の持分を既に相続しているから、合計で各一八分の四の持分を取得したことになる。 (四) 被上告人B1及び同B5について 被上告人B1及び同B5は、Dの死亡により、その非嫡出子としてそれぞれ本件土地建物の各一二分の一の持分を取得した。 |
V. On Item 5 of the ground for the jokoku appeal 1. On the choice of the applicable law (1) [Summary 1] In cases where, in transnational legal relations, there is a preliminary issue which is indispensable to solve the primary issue and which constitutes a different legal relationship from the primary issue from the viewpoint of conflict of laws, the applicable law of the preliminary issue shall not be determined by the applicable law of the primary issue or the applicable law which is designated by the rules of conflict of laws of the country of the applicable law of the primary issue, but should be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan which is the law of the forum. In the present case, by virtue of Article 25 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, the applicable law of the inheritance of J is Korean law which is the law of the home country of the deceased J. According to Article 1000, para.1, subpara.1 of the Korean Civil Code, J's direct descendants are heirs, but the applicable law of the problem of whether the jokoku appellees are J's direct descendants or not, which is a different matter from inheritance, i.e. whether there is a parent-children relationship between J and the jokoku appellees is to be determined by the rules of conflict of laws of Japan. (2) [Summary 2] In accordance with the structure of articles 17 and 18 of the Previous Law on the Application of Laws which provides for the acquisition of legitimacy as a separate legal issue within the legal problem of the existence of a parent-child relationship, if there is a problem as to the existence of a parent-child relation, first, the existence of the parent-legitimate child relationship should be determined by applying the applicable law to this relation, and if the existence of this relation is denied, the applicable law to the existence of a parent-child relationship other than that with a legitimate child should be sought and the existence of the relation should be determined by applying this law. [Summary 3] According to Article 17 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, whether the child is a legitimate child or not was to be determined by the law of the home country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth of the child. This is understood by its wording to be a provision which determines the applicable law to the emergence of the parent-legitimate child relationship in which the legitimacy is obtained by birth. If this is the case, the previous Law on the Application of Law lacks any provision on the acquisition of legitimacy on grounds other than birth. However, it is appropriate to apply this provision by analogy and determine the emergence of the relation by applying the law of the home country of the husband of the mother at the time of the birth of the child. Therefore, whether the jokoku appellees D, C, and E became the legitimate children of G and J by the marriage of G and J should be determined by Korean law which, at the time of the marriage, was the law of the home country of G who is the husband of J, and whether or not jokoku appellees B and F became the legitimate children of K and J by the legitimization by K shall be determined by Japanese law which is the law of the home country of K at the time of the legitimization by K (this is because it is evident from the records that K legitimised the jokoku appellees on March 14, 1963 after G (K) naturalised to Japanese nationality). If this is the case, by virtue of Article 773 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.4199 of 1990, a step mother-children relation emerged between jokoku appellees D, C, and E on one hand and J on the other and the jokoku appellees should be treated in the same manner as real children and become heirs (it is understood in Korea that it is not necessary for a mother and a child to belong to the same family register in order for a legal mother-child relation to emerge) (Article 12, para.1 of the Attached Rules to the amended law). (3) Now let us examine whether or not there is a parent-child relationship other than that with legitimate children between J and the jokoku appellees B and F who are not recognised as the legitimate children of J. [Summary 4] Article 18, para.1 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws is understood to be a provision which determines the applicable law to the emergence of the parent-child relation between a legitimatising person and a legitimatised child, and therefore, the previous Law lacks a provision on the applicable law when a parent-child relation emerges on other grounds. Of the emergence of a parent-child relation on other grounds, concerning the emergence of a parent-child relation between non-blood related people on a ground other than birth, in the light of the intention of articles 18, para.1 and 22 of the previous Law on the Application of Laws, it is appropriate to acknowledge the emergence of a parent-child relation only when both the law of the home country of the parent and the law of the home country of the child, at the time of the establishment of the fact which serves as the ground for the emergence of the parent-child relationship, acknowledge this. Therefore, whether or not a parent-children relationship emerges between J and the jokoku appellees by K legitimatizing B and F shall be determined by both Korean law which is the law of the law of the home country of J and Japanese law which is the law of the home country of the jokoku appellees. Since under the Japanese law, a parent-child relationship does not emerge between J and the jokoku appellees, even without considering the content of Korean law, the parent-children relationship between J and the jokoku appellees is denied, and therefore, the jokoku appellees are not the heirs to J. (4) The ruling of the original instance court, which, different from above, applied Korean law to the emergence of the parent-child relationship between J and the jokoku appellee B and acknowledged the parent-child relationship, has erred in its interpretation and application of the law and it is evident that this error affects the conclusion of the judgment of the original instance court. The argument is with grounds. The part of the judgment of the original instance court which ordered payment of the amount calculated upon the premise that the jokoku appellee is an heir to J in relation to the claim for the payment of the amount equivalent to the rent of the Building in Case 1 cannot but be quashed. 2. The share of inheritance of the jokoku appellees (1) J has inherited one-third of the estate of K in accordance with Article 900 of the Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.51 of 1980. According to Korean law, concerning the inheritance as a result of the death of J, as above, jokoku appellees D, C, and E who have a statutory mother-children relationship with J are heirs of the same rank, but the share of a female who is not within the same family register is one-quarter that of a male (Article 1009, para.1 of the Korean Civil Code before the amendment by Law No.3051 of 1977, para.2 of the same provision before the amendment in 1990, para.5 of the Attached Rules to the Civil Code before the 1977 amendment, Article 12, para.1 of the Attached Rules to the Civil Code before the 1990 amendment). It is evident that jokoku appellees C and E were females who were not within the same family register by the record. Therefore, the shares of inheritance of the jokoku appellees of the estate of K are as follows. (2) Jokoku appellee D The jokoku appellee D inherits four-sixths of the one third of the Land and the Building inherited by J, i.e. 4/18 of the Land and the Building. D has already inherited 2/12 each of the Land and the Building as the legitimate child of K after K's death, and therefore, in total, acquired 7/18 of the estate. (3) Jokoku appellees C and E Jokoku appellees C and E inherit one-sixth of the one-third of the share of the Land and the Building inherited by J, i.e. 1/18 of the Land and the Building as females not within the same family register. They have already inherited 2/12 of the Land and the Building as legitimate children of K after K's death, and therefore, in total, acquired 4/18 of the estate. (4) Jokoku appellees B and F Jokoku appellees B and F inherited 1/12 each of the Land and the Building by the death of K as K's illegitimate children. |
六 結論 以上説示したところによれば、本件の結論は、その余の上告理由について判断するまでもなく、次のようになる。 1 上告人は本件土地建物の各三分の一の持分を時効取得したというべきであり、被上告人B1の第一事件請求のうち本件建物明渡請求は棄却すべきである。 2 被上告人B1の第一事件請求のうち賃料相当額の金員支払請求は、上告人が本件建物の賃借人らから収受している賃料につき、同被上告人の本件建物の持分割合に相当する分について不当利得の返還を求めるものであると解される。しかしながら、共有者の一人が共有物を他に賃貸して得る収益につきその持分割合を超える部分の不当利得返還を求める他の共有者の請求のうち事実審の口頭弁論終結時後に係る請求部分は、将来の給付の訴えを提起することのできる請求としての適格を有しないから(最高裁昭和五九年(オ)第一二九三号同六三年三月三一日第一小法廷判決・裁判集民事一五三号六二七頁参照)、同被上告人が上告人に対し原審口頭弁論終結日の翌日である平成六年一〇月二〇日以降の賃料相当額の金員支払を請求する部分に係る訴えは、却下を免れない。 同被上告人の原審口頭弁論終結日までの賃料相当額の金員支払請求部分については、同被上告人が相続した本件建物の持分である一二分の一から上告人が時効取得したその三分の一を控除し、一八分の一の持分に相当する限度で認容すべきである。すなわち、被上告人B1の上告人に対する本件建物の賃料相当額の金員支払請求は、一箇月当たり四一万四〇〇〇円に一八分の一を乗じた二万三〇〇〇円の限度で認容すべきである。 3 記録によれば、本件土地は登記簿上Dの所有名義のままであり、本件建物には相続を原因としてI(Gの従兄弟)が三分の一、被上告人B2、同B4及び同B3が各一二分の二、被上告人B1及び同B5が各一二分の一の各持分を有することとする所有権移転登記が経由されていることが明らかである。したがって、上告人の第二事件請求は、被上告人らに対し、本件土地については被上告人らの各法定相続分の各三分の一に相当する持分(被上告人B2は五四分の七、同B3及び同B4は各五四分の四、同B1及び同B5は各三六分の一。これらの分母を共通にすると、同B2は一〇八分の一四、同B3及び同B4は各一〇八分の八、同B1及び同B5は各一〇八分の三となる。)につき、本件建物については各登記された持分の各三分の一に相当する持分(被上告人B2、同B3及び同B4は各三六分の二、同B1及び同B5は各三六分の一)につき、昭和四五年五月一六日時効取得を原因とする持分一部移転登記手続を命じる限度で認容すべきである。 よって、裁判官全員一致の意見で、主文のとおり判決する。 (裁判長裁判官 大出峻郎 裁判官 小野幹雄 裁判官 遠藤光男 裁判官 井嶋一友 裁判官 藤井正雄) |
VI. Conclusion As above, without ruling on the other grounds for the jokoku appeal, the conclusion in the present case is as follows: 1. The jokoku appellant has acquired one-third of the Land and the Building and the claim of the jokoku appellee B for the transfer of the Building in Case 1 shall be dismissed. 2. The claim of the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent in the Case 1 can be regarded as a claim for the return of the part of the rent due to the jokoku appellee corresponding to the share in the Building on the ground of unjust enrichment from the rent which the jokoku appellant is receiving. However, part of the claim by a co-owner for the return of the profit from letting the property from another co-owner exceeding the latter's share on the basis of unjust enrichment for the period after the end of the oral hearing of the fact-finding instance does not qualify for an action for future payment (Supreme Court 1984 (O) 1293, Judgment of the Supreme Court, March 31, 1988, Saibanshu, Civil Cases, No.153, p.627), the claim on the part demanding the payment of the equivalent of the rent after October 20, 1994 shall be dismissed. The part of the claim by the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent before the end of the oral hearing of the fact-finding instance shall be acknowledged to the extent of the one-twelfth of the share in the Building deducted by one-third which has been inherited by the jokoku appellant, i.e. one-eighteenth. Thus, the claim by the jokoku appellee B for the payment of the equivalent of the rent shall be acknowledged to the extent of 23,000 yen, which is the one-eighteenth of 414,000 yen per month. 3. According to the records, the Land is still registered in the name of K and the registration of the title to the Building has been transferred, one-third to Kinsetsu (cousin of J), 2/12 each to jokoku appellees D, E, and C, and 1/12 each to jokoku appellees B and F. Therefore, the claim of the jokoku appellant in Case 2 shall be acknowledged to the extent that, concerning the Land, the jokoku appellees should transfer registration of one-third each of their shares of the inheritance (jokoku appellee D, 7/54, jokoku appellees C and E, 4/54 each, jokoku appellees B and F, 1/36 each, i.e. with the common denominator, D, 14/108, C and E, 8/108, B and F, 3/108) and concerning the Building, one-third each of the registered share (jokoku appellee D, C, and E, 2/36 each, jokoku appellees B and F, 1/36 each) on the ground of acquisitive prescription on May 16, 1970. Thus, the justices unanimously rule as the main text of the judgment. Presiding Judge Justice OIDE Toshiro Justice ONO Mikio Justice ENDO Mitsuo Justice ISHIMA Kazutomo Justice FUJII Masao (*Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London) |
Justices
Forthcoming.